Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

[frlmerrin]

Response to galveston bay

aren't things a bit tense in Europe for Napoleon to be sending an army much bigger than the one he sent to Mexico?

The limit on the size of the French army in Mexico was primarily that the British would not allow the French Government to charter British merchant ships for the venture, the French at this time having a small and largely coastal merchant marine. In order to save money the French decided to use major warships as troop transports. In order to make space for the troops these ship had their guns stored in their holds and hence rendering them ineffective as warships. If we are in a situation where the French Mexican adventure never really starts (as in a Trent outrage war) and the French ally with the British against the Union the British are not likely to refuse them access to transports. Neither are most of the British transports carrying French troops likely to have to travel all the way to Vera Cruz. On top of this in a war with the Union the French are going to be far more aggressive in taking ships out of reserve which they did not really do for the Mexican adventure. So we could expect significantly more French troops deployed against the Union than they sent to Mexico and Cochin China and the Magreb. We can also expect many more French warships to be deployed against the Union than the modest blockade observation squadron, Pacific squadron and ships in the West Indies deployed to North America in OTL.
We don't really see serious tensions in Europe that would make the French want all of the army at home until the Austro-Prussian in 1866. The Danish war and the Polish rising were not that great a cause for concern in OTL.

If you look at actual mobilization the Confederacy actually beat that number, while the Union came pretty close (in overall mobilization although this doesn't count those who enlisted more than once). The British never came close historically until the Great War, and that includes the Napoleonic era (and that includes the RN too)

Two points to make here.
1) I think you are missing the point of my post. TFSmith121 has on a number of occasions gone on endlessly about how the militia of the BNA is a minnow compared with the mighty mightiness of the Union. I thought just for once we should compare like for like and on the same basis. You may if you wish see this as an exercise in the reduction of his/her arguments to the point of absurdity. You should not read my post as suggesting that the entire British Empire including the camel corps and the elephant polo team turns up at the Washington Naval yard one day and a small midshipman in a particularly cool uniform and top is sent to the Oval Office to shout "Oi! You Lincoln! Give us Mason and Slidell now or we shall proceed to spank your little army soooo badly you won't have enough vinegar and brown paper to put it back together again". What I am saying is - compare like with like. Comparing the militia of the BNA alone with that of the Union is a rhetorical device constructed with the sole purpose of winning an argument whilst avoiding the truth of the matter. On top of that it is a logical fallacy too!
2) If you look at military numbers in the Confederacy and Union as a fraction of the labour force rather than of the population as a whole you discover that the Union economy was stressed more than that of the Confederacy. This is because the large slave population of the Confederacy both male and female, quite young to very old was all part of the labour force but not significantly part of the army. In these terms the Confederacy never reached 10% in military service. In terms of the white population it most certainly did.

Also, any really large army will rapidly exceed the ability of either the French or British to supply said army. The Confederacy was a food importer prewar (from the North and parts of Texas) while Canada is a food exporter, but to a far smaller degree than the Union. The British import their food already (having exceeded a few years ago the ability of the British Isles to feed itself), while the French vary from year to year but export less than Canada.

There was no shortage of grain in Britain in OTL 1861/2 and there is no reason to expect this to change in any Trent outrage war scenario. There were a number of reasons for this but two main ones. First, because the Union grain merchants dumped the large quantities of grain that was originally intended to be sold south on the international market and most was brought by the British merchants for resale. Second, the Baltic wheat trade was controlled by the British grain merchants and they were buying up Russian wheat, the trade in which had been steadily recovering since the resolution of the Crimean war. It is true there were poor harvests in western Europe for two years but they were not famines and they had no significant effect on the price of bread in Britain. I would also expect a large number of broke Union farmers will take up grain smuggling into the Province of Canada.
Similarly there is no reason to expect that there would be a shortage of any other food on the European markets. I note in passing that the Crimean war had no impact on the supply of food to the French or British, neither would war with the Union.
I can see no reason why any British or French armies in North America should be short of food. If they are in BNA there should be ample local food supplies, similarly if they are occupying parts of New England or New York state or California then it should be possible to supply them locally too. Those elements of the army involved in raiding the Union coast from ships, small in number could be supplied by the merchant marine from either BNA, occupied areas on the Union border or from the home islands.

Which of course also goes to shipping tonnage available to move food to the British Isles AND also available to ship supplies to Canada. I suspect that equation overall is pretty complex, and that doesn't include animal feed for the vast numbers of draft and riding animals needed for a mid nineteenth century army. (16 lbs per animal per day adds up pretty quickly)
So the numbers game is a pretty complex game indeed

The British merchant marine is huge during this period; it is at least as proportionately large compared to that of other nations as the RN is. On top of this as soon as a Trent outrage war starts the entire foreign trade merchant marine of the Union will either reflag or be blockaded in port or will try the coastal trade. Based on the large number of ships that the tiny number of Confederate commerce raiders in OTL caused to reflag (many different values have been suggested Carlisle 2012 claims 1069) one would expect at least 2,000 Union ships great and small to reflag most to the British. This will significantly increase the size of the British merchant marine.
The British had enough large Atlantic liners/mail ships OTL to put a large British army in the Province of Canada. For the Trent affair they hired thirteen large steam ships at the beginning of December for three trips across the Atlantic each. They carried troops, guns, small arms for the militias. One additional ship was sent with troops and guns for Bermuda. One more was sent to the Pacific station with arms and ammunition. The Trent Affair was resolved when the Union Cabinet capitulated to British demands and before a second trip was required by the Atlantic troop ships. At no time during the charter of these ships did the mail services across the Atlantic or indeed elsewhere suffer.
Further Milne had thirty colliers sent out to key points on his station with war stocks of Welsh steam coal in the build up to hostilities. This was an entirely commercial exercise.
Why do you think that fodder cannot be found for the British armies in BNA? The Train arrived in December and found no difficulty obtaining horses and drivers for the sledges to transport elements of the British army including artillery across New Brunswick. The cavalry would be unlikely to arrive until March so there would only be a few weeks to the end of the thaw and the fresh spring grasses would be available for the horses.

 

[frlmerrin]

Crimean war as a model for Trent outrage war

Sure they do, which explains why the grand total of British troops deployed to the Black Sea theater over two years of war was 93,000, which yielded - at the high point - some 50,000 men in theater at once; in the initial deployment the winter of 54-55, it was less than 30,000.
So, all those personnel - including the non-whites - are all going to be conscripted and to swim to North America?

