Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

[EnglishCanuck]

I'm convinced you guys spend more time arguing than writing the TLs at this point. :|

Well trust me when I say I've put far more into writing this TL the next chapter will hopefully be up tomorrow.

Not to say that it isn't a fab piece of work, so please keep it up EnglishCanuck!

Thanks I hope you enjoy it!

The British can use their naval superiority in the pacific to raid and land troops all along the west coast

The Pacific coast certainly is an interesting theater. Neither side really has what you would call an abundance of resources, and thanks to the lack of a transcontinental railroad on either side of the 49th parallel each is vastly separated from the main theater of war in the East.

I'll have a few chapters dealing with that in this war, and whose to say it won't play a role in whatever next war comes along

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 7: Marching as to War Pt. 1​

“The British will change the whole course of the war; they will destroy seriatim every naval vessel; they will lay all the cities on the seaboard under contribution… I will notify the governors and municipal authorities in the North to take instant measures to protect their harbors. I have no doubt that the enemy are at this minute on their way to Washington, and it is not unlikely that we shall have a shell or a cannon ball from one of their guns in the White House before we leave the room.” – Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton in a cabinet meeting January 1862[1]

“With the departure of Lyons and the British delegation from Washington most were resigned to the idea that a violent rupture in relations was in the near future. Though some in the cabinet (notably Chase) felt that perhaps Lincoln’s proposal of mediation might be accepted Lincoln himself addressed the cabinet upon hearing the news that “We must now act as though war with Britain were inevitable” and in his characteristic manner set about preparing the cabinet and the nation for just such an eventuality.

The greatest problem facing Lincoln and his government at this juncture was that they had neither expected, nor prepared for war with Britain. All the nations resources had been mobilized for a fight in the South and as Winfield Scott would memorably say “our armies were facing the wrong way”. However, what it lacked in preparation it did make up for in experience. All but one of the eight army bureau heads had fought in the war of 1812 and many senior officers of the navy had seen action in that conflict. As such there was an institutional memory of that conflict throughout the military departments. They had a further boon of having observed both sides of the Crimean War via a military mission consisting of George B. McClellan current General in Chief at the outbreak of hostilities, Richard Delafield, then chief of the New York harbor defences, and Alfred Mordecai who had not yet re-enlisted[2].

One of the first priorities of the Lincoln administration upon the departure of the British legation was to ‘clean house’ in both the cabinet and the major departments commanding the war. One of the first casualties of this sweep was the incumbent Secretary of War, Simon Cameron.

Cameron had been selected to the cabinet for political rather than professional reasons. Though he had made a fortune in business he proved increasingly unable to keep up with the rigorous demands of his office. Having disdained the use of a secretary he increasingly seemed to run the War Department out of his pockets. When asked where he kept his files he replied “Here under my hat.” With the prospect of the war expanding he became increasingly tense and irritable in cabinet meetings and proved highly disorganized and the department increasingly became reviled as a ‘lunatic asylum’. John Nicolay would record the he was "Selfish and openly discourteous to the President. Obnoxious to the country. Incapable either of organizing details conceiving and executing general plans." To add to these difficulties allegations of corruption had dogged him ever since he had taken his position in the cabinet. Though it had been said he would not steal a red hot stove, rumors of mismanaged funds, preferable contracts to friends, and shortchanging the armed forces lead to calls for his dismissal.

Lincoln was loyal to his friend, but as the crisis winter deepened, he was forced to realize that Cameron’s faults far outweighed any potential political benefits he might have brought. The final straw had come when Cameron endorsed a measure which would call for the seizure of slaves from confirmed rebels. Still attempting to maintain the delicate balance between his moderate rand abolitionist supporters, a member of his Cabinet could not be allowed to speak out against his stated policy. So it was on January 20th 1862 that Cameron was dismissed from his position in the cabinet.

Cameron would not be left out to dry by the administration, though suggestions that he be made Minister to Russia were swiftly squashed by the Cabinet, Lincoln did not underestimate the potential power Cameron had in his home state. Though he would have to wait for election to become state Senator, he quickly became the go-to man in Pennsylvania for the Lincoln administration.

In a final act Lincoln kept the loyalty of his former Secretary of War by making him feel instrumental in the choosing of his replacement. In time many men would take credit for the decision, Seward, Sumner, Chase, but in this masterful political maneuvering Lincoln would keep the loyalty of all in the decision making process. The overwhelming decision appointed former Attorney General, Edwin M. Stanton.

Stanton was an accomplished attorney from Ohio with a distinguished career (notably the first successful insanity defense in American history, for one Daniel Sickles). At 48 the former critic of the Lincoln administration slid surprisingly easily into his role as Secretary of War. He swiftly set a new standard for the department, dismissing men whom he thought of as incompetent and adopting a new and vastly more efficient filing system for the vast reports and figures being delivered to Washington daily. He also made a quick ally of Ohio senator Benjamin Wade, head of the Senate Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. This appointment and powerful alliance marked a turning point in the management of the vast forces which were coming under the command of the Union. Though comment was made on his often explosive temper and cantankerous attitude, Lincoln in his whimsical way would say “We may have to treat him as they are sometimes obliged to treat a Methodist minister I know of out West. He gets wrought to so high a pitch of excitement in his prayers and exhortations that they are obliged to put bricks in his pockets to keep him down. We may be obliged to serve Stanton in the same way, but I guess we'll let him jump a while first."

The Secretaries of War 1862, Cameron and Stanton​

The other notable, perhaps more surprising, casualty of the reorganization of the Union’s forces, was General in Chief, George B. McClellan. The 35 year old Major General was the darling of the nation in early 1862. A West Point graduate, second of his class, in 1846 he served with distinction in the Mexican War breveted twice for bravery earning the rank of captain for his actions at Chapultepec. He went on to serve as an instructor at West Point, working on various fortifications, engineering projects and frontier service mapping a route for the transcontinental railroad. Then in 1855 thanks to his mastery of French and various connections he was sent as an observer to the Crimea Resigning from the army in 1857 he pursued various civilian careers in railroads, becoming chief engineer and vice president of the Illinois Central Railroad, and president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad in 1860.

With the outbreak of war in 1861 he re-enlisted. With his experience in engineering and railroads and an understanding of the military sciences he was, like many engineers in the day, considered to be well qualified to command and organize troops and was commissioned a major general of volunteers in April 1861, returning fully to the regular army with the same rank and rose to command the Department of Ohio. With a keen mind for organization and logistics (and his political connections in Washington) he was soon approached by Lincoln to take command of the Union army in Virginia in the wake of the disaster at Bull Run. He accepted and was soon introducing a new sense of organization, discipline, and purpose to the Federal armies, becoming General in Chief on November 1st 1861.

However, his tenure as General in Chief was marked by increasing strain with the administration in Washington. McClellan’s own over cautious nature and his dim view of his civilian overseers in Washington caused unnecessary tension. He went so far as to snub the president himself in early November. Finally his refusal to share his war plans and strategies led to his dismissal in late January while he labored in a sick bed under typhoid fever. He would retain his position as commander of the Army of the Potomac however.

A replacement was not immediately selected however, and in his place a Board of National Defense was created on January 30th. This new body was created to prepare for a possible war with Britain, coordinating strategy between the armies in the east and the west, and conducting reviews on the Union’s naval efforts. It contained a number of notable men.

One of the first to be appointed was Richard Delafield. Delafield at 63 years old, and already serving in the Corps of Engineers, had over forty years of experience in the service come the outbreak of war, serving on numerous surveying missions, his earliest being the commission to establish the boundary under the Treaty of Ghent. He would then serve constructing various coastal defences and on topographical surveys from 1819-1855 when he would be appointed to lead the Delafield Commission to the Crimea. His own report extensively detailing the parties’ travels and the introduction of revolutionary new long guns and small arms and their effects on the conflict, also detailed the defenses built by European armies in this period and how they could be best applied to the United States.

