Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

Saphroneth

Banned
As to obtaining US grain, it's actually via the way a lot of them got it to market - via water - that I imagine this going.

Remember that in one case (the reselling issue) I assume it's being basically sold on the world market (the British blockade would allow this) and being then sold to the British and thence shipped right back across the Atlantic again.
In the other case I explicitly assume an Embargo Act - if the US farmers can't sell to anyone, then either the US government is trying to buy up all that food to then destroy (or have the farmers plough into the soil) or it's just telling the farmers to suck it up.
In the latter case, where the farmers can't sell legally to anyone and have no help from the US government, then what are they going to do? Some may well accept financial ruin, but others are likely to sell to their friend Jacques over the lake on the sly, and not really care what happens after that.
And since the US grain trade supposedly fed 1/10 of the British population as well as supplying the South with food pre-war, then even 1% of the farmers doing that is going to mean enough food for about forty thousand people for a full year.


The US has no really easy way to handle the grain thing - it can make people in the US unhappy, it can spend vast amounts of money on the problem (while in the middle of a bank panic!) or it can simply accept that the likely destination of US grain is that it will be shipped right into British usage. (Some especially unscrupulous French (Spanish?) merchants might even put into NY, load up on grain, sail to Halifax or Quebec, unload the grain,and come right back to NY!)
 
As to obtaining US grain, it's actually via the way a lot of them got it to market - via water - that I imagine this going.

Remember that in one case (the reselling issue) I assume it's being basically sold on the world market (the British blockade would allow this) and being then sold to the British and thence shipped right back across the Atlantic again.
In the other case I explicitly assume an Embargo Act - if the US farmers can't sell to anyone, then either the US government is trying to buy up all that food to then destroy (or have the farmers plough into the soil) or it's just telling the farmers to suck it up.
In the latter case, where the farmers can't sell legally to anyone and have no help from the US government, then what are they going to do? Some may well accept financial ruin, but others are likely to sell to their friend Jacques over the lake on the sly, and not really care what happens after that.
And since the US grain trade supposedly fed 1/10 of the British population as well as supplying the South with food pre-war, then even 1% of the farmers doing that is going to mean enough food for about forty thousand people for a full year.


The US has no really easy way to handle the grain thing - it can make people in the US unhappy, it can spend vast amounts of money on the problem (while in the middle of a bank panic!) or it can simply accept that the likely destination of US grain is that it will be shipped right into British usage. (Some especially unscrupulous French (Spanish?) merchants might even put into NY, load up on grain, sail to Halifax or Quebec, unload the grain,and come right back to NY!)

aren't the British blockading the United States? How is it getting to market? It won't be going down the Mississippi, and it won't be going out by rail. Going out by wagon? How? Look at the geography of the US and Canadian border, use a relief map and one that shows vegetation.

So again, logistics matter.

Also, what bank panic? Buying up grain is certainly easy enough by the way. The US government has been doing it since the turn of the 20th Century, and it isn't as if it is going to waste... the Army needs it and grain keeps (in silos, for a long time)
 
Addendum on food consumption.

A soldier in the field requires about 6,000 calories a day to be completely healthy. This is a lot more than most ACW armies actually managed, but we'll go with it.

Assume it's all corn (maize). This is at 3.6 calories per gram, so a daily human intake is a little under 2 kg and our earlier estimate of 9 lb (which is 4 kg) is high. An army of 100,000 would need 200 tonnes a day, which is a reasonably sized ship a week, or the SS Great Eastern's spare space for two months. An army of 50,000 would of course have half the requirement, and if we have the army get by on a civilian level of food (3,000 calories a day) then we're also halving the requirement.

Assume it's all potatoes. This is much less efficient, at 0.77 calories per gram, and as such it comes out at 7.8 kg per man per day. This would make our earlier estimate a low one, and effectively quadruples the calculation used for corn. Great Eastern is able to supply excellent rations for 100,000 for two weeks, or moderate rations for 50,000 for two months.



All the above calculations are predicated on the idea that the soldiers are only eating food shipped from Britain, rather than simply purchasing/foraging locally (though the horses are assumed to eat local - perhaps the Army is made up of hipsters). Historically the British were better than most not so much at foraging but at paying for it, so they may do reasonably well at supplementing food shipments from home.

hopefully you are including protein in that ration, and again... foraging where? The area of likely conflict on US soil is not farming country while it is still frontier west of the Great Lakes. So foraging from who exactly?
 
I'll simply state here that this is a point EC and I differ on - I feel that the imported rifles deficit would not allow for an expansion in 1862 over OTL of any reasonable scale (since, after all, OTL they'd practically run out of percussion smoothbores let alone rifles).

I believe the difference is probably in our counting methods - I start with the state as of 30 June 1862 and count down, EC counts up. I feel mine is a better way to handle weapon wastage (known to be severe in the Americas, some battles ended with upwards of 15,000 rifles abandoned), but as I say it's a difference of opinion.

Well if we agreed on everything it could hardly generate meaningful discussion now could it? :D:p

I think perhaps the reason we may never agree on the rifles you propose is correct, I tend to count up when it comes to imports versus counting down (and really, not knowing the specifics of what weapons come from where and when they come makes this at best a guessing game) which I personally think is the best way. But as you say, a difference of opinion :)
 
geography matters... if you are going to talk about campaigns in the Northeastern part of the United States it is really important to understand the terrain and vegetation and local geography

also, generally speaking its 3 pounds a man, 5 including containers (be it wooden barrels or MRE foil, it seems to take up pretty much the same amount of bulk over the last few centuries). Canada can easily feed troops in garrison and probably their animals in garrison. It is when they leave garrison that the logistics are going to be tough as moving supplies, especially fodder, is a major reason American Armies in the Civil War, and European Armies from the 15th Century onward tried very hard to remain within a couple of hundred miles or less of a major river or railroad and why entire Civil War campaigns were delayed to ensure supply lines were secure via rail or river.

Logistics in an invasion of Canada and vice versa is a tricky business. When one examines the largely broken and hilly terrain of northern New York, one can see where even Burgoyne's division sized army would have had trouble, and one can also see why Hampden had to proceed up the Richelieu route in his invasion.

However, no one has taken anything resembling a corps sized formation north of the border before, that requires substantial movement of wagons, barges, horses, ect. Logistically speaking the best would would be to follow the Grand Trunk connector up the Richelieu River towards St. Jean, then use that as a spring board to march on Montreal from the east. Preferably this would happen in conjunction with a movement up the St. Lawrence from a crossing below Kingston following the river and railroad again.

Hypothetically you could march men along the banks of the Chateauguay, but from everything I have read it's still narrow dirt roads and boggy terrain which could slow an army down.