I’m glad you mentioned the Crimean war; it is an excellent reminder of the likely course of a Trent outrage war. If you will recall that conflict the British and their allies defeated and humiliated the Russian Empire, destroying their economy in the process. The British engaged the Russians all around the globe and despite the fact that the Russian Empire had a far better navy during the Crimean War that the Union ever had in the American Civil War they could do absolutely nothing against the might of the Royal Navy. Yes, I am delighted you brought up this example of the application of British sea and military power against a second rank power. One shudders to imagine what they might do to a third rate power.
Your description of the logistics issues in the Crimean war is interesting but it is also irrelevant and misleading. By the end of the Crimean war in which the British and their allies completely defeated the Russian Empire the Royal Navy was running a very efficient supply operation for both the British army in the Crimea and most of the armies of Britain’s allies. The Crimea is considerably more remote from the British Isles than is St. John or Halifax or Quebec (when the river is open) or even New York City and the route through the Bay of Biscay, Mediterranean and Black Sea far more difficult to navigate than the simple, direct great circle route to New York City.
As you note there were initial difficulties in the supply operation but these were resolved. As the Crimean war was only 5 years before any proposed Trent outrage war scenario the Royal Navy is hardly likely to have forgotten how they ran the Crimean supply organisation. On top of that Halifax and the Union coast are far easier to get to than the Crimea. Oh and the man who sorted all the Crimean supply problems was one Alexander Milne … who was in 1861/2 the commander of the Royal Navy’s North America and West Indies Station.
So no, the proud Indian volunteers would not need to swim to war, on the other hand other than to quell any residual Union resistance on the West Coast why on Earth would the British need them? A sufficient military force to defend the Province of Canada and the Maritimes, some ship based raiding groups, some trainers for the CSA’s armies perhaps, defenders for Bermuda and the West Indies (I suspect most of those would be as you put it ‘non-white’ volunteers, they would make the West Indies regiment up to 8 battalions or again or more) is all they need. The Royal Navy can then destroy everything useful on the Union coast whilst the Merchant Marine runs supplies to the evil slaveholders in the Confederacy. The outcome would not be dissimilar to your splendid example of the Crimean war a British victory!

Your grasp of mobilization and logistics in a trans-oceanic war in the Nineteenth or Twentieth century is, um, unique - even your "friend" with a website has finally acknowledged the total number of regular British infantry battalions that even existed in the UK and Ireland (and BNA) and "might" have been available for a field force is somewhere around 45, which - at three battalions per brigade, three brigades per division, or roughly the same as what GCM organized the Army of the Potomac's divisions at in 1861, totals all of 15 brigades, or five divisions. The British Army of the East had 12 brigades, so it's not exactly a huge increase.
The same AotP alone numbered 14 such divisions before the end of 1861; in equivalent infantry divisions, the total strength of the US forces by the end of the year was approximately 45 or so such formations.

Four points to make.
1. I would be most interested to see Bryn’s take on your claim?
2. How many troops do you suggest were actually in the 14 divisions of the AoP at the end of 1861? I mean the ones that are really there as opposed to the book strength?
3. In a Trent outrage war how many troops would you propose to send north to the border, where will they come from? How many will you send to defend the Eastern coast and where do they come from? How many will stay facing the Confederates in the East and West? How many do you propose to send to California, if any?
4. I am not quite sure why you are enclosing the word friend in speech marks? Only two possibilities present themselves, either you are implying Bryn and I are lovers which is a somewhat distasteful public accusation given there is no evidence for it and it is very personal and offensive or, possibly, perhaps more likely, you are implying I am a sock puppet of Bryn Monnery which is getting a bit boring. Wasn’t it only a little while ago you were implying that poor old Rob Craufurd was Bryn? Who will be next I wonder? It appears every time someone disagrees with your absurd ideas and spinning of historical facts they get accused of being Bryn’s sock puppet. I suspect this is a further rhetorical device to promote your position and eliminate opposition. This is not an appropriate posting behavior.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?p=10925590&highlight=Tigers#post10925590

Your In addition, your "friend" with the website has - finally - acknowledged that the oft-cited "divisions" in the UK and Ireland in 1861 were, in fact, administrative organizations, not field formations, and the British battalions that historically were sent to BNA in the winter of 1861-62 were sent out as singletons, essentially, and any formations organized were ad hoc - as was, after all, British practice at the time and continued as such until the Twentieth Century.

Once again I would be most interested in Bryn’s view on your claims. I can’t remember him e-mailing me saying anything along the lines of ‘God damn that TFSmith121 was right all along’ in the last year.

<snip>

 

[Saphroneth]

On the Crimean invasion force:

The British used fifty-two sailing transports and twenty-seven steamers with 350 boats

Brown , David K (2015-09-09). Before the Ironclad: Warship Design and Development 1815-1860 (Kindle Locations 4535-4536). Seaforth Publishing. Kindle Edition.

This was, of course, when the steamer force in the UK was smaller. The force thus transported was 22,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, 3,000 engineers and 60 guns, plus supplies.



As for the fellow with a website (which should be understood to refer to 67th Tigers - his name does not cause milk to curdle) then his full post at
http://67thtigers.blogspot.co.uk/2016/04/british-regiments-at-home-1861-2-and.html
is worth linking - it seems to me to be a balanced treatment of the situation, as it raises a former error and explains it while also noting the plans the British had.

Conclusion

Britain did not have "only three divisions" at home. Divisions and brigades for foreign service were generated by assigning ready battalions from various stations.

In the UK we can divide (for a Trent war) the battalions in the UK December '61 into the following availabilities:

• Ordered to Canada: 18 battalions
• Ready for Canada if ordered: 17 bns (1/8th, 2/18th, 2/19th, 2/21st, 2/25th, 26th, 29th, 31st, 32nd, 41st, 49th, 53rd, 1/60th, 61st, 78th, 84th and 86th)
• Retraining after foreign service, available in spring '62: 9 bns (2/1st, 1/2nd, 1/3rd and 87th as first tranches, 1/5th, 1/24th, 37th, 64th and 73rd as second)
• Recovering from foreign service, remain at home: 1 bn (59th)

Total available comes to approx. 44 battalions. At establishment of 1,000 each, this means that total line infantry available is 44,000 - to add to which there are second line forces (volunteer militia), further regulars freed up from overseas service (potentially 59 more battalions as this is how many militia volunteered for overseas service in the Crimea) and Canadian locals.

The figure of 44,000 sounds low, but it is all line enlisted troops. Officers are not counted, and LOC troops are part of a separate organization - while US armies, particularly the Union, assigned troops to these tasks and then counted them as part of their line strength; similarly, counts of Union troops tend to include officers and indeed the sick list as part of the force. The sick list is valid to compare to the 44,000 (though Florence Nightingale's work will reduce the sick list of the British force); the officers are not, nor are detached troops.



Sherman notes in his Memoirs (and indeed in the Official Records) that on taking command of the Army of the Tennessee fully half his army consisted of non-combatants.



