Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond
- Thread starter EnglishCanuck
- Start date
Very spot on. Even this current invasion of New York is something of a gamble since it can easily be argued the British have accomplished their objective of protecting Canada.
They occupy vast swathes of Maine because it's weakness is it is contiguous with Canada/New Brunswick, and in being so is right next door to British naval strength, so the power the British have in the Bay of Fundy is more than enough to back up their garrisons and toeholds. Maine is about the only realistic 'invade and occupy' state other than maybe Vermont. Otherwise the only areas they occupy are other strategic toeholds on the coasts or islands (Martha's Vineyard, Block Island, ect). Basically enough fortified toeholds to make the blockade more effective.
It feels like the British plan is more or less the equivalent to the Anaconda. An overwhelming Naval advantage with a few conquered spots to support that.
The question seems to be "What is the product necessary for war that the Union will run out of first?" Given that the Union probably produces much more food than all of its enemies combined and by the time that the components for producing steel have all been taken that the war will be over (that would basically be a line from Cleveland to New Jersey), the answer seems to be the components for gunpower. Is the Union running out of any of those components?
The question seems to be "What is the product necessary for war that the Union will run out of first?" Given that the Union probably produces much more food than all of its enemies combined and by the time that the components for producing steel have all been taken that the war will be over (that would basically be a line from Cleveland to New Jersey), the answer seems to be the components for gunpower. Is the Union running out of any of those components?
A fairly apt comparison yes. The Lizard Lion Plan i suppose you could call it!
Currently they are proverbially scraping the barrel on gunpowder. However, blockade running and the fact that TTLs 1862 was slightly less intense than OTLs 1862 they managed to keep their heads above water powder wise. But, they are gutting the civilian economy for lead and Iron.
Ficboy
Banned
We're really waiting for you to release the next chapter. Speaking of which, I wonder if you have the project on Google Docs.
Hopefully I'll have the resolution of the Siege of Washington up by the end of the week.
And currently no, the project is on a few different documents.
Sorry, I won't be sharing any of the documents relating to the TL outside this thread or the other sites I'm posting on.
Chapter 68: The Siege of Washington
Chapter 68: The Siege of Washington
“If war consisted merely in not taking risks, glory would be at the mercy of very mediocre talent.” - Napoleon Bonaparte
“Lee’s June 15th attack had failed to breach the defences, and an angry general was forced to settle down into a lengthy siege…
The second assault on Fort Lincoln on June 29th fared no better than the first and Lee found himself sticking to the strategy decided upon remaining in the entrenchments…
The Second Battle of Fort Lincoln [1]
Inside the city, the Army of the Potomac, once the grandest in the whole Union, was facing privation. Though over half the city’s population had fled when the government did in early May, some 25,000 civilians were still in the city with the remaining government clerks and soldiers. This made the issue of billeting soldiers and maintaining order difficult. Soldiers biovacked in tents, dugouts, and abandoned civilian homes when not on trench duty. Constant shelling and skirmishing started fires, and forced the preemptive destruction of some buildings. The destruction was so great that after the siege one commentator would remark “The City took on the visage of some great classical ruin, and one was forced to bring to mind the Sack of Rome or the Great Fire of London as a comparison.”
McClellan himself made his headquarters at the Wilkes House, not far from Secretary Stanton’s home. He was seen almost constantly in activity, usually cloistered with his Chief of Staff Marcey, and in and about the lines, or conferring with Stanton through the early months of May and June…” - The Siege of Washington, Jeremiah Dutton, University of Philadelphia, 1993
“McClellan was described in this period as ‘inexhaustible’ in his energy. By day he was ahorse riding through the lines, visiting the troops, and inspecting fortifications. He was even directly at the line directing men during Lee’s attack on the 15th. However, by night he was a different man. Deprived of the ability to communicate with his beloved Ellen, he was in despair, only consoling himself through letters he thought he might never be able to send.
