Oh dear, Maurice Gamelin just fell down a flight of stairs, 30th April 1940

[Cymraeg]

Right, it is what it says on the title. What if General Maurice Gamelin, the French CinC, falls down a set of stairs on the night of 29/30th April, when negotiating his way to a privy in the notoriously impractical Château de Vincennes (no telephones, very few if any radios, lot of DonRs dashing about with bits of paper (sorry, a DonR is a dispatch rider)?
I'm presuming that the French Government would have immediately summoned Maxime Weygand from Syria, who probably would have had a better flight than his May trip, which was a nightmare that involved a trip to Mersa Matruh and a collapsed undercarriage. Let's say he arrives on May 2nd.
He has (with or without suspecting this, based on if he reads the intelligence) eight days before the panzers heave into view.
Would it make a difference?

 

[Karelian]

Actually getting a phone line installed and establishing a more responsive chain of command would already work wonders. It's too late to change the general plan too dramatically and get familiarized with his duties, so he'd most likely listen to Georges who has the best general situational awareness. Since Georges opposes dashing too far forward, the butterflies take flight.

 

[HexWargamer]

Right, it is what it says on the title. What if General Maurice Gamelin, the French CinC, falls down a set of stairs on the night of 29/30th April, when negotiating his way to a privy in the notoriously impractical Château de Vincennes (no telephones, very few if any radios, lot of DonRs dashing about with bits of paper (sorry, a DonR is a dispatch rider)?
I'm presuming that the French Government would have immediately summoned Maxime Weygand from Syria, who probably would have had a better flight than his May trip, which was a nightmare that involved a trip to Mersa Matruh and a collapsed undercarriage. Let's say he arrives on May 2nd.
He has (with or without suspecting this, based on if he reads the intelligence) eight days before the panzers heave into view.
Would it make a difference?

I voted for 'he could have pulled it off' ...
The Ardennes trick was always exceedingly high risk .... it would not have taken much determined action to delay or stop the Panzers ..
On the other hand, the state of the French forces (after sitting around for 6? months doing very little) might well suggest they were incapable of any determined action ...
Still, I would hope that reconnassance flights would have been sent across the entire border area and Rommel's forces would have been 'spotted' sooned or later == I seem to recall a story that one reason why limited or no reconnassance flights were sent over the Ardennes was because the British had suggested it, and the reports the French recieved of troops and tanks movements in the Ardennes were simpy not believed ...

 

[Garrison]

Sorry I've done a bit of reading about Weygand and I'm not optimistic. His major claim to fame was being the Chief of Staff to Foch and opinions of him were not high in 1940. Given the Mechelen incident I figure he will go all in on the Dyle Plan just as hard as Gamelin.

I voted for 'its complicated' because IF he set up the 'Hedgehog' system he used during Fall Rot along the Meuse the Panzers are going to wind up as scrap metal. I just can't see him doing it, the Ardennes were impenetrable after all.

 

[oldironside]

Great idea. Complicated subject. As mentioned above, any change to OTL could cause the operation to fail. It was on a knife edge all the way through.

 

[Garrison]

Here's one thing that really would help, install some telephones in Gamelin's HQ. Seriously he didn't have radio or telephone at his chateau. His WWI counterparts had better communications.

Or don't waste the RAF and French Air Force bombing bridges and send them to bomb the traffic jams of German supply vehicles,

Or if the Belgians won't co-operate say 'f**k them' and don't go racing for the Dyle Line.

Look the Battle of France is Like the anti Operation Sealion. there are a thousand ways the Allies could easily win in France in the same way that there are a thousand ways Sealion won't work.

 

[Lascaris]

Right, it is what it says on the title. What if General Maurice Gamelin, the French CinC, falls down a set of stairs on the night of 29/30th April, when negotiating his way to a privy in the notoriously impractical Château de Vincennes (no telephones, very few if any radios, lot of DonRs dashing about with bits of paper (sorry, a DonR is a dispatch rider)?
I'm presuming that the French Government would have immediately summoned Maxime Weygand from Syria, who probably would have had a better flight than his May trip, which was a nightmare that involved a trip to Mersa Matruh and a collapsed undercarriage. Let's say he arrives on May 2nd.
He has (with or without suspecting this, based on if he reads the intelligence) eight days before the panzers heave into view.
Would it make a difference?

I'm not. Elevating Georges to Gamelin's place looks rather more likely. Which does affect the French plan...

 

[Cymraeg]

I'm not. Elevating Georges to Gamelin's place looks rather more likely. Which does affect the French plan...

Georges is the man on the spot and is more aggressive, you're quite right. So could Georges have fought them off?

 

[Karelian]

Georges is the man on the spot and is more aggressive, you're quite right. So could Georges have fought them off?

He wouldn't have gone for a river-line too far, so the Germans would meet French forces that are entrenched and have their excellent artillery system all set up.
Yet the problems with the air force and tactical-level indecision are still there. It's complicated, and the key here is the existence (or lack of) a combined-arms operational reserve, and the Anglo-French ability to use it in a coordinated and determined fashion. The Germans will break through at some point with massed combined-arms attack, but on paper the Allied armored formations are able to check them. But will they be able to react on time?

