Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

[EnglishCanuck]

Yes, but to those south of which border are you thinking?

Well a fair question! There's many problems 'south of the border' for each nation! The US for Canada, the Confederacy for the US, Mexico for the Confederacy and Guatamala for Mexico...

Bad jokes aside, excellent work as always EnglishCanuck! Sad to see the Maori wars looking to go even worse for the Maori, unless you're planning to pull a rabbit out of a hat?

Unfortunately probably not. A slightly longer war, but the colonial authorities were determined to crush the King Movement of the Maori. London - to the best of my limited knowledge - was also concerned because they found a united Maori kingship to be a challenge to colonial rule.

The best the Maori can hope for is that Britain signs a more favorable treaty with them.

 

[mundi_mundi]

Unfortunately probably not. A slightly longer war, but the colonial authorities were determined to crush the King Movement of the Maori. London - to the best of my limited knowledge - was also concerned because they found a united Maori kingship to be a challenge to colonial rule.

The best the Maori can hope for is that Britain signs a more favorable treaty with them.

My reading has told me similar, although I got the impression that those on the ground in NZ were much more sensitive to any perceived threat from the Maori. That perception definitely varied too, cf. Governors FitzRoy, Grey & Browne. Or at least much more willing to throw bloody & treasure at any group of Maori they were suspicious of.

It would make for an interesting PoD, achieving a Maori ... protectorate (for want of a better word) instead of full incorporation into the Crown. A tricky tightrope for the Maori to walk though, being strong enough not to get flattened but not seeming to be enough of a threat to attract said flattening.

 

[naraht]

My reading has told me similar, although I got the impression that those on the ground in NZ were much more sensitive to any perceived threat from the Maori. That perception definitely varied too, cf. Governors FitzRoy, Grey & Browne. Or at least much more willing to throw bloody & treasure at any group of Maori they were suspicious of.

It would make for an interesting PoD, achieving a Maori ... protectorate (for want of a better word) instead of full incorporation into the Crown. A tricky tightrope for the Maori to walk though, being strong enough not to get flattened but not seeming to be enough of a threat to attract said flattening.

The question is which nation would be the best model here. Iroquois pre-USA revolution?

 

[mundi_mundi]

The question is which nation would be the best model here. Iroquois pre-USA revolution?

Not sure, I don't know enough about how that relationship looked & worked to say. When I wrote the above the scenario I was thinking of is something like this:

1. The Maori are legally independent in name, including at least a token independent military force;
2. They're economically dominated by Imperial* companies with effectively no independent foreign relations; and
3. Because of '2' everyone outside of NZ treats them as effectively part of the British Empire in practice.

* UK, NZ & anyone else in the Empire at the time...

If it lasts long enough it might be viewed as equivalent to one of the small Indian princely states, but I think the likeliest way this could happen is a 'temporary' arrangement that ends up becoming an ongoing status quo.

 

[Shnurre]

Great TL, have been following it since early days, but haven't commented in a while.

I do have a question not related to the last posts however and extremely belated at that. It is the subject on West Virginia though and fortunately it has been out of focus of this TL and thus I don't think any answer on your part would contradict the TL text.
Specifically, I'd like to address the question of exact borders of West Virginia. We know that CSA ceded the counties opposite of Washington (Alexandria, Fairfax, Prince William and Loudon) and presumably those join West Virginia (there is common border between these counties and the rest of the state). However, I'd like to argue that there is a high probability that the southern part of West Virginia can go to Confederacy instead.

It is well known that almost all counties in south-eastern part of West Virginia voted for secession and didn't vote for creation of new state (see this and this maps for reference).
It is less well-known fact though that many of the counties that opposed secession had overwhelmingly confederate sympathies. This can be evidenced if one analyzed recruitment numbers for the Confederacy and the Union. E. g. in this paper data from 6 counties is analyzed (namely Cabell an Wayne in the south-western corner of the state, Jefferson and Hampshire in the panhandle and Ohio and Monongalia from the north) and it turns out that the two south-western counties gave a lot more soldiers to Confederacy than to the Union (the same is true for panhandle counties too) and overwhelming majority of Union recruits accredited to these counties come from other states (the same can be said even about the two northern counties).
Of course, confederate sympathies have limited impact on the post-war borders. After all, counties opposite of Washington as well as those in panhandle definitely were pro-confederate which didn’t prevent them from staying in the Union. However, unlike these counties southern West Virginia has pretty negligent strategic importance.

