What if Russia didn't take Outer Manchuria and Haishenwai/Vladivostock?

[raharris1973]

Even in the 1850 most of the cabinet was against expansion to the Amur and Pacific and this was a local initiative in which success justified violation of the explicit orders.

As most of us know, the Russian Empire did end up expanding at Chinese expense, in 1858-1860, gaining the lands of the Amur District and maritime province, while the Qing Dynasty was reeling from the 2nd Opium War and the Taiping Rebellion (and other rebellions). As the Russians conquered the Kazakh hordes and Turkestan, they also seized corners of Qing Xinjiang a bit later as well.

But apparently, up until it happened, most of the Russian cabinet was quite timid about it.

How long could this forbearance have feasibly lasted? Could the Russian Empire have conceivably reached the turn of the 20th century with its southeastern frontier at Asia a the Pacific being at a Stanovoy mountain range, where it had been set by the Treaty of. Nerchinsk about 200 years before?

What could have been the consequences?

If it were somehow possible, and Russia has neither Vladivostok, nor Khabarovsk, I imagine it would not have much of modern Pacific battle fleet to speak of at the end of the 19th century, nor would I imagine a 'Triple Intervention' occurring against Japan's Treaty of Shimonoseki terms imposed on Japan. I believe that intervention was spurred by Franco-German competition for Russian favor, but a Russia that hasn't seized the maritime province isn't one that is gunning for Port Arthur.

Would a lack of Russian annexations in outer Manchuria have prolonged Qing Dynasty/Manchu resistance to mass Han Chinese migration to Manchuria, or Manchuria north of Liaoning? A trickle of settlers had always gotten through, and state capacity for enforcing exclusion was declining anyway, but I think Russian encroachment had something to do with relaxation of entry of Han migrants into the region.

 

[ghappy1000]

The Russian Empire, without Vladivostok or Khabavosk, wouldn't have much of a Pacific battle fleet, Port Arthur nor troops and willingness to do a Triple Intervention, butterflying the Triple Intervention, the Russian invasion of Manchuria and the Russo-Japanese War with all the butterflies to come. The Treaty of Nerchinsk's set Stavroy Mountain Range could be the Russian Empire's set borders in the Far East and the Pacific in the 20th century. Finally, without Russia in Outer Manchuria, the Qing would still control Outer Manchuria and block the flow of Han Chinese immigrants to Manchuria north of Liaoning unlike the Russians.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

As most of us know, the Russian Empire did end up expanding at Chinese expense, in 1858-1860, gaining the lands of the Amur District and maritime province, while the Qing Dynasty was reeling from the 2nd Opium War and the Taiping Rebellion (and other rebellions). As the Russians conquered the Kazakh hordes and Turkestan, they also seized corners of Qing Xinjiang a bit later as well.

But apparently, up until it happened, most of the Russian cabinet was quite timid about it.

How long could this forbearance have feasibly lasted? Could the Russian Empire have conceivably reached the turn of the 20th century with its southeastern frontier at Asia a the Pacific being at a Stanovoy mountain range, where it had been set by the Treaty of. Nerchinsk about 200 years before?

What could have been the consequences?

If it were somehow possible, and Russia has neither Vladivostok, nor Khabarovsk, I imagine it would not have much of modern Pacific battle fleet to speak of at the end of the 19th century, nor would I imagine a 'Triple Intervention' occurring against Japan's Treaty of Shimonoseki terms imposed on Japan. I believe that intervention was spurred by Franco-German competition for Russian favor, but a Russia that hasn't seized the maritime province isn't one that is gunning for Port Arthur.

Would a lack of Russian annexations in outer Manchuria have prolonged Qing Dynasty/Manchu resistance to mass Han Chinese migration to Manchuria, or Manchuria north of Liaoning? A trickle of settlers had always gotten through, and state capacity for enforcing exclusion was declining anyway, but I think Russian encroachment had something to do with relaxation of entry of Han migrants into the region.