Also, what bank panic? Buying up grain is certainly easy enough by the way. The US government has been doing it since the turn of the 20th Century, and it isn't as if it is going to waste... the Army needs it and grain keeps (in silos, for a long time)

Historically the threat of war with Britain caused a banking panic as people withdrew their savings or invested in gold and saltpeter against the perceived threat of looming inflation. The Rothschild and Barring banking houses began moving their assets overseas. It was what led to Lincoln's famous "the bottom is out of the tub" quip.
 
Chapter 9: Triple Shuffle
Chapter 9: Triple Shuffle​

The war and rumours of war from the border disturb me more than I care to commit to paper. I now have the offer of office for myself to reflect upon, but how to proceed? I am deeply distressed to have this matter thrust upon me now – but dare not refuse the responsibility with such vast interests at stake. Am I truly fit to govern? What can a man do when his choices are between the tyranny of office and the freedom of his countrymen?” – George Brown in his diary, an entry dated January 9th 1862

“The defence of the Province of Canada rested not with the Premier of the Provincial Government, but with the Governor General appointed by London. In that person it fell to the recently appointed Captain General and Governor in Chief of the Province of Canada the Viscount Charles Stanley Monck, the 4th Viscount Monck.

He was unfortunate enough to replace his predecessor on the 2nd of November 1861, just as the tensions with the United States were ratcheting up. At first glance Monck did not inspire, his only real political experience came from a brief appointment as Secretary of the Treasury in Palmerston’s government from 1855-1858. Upon the inheritance of his father’s title and estates in 1849 he had also inherited his father’s considerable debt, and was thus chronically in need of a stable source of income lest he fall into genteel poverty. When offered the position by Palmerston he took it largely, as he would freely admit, for the money. He then found himself at the head of British North American affairs during one of the most difficult and turbulent periods in their history, yet somehow he managed to make himself indispensable to both the colonial and military authorities in the Province of Canada as the crisis wore on. He put on a relatable face for Canada and found himself uncannily able to guide himself through the kaleidoscope of Canadian politics, managing to play the middle man while not pushing the government in any one direction. Perhaps there was a potential Palmerston noted in the young man, or perhaps it simply was a stroke of fortune that an act of patronage would put a man so socially adept as Monck at the helm in this period. We can never be certain, but the results speak for themselves.

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Charles Stanley, Viscount Monck

Beneath him sat the civilian heads of the Province. Leading the currently most prominent party inside the Canadas, the Liberal-Conservatives, was the fifty-seven year old (and thoroughly alcoholic) John A. Macdonald. Macdonald was a native of Scotland, born in Glasgow in 1815, his family had emigrated to the British North American possessions in 1820, settling in Kingston where a number of Macdonald relations had already settled. He began a law practice in Kingston in 1836 becoming known as a competent and well spoken criminal lawyer. Though called upon to serve in the militia during the 1837 Rebellions, his greatest act would be in defending the rebels who were tried in Kingston against all advice. He would begin his political rise in 1844 being repeatedly re-elected to his seat in Kingston (even despite lengthy absences at times). His rise would come in 1856 where he would ease former premier Sir Allan MacNab out of power and become head of the Canada West Conservative faction.

At the time of the crisis he sat as the provincial head upon a shaky coalition of his own Liberal Conservative Party which was facing opposition from his counterpart John S. Macdonald (no relation) and as the crisis deepened it had looked as though the factional politics of Canada might again rear their ugly heads and stymy any effective response by the provincial government making them unable to reach the needed double majority in both provinces. However, thanks to John A.’s deep personal relationships with the men from Canada East, deadlock was avoided. John A. had long made it an important issue that his party work with the French elements in Canada East, to that end he had called upon the services of Étienne-Paschal Taché, a noted Loyalist to the crown who was able to use his not inconsiderable influence to gain French support for Macdonald’s alliance and political platforms and earning him the support of Parti-Bleus from Canada East, allowing for a solid Conservative alliance. What was more unlikely was his decision to work with the current head of Parti-Bleu in 1862, George Etienne Cartier.

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Macdonald, Cartier, Taché

Cartier was a curious figure in Canadian politics, he had been a noted reformer all his life and had actively campaigned for and even fought in the rebellions of 1837-38 and had been imprisoned for his part in the uprising. Though he had been released in early 1840 he did not drop his campaign for responsible government and was involved in the various political street battles which characterized post-revolutionary elections where mob action was the norm rather than the exception. This would all culminate in the 1849 burning of Parliament where a Loyalist mob outraged at the passage of the Rebellion Losses Bill torched the Canadian Parliament buildings in Montreal. Cartier was a member of one of the counter mobs which stared down Loyalists in the streets, but instead of turning to bloodshed he increasingly turned to the idea of responsible government. He became an ardent supporter of Louis-Hippolyte La Fontaine and his idea of reform and soon became a hard campaigning politician in the Reform minded circles of Canada, but on a conservative basis, which put him at odds with men like John. S. Macdonald, and his erstwhile rival from Canada East, Antoinne Dorion, a noted radical.

However, he and John A. saw eye to eye on a number of important issues, such as the idea of uniting the British North American possessions into a single Union (which Cartier had gone to London to promote in 1858[1]), the necessity for English-French cooperation, and the need to integrate their economies into a national industry. However, the two men were becoming trapped by policies of their own making. Since Macdonald was an opponent of the Radicals it made him an easy target for men like John S. and Dorion, while his pro-French policies were making him unpopular with the majority in Canada West who opposed French integration, and his opposition to Westward expansion was making him no friends there either. In combination all of these factors came together to threatened to undo his entire political alliance and sweep him from power.

In effect the government had become split between the Liberal-Conservative Party and its Parti-Bleu alliance (who could be called Right-Wing Reformers) and the actions of the Reform Party (who could be called Left-Wing reformers) which caused an endless seesaw of one faction or another swinging moderates over to their side and causing the government to fall, the wild cards always being the Clear Grits under John S. and the radicals of Parti Rouge under Dorion. Any minor change in political allegiance could cause a significant shift in party strength and bring down a government and cause massive shifts in policy, deadlocking the system and bringing any attempt at change to a screeching halt. This was all thanks to the incredibly poorly planned system instigated in the Act of Union of 1840 which decreed that for a motion in the House of Assembly to pass there had to be majority in both the Assembly from Canada West and Canada East, in effect one had to gain a double majority.

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The other Macdonald, and Dorion

However, John A. Macdonald was a very canny politician, and both his natural charm and wit would serve him well in the coming months. One of his first major acts to win a public relations coup would be the hosting of the “Military Ball” on January 8th 1862 in the music hall of the St. Louis Hotel in Quebec City. The hall was the very same one he had rented out almost two years earlier for his grand ‘Valentine’s Day Ball’ (rumours say to impress one particular woman), though now it was decorated more to impress upon the populace the martial nature of the times. The walls were adorned with colors from the local regiments, a massive portrait of Queen Victoria was placed beside an equally large portrait of the Duke of Cambridge the commander in chief, each was flanked by a stand of decorated rifles. Fake swords draped with flowers ringed the walls, and a military band was hired to serenade the gathered guests with martial music. Even some of the food was modeled on military rations which most of the guests were curious to try at least once.

