Which US President Is Most to Blame for the Vietnam War?

From 1950 to 1973, US Presidents increasingly escalated American involvement in conflicts in Vietnam:

  • Although Ho Chi Minh had been a US ally during WWII, Harry Truman supplied France with military and economic aid to support its war to reconquer Vietnam. In September 1950 Truman sent the first US military advisors to Vietnam.
  • Dwight Eisenhower increased aid to France and in 1954, he actually considered bombing Vietnam to prevent a French defeat in the war. But he conditioned US military intervention on support from Britain, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill refused to get involved in France's doomed colonial war. Eisenhower declined to intervene militarily, but he nevertheless ignored the Geneva Accords and supported the permanent division of Vietnam into North and South. In the South, Eisenhower installed a corrupt and authoritarian government led by President Ngo Dinh Diem. In 1956 the US suffered its first causality in Vietnam, and the following year Eisenhower sent the first Special Forces troops to Vietnam. However, advisors and Special Forces were not combat troops and they were not sent to engage in offensive operations.
  • John Kennedy dramatically increased the number of US advisors from 900 to over 16,000. He authorized the Strategic Hamlet Program and ordered Operation Ranch Hand, which saw the Air Force use herbicides to defoliate the Vietnamese jungles. Although in October 1963 JFK signed NSAM 263, which withdrew 1,000 US advisors as part of a broader plan to withdraw all advisors by the end of 1965, later that same month Kennedy greenlit a military coup against Diem. Kennedy did not intend for Diem to die in the coup, and he was horrified when this occurred, but the coup should never have happened in the first place. The coup badly destabilized the situation in Vietnam, leaving the next President with the difficult decision of either withdrawing from Vietnam or escalating further.
  • Lyndon Johnson did not follow through on the Kennedy-era plan to withdraw US advisors and he continued sending them through 1964. In August 1964 LBJ misrepresented the Gulf of Tonkin Incident by telling Congress that two attacks on US naval vessels had occurred, when in reality only one occurred. Johnson lied to Congress to convince them to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, which was basically a blank check for war. Following the Gulf of Tonkin Incident LBJ ordered the first bombing campaign against Vietnam. After promising the American people in October 1964 that he would not send American troops to fight in Vietnam, in March 1965 LBJ commenced Operation Rolling Thunder and sent the first combat troops to Da Nang. (Ironically, that is the same place where the first French troops landed in Vietnam in 1858). LBJ had been told by his generals that "victory" in Vietnam would be a stalemate that would require 4-5 years of fighting, but LBJ consistently misrepresented the war to Congress and the American people by suggesting that "light" was at the end of the tunnel. Ultimately, the Tet Offensive exposed the government's lies about the war and LBJ dropped out of the 1968 election due to voter backlash against the war.
  • Richard Nixon illegally sabotaged the 1968 Paris Peace Talks in order to win that year's presidential election. After he won, he needlessly prolonged the war for four years so that he could be re-elected in 1972. After his re-election he accepted the same peace deal which had been offered by North Vietnam in 1969. By 1973, Nixon had invaded Cambodia and ruthlessly carpet bombed Indochina. Tens of thousands of Americans and countless people in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia died as a result of Nixon's chicanery and venal pursuit of power. The last combat troops were withdrawn by Nixon in 1973.
  • Technically there were still 50 US military personnel in Vietnam by 1975, but they were not combat troops and they left following the fall of Saigon.
Ultimately, it seems that the least blameworthy President is Truman. Although he was wrong to support France in its attempt to recolonize Vietnam, that decision would not have had long term consequences for the US had Eisenhower not chosen to ignore the Geneva Accords and permanently divide Vietnam. Even then, this would probably be considered a footnote in US history had LBJ not sent the first ground troops to Vietnam in 1965. I actually think that the person who comes across the worst in this situation is Nixon. LBJ at least genuinely believed in the Domino Theory and he hoped that military intervention would have a positive outcome by preventing Communist expansion into South Vietnam. By comparison, Nixon was totally amoral and he engaged in horrendous acts for no reason other than personal ambition.
 
I think LBJ and JFK may be the most blameworthy. The coup against Diem kind of created a "you break it, you own it" situation. There may have been a possibility of persuading Diem to ease up and then closing the Ho Chi Minh trail and actually winning. But LBJ was probably primarily concerned that if there was either a clear defeat or a massive escalation then his domestic agenda would be disrupted so he temporized and hoped for the best. Nixon saw the conflict in the context of Grand Strategy and wanted to appear to be strong and decisive. I blame a lot of the mess on Westmoreland with the flawed "search and destroy" military strategy rather than either clear and hold or cutting the Ho Chi Minh trail. Search and destroy was a strategy of attrition and even with a very lopsided kill ration, the number of US casualties that the public would tolerate would not be high enough to exhaust North Vietnamese manpower.
The biggest analytical mistake was to assume that the Vietnamese state would become a Chinese and/or Russian puppet. The Vietnamese are - as demonstrated in the conflict - fiercely independent and became more of an Asian Yugoslavia.
 
I think LBJ and JFK may be the most blameworthy. The coup against Diem kind of created a "you break it, you own it" situation.

Mm, for what it's worth LBJ did oppose the coup.

For that matter, even JFK was iffy on it. The thing was largely set in motion by, no joke, a random sub-officer in the Asia-Pacific office at the State Dept getting the telegram that the generals were considering a coup, and opting to send a reply endorsing it without consulting his superior, who iirc was on vacation.

