28 February 1942. Lembang, Java.
General Auchinleck was reading through the reports that had come in during the night. Two ships, USS Langley and SS Sea Witch, had successfully unloaded their P40 fighters at Tjilatjap. The fifty-seven fighters would be a godsend once they were fully operational. At least the thirty-two off the Langley were already assembled, those on the Sea Witch were in crates and it would take a great deal of effort to get them fit for the fight.
The USAAF’s 5th Air Force were really starting to gather in strength. Arriving at Brisbane just the other day from the US were three squadrons of A-20’s, four of B26s and a couple of P39 fighter squadrons, it might be another couple of months for them to be operational, but Air Marshall Richard Peirse (CO ABDAair) was becoming more confident about going on the offensive.
Peirse, very sensibly to Auchinleck’s mind, wasn’t interfering with Major General Lewis Brereton (GOC 5th Air Force) operational control. Instead Peirse was trying to keep the overview of the whole ABDA situation. The Dutch ML-KNIL and MLD were on their last legs, and while the American reinforcements reaching Java were extremely welcome, the attack on Surabaya showed up just how weak the air defence of Java was. Until that could be improved then naval action was always going to be limited. Force Z was meant to have come forward from Ceylon for another sortie, but the loses at Surabaya had meant it had to be postponed. Even with HMS Ark Royal in attendance, the need for land-based fighter support would be needed for the battlewagons. Peirse and Brereton were both convinced of the efficacy of bombers and Auchinleck worried a little that they might become myopic about this.
The RAF build up in Singapore and Burma was another sign of hope for Auchinleck and the next Durban-Malaya convoy was due to arrive at Rangoon and Singapore in early March bringing much needed reinforcements for the RAF and some mobile radar stations. The tide was definitely turning regarding the air war in Malaya and Burma, Auchinleck noted the importance of the American Volunteer Group who’d given the RAF some very good pointers about how to fight the Japanese rather than the Germans and Italians.
The problem of the Philippines wasn’t getting any easier. Reports from Bataan suggested that a new formation of Japanese troops was replacing the worn out units that had withdrawn. As far as Intelligence could surmise, the 48th Japanese Division was the new formation. They had been pulled back and rested when the American and Philippine forces had retired to the Bataan Peninsula. It was possible that the 48th Division was meant to continue the conquest of the Netherlands East Indies, but perhaps had to be used to finish off MacArthur’s force. If indeed that was the case the situation on Bataan would likely take a turn for the worse very quickly.
While Rabaul and New Guinea weren’t specifically part of ABDA’s remit, Auchinleck noted that evacuation of the Australian Brigade on New Britain was underway, albeit slowly. The American infantry units which were tasked with securing New Caledonia for the Free French were being looked at as a possible blocking force in the Solomon Islands. The Intelligence wasn’t clear about Japanese intentions. Reading between the lines, the Australians had given the Rabaul invasion force a good kicking, so that they weren’t in a position currently to keep moving forward. If that was the case then Brigadier Savige’s men had done a lot better than it looked.
The good news was that overall, the Japanese advance seemed to have been halted for the moment. With Dutch and American forces holding Kendari on the Celebes, then Ambon and Timor seemed safe enough protecting the route from Australia to Java. The loss of Borneo gave the Japanese airfields close enough to constantly threaten Java. The USAAF bombers were doing their best to prevent those air fields from being developed, and once the numbers of US medium bombers increased, then that mission should be made easier.
Auchinleck had requested help from London regarding the probability of having to organise amphibious operations. The War Office had sent his request to Lord Louis Mountbatten, Combined Operations Advisor to the Chiefs of Staff, but Auchinleck wasn’t sure what help Mountbatten or his new organisation would be. The point was moot until Auchinleck had a strong enough force to be able to dig the Japanese out of Borneo, and open the way to the Philippines.
General Alexander in Burma and Lieutenant-General Cunningham were getting the lion’s share of reinforcements coming from Britain and the Middle East. The Dutch forces were going to be limited to holding the Malay barrier, with allied help. Going on the offensive would require a lot more infantry, The fact that the Australian 7 Division were trained in amphibious operations for the forthcoming Dodecanese campaign was interesting. Auchinleck suspected that Wavell would have a serious grievance if the Australian Division was re-tasked to ABDA Command.