The guests were all the well to do and important of Canadian Society. Monck was in attendance with his charming wife Elizabeth, Cartier and Taché were both in obvious attendance, John S. Macdonald representing the opposition, Hugh Allan and George Stephen were amongst the guests as wealthy businessmen looking to make connections for beneficial investments John Young the influential entrepreneur who had overseen the construction of the Victoria Bridge, and even Alexander Somerville had travelled from Toronto to attend what promised to be one of the social highlights of the year.

The military presence was also significant. Williams had come from his whirlwind tour of the frontier defences to attend and speak with the upper crust to assure them of the ability of the army to defend the province. Captain Collinson of the Royal Navy was also there in full dress uniform, partially as a gesture of support and primarily as a way to meet with the businessmen of Lower Canada in order to work out contracts for the construction of gunboats. Colonel Lysons was there in full dress uniform proudly talking up the achievements of the militia. Militia officers were also notable in their attendance. Colonel Sewell commanding the Quebec Volunteer Force was there with his staff, the commanders of the 7th and 8th Battalions of Volunteers were conspicuously present to remind the populace of the cities’ military valor, and men from as far afield as Hamilton had come, including colonels Booker and Denison.

The most important attendee though, would be George Brown of Toronto. Brown was an ardent reformer, having been recognized as a leading liberal and Reform politician since 1849 when he had set in motion the termination of an allegedly corrupt prison warden in Kingston. He was also known to hold hard positions on educational reform and the separation of Church and State, referring to John A’s alliance with the Parti-Bleu as "a base vassalage to French-Canadian Priestcraft." He was also one of the most noted abolitionists in Canada. He used his paper, The Globe, as a platform to denounce the Southern United States and its policies, even attacking the Northern states for their supposed complicity. He hosted such notable individuals as Frederick Douglas and Harriet Beecher Stowe, even becoming one of the leading figures in the Underground Railroad which brought fugitive slaves to freedom in Canada. As such he was adored by much of the black population of the province, who aligned closely with his politics.

It seemed as though Brown and John A. could be nothing but enemies. Indeed there has never been a rivalry so fierce as the one between Brown and Macdonald in Canadian politics. The divide between the two men was so deep John A. once quipped at a heckler who called him a drunk that “Yes, but the people would prefer John A. drunk to George Brown sober.

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Brown

However, the events set in motion since the Border Raids in October had gotten Brown to thinking. Brown feared that war might mean the loss of potential Canadian independence and annexation into the United States, which he had campaigned against in 1849, and like many Canadians he was outraged by the annexationist proclamations made by the American Secretary of State William H. Seward. The seeming ambivalence of some men amongst les Rouges and the more radical Clear Grits towards these policies disgusted him. With that in mind, he and John S. would seek out John A. at rooms in the hotel that evening for an unofficial discussion on the matter of national defence.

Though the whole conversation between the three men is not known, as like many backroom deals in early Canadian politics no notes were kept and the men spoke of it furtively in their own memoirs, it can be certain that some sort of deal was reached. We can speculate on the exact terms due to the actions which took place afterwards and thanks to some chance remarks from Brown in his diary. Brown himself would not accept a government position at first, but instead would return to Canada West to devote his considerable influence to campaigning on behalf of the government. John S. would then accept the position of Minister of Agriculture. That the majority of his party would soon ally themselves in the Assembly with John A’s coalition is of course, not a coincidence. It was here where the Great Coalition was born, in a night of backroom dealing and hard drinking amidst the anxiety of whether war would be imminent.

There would be a resulting shuffle of ministers in the creation of this new administration. Men from each side of the aisle would have to be incorporated. Macdonald would form a new ministry on the 24th of January after weeks of negotiating with his new colleagues. Brown’s close political colleague and ally Oliver Mowat would represent him by taking on the office of Postmaster General, Taché would become Minister of Militia, Macdonald would remain Attorney General, William McDougall would serve as the Minister of Crown Lands, while the remainder of the offices were passed out to Macdonald and Cartier’s supporters.

Excluded from this new coalition however, were the Rouges. Though once a major factor in the much needed double majority of provincial politics, the alliance of the Clear Grits to the Macdonald-Cartier coalition effectively robbed them of their influence in a single stroke and ended their influence. Conceivably they could have been included, but with one or two notable exceptions they had all boycotted the invitations to the ball. Dorion in particular had denounced the whole proceedings as “…une grande farce Anglo-Saxonne” to his colleagues. Once the results become clearer however, he was utterly shocked at the sudden turn around from his previous position of influence.

In time this would bear bitter fruit, but from the perspective of Macdonald and his new ministry, it seemed like a godsend to organize themselves…” Blood and Daring: The War of 1862 and how Canada forged a Nation, Raymond Green, University of Toronto Press, 2002

-----

[1] Confederation didn’t exactly spring out of a vacuum after all. It’s rather interesting when you read about personalities like Tache, Cartier, and Brown who were campaigning for Confederation. Some were really high minded, others were incredibly self-serving and cynical. Brown for instance thought that such a union would permanently disable the power of the French Catholics in Canada East, while Tache was convinced that it would grant the Canadiens total control over Quebec.

 
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Appendix to Chapter 9:
Appendix to Chapter 9:​

14th Ministry of the Province of Canada:

Premier: John A. Macdonald (Liberal-Conservative)

Deputy Premier/President of the Executive Council: George E. Cartier (Bleu)

Minister of Militia: Étienne-Paschal Taché (Bleu)

Minister of Agriculture: John Sandfield Macdonald (Reformer)

Minister of Finance: Alexander T. Galt (Liberal-Conservative)

Commissioner of Crown Lands: William McDougall (Reformer)

Minister of Public Works: George Sherwood (Conservative)

Attorney General: John A. Macdonald

Receiver General: John Rose (Conservative)

Postmaster General: Oliver Mowat (Reformer)

 

Saphroneth

Banned
Yes, the bank panic in December 1861 was over the fear of possible war with the British - the banks and indeed the government had all suspended specie payments because people were taking about a million dollars a day out of the banks.

OTL the Union then managed a string of victories and resolved Trent, which restored faith in the currency - with Union troops marching north to Canada and east to the coast, thinly spread (so some of the victories don't happen or become defeats) and no peaceful resolution of Trent... it is not guaranteed that the same recovery takes place, especially when the Royal Navy is also seriously damaging US naval operations and maritime trade.


Now, it's entirely possible that the Union can come up with a solution to this. But it adds to the problems they have, and in particular it makes the question of "what do with grain" trickier.
 

frlmerrin

Banned
Question to EC

EC,

Did you borrow the idea for the Dacotha firing on and then duelling Terror from Tielhard or from one of the people that subsequently borrowed it from him? I always thought it was probably the best chance for an Anglo-Union war after the vile and wicked Trent outrage but that was before I discovered what Wilkes got up to after he was promoted to Admiral - what a guy to have on your side.
 