Supposing the Russians don't grab Outer Manchuria later on, they probably wouldn't use the weakness of the Qing therefore not establishing protectorates (or not as much as OTL) therefore there is no Russo-Japanese War.
Without this war the Russians wouldn't be as industrialized but the power of the Tsar was never truly challenged so the Empire will collapse around the same time.

 

[raharris1973]

Following the logic of the responses, Russia deals with the domestic and foreign policy effects of no Russo-Japanese War and Revolution of 1905, I suspect leaving it vulnerable to surprise foreign policy and revolutionary failures in different locations and timed differently from OTL.

And Japan gets no humbling by the Triple Intervention. The British are more wary of Japan, and Japan has no desperation for western diplomatic partner, nor any particular "beef" or dispute with Russia, so the Anglo-Japanese alliance is much less likely. Britain remains unsplendidly isolated and alliance-free for longer?

Japan has less of a "chip on its shoulder" toward potentially intervening western powers, but may feel it can boundlessly intervene in the whole of Manchuria, and flex influence in Mongolia and China, and be assertive in other places in the Far East and Pacific, without fully understanding its limits.

On the aspect of an Anglo-Japanese alliance. One *might* still happen, motivated on the British side, less from from the pure anti-Russian/contain Russia *in the Far East* motive and more from the *naval burden reduction* motive. Calculated appeasement of rising Japan's regional, but still apparently limited and not global, ambitions, to allow greater British fleet concentration elsewhere back toward the North Sea. And Japan still saying yes to the deal, not out of particular anti-Russian fears, or diplomatic fears in general, but out of: 1. "Gosh, we're flattered the Great British Empire wants to ally with little old me.", 2. Sure we will partner with you and try to gain all the economic, training, and technology advantages of partnership we can.

 

[ghappy1000]

There would also be the possibility that the Chinese, with the extra manpower and territories from Outer Manchuria, the Chinese might win the First Sino- Japanese War with the butterflying of the Triple Intervention, the butterflying of Russian Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and Dalian (Port Arthur) and the butterflying of most of the Russian Pacific battle Fleet, the Russian invasion of Manchuria and the Russo-Japanese War with all the butterflies to come.

For Russia, the Treaty of Nerchinsk's set Stavroy Mountain Range could be the Russian Empire's set borders in the Far East and the Pacific in the 20th century. Finally, without Russia in Outer Manchuria, the Qing would still control Outer Manchuria and block the flow of Han Chinese immigrants to Manchuria north of Liaoning unlike the Russians.

For Japan, being humiliated in 1894 instead of 1945 to China might butterfly Japanese imperialism outside of otl post-1972 Japan (presumably Chinese instead of Russian or Japanese Vladivostok might also mean a Chinese instead of a Russian or a Japanese Sakhalin).

For China, it would butterfly the humiliation of losing too much Chinese territory at least as of 1893 China in otl to Japan in 1895 and to westerners from 1896 to 1898 with reduced humiliation and the butterflies to come (Boxer Rebellion, Xinghai Revolution, Chinese involvement in WW1 being butterflied by the otl Central Powers' colonies in China being butterflied with further butterflies).

At least Korea would stay independent or Chinese (vassalised) rather than Russian or Japanese colonized.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

There would also be the possibility that the Chinese, with the extra manpower and territories from Outer Manchuria, the Chinese might win the First Sino- Japanese War with the butterflying of the Triple Intervention, the butterflying of Russian Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and Dalian (Port Arthur) and the butterflying of most of the Russian Pacific battle Fleet, the Russian invasion of Manchuria and the Russo-Japanese War with all the butterflies to come.

For Russia, the Treaty of Nerchinsk's set Stavroy Mountain Range could be the Russian Empire's set borders in the Far East and the Pacific in the 20th century. Finally, without Russia in Outer Manchuria, the Qing would still control Outer Manchuria and block the flow of Han Chinese immigrants to Manchuria north of Liaoning unlike the Russians.

For Japan, being humiliated in 1894 instead of 1945 to China might butterfly Japanese imperialism outside of otl post-1972 Japan (presumably Chinese instead of Russian or Japanese Vladivostok might also mean a Chinese instead of a Russian or a Japanese Sakhalin).

