Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

Thank you! I'd been hoping to keep the outcome in doubt for a while, and I was mildly concerned people might figure out how I was going to pull it off! Thomas has further to rise yet, but saving Washington so far is his big deal! Even in the post-war environment he's going to be pretty famous, and just bristling with rank.
You have to wonder how that all plays out in post-war. Thomas might be a hero of the North but still admired in the south because he's "one of ours," especially because he's operating independently and can hog the spotlight. Assuming the south wins and there's less vitriol compared to OTL.
 
You have to wonder how that all plays out in post-war. Thomas might be a hero of the North but still admired in the south because he's "one of ours," especially because he's operating independently and can hog the spotlight. Assuming the south wins and there's less vitriol compared to OTL.
I don't know about that - in OTL Thomas's family in the South (sisters, I think) never spoke to him again. On the other hand, if the Confederacy wins its independence ITTL, they may be less bitter about those they perceived as traitors in OTL. It might end up being a case of celebrating a gallant foe. So I suppose I am not really disagreeing after all.
 
The Union is still on the ropes very clearly, but to my surprise, a handful of heroic commanders have managed to mitigate the effects of Stanton disastrous reorganisation and subsequent purge.
 
You have to wonder how that all plays out in post-war. Thomas might be a hero of the North but still admired in the south because he's "one of ours," especially because he's operating independently and can hog the spotlight. Assuming the south wins and there's less vitriol compared to OTL.
I don't know about that - in OTL Thomas's family in the South (sisters, I think) never spoke to him again. On the other hand, if the Confederacy wins its independence ITTL, they may be less bitter about those they perceived as traitors in OTL. It might end up being a case of celebrating a gallant foe. So I suppose I am not really disagreeing after all.

In Thomas's case it is an interesting question. He was widely hated by his own family and former countrymen because he was a traitor to them (choosing nation over state and all that) but in this war where he has, unquestionably, never lost a battle* then it is an open question how he might be received by former Southerners. I've given some names, with his moniker "The Bastard of Bardstown" while some Southerners know him as "The Bastard of Virginia" which gives a hint on how many will receive him.

His own sisters were, historically, livid that he served the North and treated him as though he were dead. I'm not sure that would change in this case, as he would still have, in their eyes, betrayed state and family to serve a bad cause. They may wish to reconcile before he dies though. Having an internationally famous commander as a relative would be a hard thing to shake off since, compared to OTL, Thomas will be celebrated for saving Washington, standing off numerous Confederate attacks, and quite a canny career in the West.

*This one will be disputed by none other than John Breckinridge. In the original story I devoted quite a bit to his heroic stand at Elizabethtown out west, in this version (Chapter 28 pt. 1) it's got a smaller part but it will still be a big deal for Breckinridge who now believes he is the only person to have ever defeated Thomas in battle.

The Union is still on the ropes very clearly, but to my surprise, a handful of heroic commanders have managed to mitigate the effects of Stanton disastrous reorganisation and subsequent purge.

In a lot of ways the men who would probably have chosen to go down with the ship with McClellan were not the cream of the crop as it were. Hooker has enough people on his side (or who would have switched allegiance) that there would be plenty of competent men deciding that discretion is the better part of honor, while many men who McClellan had dipped a bit of patronage on would have resigned for certain. There were a few smaller shakeups, but for the most part the army managed to get by.

The men were definitely demoralized though, as losing your army commander to spurious charges of treason and having your corps commander resign in a few days is always going to be enough to cause depression in troops already in a pretty demoralized by a season of battlefield defeat besiegement.
 
Has the Union thought of creating sharpshooters who primary job it is to shoot officers on the field. I always found it weird that high ranking officers still led at the front during the ACW despite all the reasons why you shouldn't.
 
Has the Union thought of creating sharpshooters who primary job it is to shoot officers on the field. I always found it weird that high ranking officers still led at the front during the ACW despite all the reasons why you shouldn't.

So while there are various "sharpshooter" battalions in the OOB of both the Confederate and Union armies, the idea of detailing them specifically with the task of going out and effectively assassinating officers on the field would have been considered dishonorable to most. Not only because many of the men on the other side of the lines might happen to be someone you served with, but because specifically murdering another officer was seen as crass by most men - whether it be from Sandhurst or West Point. I think many tend to forget this was still an era where men's personal honor (and indeed even an abstract kind of chivalry) were seen as very important.