Tellingly each letter he wrote throughout the siege, and there was one almost nightly, began with “I doubt this letter may ever reach you,” which was a clear indicator of his many anxieties and frustrations. In these letters he speaks of his staff, his commanders, and his hopes and aspirations for the war. In early May his letters are confident that he can break Lee’s siege, if the I Corps and XII Corps would be able to march to his relief. Their lack of appearance in May, and then June, sunk his morale. He then seemed to believe that the army was somehow reforming in Baltimore, but when he learned of the surrender of I Corps outside Fredericksburg through Pinkerton’s spies he fell into melancholy.
Through these letters he lay early blame upon himself for not immediately attacking towards Annapolis. However, this self-recrimination faded as May wore into June, and he would lay blame on alternatively Lincoln and Stanton, or both, for his present circumstances. “Stanton has no desire to win the war when he may use me as a scapegoat for the government’s defeat,” he would write on June 29th after the Second Battle of Fort Lincoln. “I am to shoulder the burden of defending the nation while he and the great gorilla, now safely in Philadelphia, make excuses and plot for my downfall. They expect me to fall on my sword, but I shall not give them the satisfaction!”
His acrimonious relationship with the Secretary of War, who had stayed behind to provide some government oversight, deteriorated as the siege went on. Stanton openly did not trust McClellan, and McClellan in turn distrusted Stanton and his judgement. Their relationship had suffered across the summer of 1862, and now in the summer of 1863 all the mistrust and disagreement came to a head. It was said in July that while touring the biovaucks of the army, a companion expressed disbelief that still so large a force should sit immobile. Stanton laughed and said “Oh that sir is merely General McClellan’s personal bodyguard.” He paused for thought. “I am told the nations of Europe did not declare war on France, but Napoleon’s person during their many wars. Perhaps if I convinced the South to declare war upon McClellan he may be inclined to move in order to defend his person from the wrath of the secesh.”[2]
Stanton in his own writings would constantly accuse McClellan of plotting a coup, and surrounded himself with officers who he summarized would be more loyal to the government than the ‘McClellanite’ faction within the Army of the Potomac. These men were McClellan’s rivals, Hooker and Rosecrans, who both had little and less to say of their commanding officer. Hooker in particular managed to distinguish himself in Stanton’s eyes as the III Corps held the line facing off against Lee’s worst attacks in June…” - I Can Do It All: The Trials of George B. McClellan, Alfred White, 1992, Aurora Publishing
“By the beginning of July, the army was in poor shape. The army had been on half rations since the start of June to conserve supplies. McClellan’s announcement that this would hold true for the whole population nearly caused a riot, but tensions were diffused by the simple expedient that soldiers outnumbered the remaining civilians by a factor of three to one. Though there were certainly grumblings, no one was foolish enough to hassle the soldiers in the streets.” - The Siege of Washington, Jeremiah Dutton, University of Philadelphia, 1993
"Unity at the top between the few political figures left in Washington and the command of the Army of the Potomac had all but evaporated. Though Stanton had congratulated McClellan in seeing off the attacks by Lee in June, he harshly criticized the commander of the army for failing to follow up with a counterattack which might have broken the Confederate lines. McClellan balked at that idea, declaring “This army must be maintained for the defence of the city in anticipation of its relief. Were it to be thrown away there could be nothing left for the government of the nation to do but surrender.”
These words, spoken to Stanton on the 9th of July, shook Stanton to his core. For whatever reason, and the reasons remain murky to this day, he began to believe that McClellan meant to surrender the army to Lee. This was probably not discouraged by regular (and some have said drunken) reports from Joseph Hooker’s headquarters which spoke ominously of ‘defeatism’ from amongst units with known ‘McClellenite’ commanders. Indeed, it was said that Daniel Sickles, using his pre-war connections with the man who had saved him from a murder charge, wove particularly lurid tales of intrigues and plans of a coup to place Stanton under arrest in order so that McClellan might ‘save the army from starvation’ and ‘the politicians.’ Stanton could have been under no illusions about who ‘the politicians’ meant in that case.