This means that one could call 44,000 British regular enlisted infantry the equivalent in actual line strength of something more like 65,000 Union infantry plus officers plus detachments. Add in the artillery (several thousand men in an army) and the cavalry, and the British force is actually fairly respectable - especailly as every man is a highly trained regular infantryman, comparable in accuracy to the US Sharpshooters (they had the same training scheme) and the force contained substantial numbers of recent combat veterans. (The force as of the Crimea was able to win the Alma within days of landing; there have been reforms and experience gained since.)


It's not able to win a war by itself; it is, however, going to take an Army of the Potomac scale force to resist (and the addition of the Canadians makes it worse). This is not an inconsiderable problem to the Union, which also must garrison the coast.

Ask oneself if the Union would do so well against the CSA as OTL if - instead of the Trent War - an ASB dematerialized 100,000 Union infantry and all their weapons, and also blew up the US navy while disallowing any US purchases of British manufactures. (ed: the ASB would also and separately make the Confederate coast sufficiently secure that the CSA would no longer need to guard their coasts.)


EDIT: fixed numbers on the establishment. It was being increased to 1,200 at the time of Trent but I have used the previous figure.

 

[TFSmith121]

Well, if the British can persuade the French, Turks, and Sardinians

I’m glad you mentioned the Crimean war; it is an excellent reminder of the likely course of a Trent - snip -

Four points to make.
1. I would be most interested to see Bryn’s take on your claim?
2. How many troops do you suggest were actually in the 14 divisions of the AoP at the end of 1861? I mean the ones that are really there as opposed to the book strength?
3. In a Trent outrage war how many troops would you propose to send north to the border, where will they come from? How many will you send to defend the Eastern coast and where do they come from? How many will stay facing the Confederates in the East and West? How many do you propose to send to California, if any?
4. I am not quite sure why you are enclosing the word friend in speech marks? - snip - Once again I would be most interested in Bryn’s view on your claims. I can’t remember him e-mailing me saying anything along the lines of ‘God damn that TFSmith121 was right all along’ in the last year.

Well, if the British can persuade the French, Turks, and Sardinians to join in against the US in 1862 (as opposed to their historical priorities, as in Mexico for the French, for example) you might have something resembling a case. Absolutely ASB, of course, but at least it would be a start.

Questions deserve answers:

1. Look at his website.

2. See below (with a link to an official source and everything!):

Dec. 31, 1861 – page 775 of the Official Records:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...2;node=waro0122:3;size=l;frm=frameset;seq=787


Present for duty
Florida (Brown) – 2012
Kansas (Hunter) – 7602
Missouri (Halleck) – 91227 (exception – all “present”)
New England (Butler) – 6466
New Mexico (Canby) – 4176
New York (Morgan) – 5223
Ohio (Buell) - 72379
Pacific (Wright) – 4632
Potomac (McCellan) – 183507
Virginia (Wool) – 10552
W. Virginia (Rosecrans) – 19500
Exp. Corps (Sherman - NC) – 13468
Pennsylvania – 4661

Total – 17,907 off.; 407,498 enlisted (425,405) “present for duty”; 477,193 “present” (includes present for duty: + 51,788 detached for temporary “extra or daily” duty; sick; and under arrest); total of 527,804 in service (so 50,611 “absent,” i.e. in service but not present with unit).

If one really wants to, the OR has the records down to the corps, division, brigade, regiment, battery, etc. level for all the US commands at various points during the conflict, and the various adjutant generals' and regimental reports have it down to the regimental, battalion, company, and battery level; interestingly enough, apparently despite the "outrage" over a couple hours delay in the mail, the Province of Canada - which never mobilized any battalions as such in the winter of 1861-62, apparently - does not keep or create any of the above records, at least not to the point that even EC can cite any such official records, as opposed to journalistic reports. Interesting, that.

3. See below:

New (2015) 19th Century TD Winner
Burnished Rows of Steel

Lays it out in great detail, in fact.

4. Go look at his website; most recent post acknowledges that all of 45 or so British regular battalions might have been available in the Atlantic world for deployment to BNA in this period, as well as acknowledging that both the British battalions historically sent to the BNA in this period were not grouped into formations prior to arriving and, in fact, this was standard British practive; the brigades and divisions formed for field service in this period by the British were generally ad hoc, and remained so until the Twentieth Century. Progress!

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Well, it's a start ... of course, one should (presumably)

It's not able to win a war by itself; it is, however, going to take an Army of the Potomac scale force to resist (and the addition of the Canadians makes it worse). This is not an inconsiderable problem to the Union, which also must garrison the coast.

Well, it's a start ... of course, one should (presumably) deal with the realities of the starting positions, as in:

a) US has 527,000 men organized, equipped, and in the field or ready for active service in the theater, with all the advantages of internal transportation in the winter of 1862;
b) British have (roughly) ~7,000 regulars in BNA, no mobilized Canadian provincial volunteers or militia, or volunteers/militia in the Maritimes, and (according to a British army estimate from later the same year) there will be less than 25,000 reservists worth the mention in the Province to either try and hold the line or serve as cadre for additional wartime mobilization units; they cannot, of course, do both;
c) British strategy (as per Bourne) was to mount not one but two separate offensives into US territory, including a hasty offensive into upstate New York with whatever was on hand when the balloon went up (shades of Saratoga or Plattsburgh, but even less well planned) and a separate second front into Maine, based on an amphibious expedition that could only be compared in size to the Crimean operations (absent the French, Turks, and Sardinians, of course) and which took the Allies (as they were) 12 months to complete - in addition, the Black Sea littoral is a somewhat more pleasant place to camp during the winter than Atlantic Maine;
d) all this is against an industrialized enemy with a vast network of internal steam transportation (riverine, rail, and canal) that was so much more extensive than anything in southern Russia its astronomical and (by the way) a navy that, in fact, made a point of fighting the British, at sea and in littoral and coastal waters (again, somewhat different than the Russians in 1854-55).

So, more than a little different strategic situation; good of you to acknowledge it.

Best,

 

[frlmerrin]

Response to Sceonn

While I am by no means an expert, allow me to state my opinion on this.

Go for it.

Britain could not gain overall numerical superiority over the Union on the fields. The cost of mobilisation is not at all comparable between them, the british would need a massive logistical effort to do the same.

