Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

[Saphroneth]

http://67thtigers.blogspot.co.uk/2016/04/reinforcements-from-colonies-for.html

This seems like a useful addendum - hopefully this will help you put some names to the battalions, EC. I know it's a bit of a headache going from "eh, 80K troops" to specific battalion names.
Basically sums to 68-69 battalions of regulars.

I happen to think this could be increased a bit by deploying overseas-militia to take on some of the garrison duties, or just by using them as second-line replacements able to hold fortified positions while training up to Regular quality.

 

[TFSmith121]

Here's a better source:

http://67thtigers.blogspot.co.uk/2016/04/reinforcements-from-colonies-for.html

This seems like a useful addendum - hopefully this will help you put some names to the battalions, EC. I know it's a bit of a headache going from "eh, 80K troops" to specific battalion names.
Basically sums to 68-69 battalions of regulars.

I happen to think this could be increased a bit by deploying overseas-militia to take on some of the garrison duties, or just by using them as second-line replacements able to hold fortified positions while training up to Regular quality.

Here's a far better source, the 1861 edition of Hart's Army List:

https://archive.org/details/newannualarmylis1861hart

Here's the 1862 version:

https://archive.org/details/hartsannualarmy16hartgoog

Here's the 1861 Navy List:

https://archive.org/details/navylistcorrect00unkngoog

Here's the 1862 Navy List:

https://archive.org/details/navylist03admigoog

Here's Organization, Composition, and Strength of the Army of Great Britain, 1863 (which covers 1862):

https://archive.org/details/organizationcom00petrgoog

Here's Annual Volunteer and Service Militia List of Canada, 1867 edition (kind of a significant date, after all):

https://archive.org/details/annualvolunteers00wilyuoft

A note on the last one; if one wishes to, one can go back through the activation and commissioning lists and work out exactly who was in command of what in 1861-62.

There's also the obvious reality that the British mainatained overseas garrisons for a reason; they had 15 battalions in the Mediterranean, for example, because the Med was the most important theater after the UK/Ireland and India; those fifteen battalions could not be drawn down without replacement in 1862 any more than they could in 1914 or 1939.

Best,

 

[HonestAbe1809]

I'm less interested in the war than what comes after the war. How the war affects the development of Canada, and whether or not the war would exhaust American resources to the point to affecting the events of the Civil War. If they lose one (or both) Lincoln can say goodbye to the chances of winning a second term.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

I'm less interested in the war than what comes after the war. How the war affects the development of Canada, and whether or not the war would exhaust American resources to the point to affecting the events of the Civil War. If they lose one (or both) Lincoln can say goodbye to the chances of winning a second term.

I agree, the war itself is not the most interesting part of TTL. I'm trying to avoid making this a purely "war" TL by having a look at the social and political impact it would have both on the North American continent and across the Atlantic.

For now of course I am confined largely to things leading up to the outbreak of war But as we go forward expect plenty of interesting ripples...

 

[frlmerrin]

I'm less interested in the war than what comes after the war. How the war affects the development of Canada, and whether or not the war would exhaust American resources to the point to affecting the events of the Civil War. If they lose one (or both) Lincoln can say goodbye to the chances of winning a second term.

Me too as it happens. There are four huge themes to play with at least.

• A more modest USA by the 20th century? Perhaps with one rival on the north American continent perhaps two or three or four. Maybe even its complete balkanisation.
• Chattel slavery survives in the CSA until the present day perhaps? Maybe the USA too? Does it get re introduced in other countries? How bad does it get? Are blacks and abolitionists held responsible for a Union defeat?
• What happens in the rest of the19th century world with no powerful USA? Siam loses independence for starters but what else? What would happen to the labour movement? Irish nationalism?
• The British empire would gain from the USA's defeat but would it continue to grow? Would it still collapse eventually? How?

All interesting stuff to debate unfortunately the debates usually get hung-up on people being unable to accept the initial conditions the big frex being Britain defeating the Union in a war at the zenith of the high Victorian period. It is a bit sad really.

 

[machine3589]

[*]Chattel slavery survives in the CSA until the present day perhaps? Maybe the USA too? Does it get re introduced in other countries? How bad does it get? Are blacks and abolitionists held responsible for a Union defeat?

