“My date with destiny had arrived, yet here I was, quietly keeping my own council, while even in that moment the last preparations for battle were being completed on the great ships under my command. Any moment there would be a signal that Admiral Hood’s battleships had commenced fire on the High Seas Fleet, and for the first time since the war had begun, I had a strange small realization that, in that moment, I had nothing to do, or maybe better put, I had nothing to do of major importance.
All the plans had been set forth, the final decisions made, and the orders despatched. The focus of command would transfer to the actual captains and seamen of the fleet, while my position would become one of simply overseeing their good efforts and provide for them what ever they might require. I led them out and brought them to this place, yet even as they would answer my call, it would be their determined effort that would deliver up the final result.
This would be their battle, I would simply be a custodian of sorts, in many ways of much less importance than any of them. The fate of the empire would rest on their shoulders. With any minute the arrival of news of battle being joined, I felt my youth momentarily pulling me away from my lonely post to be with them. Perched in the sighting hood of a battleship’s turret, slamming the breach closed on a cruiser’s main gun, or hunched over the sights of a torpedo tube on a destroyer charging after its prey; there was a quiet draw to be in those honorable places, yet here I was in the iron grip of command.
A fury of fire and shot was about to break forth on these cold dark waters, the like of which the world had not seen before. We are no longer concerned with the scouting and patrol, or the move and parry, here is the foe, and the men of the Grand Fleet are ready; and they will bring him to task.
There can be no doubt that while the guns and armour are our sword and shield, we must never forget that what will deliver us this day is the fire in the soul and the steel in the heart of the men that that follow my command and bring forth these great vessels in defense of the realm. From the highest admiral to the lowest ship’s boy, a hero every one.”
-from “The Admiral’s Bridge -Jellicoe Remembers”
As Jellicoe would take a moment to ponder what was about to manifest, at the head of the Grand Fleet, Vice Admiral Sir Horace Hood was very much involved in the last details before battle. As HMS Queen Elizabeth led the column of great fighting ships on a bearing of west by north at a speed of 18 knots, he looked out across the hazy sea to the south at the long line of battleships, with the lead ship, HMS King George V, already beginning to swing into place behind HMS Tiger, noting to himself that all was in order and everything was as it should be, He walked back across his flagship, to the far bridge wing and stared out across the gray waters to the south east at the High Seas Fleet, which was coming steadily forward, then stopping for a moment:
“… he would drop his head for a moment, before looking up at that historic flag hoist. After a moment more, possibly for reflection, he came on into the bridge.
“Captain Pope, if you may Sir, what is the range to the head of the German line?” he would ask me.
“Twenty thousand yards, Sir” I replied.
“You may commence firing,” Was his reply”
Captain P.W. Hope RN
The great 15” rifles of HMS Queen Elizabeth were already swung out, ranged and loaded. Hope would turn and repeat the command, followed scant seconds later by the gong, and then the great thunderous roar of the first half salvo was sent on its way to seek out the enemy. Almost as soon as Queen Elizabeth fired her first salvo, it was followed by the seven ships immediately behind her.
The main act of what would come to be known as the Battle of Jutland’ was under way.
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On board his flagship, SMS Konig, Rear Admiral Paul Behnke, stood emotionless as he and the ship’s crew waited calmly for the arrival of the first salvo. While the British guns had been noted not only for their ability to fire at long ranges, and their gunners for their proclivity for engaging in such activities, their ability to gain result from such efforts had been, for the most part, unsuccessful. Past actions had shown it would take them a good eight to ten salvoes to get close enough to dampen the tough hulls of his ships with close shots, before even considering taking hits on board.
As a result, it would come as somewhat of a surprise to him when with the introductory whistle to moan of incoming heavy shells would be followed by the thunderous eruptions of pillars of sea water leaping out of the ocean, to the portside of his column. The shell grouping furthest away would be no more than 1500 yards, while the closest ones, off his third ship in line, SMS Markgraf, would both be reported as well under 500 yards off her port bows.