I can't get over that picture of Cartier, he looks like someone just insulted his mother before that photo was taken.

Poor Tache is pretty old for such an important post...
 
EC,

Did you borrow the idea for the Dacotha firing on and then duelling Terror from Tielhard or from one of the people that subsequently borrowed it from him? I always thought it was probably the best chance for an Anglo-Union war after the vile and wicked Trent outrage but that was before I discovered what Wilkes got up to after he was promoted to Admiral - what a guy to have on your side.

I did indeed. I footnoted that back in Chapter 2. It's a fairly original POD so I figured it would be great to use for TTL. Of course all credit to the one who originally proposed it. Similarly to how I borrowed the idea for an earlier St. Albans raid from Hell on Earth by Andrew Uffindell. Of course, I'm not going to simply go by what other authors have written since my ideas wildly converge from what they have!

With how outraged Britain was over Trent alone, two warships opening fire on one another would really make things worse! :eek:

I can't get over that picture of Cartier, he looks like someone just insulted his mother before that photo was taken.

The eyebrows don't help :p

Poor Tache is pretty old for such an important post...

He is indeed, but if the man was anything it was vigorous! Mind you, considering how hard he worked OTL for Confederation and considering what happened not too long after the Quebec Conference OTL...:(
 

Saphroneth

Banned
EC,

Did you borrow the idea for the Dacotha firing on and then duelling Terror from Tielhard or from one of the people that subsequently borrowed it from him? I always thought it was probably the best chance for an Anglo-Union war after the vile and wicked Trent outrage but that was before I discovered what Wilkes got up to after he was promoted to Admiral - what a guy to have on your side.

And before, for that matter - he'd already been up for courts-martial over the massacre of about 80 people on Fiji.

When you're strongly suspected to be the role model for Captain Ahab, you're not precisely the sort of person to be in a diplomatic incident - I think he'd have fired on the Trent if she hadn't stopped.
 
And before, for that matter - he'd already been up for courts-martial over the massacre of about 80 people on Fiji.

When you're strongly suspected to be the role model for Captain Ahab, you're not precisely the sort of person to be in a diplomatic incident - I think he'd have fired on the Trent if she hadn't stopped.

220px-Rear_Admiral_Charles_Wilkes.jpg


Call me Ishmael...
 
So Canada's got a working government to go through the crisis although excluding the French side of things could be troublesome. Short term though, they can at least focus on the war.
 
So Canada's got a working government to go through the crisis although excluding the French side of things could be troublesome. Short term though, they can at least focus on the war.

Well a point to make is that the only ones excluded are the radical leaning Parti Rouge versus the more conservative Bleus. Historically the Rouges on their own were little more than an irritant to both Macdonald and Cartier's coalition, and the Great Coalition which came in 1864. Their opposition to the popular ultramonatant ideals of the day and the wish of some members to abolish the seigneurial system of Canada East completely caused a certain butting of heads amongst its membership which lead to the almost predictable failure of all their attempts at getting ahead in early Canadian politics.

It was only after the crushing defeats of 1867 when Dorion saw the light and removed the radicals from the party and merged with the new Liberal Party that they even got a coherent political position.

That being said, there's still plenty of people inside that party with an axe to grind and the means of doing it...bloodily.
 
Logistics in an invasion of Canada and vice versa is a tricky business. When one examines the largely broken and hilly terrain of northern New York, one can see where even Burgoyne's division sized army would have had trouble, and one can also see why Hampden had to proceed up the Richelieu route in his invasion.

.

currently reading an excellent book on naval (and this includes riverine and the various lakes) combat and operations during the American Revolution. Its (a British historian by the way) harshly critical about Burgoyne's failure to listen to any naval advance as soon as Ticonderoga fell (with his highest ranking naval advisor on the march south by an outstanding Midshipman by the name of Pellew of later fame... but still a Midshipman). It also talks about the American operations earlier and later. Great source for the difficulties on moving around by water on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, and of course the inland waters (apparently the Delaware River estuary is especially difficult due to its shallow depth).

recommend it highly for anyone talking about an Anglo-American War

http://www.amazon.com/The-Struggle-Sea-Power-Revolution/dp/0393239926

the terrain is just really unfriendly to both sides, which is why the best strategy logistically I would think for the American side is to defend in the east, gain control of the lakes, and attack via Detroit where the terrain is less unfriendly and the Lakes work in the American favor. An easier task for the Americans with their advantages in the Midwest and more difficult for the British to counter as it stretches out the defenders who have to watch every likely landing spot. In short, what some have suggested the British would try to do on the Atlantic Coast line
 

frlmerrin

Banned
And before, for that matter - he'd already been up for courts-martial over the massacre of about 80 people on Fiji.

When you're strongly suspected to be the role model for Captain Ahab, you're not precisely the sort of person to be in a diplomatic incident - I think he'd have fired on the Trent if she hadn't stopped.

Winding up his boss Wells wasn't that hard. Apparently he had a bit of a temper. Winding up Milne who was so laid back he was almost a (militant) hippie to the point where he orders his Captains to attack him if he goes near British mail ship is spectacular! He is almost as much of a diplomatic incident waiting to happen as Tunis M Craven but I rather admire Craven. The same can't be said for Wilkes.
 
currently reading an excellent book on naval (and this includes riverine and the various lakes) combat and operations during the American Revolution. Its (a British historian by the way) harshly critical about Burgoyne's failure to listen to any naval advance as soon as Ticonderoga fell (with his highest ranking naval advisor on the march south by an outstanding Midshipman by the name of Pellew of later fame... but still a Midshipman). It also talks about the American operations earlier and later. Great source for the difficulties on moving around by water on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, and of course the inland waters (apparently the Delaware River estuary is especially difficult due to its shallow depth).

recommend it highly for anyone talking about an Anglo-American War

http://www.amazon.com/The-Struggle-Sea-Power-Revolution/dp/0393239926

the terrain is just really unfriendly to both sides, which is why the best strategy logistically I would think for the American side is to defend in the east, gain control of the lakes, and attack via Detroit where the terrain is less unfriendly and the Lakes work in the American favor. An easier task for the Americans with their advantages in the Midwest and more difficult for the British to counter as it stretches out the defenders who have to watch every likely landing spot. In short, what some have suggested the British would try to do on the Atlantic Coast line

Interesting book by the sounds of it! I'll see if I can find a copy nearby.

A more friendly invasion route certainly exists up the Detroit frontier, but as even the British realized in their multiple studies on the subject, simply occupying the western half of the Province of Canada offers no military advantage, and isn't even a straight shot at Montreal.