Thanks to Ellen’s release of the correspondence after her husband’s death and the voracious defence of his father’s record by George B. McClellan Jr. shows, without a doubt, that McClellan made no plans for surrender, much less a coup. His own post-war correspondence, and his long suffering and self-serving 1864 “Report” do indeed spell out that he had no intent to surrender the city, as do the very public attempts to sue Stanton for libel until the latter’s death in 1870. All the evidence then, would bear out that this rumoured coup and surrender is nothing but slander carried out by politicking generals. That does make Stanton’s actions in order to counter this feared overthrow of civilian authority seem extremely harsh in hindsight…” - I Can Do It All: The Trials of George B. McClellan, Alfred White, 1992, Aurora Publishing
George McClellan and his wife Ellen, in 1864
“The preparations were undertaken in the utmost secrecy, and by July 11th, all was in readiness. Stanton ordered that men from Syke’s Regulars be used to created a perimeter around the President’s Park and Lafayette Square, where the Wilke’s House was located. ‘Politically reliable troops’ from Hooker’s command and under Butterfield’s supervision, were then placed in attendance to ‘prevent any trouble from officers or men adverse to a change of command’ on the outskirts of this perimeter.
Stanton would surprise McClellan and his chief of staff at the Wilkes home that morning. Accompanied by Lt. Col. Robert Buchanan of the 4th Infantry, alongside Rosencrans, Stanton approached the general as he was having breakfast.
“Mr. Secretary,” McClellan said. “May I ask the meaning of this morning intrusion?”
“You may General.” Stanton replied. “Unreasonable reports have reached my ears that you mean to surrender the city. Do you deny it?”
McClellan was wholly taken aback. “Of course I deny it!” The General replied. “Tell me who brings such lies to your ears and I will see them brought before a court martial for insubordination. I am loyal to my country sir.”
“Be that as it may General, I find your work uninspiring. While you have finely commanded this army, I find myself with no choice but to relieve you of your command. As the ranking member of government present, I hereby relieve you of your duties and shall order you confined to this house until the conclusion of the present siege.”
McClellan of course, was completely shocked. As the allegations against him were utterly false, he could only accept civilian authority in the person of Stanton. That he was effectively under house arrest made matters all the worse for him. His staff was only informed of the change of command after the fact. The news spread to the whole of the army very slowly, and it wasn’t until the 18th that the majority of the rank and file even fully understood what had happened.
In his place, Stanton elevated Major General William Rosecrans to the head of the Army of the Potomac. This caused a private outrage among the officers loyal to McClellan. The effect though, was immediate. Both Fitz John Porter and William B. Franklin offered their resignations over the matter, which caused Stanton to similarly detain both men on suspicion of ‘collaborating’ with the now deposed McClellan. In their places Edward Ord was promoted to the command of IV Corps and Daniel Sickle’s in command of the XIV Corps.
The shake up was shocking to the rank and file, and did much to damper spirits among the Army of the Potomac. Though there was some talk of a ‘counter-coup’ to undo what many in the ranks regarded as a coup against their commander, the talk was just that, talk. The men were no more eager to topple the government than they were to surrender. The chaos in the ranks however, caused confusion in command and many speculated that the next Confederate attack might break them…” - The Siege of Washington, Jeremiah Dutton, University of Philadelphia, 1993
“Stanton’s heavy-handed treatment of McClellan’s rumoured conspiracy would have heavy ramifications for Lincoln in Philadelphia. That he acted even when out of effective communication with the President still reflected poorly on him when the news became known to the world. McClellan, still a darling of the Democratic Party, would serve as a martyr for all the increasingly angry voices against Lincoln and his cabinet. The cries of ‘tyranny’ would float higher, especially in the states of New York and New Jersey…” Snakes and Ladders: The Lincoln Administration and America’s Darkest Hour, Hillary Saunders, Scattershot Publishing, 2003
----
1] As a note, the soldiers TTL do look more like those from the old drawings from the 1880s. Fewer shabby Southern soldiers with enormous beards and no shoes, many more in worn grey uniforms and British boots.