Next appointed to the board was the 71 year old Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, Commodore Joseph Smith. Smith had served with distinction in the War of 1812 on the Battle of Lake Champlain being severely wounded aboard the brig Eagle and serving in the Algerian War. He had served on various stations overseas in the Pacific and Mediterranean, when not in service in the Navy he undertook voyages in the merchant marine to the East Indies and then took his position as Bureau Chief in 1846. He had a keen mind and had served on the Ironclad Board being instrumental in the creation of the USS New Ironsides and was well versed in the management of yards so had many plans on how to put the resources of the United States to good use.

He was joined by his fellow Ironclad Board member, Lieutenant Gustavus V. Fox. The 40 year old Fox had joined the navy in 1838 as a midshipman and served in the Mexican War at the Battle of Villahermosa. He then served on various mail steamers before resigning from the navy in 1856 to pursue various industrial pursuits. With the outbreak of war in 1861 he volunteered for service, before volunteering to aid in the relief of Fort Sumter and then becoming the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. The energetic and industrious Fox, though he had little combat experience, was brimming with ideas on how to pursue the war and for new strategies and technologies with which to win the war, making him well suited for such a committee.

The next appointment did not pass without contention in the ranks of Lincoln’s cabinet. 57 year old Lorenzo Thomas had graduated the United States Military Academy in 1823, joining the 4th US Infantry. He served against the Seminoles in Florida, and served as the Chief of Staff to General William O. Butler in the Mexican War, being breveted to lieutenant colonel for his actions at the Battle of Monterrey. He remained in the army serving as chief of staff to Winfield Scott, earning his place on the board with Scott’s recommendation. He also served as adjutant general to the army. He would clash greatly with Stanton, and though he possessed a keen mind and great experience at handling the bureaucracy of war his abolitionist stance would rankle some of his other colleagues.

Finally was 63 year old John A. Dix. Dix was a career soldier and politician who had served in the War of 1812 at the age of 15 at the Battle of Niagara Falls. He served through the rest of the war to support his family, and would remain in the army until 1828 resigning with the rank of major, but would become adjutant general of the New York State Militia in 1830. He would work in law for a number of years, serving as Secretary of State for New York, and eventually becoming Senator from New York from 1845-1849. After losing his seat he would work with both his military duties and manage Mississippi and Missouri Railroad. At the outbreak of war in 1861 he was made a major general of volunteers, becoming the ranking officer amongst all volunteer officers. He served in various positions, first overseeing defensive preparations in New York, then taking over the command of Baltimore and blocking secessionist activity in that state to protect the capital. His combination of military and political experience made him invaluable to the Lincoln administration and he quickly became a favorite of Secretary of War Stanton. He would become the chairman of the board.

From left to right: Delafield, Smith, Fox, Thomas, Dix.​

Understandably with the makeup of the men on it, the board’s primary recommendations at first; were largely defensive. The main suggestions were strengthening of various fortifications along the coasts and waterways of the North which, as had been pointed out in a report by the Corps of Engineers at the end of December, had either been allowed to decay or had were neglected and lacking in armaments and men to defend them. Such was the pessimism that Thomas concluded “I confess that from information derived from reliable quarters that upon the frontier there is little confidence to be had, from Sault Saint Marie, the straights of Michigan, and inclusive of the fortress at Mackinac, the Upper Lakes, the Niagara and the Saint Lawrence there is a great need for preparation, construction and repair. The arsenals have either been removed from their positions for active service at a distance, or are pronounced worthless with a few exceptions, and as for small arms I am sadly confident that fewer than 5,000 effective rifles and muskets together could be mustered along the entire frontier.” The important frontier on the Saint Lawrence was entirely lacking fortification and the Army’s Chief Engineer Joseph Totten wrote “On that portion of the northern frontier that the Saint Lawrence abounds we have never had any defenses except a small weak redoubt at the mouth of the harbor of Ogdensburg. Every town and habitation upon either shore of this river may be said to lie at all times at the mercy of the shore opposite.”

The strategically important fort at Rouse Point, Fort Montgomery named in honor of the Revolutionary War hero Richard Montgomery who had brought the campaign to Quebec in 1775, built to control the Hudson River valley, was not even complete. The stone embrasures had not been fully prepared even in 1861, and there were no gun mounts on the forts walls which would mean either positions would have to be cut into the fort or placed around it, and its only defenders in January were its 400 odd builders who had hastily armed themselves with muskets and organized into an ad-hoc battalion.

It was decided that money must be put forward for the improvement and rearmament of all these important points. Delafield stressed that the fortifications protecting the major ports must be strengthened in any case, lest the South manage to construct fast raiders which could speed past the blockade fleet and bombard a harbor like New York or Boston and cause much national embarrassment.

There was major debate on what naval strategy should be adopted. Various schemes were bandied about, from attempting to lure the British inshore to be destroyed by torpedoes to the use of Burnside’s Coastal Division for an all-out attack on Bermuda to force the Royal Navy to operate between the extremes of Jamaica and Halifax. The second greatest contention was whether the blockade should be temporarily weakened in or abandoned in order to gather the majority of the nation’s naval strength at port lest war with Britain (or any other maritime power) break out over the winter. However, this suggestion was vetoed by Welles who would assure both the cabinet and the board that “The Royal Navy, is no more prepared for war with us than we are for a war with her. It took Great Britain six months to send a single soldier to the Crimea in the last war with Russia, it is unthinkable then that we should not have ample opportunity with which to remove our forces.” However, Lincoln advised that the available steamers be ordered to concentrate at Key West, Port Royal, and the Chesapeake in order to give them the strength to resist any sudden incursion by an enemy force, he countered Welles and Stanton’s resistance to the idea by pointing out that they could easily be dispersed again to their stations if nothing came of the new tensions. It was decided that the naval establishments would be put on alert, the planned expeditions would be postponed until the outcome of tensions with Britain were resolved, and that contingency measures should be made for the evacuation of the various Federal enclaves on the coasts of the South should war with Britain break out.

On land there were similar stances taken. Burnside’s division was eventually moved north to Albany where it could be used in case of a sudden assault to counter any British forces, and Butler’s Division was sent to garrison the most vulnerable of areas in the Board’s estimation, Portland, and was for the time being absorbed into Butler’s command of the Department of New England. To organize the regions facing the British on land, 60 year old Colonel Carlos A. Waite, formerly of the 1st Infantry Regiment and a veteran of the Mexican War breveted three times for bravery, was appointed to a staff position overseeing an area stretching from Michigan to Vermont in a theoretical department to be activated in case of war. Formations were earmarked for alternate service as the committee worked to reorganize the Union’s armies.

Despite the pessimistic state of the frontier and contentious naval questions, the board took active steps to remedy these problems. Heavy guns were removed from less desirable ships to be attached to landward batteries on the border and coasts, companies of state militia were called out to man older fortifications and erect temporary earthworks, blockhouses were constructed on vulnerable points along the frontier, and money was put forward by the state governments for improving local defences.

While many would hope for peace, the Union quietly prepared for a new front in the ongoing war…” To Arms!: The Great American War, Sheldon Foote, University of Boston 1999.

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[1] This is homage to one of my inspirations for this work in Peter Tsouras’s work ‘Dixie Victorious’. This from the piece Hell on Earth by Andrew Uffindell. Some of the story is a bit fantastic for my taste, but it’s an interesting read nonetheless!

[2] The Delafield Commission is a bit of a mixed blessing as I hope to demonstrate.

 

[LordIreland]

Great update EC, although I am sure certain posters will take exception to much of what you have said

 

[DAv]

A good update and interesting to note how quickly and seriously the US government is taking the new threat. Whether or not these measures will be enough to hold off both enemies remains to be seen but they've made a good start at least. Not having a single figure in charge of all the military could lead to a fair few problems down the road, especially with Thomas' abolitionist beliefs in particular possibly seeing him rank one enemy above another.

 

[machine3589]

Great update.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Great update EC, although I am sure certain posters will take exception to much of what you have said

Thank you Though I suppose now is a good moment to note that with a few exceptions most of the quotes from historical figures so far are real or have only been mildly edited.

Honestly there's not too much need to be fictional in some cases when the historical record can do most of the talking for you.