Well the British were well on their way to putting 50,000 regular troops into eastern continental BNA before the start of the thaw when the OTL Trent Affair was resolved. I don’t think that there is much question that they would have been able to achieve at least this and probably have these numbers up to 80,000 by summer at latest simply by extending the charters on the merchant ships they were using as transports. This was the maximum number of regular troops the British felt they could sustain in the eastern continental BNA. In addition to this the British can raise somewhere between 46,000 and 100,000 militia and volunteers in the Province of Canada and some 20,000 in the Maritimes. This gives them a force of some 200,000 in eastern continental BNA. Both the British and Union planners felt that 80,000 was bout the maximum number of troops the Union could sustain on its northern borders/the Province of Canada in a situation where they were still fighting the CSA in the south. Clearly in this situation the British have a better than 2:1 advantage, in defence with better weapons.
However, the scenario the British are planning for is where the Union and the Confederacy come to terms and the bulk of the Union armies come north against BNA. Although with hindsight we see this as highly unlikely at the time it was considered a credible scenario by the British Cabinet, diplomats and some military planners. In this situation the Union still has to keep some forces on the border with the Confederacy and to defend the coast but they can send upwards of 300,000 troops against BNA. In this scenario the British are outnumbered but still have the advantage being in defence with better weapons.
The nightmare scenario for the British, however unlikely we might think it now, was where the Union reunites with the Confederacy and they nearly all come north. So something like 700,000 troops. In this case the British situation in BNA is grave (overall they will still win the war as the Union and Confederate economies will still collapse). Both British and Union cabinet ministers considered this a real possibility.

Also while the british are capable of transporting troops, those troops are indisposed. The british empire was built on steel, and held by steel! That steel is her military scattered across her empire. Removing troops from India would result in losing India. Same with South Africa, with hostile natives still around, and all of her Colonies apart from canada. I don't see britain leaving the home isle vulnerable by sending so much of its manpower across the atlantic.

The 80,000 troops for BNA are available and can be sustained at that level. They don’t need to strip India. The most they might want from India is a few battalions to complete the subjugation of California. They don’t really need any troops from the Cape although they might want to reposition one of the West Indies regiment battalions at Lagos back to the West Indies? The Empire is peaceful at this time. The only serious threat is the Waikato war which in OTL the British started, if they don’t start it in TTL it won’t happen.

The british have also never raised the kind of manpower necessary to wage war on such a scale prior to WWI, and would not stomach it. The british contribution would be mainly naval and coastal penetration along with the defense of canada.

You are confusing my post comparing ‘like with like’ and pointing out the emptiness of one poster’s arguments with a serious suggestion that the British might actually need to build up an army corresponding to 10% of the population in order to deal with a third rate power. 80,000 troops and 120,000 millita and volunteers in east continental BNA, say 5,000 or so on the Pacific, 10,000 marines and 10,000 troops for amphibious operations, an additional 5,000 or so max. in the West Indies, maybe a 1,000 instructors for the CSA and a few thousand to support a Confederate thrust up the Mississippi - job done.

 

[Saphroneth]

The question also arises as to what "such a scale" means. The British in OTL peacetime:

(figures via RobCraufurd)

The British regular army on 31 March 1854 is 132,032 officers and men. The British regular army on 1 November 1861 is 219,216 officers and men, plus the 114,003 militia who turned up to training in 1861, plus c.162,935 enrolled volunteers (earliest return, for 1863).

Now, 220,000 officers and men, plus 114,000 militia, plus 163,000 volunteers, comes to a total not far shy of 500,000 men. This is just peacetime troops from the metropole, all armed, and all of them at least somewhat trained.

It's also clearly over the size of the Confederate army at any one time. So the British had enough troops in their army in peacetime that they could fight "on such a scale" - given that the standard British practice is to spend lots of money in order to spend fewer men, it seems fairly clear that the British could fight on the right order of scale if they had to.


It may be that someone will object and say that this figure does not allow for garrisoning the Empire. Indeed it does not; however, in the Crimea, approx. 1/3 of the militia battalions volunteered for overseas service. If we assume that, due to the Volunteers for home defence, the entire Home Establishment sans training troops (80,000 total, officers and men) may be sent, and that the Colonial Establishment (50,000) may largely be freed up by British militia going overseas to take over their garrisons, we come to approx. 120,000. The Indian Establishment (70,000 white troops plus sepoys) is not touched; it is mostly defending India.
Quite a large army even counting 1:1 commonality between Early 1862 US troops and long-service professional British troops - which is not supported by any evidence or logic, since this force of 100,000 or so British regulars available in extremis is universally armed with either the best weapons the Union has (Enfield rifle muskets, considered superior to Springfields by the CSA) or weapons the Union has not a hope of equalling (the RBL 12 lber 8 cwt field gun, a fairly reliable - for the day - breech-loading gun capable of accurate fire to a distance beyond the capabilities of the largely smoothbore Union artillery park, and rather more rapidly. It even has a traverse screw, which no common Union piece has.) They're also trained to the standard the Union allocated only to their most elite units, across the whole army, and a substantial fraction of them were with the army which took the heights at the Alma - a feat the Union could not repeat, because they failed against the weaker defences at Fredericksburg.

120,000 Union vs 72,500 Confederates (1.66 to 1)
61,000 Allies vs 36,400 Russians (1.68 to 1)
325 Union guns vs 260 Confederate guns (1.25 to 1)
132 Allied guns vs 120 Russian guns (1.1 to 1)
Climb at Fredericksburg 20m
Climb at the Alma 117m
Casualties at Fredericksburg: 12,653 Union to 5,377 Confederate (2.35 to 1)
Casualties at the Alma: 3,342 Allied to 5,709 Russian (0.59 to 1)

To it can be added another 100,000-odd Canadian militia, and of course the world's largest navy by just about any measure.


If the British cannot fight on the scale of the American Civil War, nor can the Confederacy - and nor can anyone but Russia fight on the scale of WW2.

 

[TFSmith121]

Interestingly enough, for anyone who wants to consider these issues

The question also arises as to what "such a scale" means. The British in OTL peacetime: (figures via RobCraufurd)

Now, 220,000 officers and men, plus 114,000 militia, plus 163,000 volunteers, comes to a total not far shy of 500,000 men. This is just peacetime troops from the metropole, all armed, and all of them at least somewhat trained.

- snip -

To it can be added another 100,000-odd Canadian militia, and of course the world's largest navy by just about any measure.

Interestingly enough, for anyone who wants to consider these questions, one can find actual official sources, both British and "Canadian" that provide actual official numbers for what was available for overseas and/or active service in BNA at this point, and - thanks to Google books - available for free. One simply has to search for them.