The shortest (and most decisive) route for an American invasion force is up the Hudson valley at Montreal to cut off communications with the west of the province and thereby threaten Quebec. Admittedly a column marching up the north bank of the St. Lawrence would help, but it isn't 100% necessary.
 

frlmerrin

Banned
Response to gaveston bay I

lets start from the beginning
Great idea Maria von Trapp and I think it is ‘a very good place to start!’

the limit of the French Army in Mexico was not simply shipping.. The biggest army they ever deployed overseas to this point was Crimea, roughly 300,000 men deployed including naval personnel (and 95,000 dead, overwhelmingly from disease... cholera is nasty stuff).
1) I think you are forgetting that most of the French deployment to the Crimea was in British shipping provided by the British. The French did not have the resources to deploy that many troops.
2) Why on Earth do you think the French would need to provide 300,000 troops to fight the Union? Are you still thinking of my reducto ad absurdum argument numbers as realistic projections? What would they do with that many of them? All they would need is the 3,000 troops already in the Pacific to occupy Drum barracks and take Fort Yuma – giving the Confederates the south west, 5,000 – 10,000 troops as an amphibious threat off of the east coast of the Union, maybe 20-30,000 troops, some launches and floating batteries to support a Confederate thurst up the Mississippi, a few thousand to secure the French West Indies and another few thousand to hold Vera Cruz. So 50,000 tops, job done, Bob is mon Oncle. An easier deployment than OTL.
3) You will note that as a Trent outrage war will start between 23rd Dec and 28th Jan (between the fastest negative response to the British demands and the slowest British reply to an ambiguous Union response). Thus the French will not have committed themselves in Mexico before they become involved in the war against the Union over the Trent outrage. They can always go back to Mexico after they have cut a deal with the Confederates to isolate the Juaristas from Union support.
4) I do appreciate your bringing up the Crimean war again. It is very instructive for the uninformed reader and the points below cannot be repeated often enough. In many respects the Crimean war is an excellent model for an Anglo-Union war over the Trent outrage. First, the Royal Navy fought all over the world wherever there was an opportunity to attack the Russian Empire. Second, the abrupt end of the Baltic grain trade as a result of the war affected neither British policy nor the diet of the British chap in the street. Third, the Imperial Russian Navy was almost completely destroyed in the conflict. The British, with some help from their allies, defeated and humiliated the Russian Empire. Lastly, the economy of the Russian Empire and its satellite states was shattered in the war and took many years to recover. This is of course almost exactly what would happen to the Union if they attempted to fight the British, only the outcome would be even worse for the Union as they would probably lose considerable territory to the Confederacy too. Something which thankfully the poor Russians did not have to deal with.
In Mexico they sent 70,000. So lets say you are right, and they can afford to send more even though they have to monitor events in Italy and Germany. At most figure 200,000 men (assuming the other 100,000 sent to Crimea were replacements). That does give the French, excluding naval personnel, about a field army in size.
Once again you are responding to a reducto ad absurdum argument as if it were a serious proposition. I have no idea why you are doing this?
The question is when does it [the French??] get to North America? Presumably the British are using their merchant marine and naval transports to move their troops and supplies as the priority, and the two powers are hardly close allies, even (or perhaps because) of Crimea. My guess is that it arrives substantially later than the British Army.. at best.
I fear your guess is almost certainly wrong as it assume that the vast and competent British merchant marine cannot transport 50,000+ British regulars to eastern continental BNA whilst transporting a similar number of French to the Gulf of Mexico and the eastern coast of the Union. Of course it can do both simultaneously! So realistically the French can commit to war with the Union over their outrages against neutral shipping (in OTL they made clear through diplomatic channels they were ready to do this) at the close of Dec. or beginning of Jan.. Then the first wave of troops will be on the way three weeks later or less (time to charter and load based on the British response in OTL) and in the Gulf in 6-8 weeks later at most. If they are going to the French fleet off the east coast of the Union then just 2-3 weeks later.
Where does it go? It seems unlikely to head for Mexico and I can't imagine the British want a French Army anywhere near Quebec, so perhaps Louisiana or somewhere else (Charleston the other likely port, perhaps Mobile or Wilmington)
You are correct about this. The British will not want the French in Canada East. Well done! However, there is no reason to send the French to Mobile, Charleston or Wilmington where they can do nothing useful. The places to send them I have indicated below.

Which means it has establish and maintain a lengthy and large line of communications home to keep it fed, as the South can barely feeds its own armies. This will be very expensive, as even if just the French merchant marine is used there are the costs of chartering ships, the opportunity costs lost as merchant shipping is taken out of trade etc. Sure they could charter British ships but then French money is going to the British which will upset the balance of payments rather impressively.
I find the reasoning here rather strange. In the first place even in the OTL Mexican adventure the French managed to feed the troops they sent to Vera Cruz and the interior. In that scenario they could not charter British merchant ships. In this scenario the French troops are at various places and could be supplied thus.
• In the south west of the Union they can be fed from British occupied California or Pacific Mexico.
• In New Orleans or up river they can be fed locally or from Spanish Cuba or the British West Indies primarily Jamaica. Do remember that the problems with food distribution that the Confederacy had did not occur until late in the American Civil War and were exacerbated by large parts of that nation being occupied by Union armies. In Spring/Summer 1862 with the British and French fighting the Union none of that will happen.
• Furthermore in this scenario the Confederate armies should all be much better fed than in OTL not least because the blockade will be ended within a week or so of the start of hostilities thus allowing the Confederacy can resume coastal transport of supplies.
• The troops in the French West Indies would be fed locally.
• Only the troops off the east coast need to be supplied by the RN and those rations would probably come from the Maritimes.

A soldier needs 3 lbs of food a day, a draft animal between 8-16 pounds (varies on size of animal), and the average field army has about 1 animal per 3 men in this century (and well into World War 2 for that matter), so you do the math, ...
That is very interesting. It sounds like the Union is going to have real trouble feeding and equipping the huge number of troops TFSmith121 thinks are going to deploy to the northern borders. I would value your comments on how you propose to feed these gallant Union troops in the far north with only the iced-up roads and the inadequate and inadequately connected Union railway network to supply them at the beginning of the war? You are also no doubt aware that the Canadas exported large numbers of horses to the Union army in OTL. The Union army used vast number of them, in part because even by the standards of contemporary observers they used them harshly and the horses did not last long but also simply because the need was vast. In this scenario when the Union is fighting not just the CSA but the British and probably the French the Union army will have a significant shortage of horses, whilst there will be plenty for the British to buy. How do you think this shortage of horses in the Union army will affect rations for the brave Union soldiers?
I observe the British can be fed locally from food produced in the Province of Canada or the Maritimes. Most of these rations can be moved around on the Grand Trunk and subsidiary railways and would only need to go a short distance by cart/sledge/traction engine road train.