At this point we`re not even sure if the CSA will survive the war, much less if it will survive indefinitely. Yeah, while it might be easy to assume that British belligerency will be enough to make the CSA win its independence, EnglishCanuck could still thrown in a curveball and have the Union lose to Britain, make peace with it and then proceed to win against the CSA. While that is admittedly unlikely to happen, we don`t know enough about the post-war situation at this point to discuss it.

That is unless I missed some massive clue in the book excerpts that go into each update.

 

[frlmerrin]

Dear machine3589,


Please tell me a believable strategy by which the Union can win both a Trent outrage war and a simultaneous American Civil War?

 

[Saphroneth]

Dear machine3589,


Please tell me a believable strategy by which the Union can win both a Trent outrage war and a simultaneous American Civil War?

I've got no clue - but I think the Union could LOSE the Trent outrage war (quick one!) and then win the Civil War.

 

[machine3589]

Dear machine3589,


Please tell me a believable strategy by which the Union can win both a Trent outrage war and a simultaneous American Civil War?

Read my post again and you'll see that I never claimed it can. The Union can, however, lose a Trent war and then go on to win against the CSA, which is a scenario I explicitly mentioned.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 10: Marching as to War Pt. 3​

“Wer alles verteidigt, verteidigt nichts.” - Friedrich II of Prussia

“As the crisis deepened in January and February the War Cabinet (as it came to be known[1]) began expanding on plans for war with the North that had been theorized since early December.

Preparations had begun in mid-December, but the first effort to reinforce the North American garrison had been the dispatch of a brigade under Major General James Lindsay in late November with three battalions of infantry, another battery of artillery, and a regiment of cavalry for border duties in response to the raids. However, when the crisis broke in November, this was a unit which was, although sufficient to make a show of force, not a suitable garrison for the whole of Britain`s North American colonies.

Men and material of the Royal Artillery being loaded at Portsmouth​

As the diplomatic and military situation unravelled the deterioration of relations did not catch the British completely off guard. They had the benefit of experience drawn from two previous Anglo-American wars and the conclusions of a number of extensive investigations on the subject of Canadian defence. Chiefly the first priority was to create a plan for the defence of Canada from an expected Northern invasion. At first though, the size of that invasion force was widely speculated upon. There were some fears that Seward`s belief that a foreign war might unite the two sides against a common enemy would prevail and hundreds of thousands of American soldiers would stream north of the border. However, as December wore into January these fears proved unfounded, and as MacDougall put it were “very wild and ill-considered” as “the feeling of positive hatred entertained by the South towards the North is a passion which infinitely overbears any abstract feeling of patriotism which may once have existed-where patriotism signified devotion to the Union.” This of course allowed British planners more leeway in their planning than they had thought at first. If the United States remained divided then it was assumed that the defence of Canada would be “an easy task” and more ambitious efforts could be devised.

The efforts for defending Canada of course depended largely on the strength of the garrison, and on an extensive system of fortifications and control of the Lakes. Of the first, the scarcely 7,000 men Williams had at his command come January was just below the 10,000 minimum the British felt they would need to be secure (irregardless of the militia) over the winter months.

When it came to fortifications, save for a number of well-established posts well inside the frontier, the surveys of those existing fortifications was found sorely lacking. The major forts on the Niagara frontier were in ruins, and the important fort at Île-aux-Noix had only been reoccupied in December after two years as a reformatory for delinquent boys. None of the major proposed fortifications plans suggested by the government in the previous surveys had ever been carried out in full, and even the fortifications at Quebec were of unsure value in relation to the strength of modern artillery. MacDougall though had some suggestions to counteract these deficiencies. His ideal solution was the creation of cheap and easily erected earthworks at major points on the frontier, and in front of the essential fortifications. It was his view that this would give the militia an excellent advantage in light of their lack of training, and it could free up all the regulars for the field to take the fight to an advancing enemy. The other members of the council were agreed, Burgoyne in particular advocating the use of earthworks in the defence of the major points like Quebec, Montreal, and Kingston…

