What Pods are needed to make sure the Song do not fall to the Mongols? Or at least keep them at the North China Plain?
Was it possible for the Song to repeal the Mongols.
- Thread starter Glory2Cabinda
- Start date
The most I can imagine is have the Song manage to pull off a renewal; a main reason in my opinion for the Mongol's success over the Song was the fact that they came right when Dynastic decay was starting to kick-off (and if I remember correctly one of the people responsible for helping the Mongol conquest of them was a military official who was screwed over by court politics), so if that can somehow be staved off, I imagine that the Song surviving is a possibility (although not a guarantee, since I imagine that the Mongols would be waiting for any moment of weakness to go for the neck)
My understanding is that the Southern Song as they were at the time of the formation of the Mongol empire were in no position to resist. They had a relatively weak military, largely owing to their paranoia that if a general grew to powerful he would overthrow the dynastic (can't really blame them given what had happened to previous dynasties), but most importantly they had lost all of China horse-producing regions to the Jurchens and Tanguts, so they were helpless against Mongol cavalry. They did have more advanced miliary technology in some ways, but after the Mongols conquered Jin and Western Xia they were able to employ their engineers as well, thus nullifying the only potential advantage the Song had left.
My thinking is that you would probably need a POD early in the Northern Song period to make the dynasty less averse to the military and prevent the loss of the northern regions. This, of course, could butterfly the Mongols, but that isn't a given.
My thinking is that you would probably need a POD early in the Northern Song period to make the dynasty less averse to the military and prevent the loss of the northern regions. This, of course, could butterfly the Mongols, but that isn't a given.
Would the different Mongolian tribes still have been likely to unify if Temujin died as an infant?
While I believe the Song did have a terrible military, they absolutely did have many good ideas about defense and siege tactics. It took Kublai Khan, one of the greatest Mongols ever, a multi year long campaign that took it's toll of both sides. And because the Song had much local support, they could afford those losses.
However, the Song were passive in there defense. They didn't really support friendly northern warlords against the mongols threat and there strategy almost completely relied on Xiangyang to do everything. When they lost it the Song quickly unraveled.
So maybe the Song could survive if they:
1)had a better defensive strategy
2) supported local and foreign allies against the Mongols
3) were a more friendly dynasty to military interests
However, the Song were passive in there defense. They didn't really support friendly northern warlords against the mongols threat and there strategy almost completely relied on Xiangyang to do everything. When they lost it the Song quickly unraveled.
So maybe the Song could survive if they:
1)had a better defensive strategy
2) supported local and foreign allies against the Mongols
3) were a more friendly dynasty to military interests
Yeah, the conquest of Song China was anything but easy, even with all of the resources available.
Yeah, as I said in my previous post in a point I will try to expand upon in this one the Song dynasty's own political elite absolutely didn't take the military seriously and even in the final years of the dynasty still screwed them over.
Jia Sidao helped a little bit in this problem but his efforts weren't enough (in part because of his own personality and the courts attitude) however with a half-hearted defensive strategy and the importing of Muslim siege tactics and weaponry from Persia, Kubalai Khan took Xiangyang and the dynasty fell apart
It took six years for Xiangyang to fall, and that was with most relief attempts being failing. If one of these attempts succeeded, the imperial court back in Hangzhou got word of it (IIRC, in the one relief that was successful [in 1172] they assumed the soldiers sent were all killed and abandoned the fortress to its fate) and sent more reinforcements, that could at least demoralize the attackers a fair bit, but the counterweight trebuchets would likely still finish the job unless the defenders destroy them all in a night sortie or something.
Having Khublai Khan die prematurely (he was fairly long lived for a Mongol ruler) and perhaps ignite a civil war among his sons would definitely end the siege.
Having Khublai Khan die prematurely (he was fairly long lived for a Mongol ruler) and perhaps ignite a civil war among his sons would definitely end the siege.
It was a factor of huge over reliance of Xiangyang to protect them and Imperial micromanagement that doomed the Song. I'd say if the Song dynasty had a actually effective defensive strategy Xiangyang wouldn't have been the crushing blow it was. After all, the song would have had more fortified cities in great defensive locations that protected the Song heartland along the Han river. With a good strategy of a defence in depth the Song could afford to lose Xiangyang and retreat to Fancheng, Wuhan, Ankou, and other cities without giving the Mongols a break. Eventually they'll have to stop the conquest to reconsolidate and look for other plunder opportunities the Mongol armies relied on to keep order.
Xiangyang was crucial because it defended the approaches to Sichuan, and i doubt that the loss of such a strategic province was a blow the Song could have recovered from.
Sichuan was largely independent of Song defensive network. It was basically it's own separate defense zone by the time the Mongols invaded Song, so I don't think it would have been a crushing blow to lose Sichuan.
