Best US result at Pearl Harbor -> Philippines saved?
- Thread starter naraht
- Start date
Coulsdon Eagle
Monthly Donor
Not sure a handful of obsolete Vickers Vildebeest and pretty nondescript Blenheims would have made much difference anyway, even with advance warning.
Not the Vildebeest and Blenheims, for sure, but Lockheed Hudsons more than proved their worth during the 1941-42 fighting.
Uh no. The initial Philippine attack and destruction of the USFEAF occurred on 8 Dec in Manila, while it was some 18 clock hours earlier in Hawaii. Commercial radio stations in Manila at 0220 (8 Dec) monitored real Honolulu time news broadcasts of the PH attack that were still ongoing at 0822 (7 Dec) Hawaii time. By about 0330 or so, both the Asiatic Fleet and USAFE headquarters in Manila were notified through USN and Army military channels that Pearl Harbor had been attacked by the Japanese and the war had started, but 9 hours later much of MacArthur's air force was destroyed on the ground.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far_East_Air_Force_(United_States) Page down to Combat Operations, Philippines Campaign, Surprise Attack.
"Nearly the entire B-17 force at Clark, one-third of the U.S. fighters and its only operational radar unit were destroyed" between 1235 and 1325 on 8 Dec (Manila time), 1835-1935, 7 Dec Hawaii time.
:quality(70)/cloudfront-us-east-1.images.arcpublishing.com/archetype/LHCSX2TBEVBMTDDIIYAEUGMYBE.jpg)
Why did MacArthur wait for Japan to strike first?
The inside story on why he failed to act at a decisive moment in the war.
www.militarytimes.com
https://www.c-span.org/video/?508220-1/december-1941-japanese-attack-philippines Interesting C-Span video recounting of the what happened on the first morning of the war in the Philippines and the initial attack. The chief commentator, a historian at the MacArthur Memorial Museum in Norfolk, VA, USA, does his best to portray Big Mac's actions in a good light, but too much can't be explained away to "the confusing Fog" of the situation.
Japanese Attack on the Philippines: The “Other” Pearl Harbor
American airpower barely escaped total destruction but lived to fight another day in the Philippines.
warfarehistorynetwork.com
America's Second Pearl Harbor: Japan's Brutal Attack on the Philippines
Tokyo's attack did not come as a total surprise: war had been in the air for months before December 8.
nationalinterest.org
Last edited:
That event's even harder to understand than Pearl Harbor. The too close relationship argument makes a lot of sense.Uh no. The initial Philippine attack and destruction of the USFEAF occurred on 8 Dec in Manila, while it was some 18 clock hours earlier in Hawaii. Commercial radio stations in Manila at 0220 (8 Dec) monitored real Honolulu time news broadcasts of the PH attack that were still ongoing at 0822 (7 Dec) Hawaii time. By about 0330 or so, both the Asiatic Fleet and USAFE headquarters in Manila were notified through USN and Army military channels that Pearl Harbor had been attacked by the Japanese and the war had started, but 9 hours later much of MacArthur's air force was destroyed on the ground.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far_East_Air_Force_(United_States) Page down to Combat Operations, Philippines Campaign, Surprise Attack.
"Nearly the entire B-17 force at Clark, one-third of the U.S. fighters and its only operational radar unit were destroyed" between 1235 and 1325 on 8 Dec (Manila time), 1835-1935, 7 Dec Hawaii time.
Why did MacArthur wait for Japan to strike first?
The inside story on why he failed to act at a decisive moment in the war.
https://www.c-span.org/video/?508220-1/december-1941-japanese-attack-philippines Interesting C-Span video recounting of the what happened on the first morning of the war in the Philippines and the initial attack. The chief commentator, a historian at the MacArthur Memorial Museum in Norfolk, VA, USA, does his best to portray Big Mac's actions in a good light, but too much can't be explained away to "the confusing Fog" of the situation.