A good update and interesting to note how quickly and seriously the US government is taking the new threat. Whether or not these measures will be enough to hold off both enemies remains to be seen but they've made a good start at least. Not having a single figure in charge of all the military could lead to a fair few problems down the road, especially with Thomas' abolitionist beliefs in particular possibly seeing him rank one enemy above another.

Well the Lincoln administration isn't the Buchanan administration Though it is interesting to note there was plenty of intrigue in Lincoln's cabinet historically, with Chase especially plotting behind Lincoln's back to do things like try and get Seward removed from his position and Chase's scheme to replace Lincoln as the candidate in 1864. Lincoln however, was quite up to the challenges given to him historically!

Great update.

Thank you

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 8: Marching as to War Pt. 2​

“In case of war with the United States, England will undoubtedly be willing to expend her last farthing and her last man in our defence. But while it is the duty of England to do so, and while we receive from her the exercise of all her power, still it is plainly and obviously our duty to provide a large and efficient force for the purpose of fighting upon our own soil, for our own possessions, for our own privileges and our own liberties.” – John A. Macdonald in a speech at the “Military Ball” in Quebec City, January 1862

“Commanding the forces in Britain’s North American possessions was Lt. General Sir William Fenwick Williams, First Baronet of Kars. He was a Nova Scotia native by birth, the son of a quartermaster general in the garrison at Halifax born in 1800. However, persistent rumours existed that he was actually the illegitimate child of Edward Augustus, Duke of Kent, would continue to spring up around him throughout his life. Williams for his part made no effort to deny or hide the rumours, and if true he was actually the half-brother of the Queen. While this might explain why the son of a minor officer at a colonial garrison rose to such a prominent position in the Imperial Military hierarchy (and indeed Williams eternal silence on the matter may be telling) others offer a more practical explanation for his rise through the ranks.

Williams was described as a dutiful officer, polite, and full of spirit. He had many minor military appointments from his graduation from Woolwich Military Academy, first serving as 2nd Lieutenant in the Royal Artillery before serving in Gibraltar and Sri Lanka where he rose to the rank of brevet colonel before being appointed as the British commissioner in charge of reforming the Turkish arsenal, and worked for nine years to help define the Turkish-Persian border. When the Crimean War broke out Williams was sent to take command of Turkish forces along the northern border of the Ottoman Empire and managed to reorganize the defeated Turkish forces there before arriving at Kars in 1855. In June 1855 a Russian army of 25,000 attacked Kars but were repulsed and forced to besiege the city where they suffered heavy losses. By December however with no reinforcements coming, supplies dwindling, and with sickness setting in amongst his troops Williams negotiated a surrender which allowed his men to keep their flags and their officers their swords. Williams was lionized in the presses for this success and became “The Hero of Kars” and was heaped with praise by the governments of France and England and received a pension of £1000 a year for the rest of his life.

In 1860 he accepted the position of Commander in Chief of the British forces in North America. Upon the outbreak of war he wrote that “Our trouble begins when their war ends.” He, like most British contemporaries of the time, believed that Southern independence was going to be permanent so felt that once the war with the South was concluded they would avenge themselves of the loss of their southern territories by marching north. With that in mind he had been writing ceaselessly for reinforcements to the North American garrison and in November, with the coming of the Trent Crisis he received part of his wish. Palmerston had brow beat the cabinet into accepting that there would be trouble and so another brigade had been despatched to Canada in late November.

Despite Williams’s lionization as a national hero for his efforts at Kars, there was much apprehension about his command. The many junior officers dispatched to Canada had little enthusiasm for serving under Williams, and even some Canadians themselves were leery of his leadership abilities. Lt. Col Wolseley, then serving as Assistant Adjutant General wrote in early December “No one knows who is to have the command, but almost all are agreed in thinking that Williams is certainly to be superceded[sic].” Indeed Lord Granville at the head of the War Cabinet candidly told Cardwell that Williams’s elevation was the work of a “regular conspiracy” and felt he should be replaced. In spite of this professional and political misgiving however, the man with the final say was the Duke of Cambridge, and Cambridge by exercising his royal prerogative firmly quashed any notions that Williams ought to be replaced. Indeed it was also seen as politically impossible to do so thanks to Williams’s connections at home and through his genuine popularity in Canada. Practically, finding an officer to replace him on such short notice was almost impossible, and so the matter rested.

His counterpart in the Atlantic Command was Sir Charles Hastings Doyle, an Irish born career officer. The eldest son of Lieutenant-General Sir Charles William Doyle, he graduated from Sandhurst and entered the army as an ensign in 1819 and purchasing a captaincy in 1825. In the 1830s he served as aide-de-camp in Quebec before serving in the East and West Indies in the 1840s and in 1846 was on staff as a quarter-master general. He served at Varna in the Crimea before being invalidated in early 1855 due to illness and as such missed any major action. On October 16th 1861 he arrived in Halifax just in time for the Border Crisis to break out so he could take command of the British troops there. Doyle immediately busied himself with analysis of the defensive works and the military personnel at his disposal. Described as a “stickler for protocol” Doyle was cool under pressure and extensively skilled in working in the colonial conditions he found himself in…

Williams and Doyle​

…As worries of troubles with the North spread Williams stepped up his preparations for a potential confrontation with the North. In November he had ordered blockhouses erected at vulnerable points along the border, ostensibly to watch for raiders attempting to strike south, but of course blockhouses erected on the canals and roadways would do little to deter that. When news of the Trent stoppage reached him he reacted swiftly. Embarking on a whirlwind tour of the most vulnerable points in the province he was accompanied by his aides de camp: Captain Grant of the Royal Engineers, Captain F. de Winton of the Royal Artillery, and was joined by local engineer and Inspector of Railways for the province Hamilton H. Killaly, who knew the country well. In this tour he ordered batteries thrown up and earthworks dug at St. Helen’s Island, Fort Lennox to be reoccupied, Fort Wellington strengthened, new batteries to be erected at Kingston, Hamilton, and Toronto, and Fort Malden at Amherstburg to be reoccupied.

Many of these important forts were in a state of disrepair however. Fort Lennox had for two years been serving as an école de réforme for delinquent youths and Fort Malden had been converted to a lunatic asylum in 1858. The fortifications on the Niagara frontier were in utter ruin and would require extensive repairs to even be made defensible. Though the fortifications at Prescott, Kingston, and Quebec were strong, they were all well inside the frontier.

However, even had the fortifications all been in good order he found himself wanting of men to completely defend them.

Even with the Colonial Corps of the Royal Canadian Rifles at his disposal Williams had a scant 7.000 men available to him in early 1862. Even though reinforcements had been despatched from Britain, many were still unorganized and unloading as far away as Halifax. This meant he would have to lean heavily on the militia as his first line of defence…”Canada At War 1812-1916, Paul Woods, York University, 1989

“The militia as an institution was one which had a long a proud tradition stretching all the way back to the French regime, but in most recent memory the War of 1812 and the Rebellions of 1838 wherein the loyal peoples of Canada had taken up arms to resist foreign invaders. In spite of this proud record, the militia had been allowed to dwindle into a mere paper force. Perhaps because of the persistence of the ‘militia myth’ which perpetuated by men like the Bishop Hugh Strachan, which believed that all that had to happen was for the men of Canada to take up their arms and the Province could be saved.

Despite various efforts at reform, and a comprehensive effort to create a system of organized volunteers in 1855 establishing an ‘Active Militia’ of A and B categories, in the fall of 1861 this was not a force to be relied on. In June the Category A militia, despite an authorized strength of 5,000, had only 4,422 actually show up for muster. When called on to patrol the border some few more men were willing to turn out to defend against raiders, bringing the number of men up to 4,573 who were largely tasked with building blockhouses and patrolling roads in between rudimentary drill.

This force was of course, inadequate for the defence of Canada.