Finally, I would also argue that there is high probability that unlike IOTL southern WV stayed under Confederate control for most part of the war.
IOTL in September 1862 William Loring led a successful campaign that established Confederate control over Kanawha Valley including its capital city Charleston with Union troops forced to retreat into Ohio. IOTL these gains were very sort-lived as Loring had quarrels with central command and Lee needed reinforcements after defeat at Antietam. However, ITTL the situation is much, much grimmer for the Union. August and September 1862 are perhaps worst months of the war for the North, they are beaten on every front: in Tennessee, in Kentucky, in Virginia, in Canada, in Maine and every front desperately needs reinforcements. Union simply cannot afford a sizable detachment in Kanawha Valley as its strategic importance is negligent relative to other fronts. Even if the valley is not evacuated before confederates arrive (which IMHO is extremely probable), I don’t think there is a single reason for the Union to push back into Kanawha instead of reinforcing other more important fronts (e. g. Kentucky where confederates have taken the state capital and threaten Louisville).
One could possibly argue that while in general in August-September 1862 the Union’s situation ITTL is much worse than IOTL, specifically in Virginia it is better. McClellan is beaten, but he is beaten on Rappahannock instead of OTL unimpressive victory in Maryland. However, I think that ITTL after the second battle of Centerville Confederacy definitely can send a detachment to Kanawha in order to get a relatively easy victory and get a better access to recruitment in the region, while Union even if hasn’t evacuated the region beforehand simply cannot allow its troops to get bogged down in the unimportant theatre while there is crisis everywhere else.

If Confederates do indeed capture the southern West Virginia in the second half of 1862, I think there is high chance that they would hold it for duration of the war (with the possible exception of the final period). There is a good reason for CSA to have a reasonable garrison in the region as it will appease the Virginian lobby, would provide a link with Confederate-controlled Kentucky and will be more than compensated with additional recruits from here (as mentioned in the beginning of the post, even IOTL even the counties that voted against secession provided a lot more recruits to the CSA than to the Union). While Union is able to amass the army necessary to clear Kanawha valley from confederates (at least in the latter part of the war), it has relatively low incentive to do it. As long as confederates don’t attempt to cut B&O railway, the rebel presence here provide no threat for the North. Of course, it is better to control the region instead of letting the enemy to control it, but pretty much for the entire duration of war Union has higher priority targets and if there are extra troops that could be used to clear Kanawha, it makes more sense for Union to send them elsewhere.

To sum up while Union can in theory recapture the region in late 1864 or 1865, I don’t think it would bother, and even if it will, the critical periods are between presumably August 1862 (when IOTL the Dismemberment Ordinance was signed IOTL) and the summer of 1863 (when Lincoln admits the new state to the Union ITTL) and the final part of the war.
Presumably ITTL in August 1862 Lincoln has other more pressing matters, so the Ordinance would be signed later in the year when the situation settles down a little bit. If this is true it means that ITTL the Ordinance would be signed when Confederates still control the southern half of West Virginia. While the Confederate control of specific counties does not prevent Lincoln to include those in the ordinance, I do think that if before signing it CSA has a firm control over large part of the state, the ordinance can be more moderate, especially if there is enthusiastic recruitment to the rebel army in it (at least the OTL ordinance did not include the counties along current Virginia-West Virginia border that confederates had definitive control in the Summer 1862).
Of course, the absence of certain counties in the ordinance or rebel control over them does not prevent Lincoln from including them in the state when it is admitted, nor does it prevent Union from capturing the counties later and/or demanding them as part of peace negotiations. On the other hand, I don’t think that if the confederates do indeed control southern West Virginia, it would be an important point for Union during peace negotiations.
Even if these counties are included in the state during its admittance to the Union, I think they can be “exchanged” for the 4 counties opposite of Washington that were not included in it(it makes a lot of sense from strategic point of view for the Union and could be a lot easier pill to swallow for Confederates )

What counties are likely to stay in Virginia if the arguments above a valid (see this map for reference)?
A more moderate scenario is everything to the south of line Mason-Putnam-Kanawha-Clay-Nicholas-Greenbrier- Pocahontas (17 counties in total, with the population of 110000 people in 1860). A more pro-confederate scenario is adding counties Jackson, Roane, Calhoun, Gilmer, Braxton, Webster, Randolph and Pendlton (25 counties in total with the population of 148000 in 1860).
The latter scenario in particular leaves in Confederacy virtually all the counties out of immediate vicinity of B&O railway that voted for secession, had large slave populations or known rebel sympathies.

IOTL WV population was 377 thousand people in 1860, 4 counties opposite of Washington 55000.
Thus, if all OTL WV is in the Union, the state has 54 counties and the population of 432000 in 1860.
In the moderate scenario WV has 37 counties and the population of 321000 in 1860.
In the maximist scenario WV has 29 counties and the population of 284000 in 1860.
Even in the latter scenario WV is in the same tier populationwise as New Hampshire and Vermont (a bit less in 1860, a bit more in 1870)

 

[sarahz]

The question is which nation would be the best model here. Iroquois pre-USA revolution?