It is worth noting, of course, that the British army itself did not expect more than 24,119 reserve personnel (volunteers and militia) of any military utility at all in the entire Province of Canada as late as August, 1862, and no more than 1850 in New Brunswick, 2401 in Nova Scotia, 1,643 in PEI, and 267 in Nova Scotia (plus 44 in BC etc.), as according to:

Petrie, Capt. Martin (14th F.) and James, Col. Sir Henry (RE - Topographical and Statistical Dept., War Office), Organization, Composition, and Strength of the Army of Great Britain, London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office; by direction of the Secretary of State for War, 1863 (preface dated Nov., 1862)

Reserves – BNA:
Canada – 10,000 militia (August, 1862); + 1,615 VC; 1,687 VA; 202 VE; 10,615 VI
NS – 269 VA; 2,132 VI (June, 1862)
NB – 1850 (VA and I) (March, 1861)
PEI – 1,643 (VA and VI) (June, 1862)
NF – 267 (5 cos.) (July, 1862)
BC & VI: 44 (August, 1862)

Could those numbers have been increased, in the event of conflict?

Of course, but every one of the 25,000 or so listed diverted from the (semi) organized reserve forces to becoming cadre for new wartime units is one less who can try and hold a line in the meantime. And, obviously, if the BNAers can mobilize additional wartime units, so can the Americans, which is where that whole 22 million demographic becomes useful. Numbers, as always, matter.

All in all, by going through the British Army Lists for 1861 and 1862 and the Canadian provincial militia summary (the 1867 one was used for the BROS OOBs, just to be as "charitable" as possible toward what a planned structure for the force would be, despite the obvious press of events in a Anglo-American war that breaks out in early 1862.)

In comes out to about eight divisions of infantry (three brigades each) and two of cavalry, including every British regular army battalion historically in BNA, the West Indies, Britain, Ireland, and the Channel Islands, plus two brigades worth from the Mediterranean garrisons, and a a realistic number of Province of Canada troops and Colony of New Brunswick troops, split between (as the British planned, historically) two entirely separate campaigns, one in upstate New York and/or Upper/Lower Canada and the other in Maine, plus militia defense forces in New Brunswick and the other Maritime colonies.

It's worth noting, of course, the entire British regular army in 1862 numbered as follows:

British Regular Forces – 218,309 officers and men (includes active forces, depot and garrison troops, and overseas “local and colonial” forces; of these, there are 192,852 “active” and 25,457 garrison and depot troops.)

Source is Petrie and James for numbers; source for total available regular infantry and cavalry battalions/regiments and the resulting expeditionary forces (including the BNA-raised battalions, such as they were) are:

Hart, Col. H.G. (Depot Battalion – h.p.), The New Annual Army List and Militia List for 1862, London: John Murray (pub. – printed by Woodfall and Kinder), 50 Albermarle Street, 1862 (corrected to 30 Dec., 1861) material below drawn from (PDF/book) p. 162/125;

Wily, Thomas {Lt. Col., Militia Dept., (Province of Canada) Ottawa} Annual Volunteer and Service Militia List of Canada; G.E. Debarats, Ottawa, 1st March, 1867; by authority, Provincial Parliament, Office of the Registrar;

All of the above are available via Google books, for anyone who wants to review these issues themselves. So are the Navy Lists, for that matter, as in:

The Navy List, Corrected to the 20th December, 1861: John Murray; W. Clowes and Sons, London, 1862

Worth noting, the above expeditionary totals amount to a field force roughly twice the size (in brigades) as what the British were able to sustain in the Crimean in 1854-55. And that's it, no more, no less, and this at a time when the US forces had the equivalent of 48 infantry division equivalents organized along the same lines as the British divisions sketched above. So, the odds are about 6-1. Include the rebels, and it drops to about 3-2, which suggests the obvious "Britain First" strategy of a major American offensive into Upper and Lower Canada, defense of the eastern seaboard, and a mix of the defensive and limited offensive strategy to the south. Common sense, actually.

So, in essence, unless the Americans are willfully and unrealistically and ahistorically foolish, they can gain control of the Province of Canada and points west to the Rockies in BNA over the space of a campaign season. The British can defend the Maritimes, for obvious reasons, but in any realistic situation based on war breaking out early in 1862, odds are very much against them defending the Province of Canada (i.e., Upper and Lower/Canada West and Canada East).

At least not based on the official records; your mileage may vary.

Best,

 

[galveston bay]

The limit on the size of the French army in Mexico was primarily that the British would not allow the French Government to charter British merchant ships for the venture, the French at this time having a small and largely coastal merchant marine. In order to save money the French decided to use major warships as troop transports. In order to make space for the troops these ship had their guns stored in their holds and hence rendering them ineffective as warships. If we are in a situation where the French Mexican adventure never really starts (as in a Trent outrage war) and the French ally with the British against the Union the British are not likely to refuse them access to transports. Neither are most of the British transports carrying French troops likely to have to travel all the way to Vera Cruz. On top of this in a war with the Union the French are going to be far more aggressive in taking ships out of reserve which they did not really do for the Mexican adventure. So we could expect significantly more French troops deployed against the Union than they sent to Mexico and Cochin China and the Magreb. We can also expect many more French warships to be deployed against the Union than the modest blockade observation squadron, Pacific squadron and ships in the West Indies deployed to North America in OTL.
We don't really see serious tensions in Europe that would make the French want all of the army at home until the Austro-Prussian in 1866. The Danish war and the Polish rising were not that great a cause for concern in OTL.

Two points to make here.
1) I think you are missing the point of my post. TFSmith121 has on a number of occasions gone on endlessly about how the militia of the BNA is a minnow compared with the mighty mightiness of the Union. I thought just for once we should compare like for like and on the same basis. You may if you wish see this as an exercise in the reduction of his/her arguments to the point of absurdity. You should not read my post as suggesting that the entire British Empire including the camel corps and the elephant polo team turns up at the Washington Naval yard one day and a small midshipman in a particularly cool uniform and top is sent to the Oval Office to shout "Oi! You Lincoln! Give us Mason and Slidell now or we shall proceed to spank your little army soooo badly you won't have enough vinegar and brown paper to put it back together again". What I am saying is - compare like with like. Comparing the militia of the BNA alone with that of the Union is a rhetorical device constructed with the sole purpose of winning an argument whilst avoiding the truth of the matter. On top of that it is a logical fallacy too!
2) If you look at military numbers in the Confederacy and Union as a fraction of the labour force rather than of the population as a whole you discover that the Union economy was stressed more than that of the Confederacy. This is because the large slave population of the Confederacy both male and female, quite young to very old was all part of the labour force but not significantly part of the army. In these terms the Confederacy never reached 10% in military service. In terms of the white population it most certainly did.