2] Attributed to Lincoln OTL, but better from Stanton TTL.
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Who knows, the Confederates are used to fighting McClellan, he may just be able to bungle his way into a victory.
This does not augur well for the Union. It seems that the US is tumbling towards a most disastrous failure, and though I think Rosecrans can do a better job than McClellan, the Union is now at the brink of destruction.
Ficboy
Banned
It's not going to end well for the Americans. If the Confederates do break through and take Washington DC as you said the Civil War or the Great American War is over.Chapter 68: The Siege of Washington“If war consisted merely in not taking risks, glory would be at the mercy of very mediocre talent.” - Napoleon Bonaparte
“Lee’s June 15th attack had failed to breach the defences, and an angry general was forced to settle down into a lengthy siege…
The second assault on Fort Lincoln on June 29th fared no better than the first and Lee found himself sticking to the strategy decided upon remaining in the entrenchments…
The Second Battle of Fort Lincoln [1]
Inside the city, the Army of the Potomac, once the grandest in the whole Union, was facing privation. Though over half the city’s population had fled when the government did in early May, some 25,000 civilians were still in the city with the remaining government clerks and soldiers. This made the issue of billeting soldiers and maintaining order difficult. Soldiers biovacked in tents, dugouts, and abandoned civilian homes when not on trench duty. Constant shelling and skirmishing started fires, and forced the preemptive destruction of some buildings. The destruction was so great that after the siege one commentator would remark “The City took on the visage of some great classical ruin, and one was forced to bring to mind the Sack of Rome or the Great Fire of London as a comparison.”
McClellan himself made his headquarters at the Wilkes House, not far from Secretary Stanton’s home. He was seen almost constantly in activity, usually cloistered with his Chief of Staff Marcey, and in and about the lines, or conferring with Stanton through the early months of May and June…” - The Siege of Washington, Jeremiah Dutton, University of Philadelphia, 1993
“McClellan was described in this period as ‘inexhaustible’ in his energy. By day he was ahorse riding through the lines, visiting the troops, and inspecting fortifications. He was even directly at the line directing men during Lee’s attack on the 15th. However, by night he was a different man. Deprived of the ability to communicate with his beloved Ellen, he was in despair, only consoling himself through letters he thought he might never be able to send.
Tellingly each letter he wrote throughout the siege, and there was one almost nightly, began with “I doubt this letter may ever reach you,” which was a clear indicator of his many anxieties and frustrations. In these letters he speaks of his staff, his commanders, and his hopes and aspirations for the war. In early May his letters are confident that he can break Lee’s siege, if the I Corps and XII Corps would be able to march to his relief. Their lack of appearance in May, and then June, sunk his morale. He then seemed to believe that the army was somehow reforming in Baltimore, but when he learned of the surrender of I Corps outside Fredericksburg through Pinkerton’s spies he fell into melancholy.
Through these letters he lay early blame upon himself for not immediately attacking towards Annapolis. However, this self-recrimination faded as May wore into June, and he would lay blame on alternatively Lincoln and Stanton, or both, for his present circumstances. “Stanton has no desire to win the war when he may use me as a scapegoat for the government’s defeat,” he would write on June 29th after the Second Battle of Fort Lincoln. “I am to shoulder the burden of defending the nation while he and the great gorilla, now safely in Philadelphia, make excuses and plot for my downfall. They expect me to fall on my sword, but I shall not give them the satisfaction!”
His acrimonious relationship with the Secretary of War, who had stayed behind to provide some government oversight, deteriorated as the siege went on. Stanton openly did not trust McClellan, and McClellan in turn distrusted Stanton and his judgement. Their relationship had suffered across the summer of 1862, and now in the summer of 1863 all the mistrust and disagreement came to a head. It was said in July that while touring the biovaucks of the army, a companion expressed disbelief that still so large a force should sit immobile. Stanton laughed and said “Oh that sir is merely General McClellan’s personal bodyguard.” He paused for thought. “I am told the nations of Europe did not declare war on France, but Napoleon’s person during their many wars. Perhaps if I convinced the South to declare war upon McClellan he may be inclined to move in order to defend his person from the wrath of the secesh.”[2]
Stanton in his own writings would constantly accuse McClellan of plotting a coup, and surrounded himself with officers who he summarized would be more loyal to the government than the ‘McClellanite’ faction within the Army of the Potomac. These men were McClellan’s rivals, Hooker and Rosecrans, who both had little and less to say of their commanding officer. Hooker in particular managed to distinguish himself in Stanton’s eyes as the III Corps held the line facing off against Lee’s worst attacks in June…” - I Can Do It All: The Trials of George B. McClellan, Alfred White, 1992, Aurora Publishing
“By the beginning of July, the army was in poor shape. The army had been on half rations since the start of June to conserve supplies. McClellan’s announcement that this would hold true for the whole population nearly caused a riot, but tensions were diffused by the simple expedient that soldiers outnumbered the remaining civilians by a factor of three to one. Though there were certainly grumblings, no one was foolish enough to hassle the soldiers in the streets.” - The Siege of Washington, Jeremiah Dutton, University of Philadelphia, 1993
"Unity at the top between the few political figures left in Washington and the command of the Army of the Potomac had all but evaporated. Though Stanton had congratulated McClellan in seeing off the attacks by Lee in June, he harshly criticized the commander of the army for failing to follow up with a counterattack which might have broken the Confederate lines. McClellan balked at that idea, declaring “This army must be maintained for the defence of the city in anticipation of its relief. Were it to be thrown away there could be nothing left for the government of the nation to do but surrender.”
These words, spoken to Stanton on the 9th of July, shook Stanton to his core. For whatever reason, and the reasons remain murky to this day, he began to believe that McClellan meant to surrender the army to Lee. This was probably not discouraged by regular (and some have said drunken) reports from Joseph Hooker’s headquarters which spoke ominously of ‘defeatism’ from amongst units with known ‘McClellenite’ commanders. Indeed, it was said that Daniel Sickles, using his pre-war connections with the man who had saved him from a murder charge, wove particularly lurid tales of intrigues and plans of a coup to place Stanton under arrest in order so that McClellan might ‘save the army from starvation’ and ‘the politicians.’ Stanton could have been under no illusions about who ‘the politicians’ meant in that case.
Thanks to Ellen’s release of the correspondence after her husband’s death and the voracious defence of his father’s record by George B. McClellan Jr. shows, without a doubt, that McClellan made no plans for surrender, much less a coup. His own post-war correspondence, and his long suffering and self-serving 1864 “Report” do indeed spell out that he had no intent to surrender the city, as do the very public attempts to sue Stanton for libel until the latter’s death in 1870. All the evidence then, would bear out that this rumoured coup and surrender is nothing but slander carried out by politicking generals. That does make Stanton’s actions in order to counter this feared overthrow of civilian authority seem extremely harsh in hindsight…” - I Can Do It All: The Trials of George B. McClellan, Alfred White, 1992, Aurora Publishing
George McClellan and his wife Ellen, in 1864
“The preparations were undertaken in the utmost secrecy, and by July 11th, all was in readiness. Stanton ordered that men from Syke’s Regulars be used to created a perimeter around the President’s Park and Lafayette Square, where the Wilke’s House was located. ‘Politically reliable troops’ from Hooker’s command and under Butterfield’s supervision, were then placed in attendance to ‘prevent any trouble from officers or men adverse to a change of command’ on the outskirts of this perimeter.
Stanton would surprise McClellan and his chief of staff at the Wilkes home that morning. Accompanied by Lt. Col. Robert Buchanan of the 4th Infantry, alongside Rosencrans, Stanton approached the general as he was having breakfast.
“Mr. Secretary,” McClellan said. “May I ask the meaning of this morning intrusion?”
“You may General.” Stanton replied. “Unreasonable reports have reached my ears that you mean to surrender the city. Do you deny it?”
McClellan was wholly taken aback. “Of course I deny it!” The General replied. “Tell me who brings such lies to your ears and I will see them brought before a court martial for insubordination. I am loyal to my country sir.”
“Be that as it may General, I find your work uninspiring. While you have finely commanded this army, I find myself with no choice but to relieve you of your command. As the ranking member of government present, I hereby relieve you of your duties and shall order you confined to this house until the conclusion of the present siege.”
McClellan of course, was completely shocked. As the allegations against him were utterly false, he could only accept civilian authority in the person of Stanton. That he was effectively under house arrest made matters all the worse for him. His staff was only informed of the change of command after the fact. The news spread to the whole of the army very slowly, and it wasn’t until the 8th that the majority of the rank and file even fully understood what had happened.
In his place, Stanton elevated Major General William Rosecrans to the head of the Army of the Potomac. This caused a private outrage among the officers loyal to McClellan. The effect though, was immediate. Both Fitz John Porter and William B. Franklin offered their resignations over the matter, which caused Stanton to similarly detain both men on suspicion of ‘collaborating’ with the now deposed McClellan. In their places Edward Ord was promoted to the command of IV Corps and Daniel Sickle’s in command of the XIV Corps.
The shake up was shocking to the rank and file, and did much to damper spirits among the Army of the Potomac. Though there was some talk of a ‘counter-coup’ to undo what many in the ranks regarded as a coup against their commander, the talk was just that, talk. The men were no more eager to topple the government than they were to surrender. The chaos in the ranks however, caused confusion in command and many speculated that the next Confederate attack might break them…” - The Siege of Washington, Jeremiah Dutton, University of Philadelphia, 1993
“Stanton’s heavy-handed treatment of McClellan’s rumoured conspiracy would have heavy ramifications for Lincoln in Philadelphia. That he acted even when out of effective communication with the President still reflected poorly on him when the news became known to the world. McClellan, still a darling of the Democratic Party, would serve as a martyr for all the increasingly angry voices against Lincoln and his cabinet. The cries of ‘tyranny’ would float higher, especially in the states of New York and New Jersey…” Snakes and Ladders: The Lincoln Administration and America’s Darkest Hour, Hillary Saunders, Scattershot Publishing, 2003
----
1] As a note, the soldiers TTL do look more like those from the old drawings from the 1880s. Fewer shabby Southern soldiers with enormous beards and no shoes, many more in worn grey uniforms and British boots.
2] Attributed to Lincoln OTL, but better from Stanton TTL.
The knives are coming out now that everything is down to the wire. It's such a massively boneheaded move though, we'll have to see what happens with the officers after such a massive breach of trust with the government.
I'm personally of the opinion that Rosecrans is often unfairly maligned for Chickamauga. He built an amazing army and organization while heading the Army of the Cumberland, and his early war record is nothing to sneeze at. Stone's River may have been bloody, and overall indecisive, but it didn't stop Old Rosey from driving Bragg from Tennessee in the Tullahoma Campaign, the Siege of Chattanooga be damned.
Mind you, he did sit in Murfreesboro for six months, and in this position he may not have six months...
Pretty grim innit? We shall have to see what the Army of the Chesapeake can do...
I've always thought that the softer politicking in the Army of the Potomac, as such that got John Pope an army command and saw a real whirligig of command in 1863, were always ripe for the dysfunctional infighting that tore the Army of the Tennessee to shreds. Here, without more direct oversight from an omnipresent government, and the horrifying prospect of defeat, I think I found just such an occasion for the more toxic elements of the AotP to scuttle into the light. Hooker was an obvious candidate, but I don't think Rosecrans would have sat well under McClellan's command either.