Japanese Attack on the Philippines: The “Other” Pearl Harbor
American airpower barely escaped total destruction but lived to fight another day in the Philippines.
America's Second Pearl Harbor: Japan's Brutal Attack on the Philippines
Tokyo's attack did not come as a total surprise: war had been in the air for months before December 8.
Field Marshal McArthur was confused about who his boss was, and I don't think he was over impressed with Marshall.
I think he had the bulk of the US B17s and more were on the way.
It's amazing he didn't get canned over it.
Last edited:
Yup. For sure!
Big Mac felt HE was the real boss (since he'd already served as Army CoS). He openly expressed his contempt for Rainbow 5 and acted as if he had plenty of time to prepare the defenses. This is why Marshall dispatched Brereton to hand-deliver a personal order for Mac to prepare for and follow the orders to initiate offensive action against suspected Japanese bases on Formosa as soon as hostilities broke out. In one of my readings recently, I ran across the statement that Brereton was shocked at the poor state of Air Force defenses when he arrived by Pan Am Clipper on 4 November. Brereton had intended to conduct an intensive defense improvement program, but instead was dispatched to Australia for nearly two weeks to develop supply, or evacuation (if things went south) routes. The reading points out Brereton's Australia mission reaped good results that proved useful later in the war, but it cost him and the FEAF two unrecoverable weeks in the short time between his arrival and the Japanese attacks to prepare for war.
Beyond ASB. IMO, even a Final Countdown scenario, where USS Nimitz miraculously blips through time and destroys the Kido Butai, would not deter the Japanese high command from launching the Southern Operation, including the invasion of the Philippines. There were many in the IJN General Staff who thought the Pearl Harbor operation was a foolish risk. But in their view, even if it failed disastrously, the "real strength" of the IJN would hardly be touched and the traditional plan for "One Great Battle" in the western Pacific could still be followed.
So the Philippines would still be invaded, with its defenses wholly inadequate. And that's before considering Macarthur's serious errors in preparations, planning, and strategy.
[I have imagined a Final Countdown variant that might stop the Japanese cold: during the night of 6-7 December, Nimitz displays its striking abilities to Kido Butai so impressively that Nagumo surrenders. (Because when it looks like you have bows and arrows against machine guns...) And if Nagumo then informs IJN HQ of what he's done, and why - even the maddest dogs of the high command probably would back off. But IMO that's what it would take.]
Last edited:
Here: View of American Calculations of Battleline Strength, 1941-2 is the summary of the USN analysis of battleline or fleet strength in a cross Pacific campaign. Which I referred to in my previous post. Its also interesting in it gives some hints at the war-games used in that era. War Plan Orange was probably the best prepared and thought out or tested of the Color Plans drawn up 1900-1941. Most US war plans were little more than staff studies and seldom up dated. The US Army War Plans Division circa 1938 had just eight officers and maybe 45 enlisted soldiers or civilian clerks. Thats all that could assigned under the ultra tight funding Congress provided in those years. Depending on the date the US Army officer strength was between 40 & 50 % of the authorized strength. The Navy was in a slightly different position, and the several administrations, Coolidge, Hoover, & Roosevelt had had allowed the Navy to take WP ORANGE a bit more seriously.
Last edited:
I think the debatable issue isn't so much whether the Japanese will continue to invade the Phillipines if Kido Butai fails at Pearl, as it is one of whether the Americans can stop the Phillipines from falling, or at least hold part of it, once they defeat the Pearl strike.
While they probably wouldn't be able to repel a Japanese invasion, the USAFE may be induced to fight a bit harder and hang on longer if PH ended in a Japanese defeat. Japanese aggressiveness and extreme risk-taking would likely be curbed a bit. Kimmel (or Nimitz) would feel freer to conduct more aggressive diversionary Mandates raids and reinforce or retake Wake. Guam is a "goner" for the duration of the war, hanging out there in the enemy's back yard. Perhaps more elements of a mostly intact Pacific Fleet and USAAF could be deployed through Australia to bolster the ABDA to do more to prevent the complete fall of the Dutch East Indies and delay the fall of Singapore. If the Japanese advance in the DEI could be halted, Australia wouldn't be as threatened and there could be significant impacts on what happens/doesn't happen in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.
