Chapter 131: Trans-Atlantic Troubles
Chapter 131: Trans-Atlantic Troubles
“Appointed to the position of Commander in Chief of the forces in Ireland in July of 1865, General Hugh Rose, Baron Strathnairn, was seen as more than capable of handling any trouble. He had led troops admirably in the Crimea participating at Alma and Inkerman, amongst other notable battles with distinction, and then gone immediately to India to deal with the Mutiny. His extremely admirable services there eventually earned the praise of London and placed him squarely on track for an important regional command. The absence of serious discord in Ireland during the North American War had lulled many in London into a sense of complacency over the Irish question, but Strathnairn himself was less sanguine.
Though he did not think a general rising was imminent, he was worried about riots and discord with the return of so many men from North America…
While affairs in North America were unsettled enough that the Fenians felt confident their plans might elicit some good effect in Ireland, they were unsure of whether there could be enough to force Britain to divert more of its forces from Ireland. In 1867 the garrison had again climbed from its 1865 low of only four battalions of infantry and four of cavalry. Now there were 18 battalions of infantry and 7 of cavalry, making the garrison of Ireland much stronger on the eve of this crisis than it had been during the North American War. This would cause some grumbling in Fenian circles that ‘chances were missed’ when so many enthusiastic Irishmen had gone off to fight in North America.
However, while thousands had fought, died, and then immigrated abroad, many had returned home with their skills honed by the conflict, some even in direct confrontation with British forces. This worried Straithnairn who wrote “Lord Strathnairn has had the honor at different times to bring to the notice of the Govt. that the American-Irish Fenian Leaders, so many of whom are stated to be here now, are experienced & resolute soldiers, who have won their experience in a known to the Govt. that all the intercepted plans of operations of the Fenians, shewed [sic.] that their Leaders had acquired in the American War a dangerous knowledge of practical strategy. All these plans pointed as an indispensable piece in the commencement & guarantee of success to the capture of Athlone, the Magazine Fort at Dublin, & other excellent Military Positions.”
The presence of so many veterans of the conflict, supported by American born Irishmen travelling specifically to Ireland to help stir up a rising, caused him some concern. Would arresting or killing an American citizen on Irish soil constitute an international incident? Though habeas corpus had been suspended in Ireland in December of 1866, Strathnairn was cautious in its use for this purpose. Questions to London brought no easy answers, and it was encouraged to, if possible, detain and deport such men as necessary. Naturally, the broad use of such tactics was impossible, and in the sweeping arrests which characterized British crackdowns from December to March showed little finesse. American consuls complained ceaselessly to London, but very little effort was made to address the misuse of police power. This allowed thousands to slip through the net, and by the spring of 1867 roughly 2,000 American born Irish had secreted themselves around the country.
However, much to Straithnairn’s dismay, matters across the Channel would distract the government at exactly the wrong moment…” - The Emergency of 1867, Howard Senior, 1986
“Though Bismarck’s death had shadowed the issue of the 1865 meeting at Biarritz in conspiracy[1][2], it was clear that Napoleon anticipated no great concern from his neighbor when he accepted King William’s assent to purchase the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for 5,000,000 guilders. William’s perennially bad finances, and his control over the Duchy as a personal estate, meant there was little the government in Antwerp could do to stop him, but they saw no great loss to the Dutch state. The two sides accepted the deal on the 23rd of March.
However, in neighboring Prussia, the new King-President Friederich and his advisors were completely alarmed. Chancellor Roon immediately told the King that “it is to Prussia’s great strategic disadvantage should Napoleon occupy Luxembourg City.” The consummate soldier realized immediately that the fortifications of Luxembourg provided at the very least, a redoubt from which French soldiers might launch assaults on the newly consolidated position of the North German Confederation. He strongly advised that the king not remove the Prussian garrison that had been in the city since 1848, while stating that a “show of force” might be necessary to deter French ambitions. Friedrich did not agree with a show of force, but he did think that simply stepping back from Luxembourg would set a disastrous precedent for Prussian power, and so declared that without compensation Prussia would not withdraw from Luxembourg City.
Napoleon was mildly shocked that it would provoke demands from ‘the losing power’ in the recent war. He was outraged that what he viewed as a transaction between monarchs was being objected to by the Prussian throne. Had they not through force of arms just overthrown the centuries old monarchs of noble German states only last year? The sympathetic notes from both Bavaria and Saxony pushed Napoleon in a more bullish direction.
