Una diferente ‘Plus Ultra’ - the Avís-Trastámara Kings of All Spain and the Indies (Updated 11/7)

But what constitutes a healthy economy?

I would like to argue that Tudor England with the monarch issuing monopolies is quite less healthy than post-1660 Restoration England and especially post-1688 England. As I see it, England enjoys two significant advantages: lack of internal tariff barriers and representation of the burgher class in the House of Commons. These things have nothing to do with climate or geography.

The rise of the Netherlands as the greatest maritime state at 1650-1672 took place during the First Stadtholderless Era, when the maritime States completely sidelined the agrarian ones in their internal struggle. Only then the Dutch built a battleship fleet while until then they had a cruiser fleet for trade protection and raiding. The apogee of the dutch economy was the result of an internal political struggle, not an ingrained feature of their economy. It doesn't mean that it will happen in the same degree in TTL. As I see it, any Netherlands that are closely bound to the continent by political ties (e.g. Habsburg monarchy), it is a country that will have to a tougher time going full Mistress of the Seas. Having said that, the greatest advantage the Netherlands enjoy is its financial markets and its financial institutions: this is what allowed both the States and the mercantile community to borrow at lower rates than their competitors. But this is not a dutch privilege: we know from OTL that England - a monarchy- was able to transplant these financial institutions at London. At that point the dutch economy lost its main competitive advantage.

Lastly, France is a prime example why economy is mostly a matter of institutions - barring of course major climate challenges like a desert. France enjoyed huge advantages in terms of the biggest population in Europe, very favorable climate and fertile land suitable for cultivating a great variety of crops. Yet in my view, the biggest drawback of the french economy were the internal tariffs and the inefficient tax farming methods. Even a superb statesman like Colbert didn't have the political capital to address these issues, even though he recognized them as problems. If Louis XIV spent less political capital in wars compared to internal reforms, he stood a good chance to turn France into an economic juggernaut.

Bottomline is that institutions are the most important factors to the health and prosperity of an economy.


Well, partially they can form a naval barrier: in TTL they completely control the Gibraltar Straits. Spain simply decides who has access to the Mediterranean, one of the biggest markets in the world with tens of millions of people. It will always be incredibly more expensive to transport overland a cargo than send a ship through Gibraltar. Just the threat of cutting access to these markets would often be enough for competitors to back down. Before the steamship, transcontinental trade was mostly focused on luxury items (cotton textiles, sugar, spices etc). For bulk items, the Mediterranean was more important to western European merchants than the whole of Asia. Of course, the mediterranean market was also important for luxury items as well.

Moreover, the Spanish are well established in a) chockepoints and b) settler colonies around the world. Just the fact that the Cape of Good Hope is settled by them - the regions with the most suitable climate for a european settler colony- means that power projection in the Indian Ocean is more difficult for competitors. Moreover, they control all 3 chokepoints of the Indian Ocean Trade: Bab el Mandeb, Hormuz and Malacca backed by fleets that have a lot of bases around them and a nearby settler colony. Also, the Spice Islands in contrast to OTL have converted to Catholicism. If a protestant fleet arrives they won't have the enthousiastic support the Dutch had in OTL by the locals, but face hostility. Not to mention that in TTL, the Spice Islands are under spanish direct political control and not under portuguese influence as in OTL.

Every fleet is a significant investment. However, investing in naval affairs is usually a good investment for the economy. No fleet at that era was a full professional force like modern navies. There was a professional core and in times of warfare, the different navies drew personnel from the merchant and fishing fleets. An investment in the navy means a greater investment in the merchant and fishing fleet. Particulary an investment in the fishing fleet would mean Spanish Newfoundland/ Maritimes since the most important fishery was cod. Greater investment in naval warfare, means also that the merchantmen are better protected. That would lead to cheaper insurance and more profitable commerce. If anything, a greater investment on the fleet would pay huge dividends.