For China, it would butterfly the humiliation of losing too much Chinese territory at least as of 1893 China in otl to Japan in 1895 and to westerners from 1896 to 1898 with the butterflies to come.

At least Korea would stay independent or Chinese (vassalised) rather than Russian or Japanese colonized.

Japanese won in the First Sino-Japanese War and that was why the vassalized Korea, i don't see why it wouldn't happen ITTL

 

[Georg von Frundsberg]

There would also be the possibility that the Chinese, with the extra manpower and territories from Outer Manchuria, the Chinese might win the First Sino- Japanese War with the butterflying of the Triple Intervention, the butterflying of Russian Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and Dalian (Port Arthur) and the butterflying of most of the Russian Pacific battle Fleet, the Russian invasion of Manchuria and the Russo-Japanese War with all the butterflies to come.

For Russia, the Treaty of Nerchinsk's set Stavroy Mountain Range could be the Russian Empire's set borders in the Far East and the Pacific in the 20th century. Finally, without Russia in Outer Manchuria, the Qing would still control Outer Manchuria and block the flow of Han Chinese immigrants to Manchuria north of Liaoning unlike the Russians.

For Japan, being humiliated in 1894 instead of 1945 to China might butterfly Japanese imperialism outside of otl post-1972 Japan (presumably Chinese instead of Russian or Japanese Vladivostok might also mean a Chinese instead of a Russian or a Japanese Sakhalin).

For China, it would butterfly the humiliation of losing too much Chinese territory at least as of 1893 China in otl to Japan in 1895 and to westerners from 1896 to 1898 with reduced humiliation and the butterflies to come (Boxer Rebellion, Xinghai Revolution, Chinese involvement in WW1 being butterflied by the otl Central Powers' colonies in China being butterflied with further butterflies).

At least Korea would stay independent or Chinese (vassalised) rather than Russian or Japanese colonized.

Outer Manchuria was sparsely populated in the 19th Century and without the Russian threat (Peking would be under threat if Russia gained all of Manchuria), the Qing government had no motive to colonise the area with Han settlers. In short, the territory would not give the Qing the manpower needed to tip the war in their favour. After all, the Qing was populous enough and Japan won the war because of Qing's incompetence.

Without Vladivostok, Tsar Nicholas II would not have adopted an "eastward-looking" foreign policy in the early years of his reign. What objectives will he pursue instead, doubling down in the Balkans?

 

[raharris1973]

There would also be the possibility that the Chinese, with the extra manpower and territories from Outer Manchuria, the Chinese might win the First Sino- Japanese War

The argument for these being great, pro-Qing Chinese difference-making assets in the Sino-Japanese War, as we knew it in 1894 are frankly not great, as other posters have pointed out.

Maybe outcome of Sino-Japanese struggle would change, but hardly as a straightforward, logical, linear "knock-on" effect. Rather only as a possible random, chaotic, coin-toss like "butterfly" effect.

 

[Georg von Frundsberg]

The argument for these being great, pro-Qing Chinese difference-making assets in the Sino-Japanese War, as we knew it in 1894 are frankly not great, as other posters have pointed out.

Maybe outcome of Sino-Japanese struggle would change, but hardly as a straightforward, logical, linear "knock-on" effect. Rather only as a possible random, chaotic, coin-toss like "butterfly" effect.

A different outcome I could think of is, still a Japanese victory, but since the Qing controlled extra land in Outer Manchuria and most importantly, Sakhalin/Karafuto, Japan, may forgo Liaodong and takeover coastal Manchuria instead.

Or as in this scenario, the Qing and Japanese would compete for Sakhalin, and the war could break out in a different way, especially if the Qing could project its power and threaten Japan from the Hokkaido front.

I know that the Qing did not have an effective military in the 19th Century but I wonder if they could build a naval base for the Beiyang fleet in Haishenwai or in Sakhalin (the latter would certainly be a war-provoking move)?

 

[alexmilman]

Following the logic of the responses, Russia deals with the domestic and foreign policy effects of no Russo-Japanese War and Revolution of 1905, I suspect leaving it vulnerable to surprise foreign policy and revolutionary failures in different locations and timed differently from OTL.