The Iroquois achieved a strong position by playing the British against the French and dispossessed a lot of other Indian Nations ie the Delaware The situations do not seem very similar at all

 

[Red_Galiray]

Huh, I had forgotten about Paraguay. Would this smaller US try to help it? I mean, defeat could result in this US being much less likely to mingle in foreign affairs, and now there's competence to see who "owns" Latin America as their turf. I don't remember if it's been discussed, but does the Confederacy have ambitions over the Caribbean as some Southerners did? The British certainly ought to be alarmed if a new wave of filibustering takes place. Now that I think of it, with the Monroe Doctrine practically defunct, we could see much greater European intervention in Latin America, which is certainly interesting.

 

[Young Augustus5598]

I don’t know why I never thought of it, but when the discussions happened over who would replace AS Johnston, I completely forgot that Joe Johnston was still alive and well down in the Carolinas with plenty of Congressional backers

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Great TL, have been following it since early days, but haven't commented in a while.

I do have a question not related to the last posts however and extremely belated at that. It is the subject on West Virginia though and fortunately it has been out of focus of this TL and thus I don't think any answer on your part would contradict the TL text.
Specifically, I'd like to address the question of exact borders of West Virginia. We know that CSA ceded the counties opposite of Washington (Alexandria, Fairfax, Prince William and Loudon) and presumably those join West Virginia (there is common border between these counties and the rest of the state). However, I'd like to argue that there is a high probability that the southern part of West Virginia can go to Confederacy instead.

It is well known that almost all counties in south-eastern part of West Virginia voted for secession and didn't vote for creation of new state (see this and this maps for reference).
It is less well-known fact though that many of the counties that opposed secession had overwhelmingly confederate sympathies. This can be evidenced if one analyzed recruitment numbers for the Confederacy and the Union. E. g. in this paper data from 6 counties is analyzed (namely Cabell an Wayne in the south-western corner of the state, Jefferson and Hampshire in the panhandle and Ohio and Monongalia from the north) and it turns out that the two south-western counties gave a lot more soldiers to Confederacy than to the Union (the same is true for panhandle counties too) and overwhelming majority of Union recruits accredited to these counties come from other states (the same can be said even about the two northern counties).
Of course, confederate sympathies have limited impact on the post-war borders. After all, counties opposite of Washington as well as those in panhandle definitely were pro-confederate which didn’t prevent them from staying in the Union. However, unlike these counties southern West Virginia has pretty negligent strategic importance.

Finally, I would also argue that there is high probability that unlike IOTL southern WV stayed under Confederate control for most part of the war.
IOTL in September 1862 William Loring led a successful campaign that established Confederate control over Kanawha Valley including its capital city Charleston with Union troops forced to retreat into Ohio. IOTL these gains were very sort-lived as Loring had quarrels with central command and Lee needed reinforcements after defeat at Antietam. However, ITTL the situation is much, much grimmer for the Union. August and September 1862 are perhaps worst months of the war for the North, they are beaten on every front: in Tennessee, in Kentucky, in Virginia, in Canada, in Maine and every front desperately needs reinforcements. Union simply cannot afford a sizable detachment in Kanawha Valley as its strategic importance is negligent relative to other fronts. Even if the valley is not evacuated before confederates arrive (which IMHO is extremely probable), I don’t think there is a single reason for the Union to push back into Kanawha instead of reinforcing other more important fronts (e. g. Kentucky where confederates have taken the state capital and threaten Louisville).
One could possibly argue that while in general in August-September 1862 the Union’s situation ITTL is much worse than IOTL, specifically in Virginia it is better. McClellan is beaten, but he is beaten on Rappahannock instead of OTL unimpressive victory in Maryland. However, I think that ITTL after the second battle of Centerville Confederacy definitely can send a detachment to Kanawha in order to get a relatively easy victory and get a better access to recruitment in the region, while Union even if hasn’t evacuated the region beforehand simply cannot allow its troops to get bogged down in the unimportant theatre while there is crisis everywhere else.

If Confederates do indeed capture the southern West Virginia in the second half of 1862, I think there is high chance that they would hold it for duration of the war (with the possible exception of the final period). There is a good reason for CSA to have a reasonable garrison in the region as it will appease the Virginian lobby, would provide a link with Confederate-controlled Kentucky and will be more than compensated with additional recruits from here (as mentioned in the beginning of the post, even IOTL even the counties that voted against secession provided a lot more recruits to the CSA than to the Union). While Union is able to amass the army necessary to clear Kanawha valley from confederates (at least in the latter part of the war), it has relatively low incentive to do it. As long as confederates don’t attempt to cut B&O railway, the rebel presence here provide no threat for the North. Of course, it is better to control the region instead of letting the enemy to control it, but pretty much for the entire duration of war Union has higher priority targets and if there are extra troops that could be used to clear Kanawha, it makes more sense for Union to send them elsewhere.