Lastly a comment on industrialization: greater exposure of the spanish economy on the cheap and great quality cotton textiles of India may lead to an industrial revolution. Because industrial revolution means textiles and specifically cotton. In indian cotton textiles you have a wonderful product that everybody wants to possess (I guess that living in warm Iberia is even better for selling cotton), while european cottage industry cannot compete with the indian cottage industry. There is a huge incentive of finding ways to produce it more cheaply. If spanish burghers have access to cheap capital and spanish labor is relatively expensive, then mechanization takes place.
Well 1) gist because Portugal has political control over the islands dosnt mean they become Christian. And 2) i think that it is more likely the Spanish gust buys cotton from indea, thats the risk of colonial empires, it was the indean cotton economy collapsing (and not really rebuilding untill the 1860's) that ment that labor was high priced and supply was low, that created the insensitive in England for the start of the industrial revolution. Even then wile I agree with you that institutions are more important then climate Iberia really dose not have the kind of iron or coal deposits that England or Germany (or even really france) have which means even if Spain industrialized first it has a hard ceiling on how big that can get, wich means that the Spanish golden age dose have a sell by date, even if that is probably the late 1800's.
 
Well 1) gist because Portugal has political control over the islands dosnt mean they become Christian
Well, when I see a map posted by the author were the Moluccas have the color that the key assigns to christianity... in that case what else they can be ?

And 2) i think that it is more likely the Spanish gust buys cotton from indea, thats the risk of colonial empires, it was the indean cotton economy collapsing (and not really rebuilding untill the 1860's) that ment that labor was high priced and supply was low, that created the insensitive in England for the start of the industrial revolution.
I think you got it wrong: the indian textile industry collapsed after the british industrial revolution. The european cotton textiles were much more expensive than the indian ones and they could not compete with them. In order to compete in price, mechanization was needed as indian labor was much more cheap.


Iberia really dose not have the kind of iron or coal deposits that England or Germany (or even really france) have which means even if Spain industrialized first it has a hard ceiling on how big that can get, wich means that the Spanish golden age dose have a sell by date, even if that is probably the late 1800's.
I agree on that. Although to be fair, Spain may have less iron than Britain but in 1913 the spanish known iron reserves were the 4th largest in Europe, ahead of Russia (that changed of course). Since Spain controls nearby Maghreb, they have another huge source of iron ore.

Even more importantly, we should see the geopolitical developments: An indepedent Scotland means that England will have a smaller industrial potential than the OTL Britain. The HRE has 2 regions with great coal reserves: Ruhr and Silesia. There is no guarantee that a single state will end up controlling both of them.
 
Well, when I see a map posted by the author were the Moluccas have the color that the key assigns to christianity... in that case what else they can be ?


I think you got it wrong: the indian textile industry collapsed after the british industrial revolution. The european cotton textiles were much more expensive than the indian ones and they could not compete with them. In order to compete in price, mechanization was needed as indian labor was much more cheap.



I agree on that. Although to be fair, Spain may have less iron than Britain but in 1913 the spanish known iron reserves were the 4th largest in Europe, ahead of Russia (that changed of course). Since Spain controls nearby Maghreb, they have another huge source of iron ore.

Even more importantly, we should see the geopolitical developments: An indepedent Scotland means that England will have a smaller industrial potential than the OTL Britain. The HRE has 2 regions with great coal reserves: Ruhr and Silesia. There is no guarantee that a single state will end up controlling both of them.
That was political control, the map literally says Portugal (light green), Muslim (dark green), hindu (blue). Thats gust political control.

And I think you are getting the timeline confused, indeas cotton industry collapsed when Britain took over Bengal during the mid 1700's, it wasn't untill after that, that the industrial revolution got started going in Britain. If indeas textiles are cheep then there is zero incentive to creating the machines used in the first industrial revolution, its gust cheeper to buy indean textiles. Labor needs to be expensive and supply low.