As for why officers still led on horseback, well, no matter what marvelous inventions we might have with "field telegraphs" or even air balloons, signal flags, and heliographs, most men and officers will only be able to discern what is going on directly in front of them. Add to that the very real fog of war with smoke and fire from rifles and cannons fired by tens of thousands of combatants, and it's a very chaotic situation. Your men need to be able to see you to know what you want them to do, and being on horseback was the best way for a commanding officer to not only coordinate with his brigade/division/corps but it also meant he could ride to the scene of trouble when he was needed.

Essentially it all comes down to communications. It would be impossible for a general to coordinate a few columns of men across, say, 22 miles of front unless he knew they were all supposed to meet at a specific place. If any column came into trouble they would need to take the time to track down their commander, send a messenger to find their army commander, and then the army commander would need time to react to what had happened to one column. It's why armies concentrated for battle, and you don't see many battles in the civil war that exceed more than three miles of frontage. Beyond a certain range, timely communications with moving masses of men are pretty difficult.
 
So while there are various "sharpshooter" battalions in the OOB of both the Confederate and Union armies, the idea of detailing them specifically with the task of going out and effectively assassinating officers on the field would have been considered dishonorable to most. Not only because many of the men on the other side of the lines might happen to be someone you served with, but because specifically murdering another officer was seen as crass by most men - whether it be from Sandhurst or West Point. I think many tend to forget this was still an era where men's personal honor (and indeed even an abstract kind of chivalry) were seen as very important.

As for why officers still led on horseback, well, no matter what marvelous inventions we might have with "field telegraphs" or even air balloons, signal flags, and heliographs, most men and officers will only be able to discern what is going on directly in front of them. Add to that the very real fog of war with smoke and fire from rifles and cannons fired by tens of thousands of combatants, and it's a very chaotic situation. Your men need to be able to see you to know what you want them to do, and being on horseback was the best way for a commanding officer to not only coordinate with his brigade/division/corps but it also meant he could ride to the scene of trouble when he was needed.

Essentially it all comes down to communications. It would be impossible for a general to coordinate a few columns of men across, say, 22 miles of front unless he knew they were all supposed to meet at a specific place. If any column came into trouble they would need to take the time to track down their commander, send a messenger to find their army commander, and then the army commander would need time to react to what had happened to one column. It's why armies concentrated for battle, and you don't see many battles in the civil war that exceed more than three miles of frontage. Beyond a certain range, timely communications with moving masses of men are pretty difficult.
It's sort of sad that in about fifty years that chivalry like that becomes obsolete especially later in the following decades
 
It's sort of sad that in about fifty years that chivalry like that becomes obsolete especially later in the following decades

I mean, it certainly persisted amongst the officer class - but the sheer soul crushing realities of modern war with machine guns and artillery reaching out as it did was a real killer for many of the ideas that pervaded society before the war. It probably didn't help that so many of the officer class still held to the need to "lead from the front" which saw them killed in droves.
 
Will the Union manage to reconquer the CSA at all even if in the far future like in TL 191?

Well on that we shall see! One thing I'm quick to caution readers on in thinking about the future of TTL is to not draw too many inspirations from TL-191. While Turtledove's work is the longest and most well known, it has a lot of parallelism. That definitely works for a long running novel series spanning nearly 100 years of history, but TTL is going to be different in more than a few ways.
 
Well on that we shall see! One thing I'm quick to caution readers on in thinking about the future of TTL is to not draw too many inspirations from TL-191. While Turtledove's work is the longest and most well known, it has a lot of parallelism. That definitely works for a long running novel series spanning nearly 100 years of history, but TTL is going to be different in more than a few ways.
Its good to hear this. Parallelism almost always feels out of place.
 
Chapter 71: A Memory of Gates
Chapter 71: A Memory of Gates

"The nineteenth of September,
The morning cool and clear,
Brave Gates rode through our army,
Each soldier's heart to cheer;
"Burgoyne," he cried, "advances,
But we will never fly;
No - rather than surrender,
We'll fight him till we die." - A Song for the Redcoats, 1777


“The Siege of Ticonderoga had proceeded in the desultory fashion of all sieges of the era. Burnside’s position was sound, and the British lacked the numbers for a proper envelopment. While the lines had crept steadily closer throughout July, it had been a long, and costly process. Wolseley would later write in his memoirs “Men died by pinpricks. Picked off by sharpshooters, felled by shells, and disease became rife in the dugouts,” he was thus against a long siege.

Dundas by this point, had come to agree. In London there were fears that, despite success thus far, events from nearly a century earlier might repeat themselves. However, the Army of the Hudson was not the Continental Army of 1777, and the Army of Canada was not led by Horatio Gates.