To sum up while Union can in theory recapture the region in late 1864 or 1865, I don’t think it would bother, and even if it will, the critical periods are between presumably August 1862 (when IOTL the Dismemberment Ordinance was signed IOTL) and the summer of 1863 (when Lincoln admits the new state to the Union ITTL) and the final part of the war.
Presumably ITTL in August 1862 Lincoln has other more pressing matters, so the Ordinance would be signed later in the year when the situation settles down a little bit. If this is true it means that ITTL the Ordinance would be signed when Confederates still control the southern half of West Virginia. While the Confederate control of specific counties does not prevent Lincoln to include those in the ordinance, I do think that if before signing it CSA has a firm control over large part of the state, the ordinance can be more moderate, especially if there is enthusiastic recruitment to the rebel army in it (at least the OTL ordinance did not include the counties along current Virginia-West Virginia border that confederates had definitive control in the Summer 1862).
Of course, the absence of certain counties in the ordinance or rebel control over them does not prevent Lincoln from including them in the state when it is admitted, nor does it prevent Union from capturing the counties later and/or demanding them as part of peace negotiations. On the other hand, I don’t think that if the confederates do indeed control southern West Virginia, it would be an important point for Union during peace negotiations.
Even if these counties are included in the state during its admittance to the Union, I think they can be “exchanged” for the 4 counties opposite of Washington that were not included in it(it makes a lot of sense from strategic point of view for the Union and could be a lot easier pill to swallow for Confederates )

What counties are likely to stay in Virginia if the arguments above a valid (see this map for reference)?
A more moderate scenario is everything to the south of line Mason-Putnam-Kanawha-Clay-Nicholas-Greenbrier- Pocahontas (17 counties in total, with the population of 110000 people in 1860). A more pro-confederate scenario is adding counties Jackson, Roane, Calhoun, Gilmer, Braxton, Webster, Randolph and Pendlton (25 counties in total with the population of 148000 in 1860).
The latter scenario in particular leaves in Confederacy virtually all the counties out of immediate vicinity of B&O railway that voted for secession, had large slave populations or known rebel sympathies.

IOTL WV population was 377 thousand people in 1860, 4 counties opposite of Washington 55000.
Thus, if all OTL WV is in the Union, the state has 54 counties and the population of 432000 in 1860.
In the moderate scenario WV has 37 counties and the population of 321000 in 1860.
In the maximist scenario WV has 29 counties and the population of 284000 in 1860.
Even in the latter scenario WV is in the same tier populationwise as New Hampshire and Vermont (a bit less in 1860, a bit more in 1870)

Per the Treaty of Havana, the Confederacy was forced to relinquish any claim on the State of West Virginia, while also relinquishing Loudon, Fairfax, Alexandria and Prince William counties to the District of Columbia. Washington won't want to redraw those borders anytime soon, and much as Virginia hates how much of their state they lost, that was the price of peace and independence.

Its a good thing that Davis can't run for re-election since he'd lose Virginia in a heartbeat really!

 

[EnglishCanuck]

I don’t know why I never thought of it, but when the discussions happened over who would replace AS Johnston, I completely forgot that Joe Johnston was still alive and well down in the Carolinas with plenty of Congressional backers

Sadly for him his promotion to be kicked upstairs was what Davis wanted. That and the two men still hate one anothers guts...

Some political clout could have been applied to try and replace AS Johnston with Joe Johnston, but that was unlikely immediately in 1864 because of the political acrimony, and that most of Davis enemies had spent considerable political capital to replace the Secretary of War with someone of their choosing. Moving Johnston to replace Johnston would have taken more time and Davis was, effectively, one step ahead of everyone when he moved to get rid of Beauregard.

 

[Young Augustus5598]

Sadly for him his promotion to be kicked upstairs was what Davis wanted. That and the two men still hate one anothers guts...

Some political clout could have been applied to try and replace AS Johnston with Joe Johnston, but that was unlikely immediately in 1864 because of the political acrimony, and that most of Davis enemies had spent considerable political capital to replace the Secretary of War with someone of their choosing. Moving Johnston to replace Johnston would have taken more time and Davis was, effectively, one step ahead of everyone when he moved to get rid of Beauregard.

Absolutely makes sense and even in IRL, Johnston didn’t get the Army of Tennessee until after Bragg resigned following Missionary Ridge so it makes sense here as well. I don’t think historians will be particularly kind to Bragg still, but honestly while he would lose Virginia it’s hard to imagine Davis not having a massive influence and impact on the Confederate nation simply because he was the President that saw them through to victory

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Absolutely makes sense and even in IRL, Johnston didn’t get the Army of Tennessee until after Bragg resigned following Missionary Ridge so it makes sense here as well. I don’t think historians will be particularly kind to Bragg still, but honestly while he would lose Virginia it’s hard to imagine Davis not having a massive influence and impact on the Confederate nation simply because he was the President that saw them through to victory

Bragg is very much going to be seen as "the wrong man at the right time" to military historians, and his victory at Knoxville is going to be attributed to Jackson more than anything. So Bragg will be seen as second fiddle in pretty much anything he did, which means his ghost will be raining curses down on academics (which to be fair probably isn't different from OTL...)