And I forgot about magrib . Maybe? No country really tride makeing industrial power though the colonys, it was always through domestic sources of coal and iron, if anyone could do it, it would be Spain (just across the chanel and all) but I'm not sure it would work, we just have no similar OTL examples to see if it could work. Also Scotland at its hight only produced 6.5% of the iron for great Britain so wile not haveing it would hurt, most of Britain's industry was always in the midlands. Plus Germany even with gust the rihnland is still the largest industry in Europe (west of Russia) and there is also nothing saying that we won't end up in a grossduchland senorio in wich Germany now has three major industrial centers (rhinland, Silesia, and bohemia) we just don't know yet.
 
the opening of the heretofore off-limits ports of Spanish America to trade with the cities of Antwerp and Dordrecht
Just wanna say how important this is. One of the many problems that hindered the development of Latin America was how rigged and strictly commerce was organized. The colonies could only trade with Spain, not even with themselves but only through Spain. That made legal commerce difficult and expensive (less development) and explode the black market.

While letting the Germans trade can make the colonies less dependent on Iberia and more prone to revolts in the long run decisions like these would make a healthier and more prosperous economy.
 
@X Oristos @Kvasir

Tangier, Alcacer-Ceguer, Ceuta, Melilla, Oran, and Mazalquivir are more than likely going to become majority Christian both inside the walls and out in surrounding countryside (especially after the Muslim inhabitants of the Strait cities of Tangier, Alcacer-Ceguer, and Ceuta were evicted in 1566 amid concerns over a Turkish invasion and a Morisco uprising) due to their proximity to Spain, their strategic importance, and their long-established Spanish presence (with Tangier being the crux of Portuguese settlement and Oran being the crux of Castilian-Aragonese settlement).

Everywhere between Tangier and Casablanca in Morocco and in the region surrounding Algiers is going to see the cities dominated by Christian burghers, soldiers, clergy, and fishermen (with a sizeable Muslim service class) and the surrounding countryside dominated by Muslim serfs under Christian donatarios/encomenderos. This is going to create a troublesome situation for these cities and their environs, as there will probably be the same tension between the Christian city-dwellers and the Muslim rural populace that we saw IOTL and ITTL in Valencia in the 1520s (likewise, in both cases the Muslim populace is protected by the Christian nobles that owns the latifundias on which they work).

The cities to the south of Casablanca and between Oran and Algiers are in a more precarious position for the time being, with smaller numbers of Christian settlers both inside and outside the walls and fewer donataries to lord over the surrounding Muslim populace. Lacking extensive control of the countryside, they are going to remain sustained predominantly by sea, although they are fortunate to be close to Madeira, the Canary Islands, and the Baleares, which offer a steady supply of settlers and soldiers due to cyclical patterns of overpopulation.

The hillier and more marginal regions where Muslim political authority has been demolished (such as the Rif especially but also the hill country between Oran and Algiers), there are going to be constant small scale land disputes and blood feuds between encroaching Christian and native Muslim herders and subsistence farmers, with the Muslims gradually losing out amid small victories. Given the limited land available for settlement and the reluctance of most Spaniards to settle down among hostile Muslims, I'd say the total Christian populace of Spanish North Africa by 1580 numbers around 65,000 in Morocco, 30,000-40,000 in Algeria, and 20,000-40,000 in Tunisia (that last number will be explained later, although it's also undecided right now). This pales in comparison to the 1-2 million Muslims living in the Maghreb, but is still much, much higher than the numbers IOTL.
Thank you for the clarifications.

You are correct to point out and highlight that North Africa at this point in history has an incredibly low population density. It is worth also remembering that the one to two million Muslims are pretty divided between Arabs and Berbers and these groups are themselves divided along tribal and sectoral lines. It is unreasonable to assume Spain and Southern Italy can simply replace these people through colonialism and a high birth rate. If Spain are really looking to hold North Africa long term, there needs to be a policy of assimilation of the local population. Whether Spanish missionaries have the ability to convert the locals to Catholicism is an open question. They probably will require a subtler strategy than for example OTL Southern Spain.

Theoretically, assimilation can be achieved through language, culture and religion. How the Spanish decide to handle rural local populations will be the ultimate test. Seizing land and concentrating them together may prove to be ultimately counterproductive. Divide and rule would be a more useful strategy. But I suspect it would be a bit beyond the Spanish, depending on how hardline they decide to go.