Williams had been ruminating upon this problem ever since his arrival in Canada and so had been looking for a way to solve it. He wrote often to both the Duke of Cambridge and Newcastle imploring the Imperial Government to put some kind of pressure on the Canadians to see to their own defence. Though the defence of Canada was still the responsibility of the home government, the Imperial Government itself was caught in a classic catch of believing that to put more troops in Canada would deter the Canadians from making adequate preparations, but also believing that if they did not strengthen their garrison they would look weak to their potential rivals. Now though, they had to try and stiffen the resolve of their colonial subjects, and there was some apprehension in London over the colonists abilities.

Much of this fear was overblown, the resolve of the Canadians to remain British should not have been in doubt following the events of 1812, and in 1838. When rebellion had been in the air 33,000 men had answered the call and served alongside the British regulars in protecting Canada, with 40,000 in all serving in the militia during the crisis from 1837-1838. When the Trent and Dacotah-Terror crisis had arisen Williams had then called on the category B militia to pad out the number of men available to him, and to his surprise the full muster of 10,210 men of both corps turned up for duty. Of course such was the sudden surge in patriotic fervor that many sedentary companies spontaneously began to gather at the start of December and drill with whatever came to hand.

The sudden military fever which had grasped the Province was intense, and the people found themselves for the first time since 1855 discussing matters of military nature, the papers printing patriotic slogans with the Toronto Leader saying “There now remains scarcely a gleam of hope that peace will be preserved between England and the United States. Canada may become a battlefield and it is our duty to prepare for a contingency which seems now only too certain.” and the Globe boldly stating “Before many weeks go by, we may be called upon to defend our soil from the grasp of invading armies…It was defended before, it will be defended again. With God’s blessing we will not yield an inch of our soil to the invader.” The Montreal Gazette proclaimed “No one seems willing to be left out. The spirit of the people is fairly aroused, and ere the month of February we shall have nigh, if not quite, the 100,000 enrolled who the Times has called for. Meanwhile Generals January and February will fight for us against an invading army.” Even the normally radical leaning Le Pays stated that with the question of war: “In that case what ought the population of this country to do? To this question there can be but one answer: ‘March to the defence of our territory, provided we are furnished with arms, and our experienced militia be sustained by a regular army.’ There is no reason to fear that, in these respects, England will make default.”

In order to further encourage this sentiment Williams, with the assistance of the Provincial Government issued General Militia Order No. 1 on December 12th 1862. The order required a company of 75 privates to form from each battalion of the sedentary militia, and only those who volunteered were to be accepted. The order was hoped to bring in some 38,000 men for service. On the 14th Macdonald appointed himself the minister of militia in order to facilitate a position which could cooperate with Williams and Monck in planning the defense of Canada.

On the 19th of December he began casting about for men who could aid him in the planning of the organization of the Canadian militia. His first choices were political; Cartier and Galt were obvious as the Deputy Premier and the Minister of Finance respectively. Next were George Taché and Alan MacNab, both long veterans of militia service and who had seen action against the rebels in 1837-8 and in Taché’s case, against the Americans in 1812. Each man served as the aide de camp to the Queen in Canada East and West respectively. These would form the nucleus of Macdonald’s “Committee of Provincial Defence” as an advisory body in order to manage the interests of the government. Next came some more practical appointments.

The next man appointed was the moderate Reformer Gilbert McMicken to balance out the political scales. McMicken was a successful businessman who had worked with numerous local political bodies expanding his wealth and influence. He was notable for his successes in his long service in local government positions and investment and management of railroads and telegraphs. Macdonald had also, surprisingly, turned to him in order to organize a force of agents and informers both inside and outside the province to keep the government abreast of events going on inside the ranks of enemies real and imagined.

Next came Frederick Ermatinger, the 50 year old son of Swiss immigrants he had long ties to the British military and establishment. He had practiced law, but much of his younger life was devoted to military service, joining the Montreal Volunteer Cavalry and becoming a lieutenant at 22. From the age of 24 he served in Spain in the Carlist War, first in the British Legion, and then in the Spanish forces where he reached the rank of Lt. Colonel. Upon his return to Canada he became superintendent of police in Montreal where he had a long and successful career maintaining law and order in the often tumultuous years after the rebellions of 1837-38. From 1856 onwards he became field inspector of the active volunteer militia of Canada East. He was a natural choice to advise the government on military operations, and would work well with McMicken in the creation of an extensive network of spies and informants, while contributing greatly to the creation of a comprehensive police force.

Next was Colonel Thomas E. Campbell, formerly of the British Army. A long serving former soldier who had enrolled in the army at 14 with many colonial postings he had gained fame coming to Canada in 1837 and in 1838 had a led a group of Caughnawaga Mohawks alongside the volunteer militia in an attack on the rebel positions at Châteauguay where they captured some 75 rebels, for his valor and cool headed action he was mentioned in the dispatches. In the aftermath he had done what he could to put a stop to the looting and arson of Anglophone volunteers. He would then serve as military secretary to Governor Charles Thomson, retiring from the army in 1846. From them on he served in various government capacities, becoming civil secretary to Lord Elgin, and acquired the seigneury of Rouville through marriage. He would though, advise alongside Taché in the passing of the Militia Act of 1855. He was approached by Williams to join this new body and he willingly lent his experience.

Another suggestion of Williams was Hamilton H. Killaly, the Provincial Inspector of Railways. Williams recommended him based on the advice he had given during his tour of the positions in Canada describing him as: “a very clever engineer, and a steady man of excellent character. No man knows the country better; he has a strong, clear, practical head.” Killaly had worked extensively with railroads in the Province and had, constructed, inspected, and strongly advocated for, canals to be built for the purposes of defence of the Province.

The final member of the body would not arrive until mid-January, and he was a regular Imperial officer. Colonel Daniel Lysons was a career officer, the son of topographer Daniel Lysons he was commissioned into the 1st Regiment of Foot in 1834. He would then serve in Canada during the revolts of 1837-38 at St. Denis and St. Eustache and was honorably mentioned in the dispatches for his conduct in saving the lives of many of his comrades during the wreck of the steamer Premier in the St. Lawrence in September 1843 receiving a promotion to captain as a consequence. He then served in the Russian War present at the major engagements of Alma and Inkerman, among others, and served in the siege of Sevastopol. He led the main columns in the attacks on the Redan in June where he was slightly wounded, and was then seriously wounded leading the second assault. He took command of the 2nd Brigade of the Light Division until the end of the war. Upon the return home he served intimately in the creation of the Volunteer Movement in Britain, thus he was an inspired choice to be sent to advise the Canadians on the creation of their own volunteers.

Macdonald, Cartier, Tache, MacNab, Killaly, Thomas, McMicken, Lyosons, and Ermantinger​

The Committee met fully for the first time in January, and worked hard to hammer out the basis for which the new Canadian volunteer force would be created and organized.

The first issue was the creation of battalions for the volunteers as Williams’s call for men had been wildly successful, bringing 38,556 men to arms augmenting the already existing 10,000 militiamen by mid-January. The way they would be incorporated was an issue which vexed the committee at first, but it was Taché and Campbell who solved that particular problem. Each man pointed out that with the existing text of the 1855 Militia Act the means for organizing battalions of Volunteers was already in place, and could be done easily as long as it emulated the patterns established in the creation of the existing three battalions of volunteer militia in Montreal and Toronto. In the creation of these battalions they would be numbered by formation and their officers selected from the most senior men as appointed by local militia officers. Under the articles of the 1855 Act a battalion would at full strength consist of 10 companies of men and officers totalling some 840 men at full strength.

It was agreed the simplest way to do this was to enroll the volunteer companies by geographic region in their respective military districts as laid out in 1855. For instance the ten volunteer companies which formed in Kingston proper were then organized into the 14th Battalion of Volunteer Rifles, and the companies from the outlying towns and villages were again grouped based on proximity to create the 15th Battalion of Volunteer Rifles by the brigade major of the 3rd Military District in which Kingston City and the surrounding counties was located. In the cities, with their denser population and previous history of militia service, this proved to be an easier task as men were pooled together and battalions created. In the country however, with the less dense population and the troublesome nature of winter roads, this proved to be more problematic. The issue was addressed by ordering the volunteer companies to assemble at the county seat where they could be trained and organized, most then being moved to the urban areas where Imperial officers had been dispatched for the purpose of organizing and instructing the volunteers.