As for Davis... well let's just say his legacy in the CSA is going to be complicated. In the North much less so.

 

[Shnurre]

Per the Treaty of Havana, the Confederacy was forced to relinquish any claim on the State of West Virginia, while also relinquishing Loudon, Fairfax, Alexandria and Prince William counties to the District of Columbia. Washington won't want to redraw those borders anytime soon, and much as Virginia hates how much of their state they lost, that was the price of peace and independence.

Its a good thing that Davis can't run for re-election since he'd lose Virginia in a heartbeat really!

This much is clear. What is not entirely clear though is if West Virginia is in OTL borders (plus four aforementioned counties).

Since the formation of the state is well after PoD and IOTL the borders of proposed state changed several times (including as late as 1863) one could argue that if the military situation in West Virginia was much worse than IOTL in the second half of 1862 (which I think should be the case ITTL given terrible situation in Union in August-September 1862), the final borders of the state could quite different from IOTL.
This is basically the core of my argument in the previous post. I won't repeat it in this post, I gave as much details as I could there.

Of course you as the TL author know what final picture you want to have, but I don't think that if southern part of OTL West Virginia stayed in Confederate Virginia ITTL, it would be implausible given what happened in the TL or that it contradicts the current timeline text in any way.

 

[Young Augustus5598]

Bragg is very much going to be seen as "the wrong man at the right time" to military historians, and his victory at Knoxville is going to be attributed to Jackson more than anything. So Bragg will be seen as second fiddle in pretty much anything he did, which means his ghost will be raining curses down on academics (which to be fair probably isn't different from OTL...)

As for Davis... well let's just say his legacy in the CSA is going to be complicated. In the North much less so.

I don’t know if I just missed it near the end of the war but did Patrick Cleburne ever get his own Corps or was he simply a divisional commander like IRL?

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Huh, I had forgotten about Paraguay. Would this smaller US try to help it? I mean, defeat could result in this US being much less likely to mingle in foreign affairs, and now there's competence to see who "owns" Latin America as their turf. I don't remember if it's been discussed, but does the Confederacy have ambitions over the Caribbean as some Southerners did? The British certainly ought to be alarmed if a new wave of filibustering takes place. Now that I think of it, with the Monroe Doctrine practically defunct, we could see much greater European intervention in Latin America, which is certainly interesting.

Alas poor Paraguay! So far from God, so sandwiched between Brazil and Argentina! I think the little country is going to be a little bit worse off TTL.

There are still groups in the Confederacy who want to expand south, with Cuba being the current target to some factions. Fun fact, they often said during the war they had no designs on Cuba and the Spanish government believed not a word of it!

But you do raise an important point. Latin America is currently threatened by European encroachment, as embodied in the French effort to plant a client monarch on the Mexican throne. I should note that Britain OTL was not adverse to this, however, I think the term "buyers remorse" is going to end up describing how Britain feels about effectively destroying the Monroe Doctrine.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

This much is clear. What is not entirely clear though is if West Virginia is in OTL borders (plus four aforementioned counties).

Since the formation of the state is well after PoD and IOTL the borders of proposed state changed several times (including as late as 1863) one could argue that if the military situation in West Virginia was much worse than IOTL in the second half of 1862 (which I think should be the case ITTL given terrible situation in Union in August-September 1862), the final borders of the state could quite different from IOTL.
This is basically the core of my argument in the previous post. I won't repeat it in this post, I gave as much details as I could there.

Of course you as the TL author know what final picture you want to have, but I don't think that if southern part of OTL West Virginia stayed in Confederate Virginia ITTL, it would be implausible given what happened in the TL or that it contradicts the current timeline text in any way.

I did decide for the simplicity of mapping that it should stick to its OTL borders, largely because the Union managed to keep most of West Virginia in the war, then they had no reason to give up the claimed territory (and the Confederacy had no ability to compel it) from them. I thought that was probably the reasonable solution in the end - but I'm also struggling with mapping the changes to North America completely as I'm doing my best to make a good map but a combination of poor artistic talent and a lack of time at the moment have been sadly delaying this project!

I do agree with you that they could - indeed you make a very persuasive case I hadn't considered, but I am sticking with the OTL borders for simplicity! Thanks for the info though!

 

[EnglishCanuck]

And a huge thank you to @TheRockofChickamauga and @SilentSpaniard for the Turtledove nomination! I'm truly honored people think I deserve it!