It should also be highlighted that unless the fertility rate of Spanish populations increases dramatically higher than OTL, which is unlikely, people moving to North Africa will likely suppress the growth of the American colonies. I agree with the sentiment on here that if Spain tries to control all of the Americas, the African coast, and the Indian Ocean and Spice Islands, then Spain will be dangerously overstretched. It will also incentivise England, France and the Dutch to ally themselves again Spain, even if unofficially; this is bad. This can be mitigated with instability in these countries, civil conflict, poor administration and rulers etc. but this only takes you so far.

In order for Spain to be on a path for long term growth they need to be more flexible. North America is a sensible place to allow the English, French and Dutch to fight it out for the beaver fur trade whilst the Caribbean and South and Central America can be largely exploited by the Spanish. Though if the Spanish have to give up some land here temporarily, that isn't necessarily the final word here so long as Spain remains competitive both militarily and economically. In other words, these things can be won back. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that Spain will be holding onto all this territory forever, much of it probably will ultimately be lost to independence movements. I suspect the Caribbean may prove to be the easiest territory to hold onto in the long term.

In West Africa, Spain will not be able to stop other nations trading and engaging with the native populations. Other trading posts will be set up and I'd expect similar zones in India. Ultimately, the question isn't whether Spain can lock other countries out of the global trading system, but rather, how can they exploit their First Mover Advantage to eventually outcompete the others or limit their competition to less productive and less valuable secondary (or even tertiary) territory. Once we get into the 19th and 20th Centuries technology might make it possible for Spain to basically completely push out other countries from all but the most marginal areas, but that would be an extreme wank. And it certainly wouldn't be necessary for a solid timeline.

Consider Spain today. Then imagine adding Portugal and the Azores and Cabo Verde and Madeira and Northern Catalonia. If the timeline ends with just that, it would probably be a significantly strong country in the 21st Century, ignoring their soft power. Throw in a Spanish North Africa and Spanish Caribbean and we go from one of the biggest countries in Europe to a potential global power. You can also imagine legacy ports and islands across the world ocean. At this point, whether England was able to build a colony in Tanzania or France had a colony in Brazil seems to rather miss the point.

But if Spain tries to hold too much and overstretch it possibly could end up with nothing at all.
 
Thank you for the clarifications.

You are correct to point out and highlight that North Africa at this point in history has an incredibly low population density. It is worth also remembering that the one to two million Muslims are pretty divided between Arabs and Berbers and these groups are themselves divided along tribal and sectoral lines. It is unreasonable to assume Spain and Southern Italy can simply replace these people through colonialism and a high birth rate. If Spain are really looking to hold North Africa long term, there needs to be a policy of assimilation of the local population. Whether Spanish missionaries have the ability to convert the locals to Catholicism is an open question. They probably will require a subtler strategy than for example OTL Southern Spain.

Theoretically, assimilation can be achieved through language, culture and religion. How the Spanish decide to handle rural local populations will be the ultimate test. Seizing land and concentrating them together may prove to be ultimately counterproductive. Divide and rule would be a more useful strategy. But I suspect it would be a bit beyond the Spanish, depending on how hardline they decide to go.

It should also be highlighted that unless the fertility rate of Spanish populations increases dramatically higher than OTL, which is unlikely, people moving to North Africa will likely suppress the growth of the American colonies. I agree with the sentiment on here that if Spain tries to control all of the Americas, the African coast, and the Indian Ocean and Spice Islands, then Spain will be dangerously overstretched. It will also incentivise England, France and the Dutch to ally themselves again Spain, even if unofficially; this is bad. This can be mitigated with instability in these countries, civil conflict, poor administration and rulers etc. but this only takes you so far.

In order for Spain to be on a path for long term growth they need to be more flexible. North America is a sensible place to allow the English, French and Dutch to fight it out for the beaver fur trade whilst the Caribbean and South and Central America can be largely exploited by the Spanish. Though if the Spanish have to give up some land here temporarily, that isn't necessarily the final word here so long as Spain remains competitive both militarily and economically. In other words, these things can be won back. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that Spain will be holding onto all this territory forever, much of it probably will ultimately be lost to independence movements. I suspect the Caribbean may prove to be the easiest territory to hold onto in the long term.