Also, attacking Sichuan would have to be its own entire theater. The area was hugely populated with several fortified points. With a competent and determined Song defense it would be extremely difficult to take over the province. That's also not mentioning that the general south of China's terrain is I'll suited for cavalry warfare. While it does put the Song largely on the defensive it gives the song large advantages on there own territory
At the same time, the Mongols were showing remarkable adaptability and political acumen; they could rely on turncoats to bolster their war effort through auxiliaries who were better adapted to the local terrain and climate.
The Song cannot rely on their defenses alone. What they also need is a better way to reward their generals for loyalty and in higher standards than what the Mongols can offer, and with a dwindling tax base due to gradual losses in territory and a blockade by the enemy, the tendency is for their coffers to get empty.
Of course, you are bringing out several good points, and I'll do my best to answer them as best as I can.
Of course, it wouldn't be a good idea for the Song to remain on the defensive, which is why I believe they should have supported northern warlords to bring some of the pressure off them. Also, the Song should be able to jostle for position in Yunnan against the mongols well.
One of the biggest weaknesses of the Song IMHO is that they didn't really trust there military. However in a Song survival scenario they need to get along with the army. That being said the history of China is long and it's riches vast so I do believe that if the Song actually tried they would be able to keep the generals from just betraying the dynasty.
In the South the Song navy was an extremely potent force. IOTL they wasted it in attempts to relieve Xiangyang. While they could replace the ships they couldn't replace the experienced sailors and crew. Assuming they let Xiangyang do as much worth it damage to the Mongols while keeping there navy I'm tact I don't believe that the Mongol navy would be as good or experienced as the Song navy.
I do believe Song China would be able to make up the lost income in other ways. Song China as I mentioned in the previous point had a great navy for the age as well as things people want. Trade income has always been an important part of Song economy and I imagine the Song would start to trade more to make up shortfalls. Also, southern China was still extremely populated and rich. While losing parts of the Han and Huai river valleys would hurt most of there populations was south of that. And with the War escalating I believe it would be wise for the Song to move population and assets south to protect them from Mongol raids.
Also, I believe there is only so long the war goes on before the Mongols go somewhere else for an easier target. If they exhaust their strength on a target for little in return it make Kubalai look weak. In the case of successful Song resistance against him Kubalai would have to look out for political rivals who can promise loot and treasure for an angry horde.
The best strategy the Southern Song had to repel the Mongols was: delay, delay, delay, and pray for the inherent instability of steppe politics to tear the Horde apart. In this, they were unfortunately matched by Kublai Khan, whose military and administrative talents kept the Empire in East Asia united and focused on Song. A Chagatai Khanate that posed an earlier + greater threat would have stretched Yuan resources out, and given the Song defensive system of forts + navy much-needed breathing space.
On the other hand, the Song might also not have been as long-term resilient as commonly thought. While they initially enjoyed South China as an "impregnable fortress" due to early Mongol weaknesses in siege and especially navy, their resources (not just money but also stuff like the merchant marine) were already running low due to constant mobilization + retention by local provinces for defence. Also by 1230s they were also beginning to show signs of administrative decay: the perennial Chinese problem of local wealth + power being concentrated in the hands of a few great magnates. Long-term this could have led to periods of elite-level civil war or local-level civil unrest, opportunities that any future Mongol might well exploit.
In any case, some potential options for Song to stretch things out:
1) "Armed vassalage" to Mongols: offer to pay tribute while maintaining a military establishment strong enough to deter actual Mongol control. Probably the best idea (esp during 1230s-50s), but would have been a political non-starter in a Song court prone to politicizing national security issues.
2) Supporting early Mongol resisters: Jin 1220s-1230s, Korea 1230s-50s, and perhaps the Mongol vassal of Li Tan in Shandong 1233-60s, Dali and Annam in the Southwest 1250s. Song help in providing supplies, especially to besieged coastal strongholds, could have delayed the Mongol consolidation of Northern China, which might have shifted the internal power balance of the Mongols from the urban "reformists" (i.e. Kublai) to the steppe "traditionalists" (i.e. Ariq Boke).
3) Xiangyang 1267-73: Jia Sidao accurately saw the Han River Valley as the weak link in Song defenses (being the northernmost point where the Yuan could access the Yangtze River network), but the Song had a terrible system of command. JSD likely had many political clients in the Han River (most notably the Lu clan in charge of Xiangyang) who would have been mobilized to support a defense - the Song court was probably right to be worried about this, but their response was to place an anti-JSD official as military leader, which threw all of JSD's military plans into disarray and prevented an integrated defense of the entire Han River (for starters, the Lus ignored the new guy's plans).