…in terms of communications between the colonies the planners also felt that they were lacking. There was not yet a rail line existent which connected the Province of Canada to the Maritime colonies, and as such troops would either have to be unloaded at Quebec or Montreal directly or hopefully at Rivière-du-Loup (where the rail connection with the provinces began) before the ice closed off the Saint Lawrence. As it turned out as reinforcements were dispatched only one steamer, the Asia, managed to deposit her cargo, the 1st Battalion of the 16th Regiment of Foot, 5,000 Enfield rifles and their ammunition, and an engineer company at that destination. The second steamer to even come close was the Persia which made it as far as Bic, but only managed to deposit some 400 men before being forced to retreat up the river in the face of sudden ice flows.

As an alternative there was the prospect of moving troops overland as had been done in 1812 and 1837 (most famously the 104th Regiment of Foot in their 700 mile march in the winter of 1812-13) in order to reinforce the province. There was major disagreement over the route to be used however. The Metapediac road hardly existed in anything but name and would have to have considerable improvements placed upon it to be made usable. The second more common and established route lay over the Temiscouata road, a regular road passing along the St. John River valley to Madawaska. This route though was fraught with potential dangers as for over 100 miles of its 190 mile length the road passed along the frontier with Maine, leaving it potentially open to raiding by American forces from across the border.

Major General Randall Rumley and an ad hoc staff had been dispatched in order to devise a solution to this problem. Already the 62nd and 63rd Regiments of Foot had been dispatched overland to strengthen the garrison in Canada, but only the 63rd had made the march overland, while the 62nd remained stretched out in two wings manning the frontier waiting for reinforcement from the Maritime militia to aid in the security of the Temiscouata road. Though the opinion was against the use of that route, and even though the colonial government in New Brunswick had put some 47,000$ towards the completion of the Metapediac route, Rumley chose not divide his meager staff and resources between two roads and gambled on being able to use the Temiscouata route, with the acquiescence of Doyle who used that time to attempt to put the local volunteers to good use. The working assumption then would be that the forces available (supplemented by local militia) would be used to seize the major American border posts at Houlton and Fort Fairfield in the event of war in order to make this route somewhat secure. Meanwhile the local government would be held responsible for the maintenance of the Metapediac route.

While it was generally agreed that this route could serve to transport some men and supplies, a greater number was held in reserve at Halifax to be rushed up the St. Lawrence once navigation opened to Quebec, along with a good deal of the supplies. Indeed this was the strategy which was found to work well, but come April 16th 1862 some 7,523 men of all ranks and numerous sleighs of supplies and artillery had passed up the Temiscouata route.

Men of the 63rd Regiment of Foot proceeding overland from temporary barracks along the Temiscouata Road​

With that in mind, men and materials continued to be shipped from Britain. The brigades which would form the divisions for service in North America were largely stripped from the existing divisions[2] at Aldershot, Dover, and the Curragh along with their staffs. These in turn were supplemented by the various battalions garrisoning points in Great Britain and Ireland.

The next question became how to actively use the forces Britain was coming to command in North America.

In Canada there was of course, the ever present issue of defence. While it was acknowledged that the western portion of the province could not simply be abandoned to the enemy outright, there was a gloomy view of its prospects. While an effort would be made to defend it the planners all agreed it was of secondary importance to the defence of the vital lynchpin of Quebec and so while arrangements were made to make places like Hamilton and Windsor safe, the best the planners hoped for was the defence of Kingston in order to draw off an appreciable number of the enemy. Instead the vast majority would be concentrated in Canada East, principally in the defence of Montreal.

Montreal was acknowledged as the key to communications between the eastern and western portions of the province. So long as the British controlled it they could control the St. Lawrence River and the vital communications between Kingston and Quebec. Even should the Americans cut communications across the river forces could still be dispatched to Ottawa and down the secure route of the Rideau Canal to harass the enemy in the western portion of the province.

To ensure that Montreal remained safe was the principle task of the army assembling in North America, but just how to do that was a contentious issue. One item recommended by almost all the planners was for a force to sally across the border and capture the American fort at Rouse Point. Doing so offered considerable advantage to a force on the defence as the greatest chance for a large army to advance upon Montreal would be up from Lake Champlain to seize the railroad bridge at St. Jean and from there wheel about to place Montreal under hostile guns. However, almost immediately practical objections were raised to this scheme.

