No; US strategy in WWII was to basically trade the West Pacific for time, and hold the Japanese in the South Pacific until US shipbuilding allowed them to build up a minimum of 3-to-1 advantage in carriers and battleships. Trying to hold the Philippines early on would basically just be playing into Japanese hands, i.e. sending a fleet with at best equal numbers of capital ships into a trap (this was, in fact, the basic thrust of Japanese strategy in WWII).
Best US result at Pearl Harbor -> Philippines saved?
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I think the US Navy would have been very, very reluctant to try to run to the rescue of the Philippines, even if they had lost none of their ships at Pearl Harbor. The Americans wargamed these scenarios in 1925, 1928 and 1933, with the fleet racing to relieve the Philippines and then take the fight to Japan. The wargames always ended in disaster for the Americans: in the 1933 wargame only 7 of 16 battleships made it through to Manila without damage from torpedo attacks. Both the Navy and the Army concluded that War Plan Orange was "literally an act of madness."
Pearl Harbor being a disaster for the Japanese might not have saved the Philippines, but it would have been a hell of a shock to them. I assume that the failure would have been pinned on Yamamoto.
What's the POD for replacing the West Virginia & Maryland with Arkansas?
Arkansas was the only 12" gunned battleship & serving in the Atlantic. West Virginia & Maryland were 16" & serving in the Pacific Fleet. Hence a little difficult for the Japanese to be engaged by 12" & 14" guns.
OP:In the situation where the KB had been blown to Mars, would the United States have been willing to actively supply US and RP troops in Mindanao? The "win" condition here is broad enough that Major General William F. Sharp, (commanding general, Visayan-Mindanao Force Philippines) continuing to fight with the troops that were under him would qualify. (Yes, that might lead to more deaths from Homma troops at Corregidor due to Wainright's either not being willing to tell Sharp to surrender or Sharp feeling that if he could be supplied then he was required to fight on)
Very very reluctant is a understatement. Admiral Richardson effectively refused to retain the fleet at PH after the winter fleet exercises. That got him replaced. Kimmel did not like it either & had a contingent plan in the desk drawer for moving it back to the East Coast if possible. Neither Richardson or Kimmel War Plan Pacific had any provisions for saving the Philippines. Numerous fleet exercises over two decades showed the futility in that. Aside from that the Pacific fleet had only eight aging Standard BB, the fleet as a whole was short cruisers, modern destroyers, auxiliaries of all classes, short Marines, and the expected Army ground and air forces needed were not yet available. The carrier air wings were aging out, and it was realized the carrier Ranger was not suitable for fleet ops in the Pacific. There was also in December 1941 a problem with a mass of undertrained personnel who had been taken on in the past 24 months. Besides filling out the Navy from its 75% strength of 1939 the intake from mid 1940 also had to form embryonic crews for the numerous ships being laid down.
Those exercises resulted in WP ORANGE being a plan for: 1. Building a entire new fleet triple the size of the enemy. 2, Seizing multiple islands as interval naval bases. One of the problems revealed in the earliest exercises as far back as 1907 was that the ships lost too much efficiency in mechanical break downs over that distance. In the 1920s fleet exercises showed 30% of combat capability could be lost just from mechanical breakdowns in the distance from the US West Coast to the PI. there is a long 28 page essay:
American Calculations of Battleline Strength, 1941-2 Alan D. Zimm that examines the USN calculations for extended fleet operations. Unfortunately I can't get it to upload. Recommend interested people search this one out and take a close read.
The problem of seizing forward naval bases was recognized early on The Marine Corps was looking at the question in detail, producing Major Ellis study Operations Plan 712: Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia. With its earliest working draft dated in 1921.
Kimmels War Plan Pacific - 46 (WPP-46) is another detailed document that is worth a close read.
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Garrison
Donor
They didn't even activate Rainbow Five after Pearl Harbor was attacked and as result the FEAF did little on the 8th and caught on the ground on the 9th. Of course the performance of the submarine force based at Cavite wasn't any better, with bad doctrine and terrible torpedoes rendering them useless.
The bulk of the FEAF was caught on the ground and destroyed in a 45 minute attack on the first day of the war, 8 Dec 41 in the Philippines (7 Dec in Hawaii). Cavite was destroyed by air attacks on 10 Dec, but Asiatic Fleet Commander ADM Hart had already evacuated most of his combat elements prior to that.
The six old S-boats and the 13 Clemson-Class destroyers had old but still effective torpedoes. In fact, the old 4-stack destroyers saw considerable combat after being redeployed to the Dutch East Indies and gave a very good accounting for themselves during the Battle of Balikpapan on the night of 24 Jan 42 by sinking 4 transports and an old ex-destroyer patrol boat. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Balikpapan_(1942)#Naval_engagement_(24_January)
Which is pretty notable for the persons who read those and take note, because it basically means the war the US wanted/was planning to fight in WWII in the Pacific was...really in many ways the war it did fight. In you look at WPP-46, for instance, the battleships are already allocated to a role hanging back at Pearl and the like while the carriers and escorts reinforce bases, raid enemy islands, and try to spoil enemy attacks on our bases until things can get going with the new construction and activated personnel by maybe early '43 or very late '42....which is basically what happened, it's just the BBs weren't held back because we had decided they weren't called for in the early phases, but because they'd been parked on the bottom of Pearl Harbor. You can really argue that a lot of the US success (besides crazy, crazy production backing them up) was that pre-war they were making a plan to use the basic realities of the war to win the war, and pre-war the Japanese were making a plan to use hopes and dreams about a Decisive Battle to knock the US the one good lick to get them out of the war, and the US created their war plan in reality in a way the Japanese war plans couldn't meet reality.
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Though it does make you wonder what the United States does without the attack on PH. Does public pressure cause it to do *something* (rather than wait for building) with one of the largest navies on earth.
I mean, the plan is to do something. It's to attack the Marianas Islands and other types of bases (which we did!), spoil Japanese landings where they can in the South and Central Pacific, and build up forces to hold anything not lost too fast in the opening phases, and then as new construction comes online in six to twelve months, to begin to bring forward and apply more and more force until the enemy breaks. If that's not enough newsreel footage of bombs falling on Japanese forces, there's always something like the Doolittle Raid.
Garrison
Donor
They were caught on the Ground on the 9th and technically heard about Pearl Harbor on the 8th owing to the international dateline. However you date the attack it took place a full day after Pearl Harbor. That the surface ships gave a good account of themselves elsewhere just highlights how poorly conducted the defence of the Philippines was.
USS Ward sends contact report in the clear to the HQ. The person in charge do not belive it is a false message. He sends a messenger to Kimmel that is up early and golfing. He also decide to contact the radar station that he know is having a exercise and tell them. The officer in charge then say "Well, our boys were to turn it off but were to slow and saw some planes coming from the north west but we thought it was the B-17s we were expecting"
HQ officer "The B17s would come from the north east" and then put down the telephone.
He then contact the officer in charge of the airforce "I think it is a false alarm and our boys are hung over, but i see if i can get up someone sober"
HQ officer then sound the alarm.
While most people will think it is a false alarm or execise some ships might take action and shut watertight doors and man the AA.
Since Nevada has steam up they might actually sail outside the channel.
HQ officer "The B17s would come from the north east" and then put down the telephone.
He then contact the officer in charge of the airforce "I think it is a false alarm and our boys are hung over, but i see if i can get up someone sober"
HQ officer then sound the alarm.
While most people will think it is a false alarm or execise some ships might take action and shut watertight doors and man the AA.
Since Nevada has steam up they might actually sail outside the channel.