The selection of officers, tended to be a more contentious matter. Since most volunteer companies elected their officers, arguments over seniority tended to break out almost immediately between various elected men. Some regions had already established officers serving in the active or sedentary militia which made their appointment easy and they could appoint junior officers under them as they saw fit, but many newly designated counties and companies within the military districts had no such machinery and so they would often appeal to the government. Macdonald quickly tired of petty feuds between junior officers and so gave the ranking colonels in the military districts the power to veto or approve appointments, an order which was backed by the Imperial Government ensuring that no officer could go over the head of his militia superior by appealing to the British military.

The most contentious issue was terms of service and how the government quotas might be filled if calls for volunteers went unanswered. It was argued that the Volunteer battalions should be ordered to serve for a designated period, and in the 1855 Act this had been set at a term of three years, which most agreed seemed like a fair compromise. To further entice volunteers it was agreed that a bounty would be offered for each man who enlisted in an established battalion when a call for men went out (a smaller bounty would be granted to the men who had volunteered for service in 1862 at the beginning of 1863 to supplement their pay) and that bounty could be set by the government at will. However, despite the optimism of the government, realism made them bow to the reality that bounties and patriotism would only go so far to entice men to service, and they turned to the issue of the ballot.

The ballot was perfectly legal under Canadian law, but had not been applied in half a century since the war of 1812. It was thus seen as a necessary item to ensure that the volunteer forces were not drained by the strains of war. The question of how to apply it was difficult. The suggestion that it ought to be applied to the male population as a whole was rejected out of hand by the political members of the committee, thinking it would be seen as unenforceable on the population as a whole, and rightly pointing out that such an act would be abhorrent in Britain. The idea that it could be applied purely to the sedentary militia was also seen as problematic. Even though this theoretically gave access to a pool of manpower numbering 236,427 men, by and large these were names on a list that could not be enrolled quickly, and problematically some were already serving in the volunteers! As Macdonald pointed out, simply balloting the existing names on the rolls from any given county would drain the area of men of all ages should a general ballot be called. So it was decided that a series of checks should be put on the ballot by dividing the men to be balloted into three groups.

The first group would be made up of single men and widowers without children from ages 18-45 who could be called to serve if the quotas were not met. The second group would be married men and widowers with children from the same age. The final group which could be called upon to serve were men aged 45-60 if all these quotas were not met. The government also reserved the right to create temporary ‘service battalions’ from balloted militia who would serve for one year.

Despite the measures put in place to legally carry out the ballot, most on the committee were convinced they would be fighting a short war and so did not expect to ever have to use these methods. They firmly believed that the enthusiasm shown by the populace towards the volunteer militia would prevent these measures from being necessary…

…in the Maritimes the provinces mobilized according to their own local schemes. Doyle had found the number of volunteers completely lacking when he had first arrived, and bemoaned the state of their officers, some of whom were up to 60 or 90 years in age and completely ignorant of their duties and in drill.

While the provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick had already had some 2,600 and 2,100 volunteers between them in early 1861, each province had been reluctant to spend money on the organization of men and battalions without any outbreak of hostilities. However, the rising tensions between Great Britain and the United States had led to a similar organization of new volunteer companies in early 1862.

The biggest fears came from New Brunswick with its long frontier with the state of Maine, which had so recently been a flashpoint with the bloodless “Aroostook War” of 1838. Though the New Brunswick legislature was hesitant about issuing funds for the militia without an actual outbreak of hostilities they did authorize the creation of a ‘lumbermen corps’ who would eventually form the nucleus of a number of new volunteer battalions. Originally they were put to work erecting blockhouses along the militarily vital Temiscouta Road. As tensions deepened however, London dispatched arms to the volunteers and the New Brunswickers put more funds towards the creation of new volunteer units. The one unit of volunteer cavalry, the New Brunswick Yeomanry, was activated with orders to help Doyle police the border.

In Nova Scotia similar steps were taken, the existing volunteer battalions were called out to aid the garrison, and work was done to expand the defences of Halifax. The colony also passed new legislation in 1862 in order to embody new volunteer battalions and enable the colony to conduct a levee en masse of the 44,000 sedentary militia existing in the colony in 1862. It was a point of pride of many Nova Scotians that they were the more militant of the Atlantic colonies, and their patriotism and loyalty to Britain bordered on fanatical.

In Prince Edward Island although there were no regulars, and no thought was even given to the dispatch of men and material to aid in its defence, there were some 800 volunteers in various independent companies. The colonial government in Charlottetown would work towards organizing them into geographic units for the purposes of local defence and enforcing civil authority, while also looking into the creation of a body of artillerymen to defend the local capital itself…

…the training and arming of the militia was something the Imperial government took an intense interest in. Though at the time of the Trent affair in the Province of Canada itself there were some 17,000 arms in the Province itself, only half of them modern Enfield rifles. Another 8,000 had been ordered out in June, and another 25,000 shipped at the end of October. As the crisis escalated more arms and ammunition were dispatched to Canada. The Provincial Government itself would request arms and accoutrements for 100,000 men to be shipped to Canada, and by May 1862 some 20 million rounds of ammunition would have been shipped alongside over 100,000 stands of arms. Similar shipments would be made to the Maritimes and by May 40,000 rifles were in colonial hands.

To train and organize the volunteers a body of 14 field officers and 46 sergeants had been sent to Canada, with a similar compliment for the Maritimes…” Blood and Daring: The War of 1862 and how Canada forged a Nation, Raymond Green, University of Toronto Press, 2002

Volunteers on Prince Edward Island, 1863​

“Macdonald’s backroom dealing in early January had paid off when he finally moved to pass the Militia Act in February 1862. The emergency sessions of the Assembly had continued throughout January passing smaller, less odious pieces of legislation like that which enabled Williams to embody the volunteers, and granting a bounty. However, as the details of Macdonald’s proposed act became public the debate was fierce. Predictably the Rouges almost to a man rejected much of it, especially the endorsement of the ballot. Many Reformers also found some of the legislation odious, and while publicly objecting to it, few would vote against it, and it passed in a landslide in Canada West with 61 votes for and 4 against. In Canada East though the Rouges would vote as a block behind Dorion (with among three exceptions one Thomas D’Arcy McGee) the resolution would still pass 46 for and 19 against with a total vote of 107 for and 23 against in the Assembly.

The Militia Act of 1862 while far from comprehensive was nonetheless a major step forward in the defence of Canada. While it enshrined the right of the government to enroll men of the sedentary militia by ballot it also added a number of useful tools to the process of mobilization. It enable the Imperial authorities to take control of the rail and telegraph system for the purposes of defence in an emergency, and it gave them the right to charter trains and ships as needed for the war effort. It also exempted railroad workers, telegraph operators, policemen, doctors, prison and asylum guards from militia service, but did not prevent them from joining voluntarily…

…Alongside the efforts of the regulars it would remain to be seen if these measures were enough to defend Canada come the spring…”Nation Maker: The Life of John A. Macdonald, Richard Chartrand, Queens University Publishing, 2005

-----

EDIT: I was able to find images of Lysons and Ermantinger!

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Appendix to Chapter 8: Some Notes on Canadian Mobilization​

In writing this chapter I have stuck as close to the source material available and interpretation by other historians as I can while trying to extrapolate based on the available data at the time what sort of direction the mobilization of the Canadian militia might take.

One important detail to note is that the commission put together by Macdonald above is virtually identical to the one he formed historically to investigate the details of creating a body of militia and how the province might be defended. My only two additions were McMicken and Ermatinger.

Likewise the quotes from newspapers are all historical and the 38,000 number from the militia order is also historical, and the confidence at being able to recruit men for service is attested to by multiple first and second hand sources in both official and personal correspondence, specifically by Monck in the Sessional Papers of the Province of Canada in his letters to both the Duke of Newcastle on the militia question, and with John A. Macdonald himself in correspondence regarding the formation of the militia. Macdonald is described as working hard on this question in his biographies and judging by the sessional papers he devoted plenty of energy towards it coming up to the proposal of the historic militia bill, which here has obviously been railroaded through by committee in mid-February the political aspects of that will be addressed in the next chapter. In the fine details of that act I have quoted concerns from both Monck and Macdonald’s correspondence and some of the details of the 1863 militia act which was passed historically.