... but the 180,000 men and 60,000 animals works out to a lot of pounds per day doesn't it?
No not really, not compared with the Union army at this time. The poor Union army has to feed roughly three times that many troops and horses (well actually perhaps not that many horses as they have to deal with a shortage).

as to the point of your post...the reducto ad absurdum style of debate generally makes the user look more foolish then his target. There is no reason to respect such an argument and I do not. Frankly it comes across as trolling to me.
Well I am astonished, reducto ad absurdum arguments have been part of the armoury of Western philosophy from classical times all the way up to Russell and beyond and yet to you they come across as trolling? You consider the arguments of Abelard, Kant and St Thomas Aquinas based on the technique are ‘foolishness’? I think that in taking up the position you do, you do yourself no favours in wanting to be accepted as a serious poster.
In an attempt to clarify your position on the original question, let me ask you the following question ‘Are you suggesting that TFSmith in comparing 10% of the population of the Union with 10% of the population of BNA as a relative measure of the strength of the opposing forces is more or less appropriate that comparing 10% of the Union population with 10% of the population of the total opposing forces?’ Perhaps you would like to suggest an alternative comparison

as to the Southern Labor force benefiting from slavery.. it depends. A lot actually. As the Union Armies moved into the South that slave labor force voted with their feet in staggering numbers, markedly hurting the Southern agricultural economy.
Why don’t you, as you have suggested to me on a number of occasions, ‘do the maths’? It is easy enough and you can then post it for everyone to see. If you don’t come to the same conclusions as I then I shall be very surprised. I note that a Trent outrage war would start in Dec 61/Jan 62 and probably be over by the end of 1862. Conditions in the Confederacy would be improving for all of that time with no blockade and a Union that probably could not progress a significant offensive. Your comments on the slave labour force are therefore irrelevant, they are only relevant to the late war in OTL not 1862 in TTL. In TTL the slaves have neither the opportunity nor the motivation to run away in significant numbers. Furthermore even in the historical late war I can find no significant evidence that slaves ran away in anything like ‘staggering numbers’ as you suggest. Please provide citations to source quantifying ‘staggering numbers’ as I have never seen any and I am eager to learn more of this if you are correct.
Indeed on many occasions Southern slave owners were unwilling to even loan out their slaves for vital projects...like digging fortifications. The Civil War is full of examples.
To the best of my knowledge this is true. However it was never all of the slave owners or even, again to the best of my knowledge, most of the slave owners, It is also irrelevant to the argument I was making. In fact if the slave owners keep the slaves focused on private wealth creation rather than military matters then they make a greater contribution to the labour pool.
No Civil War history that I have seen, and I have read dozens over the 45 years I have been reading them, as ever indicated that at any point the North faced a serious labor problem, particularly as immigrant its were still flooding in during the entire war. While a British naval blockade would temporarily end that, there are plenty of women in the American labor force (just as in English factories) and at worst the factories have to pay more money in wages.
Simply because you have not read of it does not mean it was not the case. Once again I simply suggest you ‘do the math’ and see what the result is and post your results. Note that you can even include the impact of migrants and women in the labour pool if you want. Although, as you say, the British blockade will stop the migrants and you don’t really get large numbers of (free white) women in the work force until the 1880s. Before that date I suspect it would be quite hard to get women to replace men in the workforce as a result of wartime shortages.

as to grain... there are readily available statistics on the world grain market in the 1860s.. you should look at them closely. Half of all grain exported (or more depending on year) is from the United States in the 1860s. Block that grain and prices will climb markedly and quickly. But we have had this discussion before. You assertion simply pretends that this discussion hasn't been gone over. While famine will not loom in Europe, prices will climb very quickly, and this is not going to make the British government popular at home or in Europe. Particularly if the Anglo-French armies buy it by the thousands of tons to feed their armies and thus cause the price to climb further.
Why do you think I would not have looked at the statistics for grain imports and exports from Britain, imports and exports from the USA and the Union during the war and equally importantly re-exports from Britain? How do you think I am in a position to say the things I have been saying if I were not familiar with the available historical material? For your information I am also aware of the annual change in the price of bread in Britain and the price of a hundred weight of cereals of various type at the various local markets in Britain. All of this material is in the British statistical abstracts for this period or the newer American abstracts which became available some years later. Some is available from the Institute of social history. Other material is available in domestic histories.
The fact of the matter is the Union grain merchants did exactly the wrong thing from the strategic point of view of the Union by selling all of the grain they could not sell south in 1861 internationally thus producing a glut. Neither the British nor anyone else in Europe is going to starve as a result of a Trent outrage war. Especially as the British do not eat a lot of wheat and have access to other grains, potatoes and rice. It is a small proportion of the total carbohydrate in the British diet.
It is also worth mentioning that a Trent outrage war will start in Jan 1862 and the Union’s 1861 harvest will already have been sold and exported between Sept and Nov./Dec.. The 1862 harvest won’t be needed until Sept. 1862 at the earliest. Given that Lincoln is not a fool (unlike certain members of his cabinet) the most likely conclusion of a Trent outrage war will be that the Union surrenders to/comes to terms with the British within 6 months. In which case, Union grain is a complete irrelevance. Only if the Union cabinet are all very silly indeed and behave like Worzle Gummige with his turnip head on does the Union fight on much beyond the 1862 harvest.
The British don’t have to blockade wheat if they don’t want to. It is up to them what they decide is contraband of war. They can have it transported in neutral ships or if they occupy some of the New England ports they can license Union ships to trade with the home islands. On top of all this there will be smuggling of wheat across the upper lakes and possibly Lake Ontario as the Union farmers won’t be able to afford to do anything else.