Through de Lhuys, he directed that Prussia would be informed that France did not want war, they would under no circumstances accept the imposition of Prussian ‘blackmail’ on the dealings between two states. The Prussian government would drop their demands for compensation. That was Napoleon’s firmest offer, and one he expected to be the basis of a final arbitration. He was further shocked when Roon not only bluntly rejected the offer, but threatened to march a Prussian army into Luxembourg…
…matters were not helped by the hawkish response of the Saxon Chancellor, Friedrich von Beust, who still smarted from the flight of the Saxon government in 1866. Emerging as a leading voice for the still independent southern German states, he was bullish in demanding Prussia not be allowed to simply seize Luxembourg. That it was being purchased by France was beside the point to him, it promised another Prussian expansion. Munich and Vienna agreed, backing the French position. Franz Joseph though, quietly indicated to John of Saxony that he would “Much prefer peace than war over Luxembourg” but the implied threat of Austrian support for France was a powerful diplomatic feather in the French cap.
On April 8th, Friedrich declared that Prussia could not abandon a member of the Zollverein without adequate diplomatic consultation, and Roon would demand the Dutch government renege on the agreement between the King and Napoleon. This outraged Dutch opinion, save in the Liberal classes who felt that the King was potentially dragging the nation into war against its interests. William though, emboldened by both French instrangience and the support of the smaller German states, refused.
Matters over little Luxembourg seemed to be spiralling out of control…” - Foreign Policy of the Second French Empire, Pierre Martin, 1991
“The news from the Continent in April 1867 gave Palmerston pause. Though older and having less energy, his instinctual distrust of all things French, and especially Bonaparte, moved him once again into a flash of his older self. There was a whirl of activity in April and May of 1867 as he used his not inconsiderable influence to petition ministers and diplomats to find an adequate solution short of war. His energies were focused, almost to all else, on preventing both an expansion of French power at the expense of Prussia, and ensuring no war came to pass that year.
While he had hoped that the Mexican adventure would keep Napoleon tied down in Europe, the threat of a Franco-Austrian alliance against Prussia was one which might become intolerable to European relations, and worse, invite a general European conflict. True, in that time Napoleon did not pull forces from Mexico or Rome, a sure sign he might have been directly considering war, but Palmerston could not use that as a yardstick for any sudden conflagration on the Continent. The Army of the Rhine, he was informed, was unusual active in its mobilisation for summer drills, and Napoleon might use it as an excuse to march on Luxembourg to assert his ownership.
Lord Russell was in evidence at Whitehall, usually with the diplomats from the smaller German states, and the Russian ambassador. At Palmerston’s urging, Russell was attempting to tease out the Russians on whether they might support Austria. Russia’s ambassador, Ernst von Brunnow, was tight lipped with the British, mostly because his government, still in some disorder from the tsar’s assassination the year prior, had no firm instructions one way or the other. Had Palmerston known this he probably would not have begun formulating a military response so quickly.
Instead, he ordered a squadron assembled in the Channel, and a second division mobilized at Aldershot in case of the need for foreign service. Many in Whitehall, still basking in the glow of their victory in North America, were moved to more forceful uses of British power. If they could use that influence to prevent a war, so much the better. Palmerston reasoned that a show of force now might prevent the need for further force in the future[3]. These rapid orders throughout April and May would have unintended consequences, as so focused was he on the threat of war in Europe, he failed to consider matters closer to home…” - The Lord Palmerston, 2002
“To Straithairn’s immense frustration, two battalions were ordered out of Ireland to Aldershot to help form the division being assembled in case of foreign service. One from Dublin and another from Cork. Despite his protests that he needed soldiers in case of unrest, the pleas fell on deaf ears in Whitehall and the Horse Guards who only saw the potential for a European War, and a still insistent need to remind the world that Britain could be a Continental player if she so chose. And so, the regiments were transferred to England.
This could not have been sweeter news in Paris and New York. The information was sent across the border rapidly, with Thomas Kelly excitedly writing his fellows in North America “With war on the Continent now seeming imminent, the time to spark a general insurrection is swiftly coming upon us. Already two regiments leave for England, your plans will excite London to dispatch further forces abroad.” This, from the information at hand, seemed a reasonable conclusion, and the effort to organize and arm men for the coming attacks intensified. However, even as excited action took place, masses of informers inside the various organizations were reporting to Dublin Castle and London what was planned. Unfortunately, only Dublin Castle seemed to take the matter with the severity it deserved, and the actions in North America, it was felt, would be little more than a sideshow.
London was, of course, dealing with dangerously incomplete information…” - The Emergency of 1867, Howard Senior, 1986
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1] Though I generally save things outside North America for the "World in Review" chapters, some events warrant exception.
2] Not the last time Bismarck's being dead and leaving a lot of Machiavellian scheming undone with no official notes will become a major problem in Europe.
3] This will continue to be something of a theme of 'unintended consequences' down the line with British foreign policy thanks to the war. Expensive as it was, no one in London is currently arguing with the results.