The dispatch of officers and equipment is again historical, though the weapons shipped in October I describe were historically caught up in red tape until December, but that small change doesn’t seem particularly earth shattering to me.

On the formation of battalions, historically there were 3 volunteer battalions existing in 1861, the Montreal Light Infantry, the 1st “Prince of Wales Regiment” and the 2nd Battalion of Volunteer Rifles (their designation “The Queen’s Own” was not conferred until March 1863). Historically in January there were 4 new battalions formed in the immediate aftermath of the crisis (the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th respectively) with 5 more battalions being embodied in 1862. Then there were more battalions embodied in 1863, some in 1864, none in 1865, and a whopping 35 in 1866 (exclusive of the 5 “Grand Trunk Railway Battalions” and the “Civil Service Regiment” in Ottawa) and 25 of those were in September 1866 alone. That brought the total of organized battalions to some 54, exclusive of the many unorganized independent volunteer companies which could be organized into “administrative” or “service” battalions at need, as was done in 1864 in response to the historic St. Albans raid. What this suggests to me however, is that the ability, machinery and will to embody volunteer companies and officers into new battalions is in place and that it can be done relatively swiftly.

The nucleus for forming cavalry and artillery regiments have existed since the 1830s with the organization of embodied militia in response to the crisis of the rebellions (the oldest bodies of each being in Montreal and Toronto) and going by a similar scheme of embodying local cavalry troops new cavalry regiments could be raised, and in many cases senior officers were already on the books come 1862 historically.

In short, the mobilization of the Canadian militia as volunteers or even as balloted “service battalions” seems to have well been within the realm of the capabilities of the Anglo-Canadian authorities in 1861-62 should war have beckoned. There is not a shred of evidence to suggest that this would either be an unpopular task by the Canadians themselves or that it would cause massive contention across lingual and religious lines, though this is only with the initial surge in patriotism and as the war goes on this might change.

Now how successful these measures have been will be addressed at a later date, but until then there’s plenty of other details to cover.

 

[frlmerrin]

BNA didn't have 3.4 million people in 1861; Statscan gives the following:

Upper Canada (Canada West/Ontario) had a population of 1,396,091; Lower Canada (Canada East/Quebec) haad 1,111,566, for a total of 2,507,657 in the Province. The population was (roughly) 60-40 Anglophone/Francophone.

In the Maritimes (each a separate colony, with a separate British governor, separate local legislature, and separate local militia structure and politics), the numbers were as follows: New Brunswick had 252,047; Nova Scotia, 330,857; Prince Edward Island had 80,857; Newfoundland had 122,638 in 1857. Link is here:

http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/98-187-x/4064809-eng.htm

The ten percent figure is a historical standard for the male population that can be subtracted from the overall population for war service (army, navy, or otherwise) without a major impact on the existing economy of a given population.

The reality is ten percent is rarely reached, but it is a yardstick; the War College and ICotAF has reams of material on these issues, if you truly wish to pursue it.

That being said, ten percent of the population of the Province of Canada's population in 1861 would have totalled 250,765. The reality of mobilization, however, is that (for example) the US states of Ohio (2,339,502) and Minnesota (172,023) are roughly equivalent to the entire population of Upper and Lower Canada, and (historically), over the course of 48 months of war, Ohio is credited with 313,180 enlistments, and Minnesota with 24,020, for a total of (roughly) 337,000 enlistments.

However, that is over the course of 48 months of war, and in a nation of ~22 million (free states and border states) with an aggregate number of enlistments of ~2.8 million. The actual numbers of US troops in service in the winter of 1861-62 was roughly 527,000 (less than a quarter of the "ideal"), and some percentage of those were always going to be sick, on furlough, detached duty (recruiting, administrative, etc), absent, or in transit. This holds true for all armies throughout history, of course.

But, set that aside. If the 10 percent rule is adhered to (again, as a yardstick), the US can mobilize 2.2 million men; the Province of Canada can mobilize 250,765.

Including all the "settled" colonies in BNA brings in ~25,000 from New Brunswick, ~33,000 from Nova Scotia, ~8,000 from PEI, and ~12,000 from Newfoundland, for another ~78,000, or a total of ~330,000.

However, if the percentages of those actually in service mirror those of the US (historically), that those actually in uniform and organized are roughly 82,500.

<snip>

OK I shall play the silly 10% numbers game:

Census 1861 unless stated otherwise

Canada West 1,396,000
Canada East 1,112,000
Maritime colonies excluding Newfoundland ca. 664,000
Newfoundland 125,000
HBC lands and North West Territories (excluding natives) 6,500 ea.
British Columbia 52,000
Vancouver Island 3,000 (exclusive of RN and RE)
Bermuda 11,500
TOTAL population of BNA colonies 3,318,000

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland 29,070,000

Hong Kong 120,000
Australian Colonies 1,207,000
New Zealand (Pakeha only) 95,000
TOTAL Australasian colonies inc. HK 1,422,000

Cape Colony – 566,158 (1865) of which 187,000 Europeans

Jamaica 441,000
Barbados 157,200
Grenada 31,900
Bahamas 35,000
Trinidad & Tobago 99,000
TOTAL selected WI colonies 764,100

Malta 141,000
Ionian Islands Protectorate 236,000
TOTAL Mediterranean holdings 377,000

British India ca. 231,000,000+ ex. Princely states
+ many other pink bits of the globe.

Confederate States of America (1860 data)
5,583,000 free people (nearly all white)
3,521,000 people owned by other people (all black)

United States of America (1860 data)
21,906,000 free people (mostly white)
433,000 people owned by other people (all black)

French population 37,386,000

So that would give us at 10% of population:

British armies 2,907,000
BNA armies 331,800
Australasian armies 142,200
Armies from Cape Colony 37,400 (assumes 10% Europeans & equal no blacks)
Armies from West Indies colonies 76,410
Armies in the Mediterranean 37,700
TOTAL Empire less India 3,532,210

We know that the British merchant marine has more than sufficient tonnage to move all of these troops to North America as required.

Armies of the CSA (ex blacks) 558,300

Armies of the USA (inc blacks) 2,233,900

So at this point we are looking at a ratio against the USA of 1.83 to 1.

The French armies would be 3,738,600

If only 1/3 of them were used then we are well over 2 to one against the USA and that is without the British using the vast military resource of India or using Chinese mercenaries or picking up additional allies from Europe and South America.

In summary no one is going to deploy 10% of her population in armies but whatever fraction they chose to deploy the advantage of numbers is with the British, possibly the French and the CSA. The USA just does not have the population to match them.

 

[frlmerrin]

Interested

EC,

Interesting start. I am not in total alignment but enjoying this time line. Please carry on.

 

[galveston bay]

OK I shall play the silly 10% numbers game:

Census 1861 unless stated otherwise

Canada West 1,396,000
Canada East 1,112,000
Maritime colonies excluding Newfoundland ca. 664,000
Newfoundland 125,000
HBC lands and North West Territories (excluding natives) 6,500 ea.
British Columbia 52,000
Vancouver Island 3,000 (exclusive of RN and RE)
Bermuda 11,500
TOTAL population of BNA colonies 3,318,000

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland 29,070,000

Hong Kong 120,000
Australian Colonies 1,207,000
New Zealand (Pakeha only) 95,000
TOTAL Australasian colonies inc. HK 1,422,000

Cape Colony – 566,158 (1865) of which 187,000 Europeans

Jamaica 441,000
Barbados 157,200
Grenada 31,900
Bahamas 35,000
Trinidad & Tobago 99,000
TOTAL selected WI colonies 764,100

Malta 141,000
Ionian Islands Protectorate 236,000
TOTAL Mediterranean holdings 377,000

British India ca. 231,000,000+ ex. Princely states
+ many other pink bits of the globe.