There was no shortage of grain in Britain in OTL 1861/2 and there is no reason to expect this to change in any Trent outrage war scenario. There were a number of reasons for this but two main ones. First, because the Union grain merchants dumped the large quantities of grain that was originally intended to be sold south on the international market and most was brought by the British merchants for resale. Second, the Baltic wheat trade was controlled by the British grain merchants and they were buying up Russian wheat, the trade in which had been steadily recovering since the resolution of the Crimean war. It is true there were poor harvests in western Europe for two years but they were not famines and they had no significant effect on the price of bread in Britain. I would also expect a large number of broke Union farmers will take up grain smuggling into the Province of Canada.
Similarly there is no reason to expect that there would be a shortage of any other food on the European markets. I note in passing that the Crimean war had no impact on the supply of food to the French or British, neither would war with the Union.
I can see no reason why any British or French armies in North America should be short of food. If they are in BNA there should be ample local food supplies, similarly if they are occupying parts of New England or New York state or California then it should be possible to supply them locally too. Those elements of the army involved in raiding the Union coast from ships, small in number could be supplied by the merchant marine from either BNA, occupied areas on the Union border or from the home islands.

The British merchant marine is huge during this period; it is at least as proportionately large compared to that of other nations as the RN is. On top of this as soon as a Trent outrage war starts the entire foreign trade merchant marine of the Union will either reflag or be blockaded in port or will try the coastal trade. Based on the large number of ships that the tiny number of Confederate commerce raiders in OTL caused to reflag (many different values have been suggested Carlisle 2012 claims 1069) one would expect at least 2,000 Union ships great and small to reflag most to the British. This will significantly increase the size of the British merchant marine.
The British had enough large Atlantic liners/mail ships OTL to put a large British army in the Province of Canada. For the Trent affair they hired thirteen large steam ships at the beginning of December for three trips across the Atlantic each. They carried troops, guns, small arms for the militias. One additional ship was sent with troops and guns for Bermuda. One more was sent to the Pacific station with arms and ammunition. The Trent Affair was resolved when the Union Cabinet capitulated to British demands and before a second trip was required by the Atlantic troop ships. At no time during the charter of these ships did the mail services across the Atlantic or indeed elsewhere suffer.
Further Milne had thirty colliers sent out to key points on his station with war stocks of Welsh steam coal in the build up to hostilities. This was an entirely commercial exercise.
Why do you think that fodder cannot be found for the British armies in BNA? The Train arrived in December and found no difficulty obtaining horses and drivers for the sledges to transport elements of the British army including artillery across New Brunswick. The cavalry would be unlikely to arrive until March so there would only be a few weeks to the end of the thaw and the fresh spring grasses would be available for the horses.

lets start from the beginning

the limit of the French Army in Mexico was not simply shipping.. The biggest army they ever deployed overseas to this point was Crimea, roughly 300,000 men deployed including naval personnel (and 95,000 dead, overwhelmingly from disease... cholera is nasty stuff). In Mexico they sent 70,000. So lets say you are right, and they can afford to send more even though they have to monitor events in Italy and Germany. At most figure 200,000 men (assuming the other 100,000 sent to Crimea were replacements). That does give the French, excluding naval personnel, about a field army in size. The question is when does it get to North America? Presumably the British are using their merchant marine and naval transports to move their troops and supplies as the priority, and the two powers are hardly close allies, even (or perhaps because) of Crimea. My guess is that it arrives substantially later than the British Army.. at best. Where does it go? It seems unlikely to head for Mexico and I can't imagine the British want a French Army anywhere near Quebec, so perhaps Louisiana or somewhere else (Charleston the other likely port, perhaps Mobile or Wilmington)

Which means it has establish and maintain a lengthy and large line of communications home to keep it fed, as the South can barely feeds its own armies. This will be very expensive, as even if just the French merchant marine is used there are the costs of chartering ships, the opportunity costs lost as merchant shipping is taken out of trade etc. Sure they could charter British ships but then French money is going to the British which will upset the balance of payments rather impressively.

A soldier needs 3 lbs of food a day, a draft animal between 8-16 pounds (varies on size of animal), and the average field army has about 1 animal per 3 men in this century (and well into World War 2 for that matter), so you do the math, but the 180,000 men and 60,000 animals works out to a lot of pounds per day doesn't it?

as to the point of your post...the reducto ad absurdum style of debate generally makes the user look more foolish then his target. There is no reason to respect such an argument and I do not. Frankly it comes across as trolling to me.

as to the Southern Labor force benefiting from slavery.. it depends. A lot actually. As the Union Armies moved into the South that slave labor force voted with their feet in staggering numbers, markedly hurting the Southern agricultural economy. Indeed on many occasions Southern slave owners were unwilling to even loan out their slaves for vital projects...like digging fortifications. The Civil War is full of examples. No Civil War history that I have seen, and I have read dozens over the 45 years I have been reading them, as ever indicated that at any point the North faced a serious labor problem, particularly as immigrants were still flooding in during the entire war. While a British naval blockade would temporarily end that, there are plenty of women in the American labor force (just as in English factories) and at worst the factories have to pay more money in wages.

as to grain... there are readily available statistics on the world grain market in the 1860s.. you should look at them closely. Half of all grain exported (or more depending on year) is from the United States in the 1860s. Block that grain and prices will climb markedly and quickly. But we have had this discussion before. You assertion simply pretends that this discussion hasn't been gone over. While famine will not loom in Europe, prices will climb very quickly, and this is not going to make the British government popular at home or in Europe. Particularly if the Anglo-French armies buy it by the thousands of tons to feed their armies and thus cause the price to climb further.

Moving supplies ... there are plenty of sources that show that after about 250 miles, a horse drawn wagon team will eat more than they carry. Thus the value of railways and internal waterways. There is exactly one railroad going into the United States from Canada. So assuming the British need all the rail they can get to support their own forces, that means the French are now relying on the terribly overburdened Confederate railways which are barely holding together even in 1861 (as they imported their rolling stock and rails primarily from the North)

As to getting grain from the Americans... sure, how is it getting to Canada exactly? By wagon? Certainly not by rail and it won't be via the Great Lakes either, as there is no way, short of ASB assumptions, that the British will ever control the Great Lakes in any war after 1812 (and they lost them during that one too).

in short, your argument deserves to be dismissed as absurd

 

[galveston bay]

I’m glad you mentioned the Crimean war; it is an excellent reminder of the likely course of a Trent outrage war. If you will recall that conflict the British and their allies defeated and humiliated the Russian Empire, destroying their economy in the process. The British engaged the Russians all around the globe and despite the fact that the Russian Empire had a far better navy during the Crimean War that the Union ever had in the American Civil War they could do absolutely nothing against the might of the Royal Navy. Yes, I am delighted you brought up this example of the application of British sea and military power against a second rank power. One shudders to imagine what they might do to a third rate power. .

indeed, Naval History is full of successful wars by the Russian Navy when they are not fighting the Turks. As to power, sure, the second largest industrial power on the planet and the largest exporter of grain is indeed a third rate power when it already has 400 ships and nearly a million men under arms in 1862 from a standing start of 60 ships and 100,000 men (including militia) in 1861. Also, who won the Battle of Lake Erie and Lake Champlain again?