When suggested to Williams in late December he wrote back a long letter of detailed protests pointing out that such an act would require him to concentrate nearly the whole of his force in Canada at the border and leave the remainder of the province defenceless. Such an attack attempted in winter would no doubt prove a failure since the river was frozen and an enemy force could easily cut the railroad stranding his men in hostile territory without supply. Even in spring it would require naval assistance which, as Captain Collinson pointed out, could not hope to be made available until later in the season when he had been able to gather his strength, and would no doubt divert attention away from an essential build up on the lakes. Finally the members of the War Cabinet itself were uncertain of Williams’ abilities on the offensive, and so felt that the army might be better husbanded on the defence, and so the matter of a pre-emptive strike on land was dropped for the moment. They instead deferred to Burgoyne’s belief that “some favourable battlefields could be selected…these, previously thoroughly well studied, could no doubt be rapidly entrenched, and made very formidable.” and MacDougall’s firm opinion that a force shielded by entrenchments could easily hold off a much superior force.

However, there was by no means a defensive minded spirit amongst the members of the War Cabinet, indeed they hoped to do everything in their power to allow bring the full might of Britain to bear against the enemy. While it was acknowledge that Canada must be defended, it was known that even its loss would not be vital or crippling to the war. Embarrassing as it might be, neither side could hope to secure decisive victory in Canada. It was not vital to the British Empire, and neither could Britain hope to advance far inland to the United States as Williams pointed out they would be “operating in broken country of their own choosing and sustained by the support of a sympathetic population” and could only “incur the fate of Braddock, Cornwallis.”

Instead Britain would concentrate where they were strongest, at sea.

There was certainly much to be made of attacking the long a vulnerable American coast as had been done in 1812, culminating in the burning of Washington and great embarrassment to the United States. It would surely draw off men who might be used to invade Canada, and would most likely be a great boon to their de-facto allies in the Confederacy.

Therefore one of the greatest schemes which appealed to the British was an assault on Maine. In principle this made a good deal of sense, Maine was not an interior portion of the United States, and was vulnerable to a thrust by the Royal Navy. It also had the dual prospects of securing the overland communications to Canada. Seizing Maine prevented American raiders from assaulting the roads overland, and seizing Portland would secure rail communications by taking possession of the Atlantic terminus of the Grant Trunk railway. The thinking was such an attack would also draw off soldiers who would otherwise be used to attack Canada and make the defence of that province far easier. The military experts, Seaton, Burgoyne, and MacDougall all pressed for the scheme and it was presented to the civilian chiefs who approved as well. Indeed De Grey began placing the troops necessary to carry out the expedition under orders at the end of December.

While the civilian and army heads were all enthusiastic of the scheme, the naval chiefs were less so. The commander of the North Atlantic and West Indies Squadron, Rear-Admiral Alexander Milne, was hardly enthusiastic. He instead preferred a more cautious scheme of defeating the Union Navy off the coasts and imposing a counter blockade of the Union’s main ports and attempting to lure the remaining Union ships to destruction on circumstances of his own choosing…

…by the end of January thousands of British troops and dozens of ships were crossing the Atlantic to destinations at Halifax and Bermuda strengthening the British possessions and positions in the North American theatre. Soon the American response arrived and the British were called to action.” Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV.

-----

[1]The composition of which is detailed in Chapter 5.

[2]While not field divisions (perhaps more accurately referred to as “training camps”) these formations do in fact provide a nucleus of ready brigades and staffs which could be deployed in an emergency for either home defence or overseas operations.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Read my post again and you'll see that I never claimed it can. The Union can, however, lose a Trent war and then go on to win against the CSA, which is a scenario I explicitly mentioned.

It's certainly a possibility

 

[DAv]

Interesting to note how Britain and Canada view their war aims in this. Relying on the sea as a way to use their strength is probably going to be the best way about it and Maine's closer to Canada's largest area of population than various other targets at least. Another good update.