The next salvo would arrive with the tight knit patterns of shells walking closer toward them. Even as the shells of the leading warships fell alongside of them, more British battle ships were swinging into line and adding their weight of fire to those already engaged.
For the High Seas Fleet, this was not the position they wished to find themselves in as the battle commenced. Jellicoe, with his pronounced advantage in scouting and reconnaissance, had obtained that classic initial advantage known as ‘crossing the T’, the main advantage being that the British ships would be able to fire full broadsides, while the High Seas Fleet would only be able to fire the forward guns until such a time as they turned to a similar bearing, if Scheer held his current course.
A further disappointment would be that the bulk of the Grand Fleet was turning into position immediately behind the Hood’s and Cradock’s combined squadrons. Scheer’s staff had deduced from the last reports from the Zeppelin that there might be as much as an eight-mile difference between the two RN forces, and with that in mind they had hoped for even a short period of time whereby the leading British dreadnoughts might be marked down before the rest would come into range to support them. However, the large sweeping circle to starboard by the advanced British squadron when the first long range visual contact had been made, had negated that gap when it had been continued until the leading British battleship was finally headed in a westerly direction. This manoeuver would allow the Grand Fleet to fall into place immediately behind HMS Tiger.
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That Jellicoe had the initial advantage in position, can be put down to several points, starting with the decided benefit the Grand Fleet held in scouting. Thanks to his available aircraft and the skills of Cradock, and how he managed the Battle Cruiser Fleet and properly orchestrated the deployments of his attendant light cruisers and destroyers, the location and disposition of the High Seas Fleet was well understood by the time the final sighting was made. For Jellicoe, it would simply be a matter of forming the battle line behind the 5th Battle Squadron, bolstered by Cradock’s three remaining heavier battle cruisers and engaging the High Seas Fleet.
Jellicoe could settle for such a basic deployment was one of the main results of divining that the High Seas Fleet was actually looking for him. He needn’t concern himself with trying to catch Scheer and force him to battle, as Scheer had indeed delivered himself up. This had left Jellicoe better able to deal with Scheer’s initial deployments, as well as savaging his remaining light cruisers and torpedo boats. This had left Scheer for the most part blind in making his final approach, which would leave the German admiral with no choice but to react to however Jellicoe would deploy.
While Jellicoe had to give up his original plan to accept battle to the east of Scheer, He would take the second best option, and simply turn to a west by north course. While this would cancel the eastern placement advantage, it would at least keep Scheer from gaining it either, and keep the advantages of light and wind neutralized, for the most part.
The other advantage that helped in setting up the initial tactical advantage was the Grand Fleet’s speed of advance, which let Cradock and Hood be sure to have the proper location for the start of the actual duel. In the first minutes of the fight, this would allow the first units of the Grand Fleet to simply maintain a steady course while the gun layers and turret crews settled into their work. In comparison, the High Seas Fleet, whose main batteries had a shorter range, would be still closing the range at that time. That would leave them in the position of having not only being forced to make their initial ranging salvoes while under fire, but to be making their final course adjustments at the same time.
While in itself, these disadvantages wouldn’t be initially crippling, any hits registered on the High Seas Fleet during this window of opportunity would play well for the Royal Navy’s efforts as the battle progressed.
That the initial placement of the two fleets had given Jellicoe an initial advantage, and forced Scheer into the unenviable position of advancing to his fleet’s fighting range while under concentrated fire from the Gran Fleet, Scheer was not without options. There have been many that are critical of Scheer’s choice of approach, however a quick review of his options and orders might better explain his decision, and why out of his four basic choices, he decided on the one he did.
The first option was simply to turn away, and in undertaking that, refuse the engagement, or at least refuse to fight until a more advantageous contact might be made. With night approaching, and having enough torpedo boats left to hopefully provide enough smoke screening, He might well have been able to cover a course reversal, and withdraw. While this might have been arguably his best choice, Scheer, based on not only his orders, but also on his own beliefs in the strength of his ships when compared to the Royal Navy’s, would not consider it at that point. His biggest concern in taking this option was that it would give Jellicoe the chance to clear away as well, and that could not be allowed.
The second possible option was to continue his course to the south, in an attempt to break the British line, and destroy the Grand Fleet in detail, rather in the manner of Collingwood at Trafalgar. While the tactical positioning used by Nelson at that famous battle had delivered up the desired result, were one to attempt such a ploy against prepared and ready, modern dreadnought types, capable of accurate directed gun fire at longer ranges, the result would likely have been catastrophic to the head of the High Seas Fleet’s line.
The third choice would be to advance to gun range, then turn back to the east as the German fleet engaged their counterparts. This would effectively nullify the British battleships at the head of British line for long enough to allow for a decided gain against the rest of the British fleet. Then, having marked down the middle to rear of the British line, his forces could deal with the rest at his leisure.
The problem with this option was that the head of the British could, at the very least, simply roll starboard and run up the western flank of the High Seas Fleet. While this would give the High Seas Fleet the advantage of light conditions, which would be considerable for them, and it would be questionable if Jellicoe might take such an option.
Even if he did, with all the advantages of the light and wind conditions that went with it, the prevalent issue after that would be the ability to hold the opposing columns target, as they would be moving in opposite directions, and to expect a good result from shooting in such a tactical disposition, would be questionable at best for Scheer’s command, and for the Grand Fleet in all likelihood, much worse.
More than likely, given such a scenario, Jellicoe would have simply brought his fleet about, after first taking advantage of his superior speed and longer ranged guns, to simply first alter to port together, and increase the range to a point where the High Seas Fleet could not interfere while this delicate manoeuvering was undertaken.
It was felt that any attempt to divide the Grand Fleet, or engage only a portion there of, would be met by Jellicoe simply turning away, then manoeuvering in such a way as to deliver a better position to resume action. Whether by division or together, this would limit Scheer’s chances to bring the Grand fleet to an engagement where the desired result might be delivered.
His fourth choice would be to turn to the west, either before or after closing the range enough that his own ships could return fire. With the daylight remaining, it might be questionable regarding gaining a decided victory. However, if general battle could be joined whereby the bulk of the Grand Fleet could be engaged, then seriously damaged, Jellicoe might be forced to retire and leave his crippled vessels to be finished off by the High Seas Fleet. That both fleets would be moving in parallel, the chance of the escape of damaged RN units would be much less successful than if the battle fleet’s courses were more divergent.
Out of the four possibilities, only the last two would seriously be considered, given the current tactical position and strategic intent of the Admiralstab and the German government. While the third option may have been a possibility, it left too much chance for the Grand Fleet to break off and leave the High Seas Fleet in no proper position to pursue. As a result, Scheer would settle on the last choice, as when all was considered, he felt it was the only realistic way having the best opportunity to gain the positive outcome deemed necessary by his superiors.
The challenge with this option, as with the one previous, was when would the fleet execute its turn. To open the angle of approach would, while clearing the arcs of fire to enable full salvoes when the range closed sufficiently to do so, would mean that not only would the time to engagement range be somewhat longer, it would also show the intended course of action for the High Seas Fleet, and allow Jellicoe’s fleet to better appreciate the High Seas Fleet’s tactical presentation. If the Berman line turned too late, it would mean a somewhat longer time to organize the initial salvoes, while if the line turned too early, the High Seas Fleet would present a much better target for a longer period.
Scheer’s choice was to order a turn to the WSW which provided just enough of an angle to clear the firing arcs of his ship’s stern turrets, while at the same time minimize the time his ships would be exposed to unchallenged fire from the Royal Navy. His timing for this was just as the first ranging salvoes were being fired by the head of the British line, and by turning at that point, Scheer had hoped that it would prolong the British ranging process.
He hoped that when his choice for an ideal combat range was reached it would just be a more moderate adjustment to swing parallel to Jellicoe’s line to continue the engagement, and by that time the ships under his command would have time to be better prepared with their initial ranging.
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“In the early stages of that historic engagement with Admiral Scheer’s High Seas Fleet, I felt that myself and those under my command had done everything possible to allow us the best position of advantage as the battle began. At the Battle of Tsushima, eleven years before, almost to the day, the great Admiral Togo delivered up a stunning victory over his Russian opponents by performing his now famous deployment, referred to as ‘crossing the T’.
From that point forward, the navies of the world would plan to emulate that manoeuver in all planned engagements of their own, as it would deliver up the most advantageous gunnery position possible. In our initial deployments for the main engagement for the Battle of Jutland, through advantages given us by our scouting forces and the skill of our captains, the Grand Fleet was able to deploy similarly.
Yet even as the Grand Fleet was moving to take full advantage of that commanding position, Admiral Scheer would order alterations which decidedly limit the return on our efforts.”
-from “The Admiral’s Bridge -Jellicoe Remembers”
That Scheer was able to manage this successfully, where the Russians had not those many years previously, can be explained as due to many factors. The Russian sailors were exhausted after sailing halfway around the world, while the High Seas Fleet was less than a day out of port. The German communications were arguably some of the best available, and their crews well trained for multiple eventualities, and their morale was good. Of more importance, was the fact that while Togo had been able to execute his plans with no real concern to previous historical reference, every navy of the world had by the time of this battle, been well versed in the implication of getting caught by such a manoeuver, and was loath to add such an event to their annals.
Even with all the variances in skill, morale and technical abilities, probably of greatest importance was that in Admiral Scheer, they had a commander with a level of skill and confidence as good as any afloat. He would assess the situation, and make changes in such a way that the Grand Fleet’s advantage would fade substantially. That Scheer was able to take these steps in the last minutes before battle would be joined, goes a long way to illustrate that, no matter his faults, he was still one of the most competent admiral’s of the period, and would be recorded in naval history as the admiral who ‘refused the T’.
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As the range to the British line ran down to 17,000 yards, Behnke would give the order to adjust the course of the High Seas Fleet to a heading closer to parallel with the Grand Fleet, then he would give the order to commence fire. That he was willing to commence fire at that range was more for a need to answer the unmolested fire that the Royal Navy had enjoyed on his squadron for the last fifteen minutes.
In that period of time, the leading ships of the British column had begun to register hits on his ships, and those hits were showing that the British shells were still exhibiting signs that their designs were faulty. As a result, in several cases of either detonating on striking, or simply shattering without detonation, little in the way of expected damage had been done. The only serious damage reported was the lodging of a dud 15” shell against the turret race of turret Anton on SMS Kronprinz.
That is not to say that damage had not been taken, it had, and if the British fire was to continue as it was, the outlook would not be good. However, being events as they were at that time, Behnke felt that the sooner fire was returned the better, and the best chance for success would be to knock back the Grand Fleet before their steady fire and accumulating hits eventually wore down his squadron.
“ … we would note the slow deliberate fire of these British salvoes were delivering a steady result against our ships, and while initially at first the saving grace was the actual performance of their shells. There could be no denying the accuracy and tight grouping of those 15” shells, and even without a good number of them detonating on contact, or not detonating at all, significant damage was being done. As we were now starting to record result from our gunnery in return, I was beginning to think that we might well be able to address our issues with the Royal Navy in a much more positive manner.”
That the British shells were still showing serious defects and failing to penetrate properly would appear at first to show Behnke, and others under fire, that the quality issues of the British was still as it had been previously in the war. He felt that several reports of an improvement in the shells of the Royal Navy, while maybe bearing some truth, had not been implemented yet, and that the High Seas Fleet still maintained their advantage in that area.
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Behnke’s rather positive take on the quality of the British shells would be short-lived however, for some time earlier, with the reports of the first hits on the German line, the Grand Fleet’s dreadnoughts would, according to their orders, switch to the new improved ‘Green Boy’ shells. While this at first would be seen as some sort of deception, it was actually based in the more mundane world of logistical necessity.
That the new Green Boy’s hadn’t been used initially had simply been due to the limited numbers available at that time. With no more than 75% of the shells carried by the 15” gunned battleships, and around half on those armed with the 13.5” guns, it had been policy since their introduction not to waste them on ranging salvoes, and instead use the older shells until the chance of hits was better.
That such an idea was something new is a good way from fact, as historically speaking, the common practice was to save the armoured piercing shells for the killing blows after the high explosive shells had reduced the target’s more unprotected areas. In fact, several of the older British ships present would do their ranging salvoes with high explosive shells, before switching to armour piercing shells once the range had been decided.
While the orders were given in good time, procedural necessity would not see all the ships switched over until several more salvoes would be fired, however, in due course by the time the German ships had begun to fire, the Royal Navy’s reply would be made up of these much improved green banded shells, and when they did, the results would be noted by the High Seas Fleet almost immediately.
Even as the first Green Boy’s were finally landing on target, the German battleships at the head of the line would soon be re beginning to note the more effective British shells as:
“… in very short order, we began to see that the British shells were having a much more decided effect on our vessels. That there would still be those that would either burst on contact or break up without proper detonation was true, however the incidence of this still happening would be greatly reduced, much to our chagrin. And those shells that did work, did so with a pronounced negative result on our battleships.”
- Rear Admiral Paul Behnke
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While the sight lines and visibility conditions were similar for both sides at that point of the battle, the funnel smoke from Hood’s squadron was carrying slightly to the NE, and beginning to cause some concerns for Cradock’s ships behind them. After a quick consultation, Cradock would order his battle cruisers out to the north by a sufficient margin to clear his squadron’s directors from these fumes. At the same time, He would signal Vice Admiral Sturdee, who was leading the 2nd Battle Squadron into battle behind him, to do the same. As the advisement was passed down the line, the Grand Fleet would eventually form a staggered line by division as they came on.
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By the time that Vice Admiral Cecil Burney’s 1st Battle Squadron had made the turn, and made its final preparations to join the battle, the salvoes were coursing back and forth between the two fleets. Both Hood and Cradock’s ships were gaining good results, as was Sturdee’s 2nd BS, each with several hits on their targets. While at first, due to the long range and the angle of the High Seas Fleet’s approach, ships had doubled up their fire on the lead ships at of the German line. By now however, their fire had been redirected to individual targets, as each German battleship in sequence would be brought under fire by the RN battleship opposite, with the High Seas Fleet responding in kind, for the most part.
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While the German battleship’s gunnery was in fine form, and finally gaining hits on their English opponents, return fire from the British ships were leaving telling blows on their German counterparts. While not completely aware of the damages taken by his squadron so far, every ship under Behnke’s command had taken serious damage at an early stage of the fight.
Almost immediately on battle being joined, Behnke had been concerned with the improvements in the accuracy of the British fire, however with the continued onslaught from the heavy British shells, that concern would deepen.
“What had not long before now would give the appearance of something more threatening, as the British gunnery would continue to smite us on a regular basis with increasingly damaging blows. From the little that was reported from the other ships in the squadron I commanded, their position was very similar to that of my flagship.
That we were damaging our opponents in return was understood, however, in very short order our battleships were beginning to be torn apart before our eyes. while at the same time, it appeared to us that our return fire on the British was having no where near the same impact. Our position, one that we had been led to believe was insurmountable by our foes, had been cast aside, and replaced with something much more challenging and dark.”
- Rear Admiral Paul Behnke
That view was driven home to Behnke when a 15” shell from HMS Queen Elizabeth would strike the upper barbette of turret Dora on his flagship, SMS Konig. The improved shell, would punch through the armour and detonate on striking the far wall of the structure., unleashing a rather unrefined vision of hell throughout the structure. Sympathetic detonations of two nearby 12” shells, along with the ignition of powder being hoisted at the time, would further enhance the carnage. While the effects of the hit were isolated from the magazine and powder store long enough that they were successfully flooded, the destructive force of the blast and fire would find its way to the barbette structure of turret Emile, and the resulting flash would ignite powder charges there.
While there would be no explosion, and only a low level deflagration, it would be enough to disable the turret and kill most of its crew, with only three men struggling free from the structure, as the rest succumbed to fire and fumes. Here again, the magazine protection held true and it would be flooded successfully.
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That the head of the German line was being mauled was a given at that point, as the combined power of both Hood’s and Cradock’s ships was indeed writing down Behnke’s command, with only the new battleship Bayern coming close to gaining similar return on HMS Malaya, and Konig Albert gaining good result on HMS Tiger. However, of the remaining ships in Behnke’s squadron, it was becoming very apparent that the results of combat were very much in favour of the Grand Fleet.
A little over an hour into the battle, Behnke was fast realizing that the position of his battle squadron was fast becoming a questionable position at best, and if their position deteriorated any farther, it might well turn into an unmitigated disaster of epic proportions. In a series of signals to Scheer he would do his best to convey his ever worsening position. Yet for the attempts made by Behnke to convince Scheer that they were indeed fast losing any imagined advantage, Scheer would hold on to the fight, like a terrier dragging a badger from beneath the cairn.
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While Behnke’s position at the front of the line was crumbling fast under the weight of fire from the pounding salvoes of both Hood and Cradock, the portion of the battle that Scheer was able to see was coming together in a somewhat different manner. While his flagship, the powerful SMS Baden, had not escaped damage, their main target HMS Audacious, was in the process of having the last bits of life pounded out of her. The British battleship had been hit at least 22 times, according to the fire control records of Baden. With the last pair coming in over the belt amidships, and striking a well compromised portion of the lower deck, they would both punch through and detonate in the forward boiler rooms. The event would be further complicated by an additional hit just under the bridge which would kill most every man there, and with it end any hopes of saving the ship. With just Y turret still responding intermittently, the shattered dreadnought would stumble out of line as Baden hammered two more full salvoes into its carcass. With her last turret finally silenced, and the ship slowing to a stop as it fell out to port, HMS Audacious was finished. Listing decidedly to starboard, and with her crew finally thinking only to save themselves, Audacious would take one last salvo from Baden, before the German battleship began preparations to redirect her fire on the next target.
“As I watched, with no small satisfaction, that great British dreadnought begin her surrender to the sea, I knew in that moment that the only thing that could defeat us would be our own doubts. We had the better ships, we had the better men. But did our officers have the steel in their hearts to lead them, that would be the question. As I looked once again at the signals from Admiral Behnke, I would begin to wonder if he had the resolve to see the fight through.
I had seen with mine own eyes the resolute overwhelming power of our fleet as Baden’s guns took that hapless British battleship to pieces. We were winning, my flagship sinking the first of surely many more British battleships was the proof of that. I could see that, many of us could, yet even as the guns of Baden were swinging toward their next prey, Behnke was signalling again, saying his ships could stand the weight of fire from the British guns no longer, that he feared that if his squadron was not allowed to break off soon it would be lost.
From: ‘My War’ by Reinhardt Scheer
Scheer’s biggest challenge with the battle at that point, was just trying to discern exactly what was taking place. While from his position at the midpoint of the line, from what he could see, the High Seas Fleet was gaining the advantage. His flagship had just systematically pounded HMS Audacious to sinking condition, while the next British battleship behind Audacious, HMS Ajax, was suffering heavily under the guns of SMS Brandenburg, and would soon be getting the attention of Baden’s remaining guns as well. Ahead of Baden, his old flagship, Fredrich der Grosse, was holding its own against HMS King George V.
While from his location, the view of the battle would leave the observer with the opinion that the High Seas Fleet was gaining the advantage, after over an hour of battle, that was not the case. For while Audacious would be sunk, along with other British battleships that day, Baden’s kill was not the first, as in the line of battle behind Baden, several German battleships were in various stages of coming to the end of their days.
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