And Japan gets no humbling by the Triple Intervention. The British are more wary of Japan, and Japan has no desperation for western diplomatic partner, nor any particular "beef" or dispute with Russia, so the Anglo-Japanese alliance is much less likely. Britain remains unsplendidly isolated and alliance-free for longer?

Japan has less of a "chip on its shoulder" toward potentially intervening western powers, but may feel it can boundlessly intervene in the whole of Manchuria, and flex influence in Mongolia and China, and be assertive in other places in the Far East and Pacific, without fully understanding its limits.

On the aspect of an Anglo-Japanese alliance. One *might* still happen, motivated on the British side, less from from the pure anti-Russian/contain Russia *in the Far East* motive and more from the *naval burden reduction* motive. Calculated appeasement of rising Japan's regional, but still apparently limited and not global, ambitions, to allow greater British fleet concentration elsewhere back toward the North Sea. And Japan still saying yes to the deal, not out of particular anti-Russian fears, or diplomatic fears in general, but out of: 1. "Gosh, we're flattered the Great British Empire wants to ally with little old me.", 2. Sure we will partner with you and try to gain all the economic, training, and technology advantages of partnership we can.

The Russian-Japanese quarrel were reasonably short term confrontation caused by the wrong Russian policies and had nothing to do with a root cause of the OTL expansion. To make the long story short, without free navigation on the Amur to the Pacific, possession of the Russian Far East was pretty much useless except for the fur trade with China. So the expansion was pretty much “historically inevitable” from a purely “imperial” point of view unrelated to the real benefits. Actually, the first official attempt had been made during the reign of CII when the Qing government was asked for permission to allow free travel by the Amur. The request was denied and CII, quite reasonably, decided not to pursue the issue. But decline of Qing combined with the minimal technological developments provided enough of an edge to renegotiate the agreement.

Now, it can be argued that, in practical terms possession of the OTL Russian Far East (as in “within today’s borders’) did not give Russian Empire any noticeable benefits militarily until WWI when Vladivostok and TransSib became important as the imports entry point (big part of which, including rifles for 20-30% of the Russian army, were coming from Japan). Economically, the benefits amounted to the fishing concessions and then, in the 1930s (?) oil concessions on Northern Sakhalin. Russian trade on the Pacific was small and probably still is.

Now, short of the Witte’s fundamental geopolitical blunder, there was absolutely no objective reason for Russian-Japanese confrontation: before and after the RJW relations were friendly and soon after the war a trade agreement was signed with a purpose to keep the 3rd party (the US) out of Manchuria. Japan “swallowed” Port-Arthur and Dalnii/Dalian but Russian expansion into Korea was a direct challenge.

Leave just the OTL annexed part, finish TransSib instead of building East China RR (which was on the subsidies), spending enormous money on Kharbin, an idiotic naval base and economically failed “warm water port” (which ceased to be ice free after the protective wall had been constructed) and spend a fraction of these resources on developing Khabarovsk, Vladivostok and Nikolaevsk-on-Amur and the conflict is simply not there. Needless to say that the whole Witte’s idea of trade in China (hence the RR and port) was a failure: China was buying very little of the Russian goods except for kerosine and Russia was not buying too much from China.

As for the idea of Pacific Navy, no matter where based, it was not just a simple stupidity but a clinical idiocy. How can you maintain a major fleet in the area thousands kilometers away from any relevant industrial plant? Transporting the big caliber guns and the battleships’ engines by a single railroad across the whole empire (most of the relevant plants were either on the Baltic or Black Sea coast) surely was quite an entertainment and this would apply to Vladivostok as well. Not to mention a need of the big docks and thousands of skilled workers (in the area grossly underpopulated and importing a lot of food from Japan). And this fleet would be doing what exactly? In OTL it was placed (stroke of a genius) in a base not just separated from the Russian territory but located in such a way that to get to the Russian port it would have to pass between Japan and Japan-occupied Korea. Pretty much the same goes for the possible reinforcements. Even the coal supplies had to be hoarded in the time of peace because there was no high-quality coal anywhere around and no oil ( the reason why the Pacific Squadron was not switched to oil while the country was one of the major coal producers).