Ticonderoga meanwhile, was becoming increasingly untenable for the Army. Wolseley himself had designed the plan which would, he hoped, drive the Union forces out and open up the way south into the interior of New York…

His plan to drive the Union from Ticonderoga centered on the aptly named Mount Hope. The British troops had already begun calling it “Mount Forlorn Hope” as a bloody attack on June 15th had been repulsed with heavy losses from the defending American troops. Wolseley though, realized it was the lynchpin in the line. To seize it would necessarily sever the defenders lines in two, and allow him to effectively cut off the fort and town. The Union would then have to decide whether to hold on still, or retreat.

To do this, Wolseley managed to mask his aims by making diversionary attacks on the lines before Fort Ticonderoga proper. Using Paulet’s First Corps, the Guard’s Division prominently, he managed to convince Burnside that the main British assault would fall on the fort itself.

In response, Burnside shuffled his troops around to meet the threat. He believed that his far line was secure, leaving only the men of Foster’s division holding the line immediately adjacent to the town. The bulk of Casey’s XVI Corps was concentrated in and around the fortress itself. Much of II Corps was held in reserve, prepared to crush any British breakthrough.

Even with losses from battle and disease, the army was still 30,000 men strong, and the British Army of Canada only slightly larger. Burnside sincerely hoped the British would strike him head on. It would, he reasoned, and not incorrectly, break the British army like waves against a rock. He would write Philadelphia of the strength of his position and the high morale of his troops. One of those facts was correct, the other was a slight exaggeration.

After months of hard fighting in terrible terrain, brutal assault by British artillery, and trench, after trench, after trench, the Army of the Hudson was exhausted, and the men thoroughly rattled. Often they would perform picket duty with reluctance, many preferring their dugouts and bunkers. Constant British shelling and sniper fire sapped men’s morale, and unless alleviated by something, many risked becoming prisoners through inertia…” - The Second Siege of Ticonderoga, Stephen Simons, New York University Press, 1995


Ticonderoga_and_surrounding.jpg

Ticonderoga and environs

“My own plans to take Ticonderoga were perhaps straight forward. Having identified the lynchpin of the Yankee line, I immediately began to prepare for the assault, often entering the entrenchments to survey the positions myself, much to the Field Marshal’s amusement. It was in this, a meticulous preparation of the assault though, that everything would need to be risked.

I ordered probing attacks to see the Yankee responses, enlarged the sapper trenches at night, and prepared a storming party to take the position. It was all done under the watchful eye of Yankee observers, and I feared that any any point they might hurl themselves from their works and throw back all my hard work, prolonging the siege indefinitely, a possibility we could hardly afford after the long and bitter fighting across the vastness of the mountains. Reinforcements from England and Canada would be long coming to recuperate our army if I failed, so I was meticulous in my work.

Naturally, this took many weeks of painstaking misdirection. We suffered losses, especially among the brave men of Paulet’s First Corps. However, they paved the way for the men of Norcott’s division, some of the most experienced and battle hardened fighters in the army I judged, press their way into the fortifications. It was the night of July 29th, before the attack was to commence, I spoke earnestly with Norcott and his brigade commanders.

I implored them to remember the losses of the Redan were incurred when the men would not follow up the attack. I exhorted them that no matter the fire they must not ‘bunch up’ and would advance with the courage expected of the men of Her Majesty’s regiments, those in the regulars or the Volunteers. I fancy that had we not been under strict orders for silence, we may have gotten a cheer.

It began before dawn on the 30th, with no artillery to light the way. The men crawled to their sapping trenches and at the pre-ordained time, rushed forwards. It is regrettable that while the sortie by the brave Canadians of the 17th Battalion of Volunteer Rifles were able to surmount the enemies first breastworks, an alert Yankee sentry managed to raise the alarm, and his charge was repulsed with much loss, including the battalions commanding officer, Col. Jean Blanchett, who fell rallying his men in the sap when a Yankee dropped lit fused shell near him.

The 1st Battalion of the 10th Regiment however, managed to make their own escarpment. This was where Captain James Montague would earn his Victoria Cross. Bravely holding the slim toehold with his storming company, he repulsed three Yankee counterattacks before reinforcements reached him, being wounded twice in the chest. It was a shame he did not survive to receive it.

Despite the grievous losses encountered by the storming parties, my speech the night before seems to have heartened them and the men pushed on, regardless of loss. In the dawn light the colors of the 10th Regiment and the 76th were flying over the Yankee fortifications on Mount Hope. I would be required to ensure our own ‘forlorn hope’ was not crushed under a tide of attackers.