 

[TFSmith121]

- snip -

"To ensure that Montreal remained safe was the principle task of the army assembling in North America, but just how to do that was a contentious issue. One item recommended by almost all the planners was for a force to sally across the border and capture the American fort at Rouse Point. Doing so offered considerable advantage to a force on the defence as the greatest chance for a large army to advance upon Montreal would be up from Lake Champlain to seize the railroad bridge at St. Jean and from there wheel about to place Montreal under hostile guns. However, almost immediately practical objections were raised to this scheme ... and so the matter of a pre-emptive strike on land was dropped for the moment."

The above is at odds with what the commander in chief, the Duke of Cambridge, actually ordered Lt. Gen. Williams to do historically, however.

As stated:

"On the strongest recommendations of naval and military experts he (Lt. Gen. Williams, British c-in-c in the Province of Canada) was ordered to attack Rouse's Point (upstate New York, Lake Champlain) immediately upon the outbreak of war with a view to blocking the Americans' most likely route of advance.1

1 (HRH The Duke of) Cambridge (in other words, the British Army's commander in chief, and a full general) to Williams, private, 14 Dec. 1861, Cambridge papers; as in:

British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862; Author(s): Kenneth Bourne; Source: The English Historical Review, Vol. 76, No. 301 (Oct., 1961), pp. 600-632

So, the British are playing smarter, but in marked contrast to their historical practice of quick and often poorly-planned early offenses ... as per the Crimea, Petropavlovsk, the 1859 Taku Forts battle, Colley's 1880-81 offensives in South Africa, etc.

Interesting; Williams telling Cambridge no. Seems rather atypical for a British general, who weren't exactly known for such, in the 1850s or 1860s, or later.

Of course, it's a tremendous benefit for the British in WIF.

Best,

 

[EnglishCanuck]

The above is at odds with what the commander in chief, the Duke of Cambridge, actually ordered Lt. Gen. Williams to do historically, however.

As stated:

"On the strongest recommendations of naval and military experts he (Lt. Gen. Williams, British c-in-c in the Province of Canada) was ordered to attack Rouse's Point (upstate New York, Lake Champlain) immediately upon the outbreak of war with a view to blocking the Americans' most likely route of advance.1

1 (HRH The Duke of) Cambridge (in other words, the British Army's commander in chief, and a full general) to Williams, private, 14 Dec. 1861, Cambridge papers; as in:

British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862; Author(s): Kenneth Bourne; Source: The English Historical Review, Vol. 76, No. 301 (Oct., 1961), pp. 600-632

So, the British are playing smarter, but in marked contrast to their historical practice of quick and often poorly-planned early offenses ... as per the Crimea, Petropavlovsk, the 1859 Taku Forts battle, Colley's 1880-81 offensives in South Africa, etc.

Interesting; Williams telling Cambridge no. Seems rather atypical for a British general, who weren't exactly known for such, in the 1850s or 1860s, or later.

Of course, it's a tremendous benefit for the British in WIF.

Best,

Well, supposedly ordered. I admit only Bourne states that he was ordered, Stacey and Hitsman only allude to suggestions, and without the actual letter it's impossible to be certain whether this is an exact order for a fully formed war plan (which absent any corroborating evidence otherwise still seems unlikely) or merely a suggestion for offensive action.

Mind you, we do know thanks to both the later commissions compiled in January and February that offensive actions were not recommended by the men charged with seeing to the defense of Canada and formulating a strategy on the ground.

Then considering Williams history of near insubordinate responses to his superiors when serving in Kars, and his complete lack of any offensive inclination in that campaign and when preparing his resources in Canada historically(and the lack of faith in his abilities by his superiors), it seems rather likely that even had such an order officially gone out he would have demurred for as long as possible, much like McClellan.

Of course, noting the responses of the commissioners historically and considering that Bourne of course is merely inferring a supposed British war plan which could have been further formulated over December and the coming months, we can't accept this as gospel. After all, even if the order was issued in December it couldn't be carried out until spring, there's four months where the British could completely change their plans from what was theorized in December based on new information arriving from the men actually on the ground in North America.