In other words, RJW was a conflict caused by the most idiotic scenario possible.

 

[alexmilman]

Outer Manchuria was sparsely populated in the 19th Century and without the Russian threat (Peking would be under threat if Russia gained all of Manchuria), the Qing government had no motive to colonise the area with Han settlers. In short, the territory would not give the Qing the manpower needed to tip the war in their favour. After all, the Qing was populous enough and Japan won the war because of Qing's incompetence.

Without Vladivostok, Tsar Nicholas II would not have adopted an "eastward-looking" foreign policy in the early years of his reign. What objectives will he pursue instead, doubling down in the Balkans?

How about, an absolutely fantastic thought, concentrating upon the long list of pressing domestic issues? 😂

 

[Fatt Shea]

Maybe if there was no Han settlement of Manchuria you could eventually end up with an independent Manchuria like we saw with Mongolia after the break up of the Qing, perhaps if it became a Russian or Japanese puppet, it could even remain under the Qing as they would mantain support there

 

[Georg von Frundsberg]

Maybe if there was no Han settlement of Manchuria you could eventually end up with an independent Manchuria like we saw with Mongolia after the break up of the Qing, perhaps if it became a Russian or Japanese puppet, it could even remain under the Qing as they would mantain support there

If this hypothetic Qing-rump state played their cards right then they could be a useful buffer state between Japan, Russia and China. As far as I know, the Revolutionaries in 1911 initially wanted to "expel the barbarians" and had permitted the Manchurians to have a country in their native land. It was the Beiyang republican regime that claimed all of Qing China as its own. With fewer Han settlers, a division between Han and Manchu territory could become easier.

However, Manchuria is rich in natural resources which makes it a lucrative target for its neighbours. I doubt the Manchurians alone could provide enough manpower to defend any invasion attempt. (That is why the only way to survive would be balancing the interests of different powers)

How about, an absolutely fantastic thought, concentrating upon the long list of pressing domestic issues? 😂

It is doable only if Alexander III had lived longer, Nicholas II would still be the Nicholas II we know.

 

[raharris1973]

The Russian-Japanese quarrel were reasonably short term confrontation caused by the wrong Russian policies and had nothing to do with a root cause of the OTL expansion. To make the long story short, without free navigation on the Amur to the Pacific, possession of the Russian Far East was pretty much useless except for the fur trade with China. So the expansion was pretty much “historically inevitable” from a purely “imperial” point of view unrelated to the real benefits. Actually, the first official attempt had been made during the reign of CII when the Qing government was asked for permission to allow free travel by the Amur. The request was denied and CII, quite reasonably, decided not to pursue the issue. But decline of Qing combined with the minimal technological developments provided enough of an edge to renegotiate the agreement.

Now, it can be argued that, in practical terms possession of the OTL Russian Far East (as in “within today’s borders’) did not give Russian Empire any noticeable benefits militarily until WWI when Vladivostok and TransSib became important as the imports entry point (big part of which, including rifles for 20-30% of the Russian army, were coming from Japan). Economically, the benefits amounted to the fishing concessions and then, in the 1930s (?) oil concessions on Northern Sakhalin. Russian trade on the Pacific was small and probably still is.

Now, short of the Witte’s fundamental geopolitical blunder, there was absolutely no objective reason for Russian-Japanese confrontation: before and after the RJW relations were friendly and soon after the war a trade agreement was signed with a purpose to keep the 3rd party (the US) out of Manchuria. Japan “swallowed” Port-Arthur and Dalnii/Dalian but Russian expansion into Korea was a direct challenge.

Leave just the OTL annexed part, finish TransSib instead of building East China RR (which was on the subsidies), spending enormous money on Kharbin, an idiotic naval base and economically failed “warm water port” (which ceased to be ice free after the protective wall had been constructed) and spend a fraction of these resources on developing Khabarovsk, Vladivostok and Nikolaevsk-on-Amur and the conflict is simply not there. Needless to say that the whole Witte’s idea of trade in China (hence the RR and port) was a failure: China was buying very little of the Russian goods except for kerosine and Russia was not buying too much from China.