However, by the end of the day, my fears were dashed. We had survived, and the Yankees simply did not have the strength to retake the works…” – The Story of a Soldiers Life, Volume II, Field-Marshal Viscount Garnet Wolseley, Westminster 1903

“By the 31st Burnside had been forced to withdraw from his position at Ticonderoga, as Hancock’s men fought a bitter rearguard action. It was the news none had wanted to hear, and merely added to the nation’s worries. Burnside would withdraw over sixty miles before finding his place to stand at Saratoga…” The Second Siege of Ticonderoga, Stephen Simons, New York University Press, 1995

“In the withdrawal southwards, the army was in poor spirits. Though the losses were not so grievous as those suffered in the early months of the season, the men were disheartened until they reached Saratoga County. It was, surprisingly, where the men began to take heart. Every boy had grown up on tales of the Revolution, and could recite stories of the great battles fought against the British.

As the army of the Hudson began to settle in behind Bemis heights, a reverent, almost mystical attitude began to develop on the ground they walked. Had not Gates been defeated at Ticonderoga, only to withdraw and destroy Burgoyne’s army at Freeman’s Farm? Was it not possible then that this was part of some grand strategy?

The rumours would hound the army each day it was at camp, and when breastworks began going up on Bemis Heights and in the countryside surrounding it, there was what one man described as “near religious hysteria” for making a stand.

In truth, this was the opposite of what Burnside desired. He hoped to withdraw behind the Mohawk River at Troy and attempt to defend the state capital closer to his means of support. In a council of war called with his generals at Adkins House on August 7th, he gave his opinion to his commanders.

Casey agreed with Burnside that a retreat should be called. However, Richardson was adamant that a stand should be made. Hancock would join in this debate. He stated “If we are to fall back on Albany we may find ourselves in the same position as we were in at Ticonderoga. The British shall approach with the gunboats and artillery and bombard us until such time we are compelled to withdraw, and the state capital shall fall. We have a fine ground here, and the British must pass beneath our guns to continue their advance. Let us meet the enemy here, and remind them of the year 1777!

Casey was tepid in his support of retreat, and Richardson, Hancock and finally Burns and Howard of XIV Corps so adamant in their support that Burnside finally agreed to draw up the army for battle…” - Hancock the Superb: The Life of Winfield Scott Hancock, Charles Rivers, Newton Publishing, 2012

“Over the 8th and 9th of August, feverish work was done to prepare. Establishing the “Horatio Redoubt” above the Hudson River along the high ground, the army managed to effectively close the river to British shipping. Lines and entrenchments were dug, cannon emplaced, and a line of earthworks facing northwards and the approaching British.

The leading edge of the Army of Canada arrived midafternoon on the 9th, the early skirmishes concentrating around, ironically enough, the farm still owned by the Freeman family near the edge of Bemis Heights proper. British cavalry scouts stumbled upon their Union counterparts, and a short skirmish ensured before both sides broke off. A light probing attack later in the day by British troops of Russell’s division was handily seen off…” – The Union’s Shield: The Army of the Hudson, Donald Cameron, University of New York


Saratoga_County_Battleground_1863.jpg

Initial Dispositions, Battle of Saratoga 1863

“Informed of the American presence across the Champlain Road, Dundas ordered the army drawn up for battle, emplacing his men and guns across Lohnes Road. On his right, Paulet’s 1st Corps was drawn up facing the extreme right of the Union line. The 2nd Corps under Grant had their flank secured on the Hudson River, supported by Collinson’s flotilla.

The Union army faced towards them. Richardson’s II Corps on the left, facing Paulet. His troops were arranged along the rough high ground, with their flank resembling a fish hook. Casey’s XIV anchored on the river facing Grant…

Fighting began as Collinson’s vessels engaged the guns of Horatio Redoubt, trading shot with the last heavy guns in the Army of the Hudson. This gun duel would last most of the day as Collinson’s vessels had little room to maneuver in the confines of the river, but it did leave them out of the fighting on the British left flank.

Dundas opened the battle with Paulet’s corps advancing towards the far end of Bemis Heights, towards the ‘fish hook’ of the Union formation. Dundas sought to envelope the Union and drive them into the river. Paulet’s 1st Division, proudly helmed by the Guard’s Brigade, led the charge. They advanced under their battle standards into the teeth of the Union position, supported by a fusillade of artillery fire. Richardson held fire.