Moving supplies ... there are plenty of sources that show that after about 250 miles, a horse drawn wagon team will eat more than they carry. Thus the value of railways and internal waterways. There is exactly one railroad going into the United States from Canada. So assuming the British need all the rail they can get to support their own forces, that means the French are now relying on the terribly overburdened Confederate railways which are barely holding together even in 1861 (as they imported their rolling stock and rails primarily from the North)
There are several railways going from the Union into Canada. What I think you are saying is there is only one railway that the British could capture and hold in order to get troops from Halifax to the Grand Trunk railway in the Canadas. This is true, however the British would only need it until the thaw of the St Lawrence in March/April (say a bit over three months from the start of hostilities). Once the St Lawrence is thawed the British can run supplies all the way up to the Niagara peninsula by water. The Union would of course have no way of securing the St Lawrence and Lake Ontario against a British fleet after the thaw and after that the railway becomes less important.
Actually, if the French are on the Mississippi and in the south west (Fort Yuma) they will be supplied by river boat and coastal steamer + river boat respectively. No trains needed.
Where exactly do you think the British will need to send supplies 250 miles by horse and cart without any fodder on the way side?
Having said all of that there is the question of what the British do for the three months between the start of hostilities and the thaw? The problem here though is not moving rations about but about how to move troops, guns and ammunition from Halifax to the Province of Canada? They have two ways of doing this:-
1) They can use the ice road they used historically. Troops would be taken to St John (NB) by boat. Then the troops would be taken by sleigh from St John (NB) to Rivière du Loup and the Great Trunk railway. The sleigh trip would take 10 days at a rate of 160 men and several tons of equipment per day. Now we should remember that they did not open this route up until the Trent Affair had already been decided and the Union had yielded to British demands. Consequently the British army ran it as a relaxed training exercise. In a real war situation they would have done things differently. As a minimum they would have got the trains running on the line to Canterbury taking about three days off the trip. They would use the engineers and locals to improve the route and they would import standing engines to help move the heavy artillery up the hills. They might even bring in road traction engines to drag the larger pieces (as they did in the Crimean war).
Curiously enough it was not the sleigh section that was the rate determining step it was the trains on the Grand Trunk. In a war situation the army would both take priority and in all probability take over the running of the railway.
2) The Royal Navy can steam into Portland Maine and take over the town which was the Atlantic terminus of the Grand Trunk and take over the railway north. The forts defending the town are either under construction or obsolete and empty of guns and garrison so they present no problem. The difficulty with this approach is that a large number of troops will be needed to defend the railway from sabotage and counter attack. This almost forces the Royal Navy to raid the coastal rail way at several points and render it unusable by the Union.
Alternatively the British can use all or most of the troops available at Halifax aggressively rather than defensively and go on the offensive.
As to getting grain from the Americans... sure, how is it getting to Canada exactly? By wagon? Certainly not by rail and it won't be via the Great Lakes either, as there is no way, short of ASB assumptions, that the British will ever control the Great Lakes in any war after 1812 (and they lost them during that one too).
If you want to I shall be happy to review any arguments you wish to make on why you think the British will not be able to control the great lakes but in respect of Lake Ontairo and Lac Champlain you will be struggling.
So:-
1) Yes Union farmers/lake traders would smuggle grain across the lakes. Working on the assumption that the British would control Lake Ontario and the Union the Upper Lakes the most likely lake for smuggling would be Lake Erie. Grain is fairly easily transported from the north eastern shore of the lake to Canada West with the railways and Lake Ontario as a means of moving it to export.
2) Based on previous behaviours of poor farmers in the anti-bellum USA if they cannot sell their crops then they will burn their farms and move over the frontier to make another farm where they don’t need to pay taxes and will not be conscripted.
3) The British have three newish and three oldish mail ships on Lake Ontario that were built to be used as warships should the need arise. There are also a large number of guns at Kingston to arm these ships and many others. There are also several screw merchant ships that could be converted to warships. The Union had a far larger merchant fleet on Lake Ontario and had far more screw ships that could be converted to warships than the Canadians. However the Union had an acute shortage of canon even in OTL. In a Trent outrage war where the Union needs to find several thousand guns for the coastal defence forts the Union lake commanders will find it very difficult to find guns for their ad hoc lake navy. However, all of this ad hoc preparation becomes insignificant about a week after the thaw when the Royal Navy comes barrelling up the St Lawrence like the wrath of God. Big frigates can reach Quebec City, large sloops of war can reach Montreal and smaller vessels including sloops, gunvessels, gunboats and floating batteries can reach Lake Ontario. They can do this even if the Union blow-up all of the locks on the St Lawrence as most of the ships have large steam engines and the ones with smaller engines can be towed by the big sidewheel RN vessels. There is nothing the Union can do to defend Lake Ontario against this force.
4) The RN may or may not be able to reach Lake Erie. If they can reach it they can control it. It all depends on who holds the Welland canals or if the Union can destroy the lock system. It should be noted however that the British appear to have considered having lock gates built in Britain and transported to Lake Ontario against this possibility.
5) It is most unlikely that the British would wish to passage Detroit in order to control the upper lakes as it would be a terrible cost for a small gain.
I would also remind you that like the Crimea and many other 19th Century wars the war of 1812 was a British victory.

in short, your argument deserves to be dismissed as absurd
One point:-
It may well be that my argument should be dismissed as absurd but:
a. I am not clear what argument in particular you are talking about?
b. Nothing I can see of what you have written above has in any way shown any of my arguments to be absurd. Please explain what you think you have demonstrated is absurd?
 

frlmerrin

Banned
Response to gaveston bay II

indeed, Naval History is full of successful wars by the Russian Navy when they are not fighting the Turks. As to power, sure, the second largest industrial power on the planet and the largest exporter of grain is indeed a third rate power when it already has 400 ships and nearly a million men under arms in 1862 from a standing start of 60 ships and 100,000 men (including militia) in 1861.
I am unclear why you are so derogatory about the Russian navy in 1862? It was far more professional that the Union navy of Jan 1862 as it demonstrated during the Crimean war*. It also had better ships that the Union navy in Jan 1862. Perhaps you could explain why you are denigrating them?
*Which you may recall the British won despite the very professional Imperial Russian navy.
First off the USA (as a whole Union and Confederacy both) is only the second largest industrial power in 1862 by some measures. If other equally valid measures are applied the USA can end up as third industrial power behind France or forth behind Prussia. Clearly the Union is less industrialised than the whole USA even if the difference is not that large. The Union navy at the turn of the year between 1861/2 is far smaller than you suggest and is well down the rankings. It is markedly inferior to the Royal, French, Russian, Spanish, Austro-Hungarian, Dutch and Ottoman navies. It is hard to be precise but it is somewhere between seventh and ninth place in the naval rankings. Thus I would suggest that by classifying the Union at the beginning of 1982 as a third rate power I am being somewhat generous. The British are of course the pre-eminent and only first rate power. The French and Prussians being second rate powers.
Why do you think that being the largest exporter of grain is so important to a nation’s status?
The number of ships the Union had in OTL late in 1862 is completely irrelevant to a Trent outrage war. The only number of Union ships that matters is the number at the start of the war. Because in the next few months the vastly superior Royal Navy will sink, burn or take as prize almost all elements or the USN that do not hide in a defended port. As it happens I do know how many ships the USN had in December of 1861. On the 3rd Dec. Gideon Wells Secretary of the USA’s navy made a statement to the Congress of the USA in which he claimed that ‘When the vessels now building and purchased of every class are armed, equipped, and ready for service the condition of the navy will be ...’
Old Navy 76
Purchased vessels 136
Being constructed 52
TOTAL 264

So you will notice that at the start of the American Civil War there were 76 ships in the USN rather than the 60 you suggest but just 33 of them were real steam warships and not a single one of them was a steam capital ship.

It is hard to be precise about this but the actual number of effective vessels in the USN in Jan 1862. Discounting things like receiving ships, hulks, store ships, ships in transit home through British stations, ships that could not be moved and keels that have been laid but which will not be launched within 3 months of the start of a Trent outrage war but including sail warships, ships on the Pacific station and vessels the USN has not more than 223 effective vessels on the east coast of the Union and probably a lot less.