Confederate States of America (1860 data)
5,583,000 free people (nearly all white)
3,521,000 people owned by other people (all black)

United States of America (1860 data)
21,906,000 free people (mostly white)
433,000 people owned by other people (all black)

French population 37,386,000

So that would give us at 10% of population:

British armies 2,907,000
BNA armies 331,800
Australasian armies 142,200
Armies from Cape Colony 37,400 (assumes 10% Europeans & equal no blacks)
Armies from West Indies colonies 76,410
Armies in the Mediterranean 37,700
TOTAL Empire less India 3,532,210

We know that the British merchant marine has more than sufficient tonnage to move all of these troops to North America as required.

Armies of the CSA (ex blacks) 558,300

Armies of the USA (inc blacks) 2,233,900

So at this point we are looking at a ratio against the USA of 1.83 to 1.

The French armies would be 3,738,600

If only 1/3 of them were used then we are well over 2 to one against the USA and that is without the British using the vast military resource of India or using Chinese mercenaries or picking up additional allies from Europe and South America.

In summary no one is going to deploy 10% of her population in armies but whatever fraction they chose to deploy the advantage of numbers is with the British, possibly the French and the CSA. The USA just does not have the population to match them.

aren't things a bit tense in Europe for Napoleon to be sending an army much bigger than the one he sent to Mexico? If you look at actual mobilization the Confederacy actually beat that number, while the Union came pretty close (in overall mobilization although this doesn't count those who enlisted more than once). The British never came close historically until the Great War, and that includes the Napoleonic era (and that includes the RN too)

Also, any really large army will rapidly exceed the ability of either the French or British to supply said army. The Confederacy was a food importer prewar (from the North and parts of Texas) while Canada is a food exporter, but to a far smaller degree than the Union. The British import their food already (having exceeded a few years ago the ability of the British Isles to feed itself), while the French vary from year to year but export less than Canada.

Which of course also goes to shipping tonnage available to move food to the British Isles AND also available to ship supplies to Canada. I suspect that equation overall is pretty complex, and that doesn't include animal feed for the vast numbers of draft and riding animals needed for a mid nineteenth century army. (16 lbs per animal per day adds up pretty quickly)

So the numbers game is a pretty complex game indeed

 

[TFSmith121]

They going to swim to North America?

We know that the British merchant marine has more than sufficient tonnage to move all of these troops to North America as required.

Sure they do, which explains why the grand total of British troops deployed to the Black Sea theater over two years of war was 93,000, which yielded - at the high point - some 50,000 men in theater at once; in the initial deployment the winter of 54-55, it was less than 30,000.

So, all those personnel - including the non-whites - are all going to be conscripted and to swim to North America?

Your grasp of mobilization and logistics in a trans-oceanic war in the Nineteenth or Twentieth century is, um, unique - even your "friend" with a website has finally acknowledged the total number of regular British infantry battalions that even existed in the UK and Ireland (and BNA) and "might" have been available for a field force is somewhere around 45, which - at three battalions per brigade, three brigades per division, or roughly the same as what GCM organized the Army of the Potomac's divisions at in 1861, totals all of 15 brigades, or five divisions. The British Army of the East had 12 brigades, so it's not exactly a huge increase.

The same AotP alone numbered 14 such divisions before the end of 1861; in equivalent infantry divisions, the total strength of the US forces by the end of the year was approximately 45 or so such formations.

In addition, your "friend" with the website has - finally - acknowledged that the oft-cited "divisions" in the UK and Ireland in 1861 were, in fact, administrative organizations, not field formations, and the British battalions that historically were sent to BNA in the winter of 1861-62 were sent out as singletons, essentially, and any formations organized were ad hoc - as was, after all, British practice at the time and continued as such until the Twentieth Century.

EC, write whatever you wish, obviously, but "frlmerrin" posted a critical response to a post I wrote. Seemed appropriate to respond.

As far as this iteration of WIF goes, it is interesting; your take on Waite, who although a full RA colonel was essentially an administrator/inspector general/garrison commander pretty much for the entirety of the war, seems very off; after his return from Texas and his leave in NY, his only active assignment I found in the OR was to the Middle Department, with a brigade command in Annapolis, Maryland, and he retired in 1864. Considering he was born in 1797 and had 40 years of active service at the time, seems reasonable; he was a contemporary of Sumner, but unlike Sumner, never made it past colonel until the wholesale brevets in at the end of the war, and his bvt. BG came after he was retired - not quite a tombstone promotion, but close to it.

Here's a search of where Waite shows up on the OR; 16 mentions, either dealing with the situation in Texas or the Maryland/Middle Department/Annapolis garrison commands:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?ALLSELECTED=1;xc=1;g=moagrp;type=simple;rgn=full%20text;q1=Carlos%20A.%20Waite;c=amis;c=amwh;c=atla;c=bays;c=cent;c=cont;c=gala;c=harp;c=intr;c=livn;c=manu;c=moamono;c=moawar;c=newe;c=nora;c=nwen;c=nwng;c=oldg;c=punc;c=putn;c=scia;c=scmo;c=scri;c=usde;view=reslist;subview=short;sort=occur;start=1;size=25;cc=moawar

Best,

 

[Sceonn]

OK I shall play the silly 10% numbers game:

Census 1861 unless stated otherwise

Canada West 1,396,000
Canada East 1,112,000
Maritime colonies excluding Newfoundland ca. 664,000
Newfoundland 125,000
HBC lands and North West Territories (excluding natives) 6,500 ea.
British Columbia 52,000
Vancouver Island 3,000 (exclusive of RN and RE)
Bermuda 11,500
TOTAL population of BNA colonies 3,318,000

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland 29,070,000

Hong Kong 120,000
Australian Colonies 1,207,000
New Zealand (Pakeha only) 95,000
TOTAL Australasian colonies inc. HK 1,422,000

Cape Colony – 566,158 (1865) of which 187,000 Europeans

Jamaica 441,000
Barbados 157,200
Grenada 31,900
Bahamas 35,000
Trinidad & Tobago 99,000
TOTAL selected WI colonies 764,100

Malta 141,000
Ionian Islands Protectorate 236,000
TOTAL Mediterranean holdings 377,000

British India ca. 231,000,000+ ex. Princely states
+ many other pink bits of the globe.

Confederate States of America (1860 data)
5,583,000 free people (nearly all white)
3,521,000 people owned by other people (all black)

United States of America (1860 data)
21,906,000 free people (mostly white)
433,000 people owned by other people (all black)

French population 37,386,000

So that would give us at 10% of population:

British armies 2,907,000
BNA armies 331,800
Australasian armies 142,200
Armies from Cape Colony 37,400 (assumes 10% Europeans & equal no blacks)
Armies from West Indies colonies 76,410
Armies in the Mediterranean 37,700
TOTAL Empire less India 3,532,210

We know that the British merchant marine has more than sufficient tonnage to move all of these troops to North America as required.

Armies of the CSA (ex blacks) 558,300

Armies of the USA (inc blacks) 2,233,900

So at this point we are looking at a ratio against the USA of 1.83 to 1.

The French armies would be 3,738,600

If only 1/3 of them were used then we are well over 2 to one against the USA and that is without the British using the vast military resource of India or using Chinese mercenaries or picking up additional allies from Europe and South America.

In summary no one is going to deploy 10% of her population in armies but whatever fraction they chose to deploy the advantage of numbers is with the British, possibly the French and the CSA. The USA just does not have the population to match them.

While I am by no means an expert, allow me to state my opinion on this.

Britain could not gain overall numerical superiority over the Union on the fields. The cost of mobilisation is not at all comparable between them, the british would need a massive logistical effort to do the same.

Also while the british are capable of transporting troops, those troops are indisposed. The british empire was built on steel, and held by steel! That steel is her military scattered across her empire. Removing troops from India would result in losing India. Same with South Africa, with hostile natives still around, and all of her Colonies apart from canada. I don't see britain leaving the home isle vulnerable by sending so much of its manpower across the atlantic.

The british have also never raised the kind of manpower necessary to wage war on such a scale prior to WWI, and would not stomach it. The british contribution would be mainly naval and coastal penetration along with the defense of canada.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

EC,

Interesting start. I am not in total alignment but enjoying this time line. Please carry on.