In West Africa, Spain will not be able to stop other nations trading and engaging with the native populations. Other trading posts will be set up and I'd expect similar zones in India. Ultimately, the question isn't whether Spain can lock other countries out of the global trading system, but rather, how can they exploit their First Mover Advantage to eventually outcompete the others or limit their competition to less productive and less valuable secondary (or even tertiary) territory. Once we get into the 19th and 20th Centuries technology might make it possible for Spain to basically completely push out other countries from all but the most marginal areas, but that would be an extreme wank. And it certainly wouldn't be necessary for a solid timeline.

Consider Spain today. Then imagine adding Portugal and the Azores and Cabo Verde and Madeira and Northern Catalonia. If the timeline ends with just that, it would probably be a significantly strong country in the 21st Century, ignoring their soft power. Throw in a Spanish North Africa and Spanish Caribbean and we go from one of the biggest countries in Europe to a potential global power. You can also imagine legacy ports and islands across the world ocean. At this point, whether England was able to build a colony in Tanzania or France had a colony in Brazil seems to rather miss the point.

But if Spain tries to hold too much and overstretch it possibly could end up with nothing at all.
Agreed. IMO Spain should get Mexico but not go too far north to land they can’t control, bag the whole Caribbean and South America and parts of West and North Africa, South Africa and the the Philippines, parts of Indonesia and India. That’s already a massive empire.
 
They probably will require a subtler strategy than for example OTL Southern Spain.

I think the policies used in Andalusia wouldn't work in North Africa if anything due to geography alone. Even so, the Spanish enjoy an advantage in the form of institutional knowledge dealing with assimilation. States that had centuries of knowledge and lived next to the target group were always more proficient in assimilation and spreading of their own religion. I think such examples are the Ottomans and the Russians.

To use the ottoman and russian experience, one of the most productive strategies are simply taxes and politics. The best tool of the islamization of Balkans and the christianization of much of Russia was taxing the different religions. Another strategy is co-opting local elites. If a local lord realized that he will have more influence in politics at his region if he adopts christianity and becomes a spanish speaker, then chances are that he will convert along with his family. This happened to the Tatar muslim aristocracy and to a great part of the Greek/Bulgarian/ Albanian aristocracy in the Balkans. Come 18th century, one couldn't tell that the Princes of the House of Yusupov were Nogai royalty,

In contrast to Russians and Ottomans, the Spanish had an almost millenarian ideology of proselytization. Therefore, I think that their efforts will be continuous (in contrast to e.g. the Ottomans when only periodically tried to mass proselytize populations) and realities on the ground will force them to use both the carrot and the whip. So, I think they will be at least as successful as the Russians and probably more.

It should also be highlighted that unless the fertility rate of Spanish populations increases dramatically higher than OTL, which is unlikely, people moving to North Africa will likely suppress the growth of the American colonies.
I am not so sure about it. In OTL the Castillians were the responsible kingdom for developing the american colonies. A spanish North Africa will attract settlers mostly from Aragon, the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, Naples and Sicily. These kingdoms had a total population many times bigger than the desired region in North Africa. By desired region, I mean the area that was climate-wise familiar to them. In any case, that would be a trend that will last centuries, not mere decades.

Moreover, I guess that the atlantic coast of Morocco would be a destination of mostly Portuguese settlers.

In order for Spain to be on a path for long term growth they need to be more flexible. North America is a sensible place to allow the English, French and Dutch to fight it out for the beaver fur trade whilst the Caribbean and South and Central America can be largely exploited by the Spanish. Though if the Spanish have to give up some land here temporarily, that isn't necessarily the final word here so long as Spain remains competitive both militarily and economically. In other words, these things can be won back. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that Spain will be holding onto all this territory forever, much of it probably will ultimately be lost to independence movements. I suspect the Caribbean may prove to be the easiest territory to hold onto in the long term.

