30 March 1942. Vichy, France.
The American Ambassador, Admiral Bill Leahy, sat opposite Marshall Petain, as he had done regularly since being given his role by President Roosevelt. Initially, Leahy had judged Petain positively, but as pressure from the Nazis increased, Petain had become frailer, older, confused and fatigued.
The Germans had been furious that although they had insisted on Weygand being withdrawn from North Africa, Weygand was still there, despite being ordered back, and Yves-Charles Chatel now seen as Governor in Algiers by Vichy. Now Petain was under pressure to bring Pierre Lavan back into the Government, and specifically to act as prime minister. The Germans were insisting of French workers be brought to Germany to make up for the shortfall caused by the mobilisation of much of the German workforce for war.
The position of the American Government, that Leahy was making clear, was that if Lavan was reappointed, as they suspected he would be, then it would be very difficult for the American Government to continue to see the Vichy regime as legitimate. The Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, Leahy’s link with Washington DC, had made it clear to the Ambassador that the US Government had recognized de Gaulle’s Free French in the territories it controlled. Washington DC would continue to engage with Vichy, though ‘the time may be coming soon when these two policies would no longer be compatible.’
Leahy showed evidence to the Petain that three German warships had docked at Brest and were repaired, resupplied and redeployed. Also, a U-boat had received similar services at Martinique in the West Indies. This was putting pressure on those in Washington who were less convinced that France was still their ally under occupation, and more a willing collaborator with their enemy.
What Leahy didn’t tell Petain was that there was a meeting going on in Algiers, even as they spoke. Jean Monnet, having worked at getting American help to France before May 1940, had been sent by Churchill to Washington to continue his work with the Anglo-French Coordinating Committee, which had been renamed as the British Purchasing Commission.
Monnet had become a regular visitor to the White House and Roosevelt found Monnet’s advice, and perspective, very helpful. Discussions about what should happen regarding the French Empire, had led to Monnet being dispatched from Washington as an envoy to Algiers to make (secret) contact with Weygand under American auspices. In addition to the Frenchman, the President had also sent Douglas MacArthur II, the nephew of the General, a diplomat in the American embassy in Vichy, with a personal letter from the President. They were joined by the French diplomat Rene Massigli, whose presence in France was becoming untenable.
In the letter, Roosevelt spoke of his continuing respect for Weygand, and assured him that the United States was not at war against France, but instead would devote its work to the repatriation of France and French power. MacArthur gave Weygand greater details about American policy. With there no longer being any danger of Germany occupying French North Africa, then plans to mount an American preventative operation to thwart that had been shelved. MacArthur noted that if French warships were used against the US Navy, or if Petain’s government was replaced by an out-and-out pro-German government, then the American response would have to be strong. The question was whether Weygand would lead and rally of the population and local military, in alliance with the United States, and move towards a defeat of Germany and the liberation of France?
The appeal of Monnet was for Weygand to deal directly with the Americans. The position of De Gaulle in London, led many in France to reject him as a puppet of perfidious Albion. This meant that if Weygand was to appeal to America for military support, by-passing the British (at least in theory), then all of France could rally to Weygand. As a soldier, with no interest in getting involved in politics, Weygand’s military appeal was broader than De Gaulle’s, and Monnet was clear that Roosevelt had no time for De Gaulle.
Weygand had got used to being fêted by a variety of interests. His meetings with the British General Wavell had been friendly, as fellow soldiers, they’d much in common, not least an antipathy towards the Boche. The various ‘Free French’ agents had been dismissed out of hand as De Gaulle’s puppets. The Italians, who were technically overseeing French application of the terms of treaty signed after the fall of France, had gone from being overbearing to being obsequious. As for the Germans, well the least said about them the better. The fact that the Americans had never broken off diplomatic relations with Vichy gave them something in their favour. Weygand recognised Petain as the legitimate ruler of France, and as long as that was the case, he could never be overtly disloyal. On the other hand, if a large military force of Americans arrived off the coast of French North Africa, there would be very little that Weygand could do to stop them invading.