Last edited:
Not debatable.
The US and Philippine forces in the Philippines were hopelessly inadequate to defend against the forces Japan dispatched to conquer the islands. And it was impossible for any significant additional US forces to reach the Philippines. Japan controlled (or would soon control) all the ocean areas around the Philippines for thousands of kilometers. The nearest additional US forces were in Hawaii, about 8,000 km away.
Assume a miraculously favorable (to the US) outcome for Pearl Harbor: all the fighters stationed in Oahu get airborne before the first strike arrives, and shoot down almost all of it. The few survivors who actually reach the harbor are blown out of the air by ground-based and ship-borne AA guns, and do almost no damage. The second wave meets an equally disastrous fate, and from radar observations and radio intercepts, the US forces learn where the Japanese carriers are. CINCPAC directs the Enterprise task force to attack them; with almost no aircraft to resist, Enterprise sinks all six Japanese carriers.
Now what? Suppose the US decides to send additional ground forces to the Philippines. It would take at least two weeks to organize such an expedition and get it embarked on transports (assuming such transports were even available). One can't just order whatever men are nearby to get on whatever ships happen to be at the docks and steam away. All their supplies and equipment have to be loaded as well, in a manner that allows the materiel to be quickly and properly unloaded and distributed to the troops. The assembled convoy could then set out, steaming at no more than 10 knots. At that speed, the convoy would take about 17 days to reach the Philippines. So these reinforcements could arrive no sooner than 31 days after Pearl Harbor: 7 January, long after Macarthur had withdrawn his surviving forces into the Bataan Peninsula, with the rest of Luzon (including Manila) abandoned to the Japanese.
Also, any US ships passing from Hawaii to the Philippines would have to pass through the mass of islands in the Central Pacific then controlled by Japan, and survive attacks by hundreds of Japanese land-based aircraft. That factor alone ensured that there would be no attempts to reinforce the Philippines. Such foolishness was excluded from War Plan Orange, even before the Pacific Fleet was smashed.
Accepting all of that, the question is whether the troops on the Bataan Peninsula could be saved *or* whether a miraculous result would cause the troops in Mindanao to fight on (as formal troops rather than Guerillas . The Japanese troops were certainly capable of the conquest of Luzon, fighting through Mindanao as well would have taken *much* longer or taken far more troops.
Saved how? Nothing happening in Hawaii would improve their training, give them more or better weapons, or add to their supplies. Without resupply or reinforcement, they will be defeated.
USAFFE in Mindanao were no better off in training, equipment, or supplies than in Luzon. Their mobility was minimal; they had no vehicles to speak of and Mindanao was mostly trackless jungle. By no later then 15 December, Japan controlled the air above and water around Mindanao. The Japanese could land anywhere, on the flanks or rears of USAFFE positions. If USAFFE deployed as "conventional" troops, they would be exposed to Japanese firepower - much greater than their own once USAFFE's very limited stock of artillery ammunition was exhausted.
The Japanese themselves demonstrated later on that troops with only small arms, when well-dug in with concealed bunkers and tunnels, and fanatically determined to resist to the last man and bullet, could make defeating them difficult and costly. However, as Allied forces also demonstrated, such resistance would be overcome, with the defenders suffering far greater casualties.
Last edited:
Actually the Pensacola Convoy might be continued. That assemblage of cargo ships and escorts had been prepared in November & had departed for the PI around the 27th November. 7 December it was well south of Hawaii, on a looping 'southern route' to PI. It was first ordered to return to Hawaii, then redirected to the Dutch East Indies. Its cargo redistributed on Java & Australia.