But in any case, it seems that JSD and the Song court suffered from a "Maginot Mentality", staking everything on Xiangyang (and more generally, their defensive system) and ignoring other methods to lift Mongol pressure, such as bribing other Mongols/Annam/Jeju/Japan to cause trouble in Kublai's rear, or even to simply negotiate with Kublai and obtain a peace. Over-reliance on Xiangyang as a "prestige objective" led the Song to invest way too much in its defense, esp. during the later period when Song relief efforts destroyed its naval superiority simply to delay the inevitable.
4) Exile: it might have been possible, though extremely difficult, to create an exiled court for Song in the mountainous regions of Southwest China, Taiwan or (most likely) Southeast Asia esp. Champa, and hope for a successful anti-Mongol revolt to sweep the Song back into power. Unfortunately Kublai was a bit too long-lived (died 15 years after Song conquest) for that plan to have any realistic chance of success.
On the other hand, the Song might also not have been as long-term resilient as commonly thought. While they initially enjoyed South China as an "impregnable fortress" due to early Mongol weaknesses in siege and especially navy, their resources (not just money but also stuff like the merchant marine) were already running low due to constant mobilization + retention by local provinces for defence. Also by 1230s they were also beginning to show signs of administrative decay: the perennial Chinese problem of local wealth + power being concentrated in the hands of a few great magnates. Long-term this could have led to periods of elite-level civil war or local-level civil unrest, opportunities that any future Mongol might well exploit.
In any case, some potential options for Song to stretch things out:
1) "Armed vassalage" to Mongols: offer to pay tribute while maintaining a military establishment strong enough to deter actual Mongol control. Probably the best idea (esp during 1230s-50s), but would have been a political non-starter in a Song court prone to politicizing national security issues.
2) Supporting early Mongol resisters: Jin 1220s-1230s, Korea 1230s-50s, and perhaps the Mongol vassal of Li Tan in Shandong 1233-60s, Dali and Annam in the Southwest 1250s. Song help in providing supplies, especially to besieged coastal strongholds, could have delayed the Mongol consolidation of Northern China, which might have shifted the internal power balance of the Mongols from the urban "reformists" (i.e. Kublai) to the steppe "traditionalists" (i.e. Ariq Boke).
3) Xiangyang 1267-73: Jia Sidao accurately saw the Han River Valley as the weak link in Song defenses (being the northernmost point where the Yuan could access the Yangtze River network), but the Song had a terrible system of command. JSD likely had many political clients in the Han River (most notably the Lu clan in charge of Xiangyang) who would have been mobilized to support a defense - the Song court was probably right to be worried about this, but their response was to place an anti-JSD official as military leader, which threw all of JSD's military plans into disarray and prevented an integrated defense of the entire Han River (for starters, the Lus ignored the new guy's plans).
But in any case, it seems that JSD and the Song court suffered from a "Maginot Mentality", staking everything on Xiangyang (and more generally, their defensive system) and ignoring other methods to lift Mongol pressure, such as bribing other Mongols/Annam/Jeju/Japan to cause trouble in Kublai's rear, or even to simply negotiate with Kublai and obtain a peace. Over-reliance on Xiangyang as a "prestige objective" led the Song to invest way too much in its defense, esp. during the later period when Song relief efforts destroyed its naval superiority simply to delay the inevitable.
4) Exile: it might have been possible, though extremely difficult, to create an exiled court for Song in the mountainous regions of Southwest China, Taiwan or (most likely) Southeast Asia esp. Champa, and hope for a successful anti-Mongol revolt to sweep the Song back into power. Unfortunately Kublai was a bit too long-lived (died 15 years after Song conquest) for that plan to have any realistic chance of success.
They thought that the military might try to seize power from the ruling dynasty and court nobles.
The city of Xiangyang was important, but it was not actually that crucial. The Song Dynasty actually lost the city repeatedly during their confrontation with the Jurchens and Mongols. What was most important was the depletion of the treasury due to repeated encroachment of Song territory by the Mongols and rising military expenditures. Sichuan was almost entirely lost by the Siege of Xiangyang while Hubei and Huainan were both devastated by repeated attacks by the Mongols. All of the aforementioned provinces were extremely rich prior to the war with the Mongols.With the loss of Sichuan and the conquest of Dali, new armies also had to be raised to defend the empire from the south-west.In 1258, the Mongols even led a chevauchee expedition from Yunnan which punched all the through Song territory from Guangxi to Hubei, which completely devastated the territory in between. It did not help that land consolidation and tax evasion was at work. Jia Sidao himself got a lot of flak because he tried to confiscate land from major landowners in order to pay the troops.