Then again, this hypothetical order being issued would also be well after the POD here.

In any event, the British were not mindless automatons who could only follow one course of action, and were completely capable of changing their minds should conditions force them to reconsider. One can hardly expect otherwise.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Interesting to note how Britain and Canada view their war aims in this. Relying on the sea as a way to use their strength is probably going to be the best way about it and Maine's closer to Canada's largest area of population than various other targets at least. Another good update.

Thank you Though obviously only time will tell whether these plans actually work or not

 

[TFSmith121]

So you're setting aside footnoted analysis by a professional

Well, supposedly ordered. I admit only Bourne states that he was ordered, Stacey and Hitsman only allude to suggestions, and without the actual letter it's impossible to be certain whether this is an exact order for a fully formed war plan (which absent any corroborating evidence otherwise still seems unlikely) or merely a suggestion for offensive action.

Mind you, we do know thanks to both the later commissions compiled in January and February that offensive actions were not recommended by the men charged with seeing to the defense of Canada and formulating a strategy on the ground.

Then considering Williams history of near insubordinate responses to his superiors when serving in Kars, and his complete lack of any offensive inclination in that campaign and when preparing his resources in Canada historically(and the lack of faith in his abilities by his superiors), it seems rather likely that even had such an order officially gone out he would have demurred for as long as possible, much like McClellan.

Of course, noting the responses of the commissioners historically and considering that Bourne of course is merely inferring a supposed British war plan which could have been further formulated over December and the coming months, we can't accept this as gospel. After all, even if the order was issued in December it couldn't be carried out until spring, there's four months where the British could completely change their plans from what was theorized in December based on new information arriving from the men actually on the ground in North America.

Then again, this hypothetical order being issued would also be well after the POD here.

In any event, the British were not mindless automatons who could only follow one course of action, and were completely capable of changing their minds should conditions force them to reconsider. One can hardly expect otherwise.

So you're setting aside footnoted research and analysis by a professional historian, one of the few who actually went and worked in the personal papers of the key British decision makers, because ... Why, again?

Mindless automatons? No, but long service professional officers in a regular force that was known, for good or ill, for its traditions, general combativeness, and a doctrine of strict obedience and following orders to the letter? "Birkenhead Drill" and "theirs not to reason why" and all that ... And, specifically, a general officer whose most significant previous act of combat command was the unsuccessful defense of a "frontier" city?

As far as the tradition of dying gallantly goes, given Brudenell and Bingham in one war and Colley in another that neatly bookend the British Army in this era, seems to be something of a blind eye to the relevant historical and institutional examples ...

It's a neat trick, overturning decades if not centuries of tradition. Quite fortuitous, in fact.

Best,

 

[frlmerrin]

So you're setting aside footnoted research and analysis by a professional historian, one of the few who actually went and worked in the personal papers of the key British decision makers, because ... Why, again?

Mindless automatons? No, but long service professional officers in a regular force that was known, for good or ill, for its traditions, general combativeness, and a doctrine of strict obedience and following orders to the letter? "Birkenhead Drill" and "theirs not to reason why" and all that ... And, specifically, a general officer whose most significant previous act of combat command was the unsuccessful defense of a "frontier" city?

As far as the tradition of dying gallantly goes, given Brudenell and Bingham in one war and Colley in another that neatly bookend the British Army in this era, seems to be something of a blind eye to the relevant historical and institutional examples ...

It's a neat trick, overturning decades if not centuries of tradition. Quite fortuitous, in fact.

Best,

If you have a copy of the orders you believe were issued please post them I would be most interested to read them. However as EC has decided to use multiple PODs some of which occur before the orders/suggestions would have arrived EC can write literally what he likes to make a good story. This is exactly what you did with your fantasy story on the same subject you will recall.

Frankly I would have preferred it if you had both kept to a single POD and then your critique would have had some validity ... if of course you could show an order was issued as you suggest. I would remind you that you have on previous occasions made claims of fact when all you actually had was strong hints about something. This seems to be the case here but posting the orders would of course prove me wrong on that. The most recent of these spurious claims that I have bothered to challenge you on was when you posted a list of ships the British had on the Pacific station at the time of the Trent outrage war and you took it straight from your own fantasy story complete with a troopship that had never left the China Seas. Whilst I think of it your list of Union ships on the Pacific also had errors I just never got around to telling you. You can fix it now.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

So you're setting aside footnoted research and analysis by a professional historian, one of the few who actually went and worked in the personal papers of the key British decision makers, because ... Why, again?