As for the idea of Pacific Navy, no matter where based, it was not just a simple stupidity but a clinical idiocy. How can you maintain a major fleet in the area thousands kilometers away from any relevant industrial plant? Transporting the big caliber guns and the battleships’ engines by a single railroad across the whole empire (most of the relevant plants were either on the Baltic or Black Sea coast) surely was quite an entertainment and this would apply to Vladivostok as well. Not to mention a need of the big docks and thousands of skilled workers (in the area grossly underpopulated and importing a lot of food from Japan). And this fleet would be doing what exactly? In OTL it was placed (stroke of a genius) in a base not just separated from the Russian territory but located in such a way that to get to the Russian port it would have to pass between Japan and Japan-occupied Korea. Pretty much the same goes for the possible reinforcements. Even the coal supplies had to be hoarded in the time of peace because there was no high-quality coal anywhere around and no oil ( the reason why the Pacific Squadron was not switched to oil while the country was one of the major coal producers).

In other words, RJW was a conflict caused by the most idiotic scenario possible.

Gosh, I appreciate the effort.

Nothing I disagree with here. Certainly, the Russo-Japanese War could have been avoided by much nearer in time decisions to 1904 and much less radical solutions than Russia forgoing acquisition of the Amur and maritime provinces. I cannot fault your analysis. I hope you are not angry I was just posing a more radical 1850s PoD, one effect of which, would be to remove all doubt of there being no Russo-Japanese war.

 

[alexmilman]

Gosh, I appreciate the effort.

Nothing I disagree with here. Certainly, the Russo-Japanese War could have been avoided by much nearer in time decisions to 1904 and much less radical solutions than Russia forgoing acquisition of the Amur and maritime provinces. I cannot fault your analysis. I hope you are not angry I was just posing a more radical 1850s PoD, one effect of which, would be to remove all doubt of there being no Russo-Japanese war.

Why should I be angry? It is ATL, not a real life. I may agree or disagree with what is written but why would I be angry with you personally?

 

[Fatt Shea]

If this hypothetic Qing-rump state played their cards right then they could be a useful buffer state between Japan, Russia and China. As far as I know, the Revolutionaries in 1911 initially wanted to "expel the barbarians" and had permitted the Manchurians to have a country in their native land. It was the Beiyang republican regime that claimed all of Qing China as its own. With fewer Han settlers, a division between Han and Manchu territory could become easier.

And Manchuria would not be seen as so intergral to the state if not for the Han migration there, this Qing state might contain Mongolia as support for the Qing was high there during the Xinhai revolution, maybe this state could end up being a sort of Manchu Mongol federation since the power of the Mongols relative to the Manchus would be higher. They also have cultral similarities which would help in this.

 

[raharris1973]

And Manchuria would not be seen as so intergral to the state if not for the Han migration there, this Qing state might contain Mongolia as support for the Qing was high there during the Xinhai revolution, maybe this state could end up being a sort of Manchu Mongol federation since the power of the Mongols relative to the Manchus would be higher. They also have cultral similarities which would help in this.

Sounds like Japan-bait to me.

Or Korea-bait, if Korea is so fortunate enough as to be remaining independent and self-modernizing.

 

[Fatt Shea]

Sounds like Japan-bait to me.

Or Korea-bait, if Korea is so fortunate enough as to be remaining independent and self-modernizing.