In the ensuing years many myths grew up surrounding Richardson’s decision. He hoped to ‘see the whites of their eyes’ or that he was low on ammunition. Most of his officers testified that Richardson held his fire to ensure that he made the most impact possible on those formations now identified as the elite of the British army. The Guards Brigade, buoyed by a sense of complacency, surged up the hill only to take massed volley fire at point blank range. It was a like a scythe through wheat, and the Guards broke, retreating pell mell down the slope, in their retreat they crashed into portions of the 2nd Brigade, disordering the whole of the British right.

On the left, Grant’s corps advanced calmly, maneuvering through the difficult terrain and across Mill Creek. They endured massed counter battery fire, but not the same silence that Richardson had placed upon his men. It was a hail of rifle fire, and cannonade, leaving hundreds dead or wounded.

However, Grant’s men, including Norcott’s 3rd Division, managed to surmount Bemis Heights, but only briefly, being driven back in a more organized manner than the Guards had been. The fighting lasted intermittently for two hours, finally forcing the retreat of the 3rd Division, when events on the right took the attention of the British Army…

Richardson, as aggressive as ever, mounted what had been authorized as a limited counterattack against Paulet’s Corps as it fell back across Mill Creek, it quickly devolved into a pursuit as the exhausted Guards fell back to Freeman’s Farm. In the Wheatfield, the Guards turned, and made their stand…

Crack Enfield volleys repelled the attacks, and one shell shocked New Yorker would relate the Wheatfield was “the hottest place I ever saw on this earth or want to see hereafter. There were shot, shells, and Minie balls sweeping the face of the earth; legs, arms, and other parts of human bodies were flying in the air like straw in a whirlwind. The dogs of war were loose, and ‘havoc’ was their cry.”

Blenker’s Division was quickly ‘used up’ in the assault, and with Burn’s division having been severely weakened, Richardson committed his old division to the attack under Olive O. Howard. It was the cream of the army, Meagher’s Irishmen requested to lead the charge to once again come to grips with their old foe the Guards. They advanced under their golden harp banner, determined to come to grips with their enemies. Moving into the teeth of the fire, they advanced, were repulsed, but did not turn their backs once. Of the 1,400 men who had reported for duty that morning, only 1,000 would return from the assault, and only 400 unwounded with Meagher himself among the wounded.

The slaughter was remarkable. William French would be killed leading his men, and Richardson himself would swoop in to reform the lines and organize a counter attack. It was here he would fall, cajoling the color party into action. This would effectively end the counterattack in the Wheatfield.

Howard would state that “Whole ranks of brave men were mowed down in heaps to the right and left. Never before was I so consciously troubled with fear that my horse would further injure some wounded fellow soldier, lying helpless on the ground. This most deadly combat raged until our last round of ammunition was expended.

With Richardson’s death, Hancock became the ranking general in II Corps, and he wisely ordered his men to their entrenchments…

Grant’s attacks on the left petered out by late afternoon, and Dundas would grudgingly call off the attack. He had not the strength left to batter his way through this American position. It had been, in the words of Wolseley “a wholesale bloodletting” and Dundas was compelled to withdraw north towards Schuylerville after negotiating with Burnside to allow a truce for the collection of the wounded and the dead on the 12th. Of the 35,000 men he brought to battle that day, some 8,000 were dead, wounded, or captured. Burnside was little better. Of the 29,000 brought to battle, 5,000 were dead and wounded. The total of the casualties at the Battle of Saratoga was 13,000 for both sides, the bloodiest in the northern theater…” - Death on the Heights, The Battle of Saratoga, Alexander Matheson, New York University Press, 1984
 
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How harsh will the post-war treaty be on the US? The US seems to be doing quite well in fighting a two-front war that includes a global superpower so will harsher terms be sought as revenge?
 
How harsh will the post-war treaty be on the US? The US seems to be doing quite well in fighting a two-front war that includes a global superpower so will harsher terms be sought as revenge?

Well I do already have the treaty wrapping the war up hammered out. It's going to be...varying shades of bad. In the early chapters you'll have an idea of what the British are thinking in the December Ultimatum. They may or may not expand on that.
 
well now would seem like a good time to start negotiating with her majestys government .use the recent victory as leavarge get peace and send the forces in the north to maryland to take out there anger on lee and boom .
Well of course this depends on how things go in the west.If grant can crush Johnson without too many casualties.
finallly the recent chapters seem to have a theme of sieges failing and that just happened to me in RTW .so Grant is going to lose isn't he?
Great chapter as always!
 
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