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 121: Politics and Partitions ​

“The final discussion of the fate of Kentucky was to be taken up in 1866. The stipulations in the Treaty of Havana had made clear that Kentucky was to be able to decide her own fate, and in accordance with Article 9, the two sides had sat down to hammer out the means by which the state would be consulted in April 1866. Five commissioners from the United States and five from Kentucky would meet in Lexington to discuss how the referendum would go. Former Confederate governor George W. Johnson was the man who led the Confederate delegates. His presence was a not so subtle jab in the eye of Washington, as he had stayed and fought for his state while many men who had fought for the North could not say the same. In this, another commissioner, Thomas Bramlette declared that he would help “in the bloody baptism of Kentucky into the Confederacy for her liberty,” as Bramlette had originally been a staunch opponent of secession, fighting with the 3rd Kentucky Infantry, and a former supporter of Lincoln, his defection (among others) to the Confederate cause was a dire statement for how low the esteem of the United States had fallen in the state.

Meanwhile, Washington had selected Richard T. Jacob to lead the United States delegation. A Kentuckian with unquestionable bonafides for the support of the Union cause, and just as importantly, President McClellan, he was determined to lead the back into the fold of the stars and stripes…

The United States wished for a simple majority vote akin to an election for governor, while the Southern delegations insisted on a convention like those undertaken by the original 11 seceding states in 1861.

However, the North flatly refused, believing - with some justification - that ‘men of means’ in Kentucky had been seduced by the siren song of secession. More accurately, the Northern government had so thoroughly disenfranchised many leading men of the state up to 1864 that as a class, many Kentucky politicians loathed the government in Washington. Even the Lion of Whitehall, Cassius Clay, would write that “My country has treated Kentucky shamefully,” in reference to its declaration of insurrection in 1864 and the military government imposed on the state since 1862, which had still not been lifted by the time of the referendum.

Confederate advocates were critical of this, accusing the North of seeking to abuse voters by military force. In response, the Confederacy placed 5,000 men in Kentucky, while the Union had another 7,000 on guard. The state was still a hotbed of guerilla violence as some communities sought to settle scores, particularly in the Jackson Purchase, the seven counties which were the staunchest supporters of the Confederacy. Many Unionists entered the state to prosecute “spies and traitors” while Confederate guerillas still would randomly kill United States soldiers. It was this exact kind of violence McClellan wished to avoid, and urged his commissioners to a swift vote.

It was only after much arm twisting that the United States point of view, a general referendum, was agreed to by all parties. Local officials, one man for the Confederacy and one man for the United States, would be placed to watch all ballot boxes to ensure there was no ‘undemocratic conduct’ during the statewide referendum, and soldiers were not allowed to be employed in the works by either side.

The machinery for the vote was ready by July of 1866, with both sides having worked feverishly to flourish broadsheets, posters and speaking campaigns to warn of the ills of the other side. Confederates spoke of the “specter of abolitionism” and the “destruction of trade” promised by remaining in the United States. The United States meanwhile warned of “economic ruin” while appealing to the patriotism and shared heritage Kentucky had with the rest of the country. It lionized men like Isaac Shelby and John Crittenden, praising valor against enemies abroad and loyalty at home. Both sides hoped that such patriotic appeals could sway the people, but it was only as the people went to cast their votes for or against secession that it would become clear what the future of Kentucky was…

When both sides began to do the tally of the vote, it became clear with alarming alacrity that secession had won the day. The more southern counties and naturally the occupied counties, delivered clear majorities for secession, despite two known cases of pro-Union ballot stuffing in Hickman County which managed to deliver 8,000 votes out of a pre-war population of 7,000. However, despite any duplicity by either side, of the 129,237 ballots cast 71,093 votes were cast for secession, and 58,144 votes were cast for the Union. Kentucky had cast its lot with the Confederacy…” - The Era of Hard Feelings, William Avery, Random House, 1989

“Macdonald’s ability to defer a crisis by delay had earned him the sobriquet, Old Tomorrow, and he aptly applied that moniker to the partition of the territory seized from Maine. Both New Brunswick and Quebec claimed some or all of the new territory, with New Brunswick greedily demanding every piece, much to the annoyance of the emerging provincial government in Montreal.

Ever the realist, Macdonald continuously deferred the talks of partition, and added delay after delay to the work of making a full survey of the new territory, leaving it to the running of the British military between 1864 and 1866. Though this did annoy some locals, it allowed for a slow integration, which Macdonald was happy to have. In private he assured the members of each province that they would receive their ‘fair share’ but never specified what that was. These vague hints were deliberate, and he had only one date in mind for the partition, after the September 1866 election.

Going into the election it was clear that the Great Coalition of 1862 was fraying at the edges. Former Grits and Rogues had different policy ideas, but they had no central platform to rally around. The Rogues, having opposed almost every government policy, were in the political wilderness and sequestered in the Province of Quebec, posing little threat to the new government. The former Grits, more numerous and diffused around the new kingdom, had a potential platform, but no party apparatus, with men of opposition not having any contact with one another in the other provinces.