That being said, coup or not, the situation was untenable. Opposition to the coup in the Kennedy admin was largely based on the notion that Diem would be replaced by a 'rotating succession of inadequate generals,' which is of course what ended up happening (an anecdote i recall is that by like, 65 or 66, a state department employee was quoted as saying that the national symbol of S. Vietnam should be the turnstile, so severe was the spiral of coups and countercoups). But on the other hand, Diem and the Nhus were incredibly toxic and horribly out of touch. They couldn't have won the war either.

I find the fault lies with Eisenhower - for acquiescing to Diem's referendum, for not having anyone in the pocket before Diem overran the Saigon crime syndicates, for not realizing that Dien Bien Phu was essentially the end of imperialism in Southeast Asia rather than an offensive move by world communism or whatever.
 
Amadeus has a good summary.

The French attempt at reconquest and American support were mistakes by Truman and de Gaulle, but the situation was reversible, as shown in fact by the French themselves, who not only withdrew in 1954, but started dismantling their colonial empire.

Eisenhower basically commits to the creation and support of a corrupt American client state. This creates a problem for Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon in that just walking away and letting the North win signals to all the other American client states that the US government won't necessarily have their back.

The dominoes are not really other countries in Southeast Asia, its corrupt regimes supported by the USA everywhere in the world. If the USA cuts its losses in the 1950s, nationalist or communist Vietnam really is no worse a problem than nationalist Indonesia or nationalist Egypt. It can be subverted later, or move back into the western column, and it doesn't present the strategic irritation the Cuba did.
 
Amadeus has a good summary.

The French attempt at reconquest and American support were mistakes by Truman and de Gaulle, but the situation was reversible, as shown in fact by the French themselves, who not only withdrew in 1954, but started dismantling their colonial empire.

Eisenhower basically commits to the creation and support of a corrupt American client state. This creates a problem for Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon in that just walking away and letting the North win signals to all the other American client states that the US government won't necessarily have their back.

The dominoes are not really other countries in Southeast Asia, its corrupt regimes supported by the USA everywhere in the world. If the USA cuts its losses in the 1950s, nationalist or communist Vietnam really is no worse a problem than nationalist Indonesia or nationalist Egypt. It can be subverted later, or move back into the western column, and it doesn't present the strategic irritation the Cuba did.

Ironically, De Gaulle opposed the American war in Vietnam and he tried in 1964 and 1965 to mediate a peace settlement in Vietnam but LBJ rebuffed him.

I think that once the French lost in 1954, Eisenhower should have just let them lose and not have gotten the US more involved. Virtually no one in the US cared about the war in Indochina in 1954, so Eisenhower would not have suffered politically. It was only after Eisenhower committed the US to defending South Vietnam (a country which his administration created) that later Presidents had a political problem in being saddled with an alliance they did not want but could not break due to domestic political concerns.

Mm, for what it's worth LBJ did oppose the coup.

For that matter, even JFK was iffy on it. The thing was largely set in motion by, no joke, a random sub-officer in the Asia-Pacific office at the State Dept getting the telegram that the generals were considering a coup, and opting to send a reply endorsing it without consulting his superior, who iirc was on vacation.

That being said, coup or not, the situation was untenable. Opposition to the coup in the Kennedy admin was largely based on the notion that Diem would be replaced by a 'rotating succession of inadequate generals,' which is of course what ended up happening (an anecdote i recall is that by like, 65 or 66, a state department employee was quoted as saying that the national symbol of S. Vietnam should be the turnstile, so severe was the spiral of coups and countercoups). But on the other hand, Diem and the Nhus were incredibly toxic and horribly out of touch. They couldn't have won the war either.

I find the fault lies with Eisenhower - for acquiescing to Diem's referendum, for not having anyone in the pocket before Diem overran the Saigon crime syndicates, for not realizing that Dien Bien Phu was essentially the end of imperialism in Southeast Asia rather than an offensive move by world communism or whatever.

My understanding about the Diem coup is that JFK was really indecisive about it and told Lodge to tell the generals that the US would neither support or oppose a coup. (Which for all intents and purposes meant that he was letting them start the coup). But you are correct that Diem was a terrible leader and the people of South Vietnam genuinely wanted him out. Had a coup not taken place in 1963, then by 1964 or 1965 Diem would have become vulnerable to a popular revolt.

LBJ should have just accepted the fact that the US should not have been in Vietnam to begin with and withdrawn the advisors in 1965.
 

bugs

Gone Fishin'
Ironically, De Gaulle opposed the American war in Vietnam and he tried in 1964 and 1965 to mediate a peace settlement in Vietnam but LBJ rebuffed him.

I think that once the French lost in 1954, Eisenhower should have just let them lose and not have gotten the US more involved. Virtually no one in the US cared about the war in Indochina in 1954, so Eisenhower would not have suffered politically. It was only after Eisenhower committed the US to defending South Vietnam (a country which his administration created) that later Presidents had a political problem in being saddled with an alliance they did not want but could not break due to domestic political concerns.



My understanding about the Diem coup is that JFK was really indecisive about it and told Lodge to tell the generals that the US would neither support or oppose a coup. (Which for all intents and purposes meant that he was letting them start the coup). But you are correct that Diem was a terrible leader and the people of South Vietnam genuinely wanted him out. Had a coup not taken place in 1963, then by 1964 or 1965 Diem would have become vulnerable to a popular revolt.

LBJ should have just accepted the fact that the US should not have been in Vietnam to begin with and withdrawn the advisors in 1965.
That's what am having him do in my tl
 
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