Facing this is the Royal Navy’s North America and West Indies station which is around 34 effective steam ships in strength, an extra 6 warships are available to defend Bermuda and Jamaica. An additional ca. 16 ships were to be sent to the NA&WI station at the immediate beginning of hostilities (Grey to Milne) and some 25 more within the month (Manchester Guardian various). This gives a total RN fleet within the month of 81 ships which will continue to grow in size over the next few months. The big ironclads, mortar frigates and many more gunboats would go out in April or May. The new build floating batteries would be available around July/August.

Thus we have an initial force ratio of 223:81 on the east coast. Of course by comparing hull numbers in this way we are implying that the mighty USS Sam Huston, sail schooner, 66 short tons displacement and one very small gun is the equivalent of, for example HMS Nile, 2nd rate 2-deck screw line of battle ship, 4376 long tons displacement, 90 guns which is clearly not the case. The Union Navy being a very modest war fleet with a large number of Sam Hustons, tugs and similar is not a real navy at all it was a naval gendarmerie. The best of the five frigates which are the largest true warships in the Union navy is probably the Colorado. She might be able to take Nile on a good day but not two or three Niles which is what the RN can send against her. The little Sam Hustons are so small they cannot hold more than two weeks supplies and are not even useful as commerce raiders.

Similarly, the United States of America’s regular army at the start of the American Civil War was just 16,000 men. Your claim for 100,000 troops including militia is not realistic. It might be true as a book number but nearly all of those men were both untrained and unarmed.

The effective size of the Union army at the start of Jan 1862 which would be the start of a Trent outrage war us somewhat open to question. The widely accepted value is 527,204 troops. Clearly not all of these troops were trained to even the most basic level but most were. I usually work with this value.

Also, who won the Battle of Lake Erie and Lake Champlain again?
Let me ask you a more important question. Which great empire won the war of 1812 of which the battles on the lakes were such a tiny part. Which minor nation had its merchant fleet destroyed during the war of 1812 and which took over thirty years to recover from? Which great empire completely and comprehensively defeated the Russian Empire in the Crimean war? I could go on but it would be boring. Do you see the point I am trying to make here?
While a full scale total war between the British Empire and the United States would be bad, as the the War of 1812 didn't collapse the economy, only the treasury, I suspect that you are impressively off base in your assertion here.
The thing is in most respects the war of 1812 is a very poor model for an Anglo-Union war over the Trent outrage during the American Civil War. Just for starters the British were fighting half of Europe to keep democracy and constitutional restrainst on the monarchy alive whilst having to defend their colonies against the encroachment by a supposed democracy over the most minor of slights. In Jan. 1862 Britain has no distractions abroad whilst the USA is fighting a Civil War and is trying to progress the genocide/ethnic cleansing of various aboriginal peoples. In 1812 the USA was on near technological parity with the British. In 1862 the British are 30 years ahead in technology.
In 1861/2 the mere threat of war with the British wrecked the Union banking system. Think what actual war would do.
As to the American coast..you need to read this book "The Struggle for Sea Power: A naval history of the American Revolution" which discusses at length the particular difficulties of approaching Boston, New York and Philadelphia harbors due to sand banks, narrow channels and heavy currents not to mention of course the defenses, which are state of the art as of 1862. Charleston in 1863 proved that ironclads cannot pound forts into submission, and Farragut had his successes by bypassing the forts at high speed (and he had pilots who knew the local conditions at Mobile Bay and New Orleans). The Royal Navy could barely raid at will in 1814, and even then they avoided heavily defended ports. They landed on a beach and walked to Washington and the fleet only faced a single fort. No such weakness exists in 1861 on the Union coast, much less in 1862
Why would I need to read the book The Struggle for Sea Power: A naval history of the American Revolution"? I have already told you the war of 1812 is a poor model for an Anglo-Union war in 1862 why would the revolution be any better? The forts had changed by 1862, the approaches to the ports had been improved, channels marked and dredged, steam ships are far more manoeuvrable than sailing ships and the cannon on the Royal Navy ships at least were far bigger. What do you think we can learn about a Royal Navy attack on the coast of the Union in 1862 by looking at what happened over 70 years previously?
What I did was get contemporaneous (1862) or near contemporaneous charts of the ports of Boston, New York, Charleston and Old Point Comfort and found out what the channels and tides were really like in 1862. Then I got hold of some plans of the key forts and surroundings for the 1860s and looked in the OR for the number of guns in the batteries. If anyone has 1860s charts for Portland Maine or Mobile I would love to have a copy.
What did the bombardment of the Charleston defences prove? Very little other than that the Union could not bring a large enough battery to bear on the forts and that armour piercing bolts were very effective against the weakly layered armours of most Union ironclads. If the British went against Charleston (which they wouldn’t it being a Confederate city) they would probably not go about it in the same way the Union navy did. I would suggest they would bring large ships against the earthwork batteries on the beaches and then either land artillery and take the forts from behind or bring bigger ships forward once the outer defences had fallen. Note they can’t get any really big ships into the harbour. Tsouras really screwed up his battle of Charleston over this in his book Britannia’s fist.
1814 is not 1862. In 1814 the Royal Navy was using sail ships and they did not have nearly enough ships in North American waters to do what they wanted to do. In 1862 they have an abundance of ships, marines and soldiers. They have steam ships with BIG guns. Most of the Union’s third system forts are poorly sited and obsolete. Some of them do not have any battery, most of them have only a small battery and to the best of my knowledge none of them have a full battery. None of them have a full garrison, some of them have no garrison. The only thing the Union has going for them is that the Royal Navy does not know how badly the third system forts are defended. I am not aware of anywhere on the eastern coast of the Union that would be defensible against a concerted attack by the Royal Navy in Spring 1862.
There is nothing wrong with avoiding forts, landing on the beach and marching off to burn down your enemy’s capital. Why put your troops and ships at risk for no reason. This is absolutely splendid tactics and just the sort of thing I would expect the RN to do all over the Union coast in 1862! You can’t burn down your enemy’s capital too often if you want to win a war.
Clearly sir you are no naval historian if you believe in all seriousness that the RN can routinely raid an unguarded American coast without suffering serious attrition in the process
Two points:
1) I never claimed to be a naval historian so that is ok. I will claim to know more about the Union and Royal Navies during the period in question than you do however and I offer as evidence my responses to your post.
2) It would be a very poor navy indeed that could not raid an unarmed coast without taking serious losses? Are you sure that is what you wanted to say?

as to Bryn, it is hard to take him seriously after in a discussion with me he stated that McClellan was the best general the Union Army had. So while I enjoy reading some of his Traveller 2300 roleplaying source material, I cannot take his conclusions about the American Civil War seriously
My God is Traveller still around?
 
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