Despite some internal opposition then, Macdonald and his ministers faced little true opposition in the coming election, with only a smattering of Nova Scotia based MPs and unrepentant Grits acting to challenge the government. They formed a shaky coalition under the nominal leadership of William Annand of Nova Scotia. A firm follower of Joseph Howe, it has long been speculated his leadership was so Howe might have a foot in both camps, and Howe spoke out in favor of the leadership of Annand, while declining to run himself.

Under this less than united leadership, Annand and his compatriots styled themselves the Principles Opposition, sometimes called the PO in the press of the day, and Macdonald would call them the ‘Particularly Odious’ which prompted much mirth in the House. However, without a united platform, the opposition never stood a real chance.

When the ballots were tallied, the Great Coalition had won 166 of the 187 seats up for grabs, with the opposition winning a mere 21, primarily in Nova Scotia and Quebec, with the united ranks of the Coalition sweeping to power.

Macdonald however, realized that he had to have Howe in his government. Deftly he offered the man the position of Minister of Marine and Fisheries, so as to have him as a representative of the Maritimes in their most sensitive post. Howe was effectively given an offer he couldn’t refuse, and so threw his lot in with the Macdonald government…

Finally, in November, Macdonald announced the partition. The common story is that Macdonald, in a boozy evening, had looked at the map and proclaimed it a “wretched timber lot” and slashed at it with a pen. By chance it landed at Beau Lake and ran in a straight line to the new border. Regarding his work he chuckled and declared “It is done!”

While most likely embellished, the divide of the former American territory managed to mollify the governments in both Saint Andrews and Quebec, especially the timber barons of both regions who would go on to develop the land and in some cases, national politics…” - Nation Maker: The Life of John A. Macdonald, Richard Chartrand, Queens University Publishing, 2005

 

[SultanArda]

Finally, in November, Macdonald announced the partition. The common story is that Macdonald, in a boozy evening, had looked at the map and proclaimed it a “wretched timber lot” and slashed at it with a pen. By chance it landed at Beau Lake and ran in a straight line to the new border. Regarding his work he chuckled and declared “It is done!”

While most likely embellished, the divide of the former American territory managed to mollify the governments in both Saint Andrews and Quebec, especially the timber barons of both regions who would go on to develop the land and in some cases, national politics…” - Nation Maker: The Life of John A. Macdonald, Richard Chartrand, Queens University Publishing, 2005

Finally!
We learn the fate of that giant potato field with some lumberyards!
I am happy!
(though last line made me question something. Who are these lumber barons?)

 

[Young Augustus5598]

Chapter 121: Politics and Partitions ​

“The final discussion of the fate of Kentucky was to be taken up in 1866. The stipulations in the Treaty of Havana had made clear that Kentucky was to be able to decide her own fate, and in accordance with Article 9, the two sides had sat down to hammer out the means by which the state would be consulted in April 1866. Five commissioners from the United States and five from Kentucky would meet in Lexington to discuss how the referendum would go. Former Confederate governor George W. Johnson was the man who led the Confederate delegates. His presence was a not so subtle jab in the eye of Washington, as he had stayed and fought for his state while many men who had fought for the North could not say the same. In this, another commissioner, Thomas Bramlette declared that he would help “in the bloody baptism of Kentucky into the Confederacy for her liberty,” as Bramlette had originally been a staunch opponent of secession, fighting with the 3rd Kentucky Infantry, and a former supporter of Lincoln, his defection (among others) to the Confederate cause was a dire statement for how low the esteem of the United States had fallen in the state.

Meanwhile, Washington had selected Richard T. Jacob to lead the United States delegation. A Kentuckian with unquestionable bonafides for the support of the Union cause, and just as importantly, President McClellan, he was determined to lead the back into the fold of the stars and stripes…

The United States wished for a simple majority vote akin to an election for governor, while the Southern delegations insisted on a convention like those undertaken by the original 11 seceding states in 1861.

However, the North flatly refused, believing - with some justification - that ‘men of means’ in Kentucky had been seduced by the siren song of secession. More accurately, the Northern government had so thoroughly disenfranchised many leading men of the state up to 1864 that as a class, many Kentucky politicians loathed the government in Washington. Even the Lion of Whitehall, Henry Clay, would write that “My country has treated Kentucky shamefully,” in reference to its declaration of insurrection in 1864 and the military government imposed on the state since 1862, which had still not been lifted by the time of the referendum.

Confederate advocates were critical of this, accusing the North of seeking to abuse voters by military force. In response, the Confederacy placed 5,000 men in Kentucky, while the Union had another 7,000 on guard. The state was still a hotbed of guerilla violence as some communities sought to settle scores, particularly in the Jackson Purchase, the seven counties which were the staunchest supporters of the Confederacy. Many Unionists entered the state to prosecute “spies and traitors” while Confederate guerillas still would randomly kill United States soldiers. It was this exact kind of violence McClellan wished to avoid, and urged his commissioners to a swift vote.