Wait, John Mackay Hitsman and Charles Perry Stacey aren't professional historians who wrote accredited and vigorously foot noted books who had access to many of the relevant files and papers?

How amusing.

Though it is interesting that you act as though Bourne is relating a British plan which is set in stone when the man himself explicitly notes: "While, evidently, no written war plan was finally approved it is easily possible with the help of other supporting evidence to reconstruct from the memoranda of these three experts British ideas about the conduct of the war in Canada."

Which rather obviously means the British plans are more than open to interpretation.

It's a neat trick, overturning decades if not centuries of tradition. Quite fortuitous, in fact.

Not really. I mean, unless you consider the idea that the British - who as noted made no concrete war plans by the time the crisis ended, and who had little faith in their general commanding the forces in North America (who as noted, had little problem with complaints towards the higher ups), and after December still had 4 months to finalize plans - cannot possibly change their minds or switch strategies to be so.

Then yes it might be fortuitous. Otherwise, not even remotely.

 

[Saphroneth]

If we're only allowed to work with concrete plans, then the Americans don't react militarily at all - because, well, the American response to the Trent affair was almost entirely diplomatic. About the extent of their military planning was to appoint someone to command the sector from Maine to Michigan and move a few companies of troops to coastal defence.

Unless, of course, there's a well-footnoted analysis of the American plan which we can look at to see how they were planning to spring into action and take Canada.

For reference, here's what it looked like last time from a DoW of June 18, when the US were undistracted (via Wiki)

On July 12, 1812, General William Hull led an invading American force of about 1,000 untrained, poorly equipped militia across the Detroit River and occupied the Canadian town of Sandwich (now a neighborhood of Windsor, Ontario).[78] By August, Hull and his troops (numbering 2,500 with the addition of 500 Canadians) retreated to Detroit, where they surrendered to a significantly smaller force of British regulars, Canadian militia and Native Americans, led by British Major General Isaac Brock and Shawnee leader Tecumseh.[79] The surrender not only cost the United States the village of Detroit, but control over most of the Michigan Territory. Several months later, the U.S. launched a second invasion of Canada, this time at the Niagara peninsula. On October 13, United States forces were again defeated at the Battle of Queenston Heights, where General Brock was killed.[80]

This means that a rough prediction is about four weeks just to get over the border.

 

[TFSmith121]

Orders? Go ask Bourne

If you have a copy of the orders you believe were issued please post them I would be most interested to read them.

Orders? Go ask Bourne ... you're at Ghent or whatever. Oh wait, he's dead. Oh well, you could go and check the documents he cited, which are in the UK...

Wait, John Mackay Hitsman and Charles Perry Stacey aren't professional historians who wrote accredited and vigorously foot noted books who had access to many of the relevant files and papers?

And their take on the order from Cambridge to Williams differs from how Bourne describes it, how, exactly?

If we're only allowed to work with concrete plans, then the Americans don't react militarily at all - because, well, the American response to the Trent affair was almost entirely diplomatic. About the extent of their military planning was to appoint someone to command the sector from Maine to Michigan and move a few companies of troops to coastal defence.

For reference, here's what it looked like last time from a DoW of June 18, when the US were undistracted (via Wiki)

-snip -

This means that a rough prediction is about four weeks just to get over the border.

British: During the short of war period, the commander in chief orders theater commander (in an isolated theater, which by definition is going to become even more isolated once the balloon goes up) to embark upon an offensive immediately upon beginning of hostilities, as related by British historian working in the papers of said Commander in Chief.

Americans: No need for war plans because there's not going to be a war.

In Sap's eyes, that is important, somehow, but one of these things is not like the other.

Also, what was the major difference in terms of transportation and communications in North America between 1812 and 1862? Gee, I wonder.

Oh, wait, here it is:

Best,