Certainly, the bulk of the Japanese fleet was based at Truk, waiting to ambush any USN intrusion into the central Pacific. That was their core naval strategy. About the only way for the Pensacola Convoy to get through is loop far down to the DEI & then sprint north (if you can imagine 1920s or 1930s cargo ships sprinting) to Luzon & Manilia. The parts of the convoy sent to DEI took that route & made it to Java more or less intact in December and early january. It was after the Japanese declared war on the DEI in January and started operating aircraft and surface ships that far south the cargo delivery to the DEI went down hill.
Aboard the convoy was a mix of aircraft items, support unit material, ammunition, a Army artillery brigade of cannon with transport and 2,000+ soldiers, and miscl Navy personnel. Officially the convoy was designated Task Force 15.5. It was expected to cross the south central Pacific unmolested as negotiations had not yet ended when it was ordered and organized. That is it was calculated Japan would not resort to war for several more months.
Last edited:
IOW, nothing that would make a major difference in the fighting. Besides which: the convoy took 9 days to steam from Fiji to Brisbane (arriving 22 December). It would have required another month to reach the Philippines, far too late to be of any real use.
Two fast ( for 1941) transports , escorted by the CA Louisville,are enroute from the Philippines to Hawaii, with Army dependents in a last minute evacuation. The Navy had sent all dependents home in late 1940, with the exception of those to pregnant to travel, and all were gone by spring 1941. The ex liner transport President Harrison had brought the main body of the 4th Marines to the Phillipines from China and was in Harbor in China, waiting for the Legation Marines from Peking and Tensin, where it was captured.
In addition the USN was short on fleet oilers, ammunition ships, and repair ships, vessels necessary for an advance across the Pacific. Oilers we would not see in sufficient numbers until the fall of 1942, and the others coming along throughout 1943.
The only thing I can think of is a much larger Phillipine Defense force with significant air assets that could contest for air superiority in the region.
The naval aspect is probably unsalvageable.
Some good PODs - avoid the submarine torpedo screw up and the sea lanes are at least not an easy thing for the Japanese invasion. Avoid the Clark Field screw up. Have an armored contingent in the Phillipines for a counterattack on Luzon's beaches. Invest much earlier in a good Filipino Army, not just the Scouts units - on Bataan it was clear that the regular Phillipines Army was severely lacking in discipline and basic features of US doctrine like artillery observation and fire missions, and of course had dated equipment.
Ultimately however all of these are delaying the inevitable, unless Japan squanders it's many advantages.
The naval aspect is probably unsalvageable.
Some good PODs - avoid the submarine torpedo screw up and the sea lanes are at least not an easy thing for the Japanese invasion. Avoid the Clark Field screw up. Have an armored contingent in the Phillipines for a counterattack on Luzon's beaches. Invest much earlier in a good Filipino Army, not just the Scouts units - on Bataan it was clear that the regular Phillipines Army was severely lacking in discipline and basic features of US doctrine like artillery observation and fire missions, and of course had dated equipment.
Ultimately however all of these are delaying the inevitable, unless Japan squanders it's many advantages.
They had a lot of the available US air assets, unfortunately they got caught on the ground. MacArthur had sold Marshall and Arnold on building up the Philippines vs writing them off as per Orange. Unfortunately US embargoes speeded up Japan's timetable. An attack three months later would have run into a much stronger defense. The US was pouring units and equipment into the Philippines.
Sounds like the same problem MacArthur's army units had in Korea.
Peace time preparation was not a strong point of his.
They had some planes but not a sufficient amount of modern fighters deployed in a manner for for air defense, nor heavier fighters available to be used in CAS roles (I know fighter-bombers were not possible at this point in time for the US). I don't know if they had any Wildcats, I believe only P-40s
They dont have to beat Japanese carrier pilots, only to attrite them. With more flak air defenses from the ground, as well as more competent fighter deployment, this may be possible
Last edited: