New Years, 1917
The guns on the Western Front had been silent for almost a month, however while the fighting had ended there, in other locations in Europe, the fighting would still continue at varying levels as many of the nations involved struggled to maintain control of what they found themselves in possession of, along with attempts to add additional parcels of the continent before the final proposals were agreed to.
While the remapping of Europe was fully underway by that point, there was little of that which would concern the Royal Navy at that time, as the RN had more than enough to concern itself with. The Admiralty and the navy would be concerning themselves with a supposed transition to peace, while at the same time retaining its near war time levels of operational efficiencies and resolute determination to dominate the sea lanes as needed.
For the most part, economic necessities and restrictions which would face the RN at that point, would be met for the most part by the widespread decommissioning of the older and badly worn out elements of the fleet. This, along with the release of the associated men and officers of these vessels, would be the first large steps toward addressing the large scale fiscal realities that were even in those early days of peace ensnaring the economies of Great Britain, the Dominions and the rest of the Empire.
“Truthfully, those early months after the German submission were, in many ways, more stressful than the darkest days of the Great War at sea, in my estimation. For while during the war the struggles of the Admiralty had been centered on maintaining our strength and efficiencies in our epic struggle to not only deny the foe free usage of the oceans of the world, but to maintain our freedom of movement and trade over those same waters even as they might attempt to halt us.
In those war years our challenges, once outside the scope of our enemy’s dark efforts, would be centered into the acceptance of new tactics, the defence of proven efforts, and the removal of theories found to be flawed. While in a few cases efforts would best described as challenged-not by the foe- but rather by the political and intra service politicking that was (and in some ways still prevalent) in the middle to upper ranks of the fleet, the bulk of our concerns were with the foe. Yet even with these challenges, we in the Admiralty could count on the support of both the government and people to help ease our burdens and responsibilities.
Yet, with the coming of the end of the war, our parameters were changed drastically. The beginning of the crumbling of our great wartime political coalition and the great Entente, in combination with the apparent lack of sufficient and initial obvious threats to our seaborne trade and communications would begin to alter the view that a strong Royal Navy would be paramount to our continued strength as an empire. Our new foe was no longer an enemy that was bent on destruction on the high seas, rather it was one who would set about striking down the fleet by attempting to choke off our fiscal need.
This new enemy would prove to be one that would attempt to deliver up the most callous of campaigns against us, and one that while would be brought to task, would deliver us into some of our most serious struggles of the Admiralty postwar, other factors would allow a more balanced approach soon enough. However, even with a calming of the waters so to speak, we in the Admiralty would need to work diligently to fine a long term balance between the needs of the fleet and the fiscal realities facing the nation and empire.”
- Reginald McKenna, First Lord of the Admiralty
First Lord McKenna would indeed stand down the foe, and through his efforts, he would set the Admiralty and the Royal Navy on a course that would see them through the next forty years and more. By his leadership and efforts, while the Royal Navy would see fiscal austerity programs, a concerted effort would be made to not only keep the fleet maintained in a proper manner, but to provide for a building program that would not only provide for a continual program of replacement, as well as a steady input of the newest technologies.
While McKenna would not be well thought of in some circles for his handling of the RN’s down-sizing immediately after the Great War, if one were to look at the end result of that period, the observation must be made that McKenna had overseen a remarkable program which, while sloughing off the least useful portions of the RN, he was able to set the RN on a course that would provide for an efficient, modern and flexible force that would if not always be a totally dominant force on the oceans of the world, it would be one that would cause other first class naval powers to take serious note of how their efforts might be impacted by the Royal Navy.
A goodly portion of McKenna’s thought process had sprung from the vastly changed political landscape across the globe in general, and in Europe in particular. As Great Britain was making a concerted effort to gather in not only the portions of Germany that had been designated as under her control in the interim, there were also the need to secure, stabilize and support areas as far distant as the new emerging nations of Finland, Poland and the Baltic states. Further south, Romania, Greece and Bulgaria were proving to be a diplomatic juggling act, while the once again crumbling Ottoman Empire would foist a whole new set of challenges on the diplomatic front as well.
In the case of her erstwhile major allies, the challenges were even more compounded, as both France and Russia were devolving into revolution of sorts, as internal political dynamics, no longer fettered by the war, had begun to move to the fore. Newly arrived on the scene, the Americans, would for all the world, take on the appearance of a spoiled and mouthy school boy, who in most cases, would rather than providing solid support, would in their stead, be not much better described than being a political nuisance in the ongoing attempts at parlay.
Being everything being as it was, McKenna’s clear head, and good understanding of matters naval, had allowed him to take the proper steps after the war’s end to not only secure the bulk of the remainder of the High Seas Fleet and move it to points under the aegis of the Royal Navy, but to as well secure not only the important German naval bases, but the key shipyards as well, along with design and certain manufacturing faculties.
The upside of this was that in short order, select of the surviving High Seas Fleet had been, or would be soon underway to British ports. Upon the arrival of these ships in British ports, the transfer crews were taken off, and returned to Germany. As well as these ships, various components, from the smallest to the largest, were also removed to Great Britain for research and design purposes. As well, one each of the remaining Bayern, Mackensen and the following improved Mackensen class super dreadnoughts, were to be completed and turned over to the British. The remaining ships building were to be scrapped, starting immediately, while progress on all smaller vessels would be suspended, too.
The down side for the Admiralty would be the constant visits, queries and demands from various nations regarding not only access to and information on, the High Seas Fleet, but their own demands for a share of the German fleet. At the same time, most, if not all of the respective allies were pressuring the British for knowledge on what they had learned during the war, as well as details on their new designs as well.
However, even as the requests, queries and demands had gone from a trickle to a flood, the British at all levels had become very reluctant to impart any more than just the most basic of information in response, and in several cases their replies’ might have been best described as approaching deceptive. As to the actual sharing out of the remnants of the High Seas Fleet, the British would quickly become down right obstinate in the short term.
While there were those who were rather put out at the British response, and many would complain as to the British actions, the Admiralty, with the full support of both the RN and the government, would maintain their position for the immediate future.
From the Admiralty’s chair, their reasoning for their position was fairly straight forward. Out of all the Entente members, the British had borne the brunt of the Great War at sea, and had paid a heavy price for their lessons learned. Added to that was the fact that while the Royal Navy was unarguably the largest and most developed fleet in the world at that point, a good portion of the RN was not only well worn and damaged, but to a significant degree, the fleet was not only obsolete, but worn out as well.
In recognizing these truths, the Admiralty also understood that it was not just the Royal Navy that was in this position, but that navies around the world were facing the same challenges. The last thing the Admiralty could afford at that point was another building race, particularly with the likes of the Unite States, which had the potential to well out build the Royal Navy in the moderate to long term, if the political will was present.
However, in keeping a tight grip on lessons learned and new technologies and war prizes, the Admiralty hoped to be able to better maintain their overall lead and superiority as they went into the post war years, while at the same time possibly causing other navies to hold off somewhat as they waited to see what and how the Royal Navy would deal with future upgrades and replacements.
As well, the Admiralty would begin to build a program that would become known unofficially as ‘the understated truth’, a system of presentation of the statistics and dimensional information on the Royal Navy would be somewhat muddled to better protect what the RN was actually doing or getting.
The program had in essence been started inadvertently with the design information on the Renown class battle cruisers, when their armoured protection had been publicized as similar to the preceding Tiger class, when in fact it had been significantly heavier.
That the British would move to such a degree from their previous peace time standards would be surprising to many when the extent of the deception would come out many years later, would be shocking to many historians. However, given the political situation at that time, the British efforts toward these deceptive measures were easily explained, for having just finished the Great War, which had started with the British enjoying a strong alliance with two of the World’s most powerful nations, now found itself trying to settle the post war peace while at the same time seeing their erstwhile allies devolving into something of a more questionable value.
At the same time, the British could see their American cousins beginning to flex their economic might, while at the same time eyeing up both the great Dominions and the rest of the empire as new potential economic targets, along with European markets as well.
As a result of all these outlying factors, Great Britain, long basing its foreign policy on keeping Europe from falling under the sway of one dominant Nation or group of nations, now found herself moving by default back toward a position resembling something more akin of ‘Splendid Isolation’, a position where the strength of the Royal Navy would be what would best protect the interests of the British Empire.
So it was that while the postwar fiscal realities would preclude massive building programs similar to those leading up to the Great War, political realities would see to a more austere building program that would continue at a steady pace, quietly enhanced by ‘The Understated Truth’.
The guns on the Western Front had been silent for almost a month, however while the fighting had ended there, in other locations in Europe, the fighting would still continue at varying levels as many of the nations involved struggled to maintain control of what they found themselves in possession of, along with attempts to add additional parcels of the continent before the final proposals were agreed to.
While the remapping of Europe was fully underway by that point, there was little of that which would concern the Royal Navy at that time, as the RN had more than enough to concern itself with. The Admiralty and the navy would be concerning themselves with a supposed transition to peace, while at the same time retaining its near war time levels of operational efficiencies and resolute determination to dominate the sea lanes as needed.
For the most part, economic necessities and restrictions which would face the RN at that point, would be met for the most part by the widespread decommissioning of the older and badly worn out elements of the fleet. This, along with the release of the associated men and officers of these vessels, would be the first large steps toward addressing the large scale fiscal realities that were even in those early days of peace ensnaring the economies of Great Britain, the Dominions and the rest of the Empire.
“Truthfully, those early months after the German submission were, in many ways, more stressful than the darkest days of the Great War at sea, in my estimation. For while during the war the struggles of the Admiralty had been centered on maintaining our strength and efficiencies in our epic struggle to not only deny the foe free usage of the oceans of the world, but to maintain our freedom of movement and trade over those same waters even as they might attempt to halt us.
In those war years our challenges, once outside the scope of our enemy’s dark efforts, would be centered into the acceptance of new tactics, the defence of proven efforts, and the removal of theories found to be flawed. While in a few cases efforts would best described as challenged-not by the foe- but rather by the political and intra service politicking that was (and in some ways still prevalent) in the middle to upper ranks of the fleet, the bulk of our concerns were with the foe. Yet even with these challenges, we in the Admiralty could count on the support of both the government and people to help ease our burdens and responsibilities.
Yet, with the coming of the end of the war, our parameters were changed drastically. The beginning of the crumbling of our great wartime political coalition and the great Entente, in combination with the apparent lack of sufficient and initial obvious threats to our seaborne trade and communications would begin to alter the view that a strong Royal Navy would be paramount to our continued strength as an empire. Our new foe was no longer an enemy that was bent on destruction on the high seas, rather it was one who would set about striking down the fleet by attempting to choke off our fiscal need.
This new enemy would prove to be one that would attempt to deliver up the most callous of campaigns against us, and one that while would be brought to task, would deliver us into some of our most serious struggles of the Admiralty postwar, other factors would allow a more balanced approach soon enough. However, even with a calming of the waters so to speak, we in the Admiralty would need to work diligently to fine a long term balance between the needs of the fleet and the fiscal realities facing the nation and empire.”
- Reginald McKenna, First Lord of the Admiralty
First Lord McKenna would indeed stand down the foe, and through his efforts, he would set the Admiralty and the Royal Navy on a course that would see them through the next forty years and more. By his leadership and efforts, while the Royal Navy would see fiscal austerity programs, a concerted effort would be made to not only keep the fleet maintained in a proper manner, but to provide for a building program that would not only provide for a continual program of replacement, as well as a steady input of the newest technologies.
While McKenna would not be well thought of in some circles for his handling of the RN’s down-sizing immediately after the Great War, if one were to look at the end result of that period, the observation must be made that McKenna had overseen a remarkable program which, while sloughing off the least useful portions of the RN, he was able to set the RN on a course that would provide for an efficient, modern and flexible force that would if not always be a totally dominant force on the oceans of the world, it would be one that would cause other first class naval powers to take serious note of how their efforts might be impacted by the Royal Navy.
A goodly portion of McKenna’s thought process had sprung from the vastly changed political landscape across the globe in general, and in Europe in particular. As Great Britain was making a concerted effort to gather in not only the portions of Germany that had been designated as under her control in the interim, there were also the need to secure, stabilize and support areas as far distant as the new emerging nations of Finland, Poland and the Baltic states. Further south, Romania, Greece and Bulgaria were proving to be a diplomatic juggling act, while the once again crumbling Ottoman Empire would foist a whole new set of challenges on the diplomatic front as well.
In the case of her erstwhile major allies, the challenges were even more compounded, as both France and Russia were devolving into revolution of sorts, as internal political dynamics, no longer fettered by the war, had begun to move to the fore. Newly arrived on the scene, the Americans, would for all the world, take on the appearance of a spoiled and mouthy school boy, who in most cases, would rather than providing solid support, would in their stead, be not much better described than being a political nuisance in the ongoing attempts at parlay.
Being everything being as it was, McKenna’s clear head, and good understanding of matters naval, had allowed him to take the proper steps after the war’s end to not only secure the bulk of the remainder of the High Seas Fleet and move it to points under the aegis of the Royal Navy, but to as well secure not only the important German naval bases, but the key shipyards as well, along with design and certain manufacturing faculties.
The upside of this was that in short order, select of the surviving High Seas Fleet had been, or would be soon underway to British ports. Upon the arrival of these ships in British ports, the transfer crews were taken off, and returned to Germany. As well as these ships, various components, from the smallest to the largest, were also removed to Great Britain for research and design purposes. As well, one each of the remaining Bayern, Mackensen and the following improved Mackensen class super dreadnoughts, were to be completed and turned over to the British. The remaining ships building were to be scrapped, starting immediately, while progress on all smaller vessels would be suspended, too.
The down side for the Admiralty would be the constant visits, queries and demands from various nations regarding not only access to and information on, the High Seas Fleet, but their own demands for a share of the German fleet. At the same time, most, if not all of the respective allies were pressuring the British for knowledge on what they had learned during the war, as well as details on their new designs as well.
However, even as the requests, queries and demands had gone from a trickle to a flood, the British at all levels had become very reluctant to impart any more than just the most basic of information in response, and in several cases their replies’ might have been best described as approaching deceptive. As to the actual sharing out of the remnants of the High Seas Fleet, the British would quickly become down right obstinate in the short term.
While there were those who were rather put out at the British response, and many would complain as to the British actions, the Admiralty, with the full support of both the RN and the government, would maintain their position for the immediate future.
From the Admiralty’s chair, their reasoning for their position was fairly straight forward. Out of all the Entente members, the British had borne the brunt of the Great War at sea, and had paid a heavy price for their lessons learned. Added to that was the fact that while the Royal Navy was unarguably the largest and most developed fleet in the world at that point, a good portion of the RN was not only well worn and damaged, but to a significant degree, the fleet was not only obsolete, but worn out as well.
In recognizing these truths, the Admiralty also understood that it was not just the Royal Navy that was in this position, but that navies around the world were facing the same challenges. The last thing the Admiralty could afford at that point was another building race, particularly with the likes of the Unite States, which had the potential to well out build the Royal Navy in the moderate to long term, if the political will was present.
However, in keeping a tight grip on lessons learned and new technologies and war prizes, the Admiralty hoped to be able to better maintain their overall lead and superiority as they went into the post war years, while at the same time possibly causing other navies to hold off somewhat as they waited to see what and how the Royal Navy would deal with future upgrades and replacements.
As well, the Admiralty would begin to build a program that would become known unofficially as ‘the understated truth’, a system of presentation of the statistics and dimensional information on the Royal Navy would be somewhat muddled to better protect what the RN was actually doing or getting.
The program had in essence been started inadvertently with the design information on the Renown class battle cruisers, when their armoured protection had been publicized as similar to the preceding Tiger class, when in fact it had been significantly heavier.
That the British would move to such a degree from their previous peace time standards would be surprising to many when the extent of the deception would come out many years later, would be shocking to many historians. However, given the political situation at that time, the British efforts toward these deceptive measures were easily explained, for having just finished the Great War, which had started with the British enjoying a strong alliance with two of the World’s most powerful nations, now found itself trying to settle the post war peace while at the same time seeing their erstwhile allies devolving into something of a more questionable value.
At the same time, the British could see their American cousins beginning to flex their economic might, while at the same time eyeing up both the great Dominions and the rest of the empire as new potential economic targets, along with European markets as well.
As a result of all these outlying factors, Great Britain, long basing its foreign policy on keeping Europe from falling under the sway of one dominant Nation or group of nations, now found herself moving by default back toward a position resembling something more akin of ‘Splendid Isolation’, a position where the strength of the Royal Navy would be what would best protect the interests of the British Empire.
So it was that while the postwar fiscal realities would preclude massive building programs similar to those leading up to the Great War, political realities would see to a more austere building program that would continue at a steady pace, quietly enhanced by ‘The Understated Truth’.