While a full scale total war between the British Empire and the United States would be bad, as the the War of 1812 didn't collapse the economy, only the treasury, I suspect that you are impressively off base in your assertion here.

As to the American coast..you need to read this book "The Struggle for Sea Power: A naval history of the American Revolution" which discusses at length the particular difficulties of approaching Boston, New York and Philadelphia harbors due to sand banks, narrow channels and heavy currents not to mention of course the defenses, which are state of the art as of 1862. Charleston in 1863 proved that ironclads cannot pound forts into submission, and Farragut had his successes by bypassing the forts at high speed (and he had pilots who knew the local conditions at Mobile Bay and New Orleans). The Royal Navy could barely raid at will in 1814, and even then they avoided heavily defended ports. They landed on a beach and walked to Washington and the fleet only faced a single fort. No such weakness exists in 1861 on the Union coast, much less in 1862

Clearly sir you are no naval historian if you believe in all seriousness that the RN can routinely raid an unguarded American coast without suffering serious attrition in the process


as to Bryn, it is hard to take him seriously after in a discussion with me he stated that McClellan was the best general the Union Army had. So while I enjoy reading some of his Traveller 2300 roleplaying source material, I cannot take his conclusions about the American Civil War seriously

 

[TFSmith121]

Considering the difficulties the French had deploying and

in short, your argument deserves to be dismissed as absurd

Considering the difficulties the French had deploying and sustaining an army of ~172,000 men into northern Italy in 1859, with all the advantages of overland movement by interconnected railways and by sea from one set of developed ports to another via coastal steamships, and adjacent borders, and distances from the French frontier at Menton via Genoa to the "front" at Alessandria of all of 136 miles, and in a conflict that began in the northern hemisphere spring and lasted less than 90 days, it's a little more than that...

Most of these discussions would be made greatly more realistic if all parties concerned used the "get directions" applet and "terrain" view on Google maps.

Those little black lines running across the topography in the terrain view are very useful for those who have never carried a pack and a weapon from Point a to Point b via shank's mare - even without someone waiting for you at Point b - or even worse, along the way - with malice in their hearts.

Over hill, over dale, and along the dusty trail, etc.

Best,

 

[galveston bay]

war debts

so presumably the British and French governments are still paying off debts from the Crimean War

How big was that debt, how are the payments in terms of proportion of treasury outlays (for both), how does that debt add to the French debt from the recent war with Austria and the debt the British also incurred from their recent war in India.

How big a debt will a major war with the United States add to this?

While I feel reasonably comfortable that the British can handle it (after all, the Napoleonic Wars were vastly expensive although that debt took 20 years of austerity for the British to pay off) I am less convinced that the French can handle it. While the Americans have gold and silver (and lots of it, not even counting the riches from the Pacific Coast... Gold Rush in Denver in the middle of the Civil War after all) and the British have a huge financial sector and even bigger mercantile sector, the French are behind both in that respect.

So how much money do the British and French have to spend? This is not rhetorical, I am curious and do not have quickly available resources to research this, while I suspect some of you guys might. While the British government might lose an election if they go to far (in spending vs successful military activity), Napoleon is not as firmly on his seat. He doesn't stand for election and his predecessor in power was kicked out of office by the Paris mob. (which will turn up again in 1870 as well).

 

[RodentRevolution]

Especially for someone like me for whom 19th century North America is very much outside my specialty.

You know you could actually read EnglishCanuck's posts especially his story posts whose footnotes tend to cite numerous contemporary and more recent scholarly sources. As to the British being really rather strong in the 19th Century there is in fact a rather hugely significant piece of evidence regarding the matter....the existence of the British Empire

You do not get to keep that much stuff without being rather tough. You might note how the Empire declined once it was no longer so far ahead of the game relative to its peers as would happen in the 20th Century.

The idea that the USA was born a superpower is a myth and ignores the hard work that went into building a nation and in fact demeans that hard work.

 

[Karolus Rex]

Great Updates EC, but I have one quick question for you.

Given that until late 1862 both sides suffered from severe lack of ammunition and weapons, and the CSA would continue to suffer from this until the end, what measures is the Union making to ensure that their production capacity expands?

I ask this because in a Trent War the CSA would find it easier to import more military supplies from the UK, given that the blockade would be weakened, while the Union, that by August 1862 had imported 726,000 rifles, would find the British markets blocked and their ability to safely bring European war supplies weakened.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

A good and detailed update into how Canada's preparations for the upcoming conflict and interesting to note how their council contrasts with that of the US. Will we see more insight into France in this version of the timeline?

There will be some more insight into France this time around, but I probably won't be posting too much about them until summer 1862, so a few chapters to go before that

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Great Updates EC, but I have one quick question for you.

Given that until late 1862 both sides suffered from severe lack of ammunition and weapons, and the CSA would continue to suffer from this until the end, what measures is the Union making to ensure that their production capacity expands?

I ask this because in a Trent War the CSA would find it easier to import more military supplies from the UK, given that the blockade would be weakened, while the Union, that by August 1862 had imported 726,000 rifles, would find the British markets blocked and their ability to safely bring European war supplies weakened.

Well the Union had imported many rifles come early 1862 (and had been doing so since April 1861) and a while ago I averaged that number out and even absent British weapons shipped from December 1861 onwards the number of rifles bought from Belgium, Austria, France, and the various German states (and including domestic production) the number of rifles available in Union hands still comes to around 600,000+ or so. Of course the implementation of blockade would seriously curb this supply as even the threat of action would cause insurance rates to sky rocket for ships travelling to and from the US.

On terms of saltpetre and powder, well this puts the Union down 2300 tons from what the total was historically. This DuPont purchase from Britain was a big boost the the dwindling domestic stocks, but other sources like the German states and Belgium were still exporting. The loss of the DuPont purchase would be painful, but not crippling to the Union efforts (and I intend to address how the government can make up the difference in another chapter) and so would probably cause an inquiry into how to improve the domestic industry much earlier than OTL.

The biggest winner of this would of course be, the Confederacy. British arms and powder could be supplied to them, ending a serious problem for the Confederacy. The French too might then find that previous contracts made to the Northern government are suddenly "unprofitable"...

Of course any opening up of Southern ports to foreign commerce has immense ramifications but I will address these at a later date

 

[Saphroneth]

I'll simply state here that this is a point EC and I differ on - I feel that the imported rifles deficit would not allow for an expansion in 1862 over OTL of any reasonable scale (since, after all, OTL they'd practically run out of percussion smoothbores let alone rifles).

I believe the difference is probably in our counting methods - I start with the state as of 30 June 1862 and count down, EC counts up. I feel mine is a better way to handle weapon wastage (known to be severe in the Americas, some battles ended with upwards of 15,000 rifles abandoned), but as I say it's a difference of opinion.