 

[oldironside]

He wouldn't have gone for a river-line too far, so the Germans would meet French forces that are entrenched and have their excellent artillery system all set up.
Yet the problems with the air force and tactical-level indecision are still there. It's complicated, and the key here is the existence (or lack of) a combined-arms operational reserve, and the Anglo-French ability to use it in a coordinated and determined fashion. The Germans will break through at some point with massed combined-arms attack, but on paper the Allied armored formations are able to check them. But will they be able to react on time?

Not sending some of France's best mechanised troops off on a wild goose chase into the Netherlands might help. That's a PoD already masterfully explored in A Broken Sickle.

 

[Garrison]

One other thing that occurred to me is that when Weygand was recalled he postponed a counterattack that Gamelin had planned for two days, by which time it was too late. If there's no change of command maybe an equivalent would go ahead as planned. On the other hand if the Dyle Plan goes ahead and you get the same disaster Weygand probably gets the sack the same way Gamelin did OTL and then maybe you get Georges in charge before its too late?

 

[oldironside]

One other thing that occurred to me is that when Weygand was recalled he postponed a counterattack that Gamelin had planned for two days, by which time it was too late. If there's no change of command maybe an equivalent would go ahead as planned. On the other hand if the Dyle Plan goes ahead and you get the same disaster Weygand probably gets the sack the same way Gamelin did OTL and then maybe you get Georges in charge before its too late?

I've always felt that the sacking of Gamelin happened at exactly the wrong moment. Apparently Weygand cancelled the attack while he made a tour of the various ministries to ensure he had political support, then ordered a very similar attack himself, by which time it was too late. If they had sacked Gamelin 24 hours earlier, or 24 hours later, the attack would have gone in and we could have all been gnoshing Knoblauchwurst on the Kurfürstendamm by St Leonard's Day.

 

[Garrison]

I've always felt that the sacking of Gamelin happened at exactly the wrong moment. Apparently Weygand cancelled the attack while he made a tour of the various ministries to ensure he had political support, then ordered a very similar attack himself, by which time it was too late. If they had sacked Gamelin 24 hours earlier, or 24 hours later, the attack would have gone in and we could have all been gnoshing Knoblauchwurst on the Kurfürstendamm by St Leonard's Day.

It is amazing how much of the reputation of the Wehrmacht rests on that one giant gamble in the Ardennes. I guess its true that if a desperate plan works its 'bold', if it fails its 'reckless'.

 

[oldironside]

It is amazing how much of the reputation of the Wehrmacht rests on that one giant gamble in the Ardennes. I guess its true that if a desperate plan works its 'bold', if it fails its 'reckless'.

Exactly my feeling. they only had one shot at it.

If one takes the dimension theory of reality (as postulated by Kryten in Red Dwarf), we are living in one of the very few dimensions where it all went okay for the Wehrmacht and they actually disentangled that epic traffic jam and got across the river in more or less good order. There are so many minor, trivial, easily swayed factors that produce a different result that it really beggars belief that they actually pulled it off. Yes, they were organised, they were aggressive, and they rode their luck, but so many of the other factors were out of their hands

 

[Garrison]

Exactly my feeling. they only had one shot at it.

If one takes the dimension theory of reality (as postulated by Kryten in Red Dwarf), we are living in one of the very few dimensions where it all went okay for the Wehrmacht and they actually disentangled that epic traffic jam and got across the river in more or less good order. There are so many minor, trivial, easily swayed factors that produce a different result that it really beggars belief that they actually pulled it off. Yes, they were organised, they were aggressive, and they rode their luck, but so many of the other factors were out of their hands

And on top of all that Reynaud wanted France to fight on from North Africa, which I think happened in the late, lamented 'The Whale Has Wings'.

 

[marathag]

don't waste the RAF and French Air Force bombing bridges

I think you mean RAF not dropping leaflets. Just getting them into dropping live HE on Germany is a big help.

 

[Garrison]

I think you mean RAF not dropping leaflets. Just getting them into dropping live HE on Germany is a big help.

True, but in terms of the Battle of France the bombers were largely thrown away trying to blow up bridges, a task that even with Lancasters and tallboy bombs would pose a challenge, never mind the Fairey Battle.

 

[HexWargamer]

I think you mean RAF not dropping leaflets. Just getting them into dropping live HE on Germany is a big help.

I think they had moved on to 'Stage 2' ("don't drop bombs on private property") or perhaps even Stage 3 ("don't drop your bombs if civilians could be hit") by then ...Stage 4 ("drop your bombs on a different country") is still ahead, as is Stage 5 ("only drop 5% of your bombs within 5 miles of the target") ..

On the other hand, I believe they had reached the "send in bombers unescourted and loose more than half of them" stage by December 1939 (see Battle of the Heligoland Bight) and might even have bombs that actually exploded ....

The French, of course, where still at the "line up your fighters on the ground in a nice neat row" stage, along with all out effort of 'only fly one mission a day' approach to loosing the air war ...

 

[oldironside]

The French, of course, where still at the "line up your fighters on the ground in a nice neat row" stage, along with all out effort of 'only fly one mission a day' approach to loosing the air war ...

To be fair, even 18 months later the Americans were still pretty big fans of this sort of strategy.

 

[Garrison]

To be fair, even 18 months later the Americans were still pretty big fans of this sort of strategy.

It works if you don't bother with niceties like declaring war and lets be honest it was the only way the Luftwaffe ever found to achieve air superiority that reliably worked.