Without an adequate supply of money, it would be hard to retain the loyalty of regular soldiers. It was the defection of these soldiers in the aftermath of the Siege of Xiangyang that would prove much devastating to the Song Dynasty, which was helped by the fact that the military-governor of the city of Xiangyang, Lu Wenhuan, was the cousin of their old boss, Lu Wende.His successful defection to the Mongols opened a doorway for further defections from the Song military.
I think the Song Dynasty could have done better against the Mongols if it relied on a land for service system rather than a cash for service system. The cash for service system was frankly too expensive for even the Song Dynasty in a prolonged struggle against the Mongols.Theoretically, the Song Dynasty was richer and more populous than the Jurchens and the Mongols. In terms of actual soldiers they could raise however, they were often outnumbered by the Jurchens and the Mongols who were able to not only raise tribal forces, but also Han defectors, who were often paid by loot and privileges rather than a regular income by the government. It did not help that the Song Dynasty often had ghost soldiers--soldiers who only exist on paper so that generals could receive the extra pay.
I strongly suspect that even if the Song Dynasty retained the 'horse producing regions' to the north, these horse producing regions would have rapidly become grain/sheep producing regions instead. Even with the loss of these regions, the Song Dynasty still had horse producing regions in it's early phase. Problem however was that these lands were quickly converted into farms or grazing fields for sheep so that the elite could profit from them. It did not help that the Song Dynasty Confucian elite squandered what warhorses they had left from previous dynasties by abandoning eugenic practices. They seriously believed that it would be immoral for a horse to mate with another closely related horse and therefore mated their warhorses with horses that were not bred for war.
The Mongolian navy IOTL was actually better than the Song one. It was staffed mainly by Song defectors and was able to repeatedly defeat the Song one during the Siege of Xiangyang.
This.
This is unfortunately true.
This is also true.
You got it mate. Unfortunately, supporting the Jin Dynasty would have been impossible. The Song Dynasty actually deliberated about whether they should back the Jin Dynasty IOTL. The Jurchens however thought that they could "get what was lost from the Mongols through the Song" by invading them--which made actual assistance to the Jin Dynasty impossible.
Unfortunately, they were simply bankrupt by then.
In order for an exile to succeeded, they would need to settle Taiwan or SE Asia much earlier than the otl fall of Song.
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Your right about Song in that during and after Xiangyang they really screwed themselves over, but before Xiangyang the Song had many advantages. IMO their two biggest mistakes were:
1) the Song court was a pit of vipers
2) Song defensive strategy had a lot of holes and was generally a passive one.
Of course if they took time to fix there issues or Jia Sidao had gotten along better with the court these could be mitigated or even fixed. They wouldn't have let the Mongols outflank them in Yunnan and Sichuan. They wouldn't have wasted there Navy and crews on pointless attempts at relieving Xiangyang after it quit being worth it. And they would support rebellions in Mongol territory to relieve pressure.
Also, the Song would only need survive long enough for a Mongol chief to rebel against Kubalai. You mentioned that the Han defectors joined in hopes of loot, plunder, and privileges-but what if the loot doesn't come quickly enough in large enough quantities? It would be pandemonium. If Kubalai doesn't find success in his China campaign quickly enough his head is at risk.
I think the situation could have been salvageable if the emperor of the time wasn't actually a literal imbecile.I think Jia Sidao himself was actually a competent commander(seeing as he defeated an army led personally by Kublai Khan back in 1259), but he was seriously out of his depth as chancellor. A lot of his policies from otl, such as his attempt to audit the spending of his generals for corruption, were frankly quite short-sighted. He purged a lot of good generals in the process while pushing some of them to the arms of the Mongols. The otl Mongol naval commander for example was one of the people who defected to the Mongols after being prosecuted by Jia for corruption.Nonetheless, I'm not too sure how the Song dynasty could have solved the fiscal crisis without such drastic measures. The correct thing as @profxyz mentioned would have been to pay tribute to the Mongols while finding a way to fix the problems.
In terms of the Song strategy, I think they could do better if one of the military governors of Sichuan, Yu Jie, didn't get purged for perceived disloyalty. IOTL, he managed to defeat the Mongols repeatedly in Sichuan, and was planning to retake Hanzhong, which would have perhaps made Sichuan less vulnerable to another Mongol invasion. They could also try to aid Dali or conquer Yunnan as you mentioned.
They actually retained a large navy after Xiangyang fell. Jia Sidao himself tried to launch a counter-attack afterwards with two thousand ships and an army of 130,000 troops. Problem was that the commander of the vanguard, who was an associate of Lu Wenhuan, decided to defect--which caused the entire army's morale to disintegrate.
I agree. Which is why @profxyz' strategy of armed vassalage is the most feasible one in terms of financial and human cost. The Mongol system of loot and privileges can only break down if there's not enough wars for the Mongols.
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