Well if everyone were in total alignment with what I wrote this would never generate any discussion, and where would the fun in that be

 

[EnglishCanuck]

As far as this iteration of WIF goes, it is interesting; your take on Waite, who although a full RA colonel was essentially an administrator/inspector general/garrison commander pretty much for the entirety of the war, seems very off; after his return from Texas and his leave in NY, his only active assignment I found in the OR was to the Middle Department, with a brigade command in Annapolis, Maryland, and he retired in 1864. Considering he was born in 1797 and had 40 years of active service at the time, seems reasonable; he was a contemporary of Sumner, but unlike Sumner, never made it past colonel until the wholesale brevets in at the end of the war, and his bvt. BG came after he was retired - not quite a tombstone promotion, but close to it.

As a place holder whose job is basically to oversee the organization of a yet to be activated department he seems perfectly qualified as a staff officer."If" the department is activated he'll be shuffled out to make way for a more qualified officer to be sure.

 

[TFSmith121]

Curious; so the Americans have a colonel as a placeholder

As a place holder whose job is basically to oversee the organization of a yet to be activated department he seems perfectly qualified as a staff officer."If" the department is activated he'll be shuffled out to make way for a more qualified officer to be sure.

Curious; so the Americans - who do, after all, have 527,000 officers and men under arms by this point (winter, 1861-62) in theater, and holding full rank in the volunteer service up to and including major generalships (including Burnside, who, IIRC, you suggested was the likely choice to send to upstate NY with the Coastal Division, specifically recruited, trained, and organized for expeditionary and amphibious warfare) - have an RA colonel as a "placeholder" (and I'm curious where you think that sort of assignment was made, historically) and the British (and BNAers) have a lieutenant general and his staff in the Province and a major general and his in New Brunswick.

Interesting.

Best,

 

[EnglishCanuck]

aren't things a bit tense in Europe for Napoleon to be sending an army much bigger than the one he sent to Mexico? If you look at actual mobilization the Confederacy actually beat that number, while the Union came pretty close (in overall mobilization although this doesn't count those who enlisted more than once). The British never came close historically until the Great War, and that includes the Napoleonic era (and that includes the RN too)

For the French I imagine that the 38,000 men dispatched to Mexico historically was pushing the limit of what was practical what with the expeditions in Indochina concurrently.

For the British, well you're correct in saying that until the Great War they never had anything resembling the numbers for mass grinding battles of continental attrition, the Crimea showed that particular problem nicely. Short sharp campaigns were their specialty.

Also, any really large army will rapidly exceed the ability of either the French or British to supply said army. The Confederacy was a food importer prewar (from the North and parts of Texas) while Canada is a food exporter, but to a far smaller degree than the Union. The British import their food already (having exceeded a few years ago the ability of the British Isles to feed itself), while the French vary from year to year but export less than Canada.

On Canada and food, the production for the needs of an army in Canada could most likely be met by the domestic farmers and fisheries in the provinces (of course at the cost to Great Britain's food prices obviously) while the need for horseflesh, feed and fodder could also be met by the Canadians (historically they sold more than a trifling number of animals south of the border thanks to the spectacular prices people were willing to pay, so much so the Canadian Horse became endangered!).

The US on the other hand will have its larders overflowing with food, though from some perspectives I imagine that is a bad thing.

Which of course also goes to shipping tonnage available to move food to the British Isles AND also available to ship supplies to Canada. I suspect that equation overall is pretty complex, and that doesn't include animal feed for the vast numbers of draft and riding animals needed for a mid nineteenth century army. (16 lbs per animal per day adds up pretty quickly)

So the numbers game is a pretty complex game indeed

I admit this is a kind of numbers game for which I am vastly unqualified (if anyone wants to take a crack at it be my guest ) but I am willing to bet that a nation with some 200,000+ merchant seamen and some 58,000 men in her navy does have the shipping tonnage necessary to manage the transport of such an army and its supplies.

It's by no means easy, but I imagine it could be done.

While I am by no means an expert, allow me to state my opinion on this.

The more the merrier

Britain could not gain overall numerical superiority over the Union on the fields. The cost of mobilisation is not at all comparable between them, the british would need a massive logistical effort to do the same.

This is pretty much a given. In no theater can the British gain a strategic numerical advantage over the Union. The logistics involved in moving such a force and feeding it is too much to bear over the Atlantic in the 1860s even for the vast British merchant fleet, and to create a force which could achieve parity with even the Army of the Potomac would basically strip the entire Empire dry!

There's only 229,000 (white)[1] men in the whole British armed forces!

Also while the british are capable of transporting troops, those troops are indisposed. The british empire was built on steel, and held by steel! That steel is her military scattered across her empire. Removing troops from India would result in losing India. Same with South Africa, with hostile natives still around, and all of her Colonies apart from canada. I don't see britain leaving the home isle vulnerable by sending so much of its manpower across the atlantic.

As an interesting aside on the Empire at this point; the 1860s are probably the only conceivable period where there could be another Anglo-American War purely because of how secure the Empire is and how lacking the British competitors are in comparison.

For instance at home there is little chance of a revolution or invasion so a large garrison is unnecessary. In India the back of the serious Native resistance has been crushed and the troops are returning home. In Africa the Empire hasn't yet pushed far enough inland to come into serious confilct or contact with any of the more warlike peoples or the settlers of the veldt. In Asia and the Pacific the only competitors are the Maori or the Taiping, each of whom can practically be dealt with at the leisure of the British or their allies.

On the international front her only serious colonial competitor (France) is in a period of detente and understanding, and pursuing vastly different interests in Mexico and Indochina while also supporting her on a number of issues.

In terms of the Empire being quiet it's hard to find one as good as this any other time in the Victorian era!

The british have also never raised the kind of manpower necessary to wage war on such a scale prior to WWI, and would not stomach it. The british contribution would be mainly naval and coastal penetration along with the defense of canada.

Hey I thought you said you weren't an expert

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[1] Obviously the Indian troops, West Indies Regiments, and other 'colonial' corps are exceptions to this rule, but you can't move the Native troops from India and the West Indies troops are usually relegated to garrison duties on the west coast of Africa and the West Indies themselves.

 

[TFSmith121]

No, actually

For instance at home there is little chance of a revolution or invasion so a large garrison is unnecessary. In India the back of the serious Native resistance has been crushed and the troops are returning home.

No, actually.

"... (in) 1857, the British regular Army then consisted of less than 176,000 men, of whom about 30,000 were in India when the Mutiny started at Meerut. ... (in 1858) the size of the Army was inceased to nearly 230,000 men, of whom more than 92,000 were in India; never again were the British to have less than 60,000 regular troops in India as long as they ruled there, and not until 1876 did the size of the Army fall below 200,000."

Source is Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria's Little Wars, p. 134, 1985 Norton paperback edition.

The troops were not returning home, in other words. Other than regular rotations, the only British military personnel coming back to Britain in 1859-61 were the former "European" EIC troops who had refused to accept being conscripted from the EIC army into the British army - these were the same men that had participated in the "white" mutiny.

Historically, there were a total of 59 British infantry battalions (50 British Army and nine "European" EIC being converted to the British establisment) and 11 cavalry regiments (8 British and 3 "European" EIC being conscripted) in India at this point (plus the ethnically Indian troops, of course); source is:

Hart, Col. H.G. (Depot Battalion – h.p.), The New Annual Army List and Militia List for 1862, London: John Murray (pub. – printed by Woodfall and Kinder), 50 Albermarle Street, 1862 (corrected to 30 Dec., 1861)


You can find it on-line through Google Books.

Best,

 

[EnglishCanuck]

No, actually.

Actually the peak levels of deployment are being drawn down since the Mutiny and the Opium Wars, it's why you have more battalions returning from service in India than being dispatched to India in 1861.

 

[DAv]

A good and detailed update into how Canada's preparations for the upcoming conflict and interesting to note how their council contrasts with that of the US. Will we see more insight into France in this version of the timeline?