German support for the Ottomans in WW1 was a bit unfocused to say the least. Just for the army there were 3.5 competing power centres among German military advisers simultaneously.
First there was the German component of the Turkish general staff, namely Enver Pasha's deputy Bronsart von Schellendorf. Generally they shared Envers goals and supported his plans and methods. Aside of his warplans they also played a core role in conducting the Armenian genocide. Especially Schellendorf was politically secure in Envers staff after he (as member of the military mission!) had sided with Enver in his first conflicts with the head of the military mission, Liman von Sander, upon appointment as minister. OTL it took the concentrated pressure of Liman, Falkenhayn and the German foreign office to part Schellendorf and Enver in 1917.
Second there was the military attaché at the embassy, from 1915 onwards von Lossow. Generally he promoted the German goals and ideas for the conduct of the war in the Middle East. He also wanted a stronger German control of the military command structure and de facto became the personnel office for the middle East. The greatest "success" probably was the forming of Army group F under Falkenhayn. Also coordinated arms shipments from German firms. Protested the Armenian genocide, but did not press the issue.
Third was probably the most effective, the military mission under Liman von Sanders. Started with some delay after a diplomatic row in 1913, Liam von Sanders had had some success in training a core of effective units and had probably the most realistic view on Ottoman capabilities on all sides. Unfortunately he was politically also the weakest. Other German officers did not like that he promoted Turkish officers into his staff and subordinate commands (including one Mustafa Kemal) instead of finding posts for German officers. The German government was not happy with his warnings about the feasibility of more aggressive plans for the Ottoman army. Enver was peeved about the same and also that he was one of the few German higher ups in open opposition of his ethnic cleansing plans, a few times outright preventing them. His very Prussian bearing did not make him any more popular. Nor did him being Jewish.
The half was Colmar von der Goltz. An old Ottoman hand he became special advisor to the Sultan in large part to sideline the - for all the interpersonal conflicts - very respected Liman von Sanders' pessimism in Ottoman war planning in late 1914. As both Liman von Sanders and Enver Pasha did not get along with him his effect during his 10 month in Constantinople was somewhat limited, but from fall 1915 to his death in April 1916 he was pretty successful in forming a coherent CP policy for Mesopotamia and Persia as commander of 6th army. He also forced a temporary halt to ethnic cleansing in his AoR despite being an advocate for strategic relocations of Armenians in his first tour with the Ottomans around 1900 and agreeing to some deportations at first. His efforts, both strategic and humanitarian did mostly not survive his death.
There were of course even more German players involved in influencing Ottoman strategy, especially the foreign office and to a lesser degree the navy, but getting all agendas aligned seems unrealistic. I think with some changes it should at least be possible to have some basic coordination among army officers though.
Let's say that during the Liman von Sanders crisis the general accepts the eventual otl solution to be promoted to Inspector General from Corps Command before Enver Pasha becomes minister of war. Then instead of appointing German officers over his head in violation of the contract of the military mission Enver does it in coordination with his Inspector General. This would prevent the otl undermining of Liman of Sanders and instead establish the head of the military mission as senior German officer in theatre and the one making personnel decisions. It also would remove one major early point of conflict between Liman and Enver.
Now during the war I would still expect conflicting interests and POVs among the German officers assigned to various posts (especially with people like Schellendorf and Feldmann still fucking around), but with a single accepted center of gravity the strategic advice given to the Ottomans might not be quite as much a cacophony of competing ideas. The Ottomans still will do their own thing and will sometimes listen to one over another German advisor or none of them. But it should still have a beneficial effect. But how big an effect would this really have?
First there was the German component of the Turkish general staff, namely Enver Pasha's deputy Bronsart von Schellendorf. Generally they shared Envers goals and supported his plans and methods. Aside of his warplans they also played a core role in conducting the Armenian genocide. Especially Schellendorf was politically secure in Envers staff after he (as member of the military mission!) had sided with Enver in his first conflicts with the head of the military mission, Liman von Sander, upon appointment as minister. OTL it took the concentrated pressure of Liman, Falkenhayn and the German foreign office to part Schellendorf and Enver in 1917.
Second there was the military attaché at the embassy, from 1915 onwards von Lossow. Generally he promoted the German goals and ideas for the conduct of the war in the Middle East. He also wanted a stronger German control of the military command structure and de facto became the personnel office for the middle East. The greatest "success" probably was the forming of Army group F under Falkenhayn. Also coordinated arms shipments from German firms. Protested the Armenian genocide, but did not press the issue.
Third was probably the most effective, the military mission under Liman von Sanders. Started with some delay after a diplomatic row in 1913, Liam von Sanders had had some success in training a core of effective units and had probably the most realistic view on Ottoman capabilities on all sides. Unfortunately he was politically also the weakest. Other German officers did not like that he promoted Turkish officers into his staff and subordinate commands (including one Mustafa Kemal) instead of finding posts for German officers. The German government was not happy with his warnings about the feasibility of more aggressive plans for the Ottoman army. Enver was peeved about the same and also that he was one of the few German higher ups in open opposition of his ethnic cleansing plans, a few times outright preventing them. His very Prussian bearing did not make him any more popular. Nor did him being Jewish.
The half was Colmar von der Goltz. An old Ottoman hand he became special advisor to the Sultan in large part to sideline the - for all the interpersonal conflicts - very respected Liman von Sanders' pessimism in Ottoman war planning in late 1914. As both Liman von Sanders and Enver Pasha did not get along with him his effect during his 10 month in Constantinople was somewhat limited, but from fall 1915 to his death in April 1916 he was pretty successful in forming a coherent CP policy for Mesopotamia and Persia as commander of 6th army. He also forced a temporary halt to ethnic cleansing in his AoR despite being an advocate for strategic relocations of Armenians in his first tour with the Ottomans around 1900 and agreeing to some deportations at first. His efforts, both strategic and humanitarian did mostly not survive his death.
There were of course even more German players involved in influencing Ottoman strategy, especially the foreign office and to a lesser degree the navy, but getting all agendas aligned seems unrealistic. I think with some changes it should at least be possible to have some basic coordination among army officers though.
Let's say that during the Liman von Sanders crisis the general accepts the eventual otl solution to be promoted to Inspector General from Corps Command before Enver Pasha becomes minister of war. Then instead of appointing German officers over his head in violation of the contract of the military mission Enver does it in coordination with his Inspector General. This would prevent the otl undermining of Liman of Sanders and instead establish the head of the military mission as senior German officer in theatre and the one making personnel decisions. It also would remove one major early point of conflict between Liman and Enver.
Now during the war I would still expect conflicting interests and POVs among the German officers assigned to various posts (especially with people like Schellendorf and Feldmann still fucking around), but with a single accepted center of gravity the strategic advice given to the Ottomans might not be quite as much a cacophony of competing ideas. The Ottomans still will do their own thing and will sometimes listen to one over another German advisor or none of them. But it should still have a beneficial effect. But how big an effect would this really have?
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