Other trading posts will be set up and I'd expect similar zones in India

I think I believe the opposite would be more probable: it is easier for English/Dutch/French to project power in the Caribbean than the Indian Ocean. At the Carribean I think the Spanish will burn down rival settlements regularly and inhibit them for as long as they can. But other Europeans will want their own tropical goods from West Indies (sugar first and foremost). After some time, I think the Spanish may give up control of minor Carribean islands, but not the Greater Antilles, if the perceived cost is higher than the perceived advantages.

In contrast, I think it is very difficult for other Powers to effectively project power in the Indian Ocean if the Spanish are entrenched there. There is a communication lag of 2 years between Europe and the East Indies. In OTL the Portuguese tried to do too much with too few resources. For example, they attempted to essentially run a protection racket over Asian merchants in the routes they controlled. But they didn't have the ships and men to enforce it. The great contrast to OTL is that the TTL Estado da India has a much greater income. After the shock of the initial portuguese foray in the Indian Ocean and the failure to capture Aden, the Aceh-Venetian trade axis managed not only to survive but to export perhaps greater quantities of spices to Europe than the Portuguese (source: A Splendind Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World). In TTL Spain controls not just all the spice trade towards Europe, but all the global supply of mace, cloves and nutmeg.

As I see it, TTL trade wealth is many times greater than the OTL portuguese one. I dare say that it is greater than the VOC income during its golden era. The nature of that wealth, means that in contrast to extracted wealth (Potosi silver), a great part of it will go to a positive reinforcement cycle of more ships, more forts, more mercenaries, greater political control. For example, the author indicated that the next target of spanish expansion will be Ceylon and total control of the cinnamon trade.

Therefore, when the first english/dutch/french ships arrive in the Indian Ocean, they won't find the OTL Estado da India, but a semi-autonomous political entity that will be vastly more powerful and much better entrenched than in OTL. Not to mention that the Estado da India will be backed by a south african settler colony with climate suitable for Europeans.

Even more importantly, the OTL Dutch and English were able to entrench themselves in the East Indies by freely trading in the Spice Islands and producing huge returns that funded their initial empire-building. Now the Spice Islands will be Portuguese. They can limit themselves to pepper trading from India, but it would be an uphill battle to survive with just a slice of the peppercorn trade. And that doesn't take into account the responce of a much more powerful Estado da India.

Last but not least, due to butterflies it will be difficult to see a VOC like the OTL one. The feudal overlords of the Netherlands won't allow the VOC shareholders the level of autonomy they enjoyed in OTL when they were the actual decision makers in Holland. That would lead to something like the english EIC that was initially less well governed (they had each year to return the profits to shareholders instead of using the profits and just pay dividend).

In West Africa, Spain will not be able to stop other nations trading and engaging with the native populations.
I think so as well. But West Africa trade will be really valuable only after hostile Powers snatch some carribean islands for sugar production. So, I think mostly it will be about slave trading unfortunately.

North America is a sensible place to allow the English, French and Dutch to fight it out for the beaver fur trade
I most certainly agree! Beaver fur will not be worth it from a spanish POV. The only commodities of strategic importance for Spain would be cod and naval supplies. A Spain that is a greater naval power needs more naval supplies (pitch, masts etc) than the OTL one. And hostile powers in the North Sea can stop that trade. The only solution would be to get the naval supplies they need from an area they already had major interests in: the Maritimes and São Lourenço.
 
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~ Uma colônia salva por uma vaca ~

By 1600, another 114 families had been planted in the colony over the years and as many as 3,000 Portuguese lived in settlements, forts, farms, and ranches on the Sulafrican coast and its hinterland, combined with a population of 5,000 mulatos and Lusitanized Africans.

View attachment 321284
Sulafrica, c. 1570
I'm going back to this update, because A: It's my favorite update thus far, and B: I did a quick bit of math, and if the population of 8,000 Lusophones in the Cape in 1600 grew by 2% each year for 200 years with no immigration, the Portuguese Cape Colony's population in 1800 would be 420,000 (no marijuana reference intended). Factoring in the thousands of Portuguese that would likely arrive during that time, the population of the Portuguese Cape could be around 450,000 or even as high as 500,000. For comparison, the Dutch Cape Colony's population in 1800 was just over 60,000. Needless to say, Southern Africa is going to look much, much different ITTL.
 
I'm going back to this update, because A: It's my favorite update thus far, and B: I did a quick bit of math, and if the population of 8,000 Lusophones in the Cape in 1600 grew by 2% each year for 200 years with no immigration, the Portuguese Cape Colony's population in 1800 would be 420,000 (no marijuana reference intended). Factoring in the thousands of Portuguese that would likely arrive during that time, the population of the Portuguese Cape could be around 450,000 or even as high as 500,000. For comparison, the Dutch Cape Colony's population in 1800 was just over 60,000. Needless to say, Southern Africa is going to look much, much different ITTL.
A White majority South Africa would be interesting indeed given the lack of Apartheid. Since the whites are naturally majority without needing any genocide or anything, South Africa could very possibly remain Spanish/Portugese for a long long time. A second Brazil or something.
 
A White majority South Africa would be interesting indeed given the lack of Apartheid. Since the whites are naturally majority without needing any genocide or anything, South Africa could very possibly remain Spanish/Portugese for a long long time. A second Brazil or something.
I'm guessing Whites/Pardos will be the majority in the previously Khoisan areas of Western South Africa and Namibia, but whether they'll be the majority in the Bantu areas in the east (most notably the Highveld) is questionable. I'm not sure how densely populated by Bantus South Africa was at the time of colonization, but I do know that Bantus make up 80% of South Africa's population IOTL, so I'm sure that Bantus will be at least a large minority of Portuguese South Africa's population.
 
I'm guessing Whites/Pardos will be the majority in the previously Khoisan areas of Western South Africa and Namibia, but whether they'll be the majority in the Bantu areas in the east (most notably the Highveld) is questionable. I'm not sure how densely populated by Bantus South Africa was at the time of colonization, but I do know that Bantus make up 80% of South Africa's population IOTL, so I'm sure that Bantus will be at least a large minority of Portuguese South Africa's population.
Brazil 2.0 basically.
 
How likely is that Castilian and Portuguese will fuse to become a new language? Because with Portugal and Castile and Aragon altogether it means that there’s a potential for a language fusion.
50/50 I'd say. Spanish will likely still develop as a sort of fusion of the three languages but just as Catalonia still has its own dialect if not language, it's possible Portugal will as well.
 
I think Portuguese would resemble OTL Galician due to Castilian influence and would be more mutually intelligible with Castilian, not like IOTL, when intellibility is asymmetrical with Portuguese speaker being able to understand Spanish but not the other way around.
 
I think Portuguese would resemble OTL Galician due to Castilian influence and would be more mutually intelligible with Castilian, not like IOTL, when intellibility is asymmetrical with Portuguese speaker being able to understand Spanish but not the other way around.
Galicia is half Portugese so yeah I think this is what'll happen.
 
The most likely outcome is it starts with a common literary standard and overtime people will slowly shift to that pronunciation. See Scots and English, Low German and High German, French and Occitan. This phenomenon is most common when the languages are very similar. I have no doubt that Portuguese will have similar status as several of these regional languages in the modern world.

This happens because a common written standard is so incredibly useful even though the letters are not always phonetic for the non- favoured dielect or language or even grammar shifts. Eventually everyone knows the standard and you only really see it in the rural areas as an exclusive language.
 
The most likely outcome is it starts with a common literary standard and overtime people will slowly shift to that pronunciation. See Scots and English, Low German and High German, French and Occitan. This phenomenon is most common when the languages are very similar. I have no doubt that Portuguese will have similar status as several of these regional languages in the modern world.
I don't think that the above mentioned examples could be relevant or be possible to be compared to a fully developed national language as the Portuguese. What, I can guess its that among TTL elites would be a progressive shift to an bilingualism...
But, even if it, of course, would have effects in the development of both languages but its effects would be mainly limited to the aforementioned political (aristocratic) and administrative elites.
 
I don't think that the above mentioned examples could be relevant or be possible to be compared to a fully developed national language as the Portuguese.

All of those languages were once fully developed national languages. What will probably happen is that the common standard will be a mix of castillian and portuguese, and those two languages will slowly disappear until they are only found in rural areas.
 
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