It was only after much arm twisting that the United States point of view, a general referendum, was agreed to by all parties. Local officials, one man for the Confederacy and one man for the United States, would be placed to watch all ballot boxes to ensure there was no ‘undemocratic conduct’ during the statewide referendum, and soldiers were not allowed to be employed in the works by either side.

The machinery for the vote was ready by July of 1866, with both sides having worked feverishly to flourish broadsheets, posters and speaking campaigns to warn of the ills of the other side. Confederates spoke of the “specter of abolitionism” and the “destruction of trade” promised by remaining in the United States. The United States meanwhile warned of “economic ruin” while appealing to the patriotism and shared heritage Kentucky had with the rest of the country. It lionized men like Isaac Shelby and John Crittenden, praising valor against enemies abroad and loyalty at home. Both sides hoped that such patriotic appeals could sway the people, but it was only as the people went to cast their votes for or against secession that it would become clear what the future of Kentucky was…

When both sides began to do the tally of the vote, it became clear with alarming alacrity that secession had won the day. The more southern counties and naturally the occupied counties, delivered clear majorities for secession, despite two known cases of pro-Union ballot stuffing in Hickman County which managed to deliver 8,000 votes out of a pre-war population of 7,000. However, despite any duplicity by either side, of the 129,237 ballots cast 71,093 votes were cast for secession, and 58,144 votes were cast for the Union. Kentucky had cast its lot with the Confederacy…” - The Era of Hard Feelings, William Avery, Random House, 1989

“Macdonald’s ability to defer a crisis by delay had earned him the sobriquet, Old Tomorrow, and he aptly applied that moniker to the partition of the territory seized from Maine. Both New Brunswick and Quebec claimed some or all of the new territory, with New Brunswick greedily demanding every piece, much to the annoyance of the emerging provincial government in Montreal.

Ever the realist, Macdonald continuously deferred the talks of partition, and added delay after delay to the work of making a full survey of the new territory, leaving it to the running of the British military between 1864 and 1866. Though this did annoy some locals, it allowed for a slow integration, which Macdonald was happy to have. In private he assured the members of each province that they would receive their ‘fair share’ but never specified what that was. These vague hints were deliberate, and he had only one date in mind for the partition, after the September 1866 election.

Going into the election it was clear that the Great Coalition of 1862 was fraying at the edges. Former Grits and Rogues had different policy ideas, but they had no central platform to rally around. The Rogues, having opposed almost every government policy, were in the political wilderness and sequestered in the Province of Quebec, posing little threat to the new government. The former Grits, more numerous and diffused around the new kingdom, had a potential platform, but no party apparatus, with men of opposition not having any contact with one another in the other provinces.

Despite some internal opposition then, Macdonald and his ministers faced little true opposition in the coming election, with only a smattering of Nova Scotia based MPs and unrepentant Grits acting to challenge the government. They formed a shaky coalition under the nominal leadership of William Annand of Nova Scotia. A firm follower of Joseph Howe, it has long been speculated his leadership was so Howe might have a foot in both camps, and Howe spoke out in favor of the leadership of Annand, while declining to run himself.

Under this less than united leadership, Annand and his compatriots styled themselves the Principles Opposition, sometimes called the PO in the press of the day, and Macdonald would call them the ‘Particularly Odious’ which prompted much mirth in the House. However, without a united platform, the opposition never stood a real chance.

When the ballots were tallied, the Great Coalition had won 166 of the 187 seats up for grabs, with the opposition winning a mere 21, primarily in Nova Scotia and Quebec, with the united ranks of the Coalition sweeping to power.

Macdonald however, realized that he had to have Howe in his government. Deftly he offered the man the position of Minister of Marine and Fisheries, so as to have him as a representative of the Maritimes in their most sensitive post. Howe was effectively given an offer he couldn’t refuse, and so threw his lot in with the Macdonald government…

Finally, in November, Macdonald announced the partition. The common story is that Macdonald, in a boozy evening, had looked at the map and proclaimed it a “wretched timber lot” and slashed at it with a pen. By chance it landed at Beau Lake and ran in a straight line to the new border. Regarding his work he chuckled and declared “It is done!”

While most likely embellished, the divide of the former American territory managed to mollify the governments in both Saint Andrews and Quebec, especially the timber barons of both regions who would go on to develop the land and in some cases, national politics…” - Nation Maker: The Life of John A. Macdonald, Richard Chartrand, Queens University Publishing, 2005

So Kentucky joins the Confederacy and the border rests upon the line of the Ohio River. I think this bodes very very well for a potential campaign by Breckinridge to run for President of the Confederacy in 1867.