 

[Saphroneth]

As an aside, it's a bit self indulgent but I decided to work out how much materiel the SS Great Eastern could carry - it's the largest transport ship in the world, true, and not representative, but I thought I'd be funny about it.


SS Great Eastern
GRT 18,195 tons

One 12-lber plus 250 rounds: 8 cwt (gun barrel and breech) plus trail (unknown) plus 250 x (12 lb plus 1lb 8oz for propellant).
Gun approx. 0.5 ton, ammunition approx. 1.5 tons. 2 tons total.

Field artillery plus ammunition for campaign: 300 tons for 150 guns.


One Enfield rifle musket plus 200 rounds: 9.5 lb (rifle) plus 40g per cartridge.
Rifle approx. 4.3 kg, ammunition approx. 8 kg, 12.3 kg total.

Rifles plus ammunition for campaign: 1,476 tonnes for 120,000 rifles.

100 rounds extra training allotment for entire Canadian militia (upper bound of 100,000 men) = 800 tonnes.


Food for one man for one day = 9 lb (massive overestimate).
Assume the campaign lasts four months.
Food for one man for the campaign = 1/2 ton.
Remaining weight on ship: 15,500 tonnes.
You can feed 31,000 men for four months (with large rations, to boot) from the remaining weight on the ship. Functionally you'd be sourcing food locally and getting it in multiple shipments instead, of course, but a run from the Great Eastern is basically a months' food for 120,000 men, and enough weapons and ammunition to supply that army for an intensive campaign..


(Though it occurs to me that, in the way of things, it's reasonably likely that the British will feed their armies with US grain!:
No US embargo - food sold to Prussians, Prussians sell it to British, British ship it back to the US (wah wah waaaah)
US embargo - food not sold to anyone, farmers have lots of grain they can't sell, Canadians buy it and smuggle it across border!)

 

[galveston bay]

As an aside, it's a bit self indulgent but I decided to work out how much materiel the SS Great Eastern could carry - it's the largest transport ship in the world, true, and not representative, but I thought I'd be funny about it.


SS Great Eastern
GRT 18,195 tons

One 12-lber plus 250 rounds: 8 cwt (gun barrel and breech) plus trail (unknown) plus 250 x (12 lb plus 1lb 8oz for propellant).
Gun approx. 0.5 ton, ammunition approx. 1.5 tons. 2 tons total.

Field artillery plus ammunition for campaign: 300 tons for 150 guns.


One Enfield rifle musket plus 200 rounds: 9.5 lb (rifle) plus 40g per cartridge.
Rifle approx. 4.3 kg, ammunition approx. 8 kg, 12.3 kg total.

Rifles plus ammunition for campaign: 1,476 tonnes for 120,000 rifles.

100 rounds extra training allotment for entire Canadian militia (upper bound of 100,000 men) = 800 tonnes.


Food for one man for one day = 9 lb (massive overestimate).
Assume the campaign lasts four months.
Food for one man for the campaign = 1/2 ton.
Remaining weight on ship: 15,500 tonnes.
You can feed 31,000 men for four months (with large rations, to boot) from the remaining weight on the ship. Functionally you'd be sourcing food locally and getting it in multiple shipments instead, of course, but a run from the Great Eastern is basically a months' food for 120,000 men, and enough weapons and ammunition to supply that army for an intensive campaign..


(Though it occurs to me that, in the way of things, it's reasonably likely that the British will feed their armies with US grain!:
No US embargo - food sold to Prussians, Prussians sell it to British, British ship it back to the US (wah wah waaaah)
US embargo - food not sold to anyone, farmers have lots of grain they can't sell, Canadians buy it and smuggle it across border!)

wikipedia states specifically regarding the Great Easterns second voyage that she was carrying troops on special charter in 1861 for the British government from Britain to Quebec. It specifically lists the number of passengers, although skips over what cargo is carried. One would assume at the very least the standard equipment and basic supplies for the troops aboard.

as to feeding British troops on US grain? A bit optimistic aren't you? besides as the shooting isn't likely to start until spring, and typically harvest is in autumn, hopefully they have some food to tide them over before the American farmers in the Midwest roll over and hand over to the invading army their food

How is the British Army getting to the Midwest? That is were the bulk of the US grain crop is grown. Maine and Massachusetts and upper New York State are not big grain producing regions (and never were), as the ground is mostly rocks with a thin layer of soil and thus farms are more commonly stockraising (dairy and pigs and chickens), or small family farms. In fact one reason that the US Midwest was mainly settled by New Englanders is because the farm land in the Midwest in so much better. The population of New England saw a considerable outflow in the decades pre-Civil War, and those who didn't go west moved into towns and cities.

Which is why most of that part of the US is now towns surrounded by second growth timber and a few stock farms.

geography matters... if you are going to talk about campaigns in the Northeastern part of the United States it is really important to understand the terrain and vegetation and local geography

also, generally speaking its 3 pounds a man, 5 including containers (be it wooden barrels or MRE foil, it seems to take up pretty much the same amount of bulk over the last few centuries). Canada can easily feed troops in garrison and probably their animals in garrison. It is when they leave garrison that the logistics are going to be tough as moving supplies, especially fodder, is a major reason American Armies in the Civil War, and European Armies from the 15th Century onward tried very hard to remain within a couple of hundred miles or less of a major river or railroad and why entire Civil War campaigns were delayed to ensure supply lines were secure via rail or river.

 

[Saphroneth]

Addendum on food consumption.

A soldier in the field requires about 6,000 calories a day to be completely healthy. This is a lot more than most ACW armies actually managed, but we'll go with it.

Assume it's all corn (maize). This is at 3.6 calories per gram, so a daily human intake is a little under 2 kg and our earlier estimate of 9 lb (which is 4 kg) is high. An army of 100,000 would need 200 tonnes a day, which is a reasonably sized ship a week, or the SS Great Eastern's spare space for two months. An army of 50,000 would of course have half the requirement, and if we have the army get by on a civilian level of food (3,000 calories a day) then we're also halving the requirement.

Assume it's all potatoes. This is much less efficient, at 0.77 calories per gram, and as such it comes out at 7.8 kg per man per day. This would make our earlier estimate a low one, and effectively quadruples the calculation used for corn. Great Eastern is able to supply excellent rations for 100,000 for two weeks, or moderate rations for 50,000 for two months.



All the above calculations are predicated on the idea that the soldiers are only eating food shipped from Britain, rather than simply purchasing/foraging locally (though the horses are assumed to eat local - perhaps the Army is made up of hipsters). Historically the British were better than most not so much at foraging but at paying for it, so they may do reasonably well at supplementing food shipments from home.