A modernised Korea could be very powerful in this scenario, if they took Manchuria they could create a mega Korea as it would be quite easy to colonise considering the very low population there compared to what it could support. Already in OTL 2 million Koreans lived there by the communist takeover mainly to avoid the poverty of Korea and this number could have been higher with an active colonisation effort by the Korean government with the rest of the land not being settled by Han meaning more for the Koreans. This would be one of the best ways for Korea to become a super power.
However the Manchus would have some ways of avoiding this, for one they could settle the land with Manchus who lived throughout China in seperate areas from the Han fleeing from the persecutions by the Han which would keep the land Manchurian and pro Qing while also populating it. Loyalist Han (like Zhang Xun who was called general queue as he refused to cut his queue) could also make up some of the population. Bannermen of all ethnicities throughout China could also move here to keep their traditional status and to avoid discrimination as they were often all considered Manchu. The Qing could recruit help from the Japanese who helped the royalists OTL and might see this as a good way to weaken this modernised Korea. The Japanese could offer help modernising their army and a gaurantee of their independence in exchange for economic concessions and an agreement to fight Korea in a potential future war. They could also enlist the support of the Russians (although if the Soviets still take over they wouldn't be interested in helping this Qing rump state.) Perhaps they could offer them rights to base their navy and to create a port like Vladivostok or to use Port Arthur (this would be pretty ironic considering the scenario that lead to it.)

Without a modernised Korea Japan would probably end up with the area, this would make Mancukuo a lot easier to settle and perhaps all the empty land could satiate Japan's land hunger but this seems unlikely given how hungry they were in this period. But we could end up with this more Japanese Manchukuo surviving if this scenario butterflies the Russian revolution as Japan wouldn't have gone so far right without the execution of the Russian emperor and spread of communism.

 

[TheWitheredStriker]

I love the idea of Russia not annexing Outer Manchuria, and Manchuria becoming independent under the Qing dynasty in 1911 as a result. Definitely thinking on what I can contribute to this scenario.

However... why exactly are we talking about a modernized Korea that colonizes Manchuria? I don't want to be a downer, but by the time Manchuria becomes independent in 1911, Korea has lost its independence and is a non-autonomous province of Japan. They will not be doing anything whatsoever. Korea's fate is not going to change simply because Manchuria has a bit more land.

What will change about Korea though, is that when it reclaims its sovereignty from Japan, it will do so fully united. Unless Manchuria goes communist or stuff like that, there will be no one to directly back up the Kims in the Korean War when South Korea is whooping their ass. And even if Manchuria does turn communist and intervenes militarily, they'll be unlikely to turn the tide like China did. Manchuria may have heavily modernized by then, but I'm doubtful of their ability to push the Americans back over the borders.

Without a modernised Korea Japan would probably end up with the area, this would make Mancukuo a lot easier to settle and perhaps all the empty land could satiate Japan's land hunger but this seems unlikely given how hungry they were in this period. But we could end up with this more Japanese Manchukuo surviving if this scenario butterflies the Russian revolution as Japan wouldn't have gone so far right without the execution of the Russian emperor and spread of communism.

I honestly think Japan and Manchuria would moreso be allies. Manchuria, especially with Outer Manchuria, would be a joint buffer state against both China and Russia. Annexing or militarily occupying the region would give Japan a direct border with both. This strikes me as undesirable in a situation where Manchuria is already fully independent and does not require the presence of the Japanese military to even exist, especially considering that Manchuria and Japan have many reasons to be friends here.

The Qing dynasty will likely want to cling on to power and their ties with China won't be too hot. They Manchus will also be interested in modernization and industrialization, now that they've lost pretty much their entire empire and only retain their homeland. Considering how sparsely populated the region is, the Manchus are going to need advanced infrastructure and a strong army to stop themselves from becoming the plaything of their neighbours. Thankfully for them, Manchuria is ripe for industrialization thanks to its resources. They would also receive a lot of investment and perhaps tutors from Japan, helping them become a respectable power who can hold threats at bay.

The Manchus are unlikely to be happy with the Western powers, too. The unequal treaties are China's problem now, but they were forced upon the Qing when they ruled that country.

On the other hand, I also don't think that Manchuria would fully back Japan in the Pacific War, at least not out of their own volition. The Manchus are threading on thin ice. Picking a fight with... basically everyone else would completely destroy whatever stability and prosperity they've built up.

 

[rfmcdonald]

I do think that if you keep greater Manchuria under the Qing, that could plausibly lessen the geopolitical pressure on Korea. A country not under imminent threat of Russian occupation might well be less of a Japanese target.