Considering Stalin he probably would be moving the Armenians inland and ethnically cleanse the areas so there'd be more settlers in the Armenian SSR. The SSR would frankly need the settlers.
Of lost monkeys and broken vehicles
- Thread starter Lascaris
- Start date
My dear fellows you are all far to committed to the idea of two turkeys. There will not be. The Soviets will "accommodate" things such as Greek territorial expansion in Anatolia, and the Free City option, Cyprus going to Greece etc, but in return will demand an adjustment of percentages and the maintenance of what is left in Turkey as a client of them, and the Turks themselves will seek such an arrangement. The German, Austrian and Korean occupation zones were unique. In most other cases the preference was to move borders.
My expectation is that beyond border changes in the East, the Russians will not seek outright territorial cessions. Basing rights, and extraterritoriality yes, but not outright territorial annexations. A Soviet base in Asiatic Istanbul (as part of a Free State arrangement) permits the Soveits to present themselves as the defenders of Muslims feeling the Wally side, and keep Turkey tethered to them with promises of a potential future date when their part of Istanbul reverts to Turkey.
And not that future. Once the Cold War intensifies, when the Greeks attempt their legislative coup in the European side, the Soviets will arrange for the asiatic side asking to become part of Turkey. A Turkey that around that time might declare itself a Republic.
As long as the Soviet have military presence in the Straits, the particulars of territorial status are secondary if not tertiary.
So my expectation is that around 1946-1947 the Free Straits Zone will be divided into a Greek and Turkish one, with the Soviets keeping basing rights.
My expectation is that beyond border changes in the East, the Russians will not seek outright territorial cessions. Basing rights, and extraterritoriality yes, but not outright territorial annexations. A Soviet base in Asiatic Istanbul (as part of a Free State arrangement) permits the Soveits to present themselves as the defenders of Muslims feeling the Wally side, and keep Turkey tethered to them with promises of a potential future date when their part of Istanbul reverts to Turkey.
And not that future. Once the Cold War intensifies, when the Greeks attempt their legislative coup in the European side, the Soviets will arrange for the asiatic side asking to become part of Turkey. A Turkey that around that time might declare itself a Republic.
As long as the Soviet have military presence in the Straits, the particulars of territorial status are secondary if not tertiary.
So my expectation is that around 1946-1947 the Free Straits Zone will be divided into a Greek and Turkish one, with the Soviets keeping basing rights.
BTW Sinope is the bigger Black Sea port. So Samsun+Sinope
An Izmit-Sinope line is not enough. A true Soviet alternative to the Straits require that Antalya and Mersin are under a pro-Soviet regime.
An Izmit-Sinope line is not enough. A true Soviet alternative to the Straits require that Antalya and Mersin are under a pro-Soviet regime.
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Tbf I think if Stalin was to take over Asiatic Constantinople for the Russian SSR it is being he sees it to be important to Russia itself, and considering that the straits is the only way for the Black sea fleet to leave the Black Sea I think he'd see it to be just as important, if not more important than the Prussian annexation. Maybe I'm thinking of Stalin as too imperialistic and part of his calculations to take Prussia was due to the Nazis but the direct annexation of the Marmara would be considered at the very least.
Yeah I forgot about that port. Yeah so Samsun + Sinope.
There are differences. In the case of Prussia Stalin did not know how Germany would end up, and holding Kongsberg was also a useful tool for threatening Poland. Now the logic here could be the same, but I think compared to the German or Polish question, Stalin can be more confident of Soviet influence on Turkey.
Tbf considering the proximity of the international city on the other side and Greece probably gaining parts of the Marmara region I think it's possible that Stalin would be concerned about it. Granted, I think only basing rights is possible, it's just that the option of direct annexation is something that Stalin could have negotiated if he can't move supplies via rail to Biga, which would make soviet control over Biga limited for example.
I get your point, but I must say IMHO Biga is a none issue. The Soviets will sacrifice it for something. It does not have any good ports. Not really worth much except if the Soviets are really serious about establishing a forward base into the Aegean, in which case Akcay specifically is more useful. But again easily checked from Lesvos.
I just wonder what proportion of the final settlement will be determined based on facts on the ground compared to political decisions among the allies. Personally, I have a soft spot for greek maximalist claims, and even if they don't get everything immediately , I don't see an international zone working out in the long term.
yeah I understand, let's agree to disagree on this because I see why you'd think that way too. Getting the Turks to be close allies would be a boon to the USSR.
As for the Kurds, I recently had the lovely experience of visiting erbil and sulemaniyeh, where I was staying with a former politician and history enthusiast. Although there is a difference between Iraqi and Turkish Kurds ofcourse, he has presented the Kurdish folks to be heavily pro west throughout the 20th century( specifically the British, probably due to their dividing colonial ethnicities and setting them up against each other) I simply do not see them being pro soviets unless the Wallies really do something to fuck them over. With the coming of Arab socialism and the clusterfuck of middle eastern cold war politics id imagine them to die hard allign with the Wallies.
I disagree here. Ecumenical influence on the Pope's level is way beyond the POD of TTL, you would have to go back to Byzantine times. IOTL, even the pan-Balkan Orthodox pretensions of the Patriarchate of Constantinople were dead by 1910 due to the rise of nationalism, and its influence in the Balkan Slavic churches went from low to zero after that. The elevation of the Serbian and Romanian churches to patriarchates happened already in the 1920s OTL, and Bulgaria followed after 1945. And the ethnic cleansing of the Constantinopolitan Greeks has left the patriarchate almost without a flock and being quite unable to replenish its cadres, effectively a hostage of the Turkish government. Constantinople still has vestigious authority due to the canonical traditions of Orthodoxy: all non-autocephalous Orthodox communities automatically fall under it, it has the power to e.g. grant autocephaly to Kiev away from Moscow, and it is still officially the head of the Orthodox community. But otherwise, the institution is on life support.
ITTL, conditions are much, much different. With Constantinople not Turkish, and with a sizeable flock of its own (the City, Asiatic Greece, and the New Lands), and the patriarch still effectively in the role of a millet ethnarch in the 1920s-1930s, the patriarchate will retain much of its prestige and power as an actor. It may be closely associated with Greece, and Greek nationalist aspirations for the City, but beyond that, it is a different question. The raising of Serbia and Romania to patriarchates may be butterflied (though not their autocephaly) away. A patriarchate that will have a flock in the millions, with its property intact, and a leader able to officiate in the Hagia Sophia, is a different beast to the ceremonial figurehead of today. Sure, any attempts to exercise its authority, especially in countries soon to be under Moscow's thumb, will meet resistance, but I am pretty sure that TTL's patriarchs will be much more willing to pursue their own interests and policies, not necessarily in concert with the Greek state (even OTL's Church of Greece has done so). All the more so the longer Constantinople remains a free city and a battleground of the free world against godless communism (I can see the patriarchs gracing the cover of TIME magazine quite a few times).
I cannot see Britain agreeing to Turkey becoming a soviet vassal with the possibility of Antalya and Mersin hosting the Red Fleet. Biga is already a major concession and that's due to Americans being short-sighted. But as you said, the Dardanelles can be controlled from Moudros, where I expect the OTL german base construction to be vastly expanded. And if Lemnos is neutralized by e.g. the soviet air force, then there is always Souda.
But Soviet open sea bases? While Britain still controls Suez? That would be an anathema for Whitehall. Therefore, I think that Biga and Asiatic Constantinople is all what Stalin gets.
Biga can still act as the bolt that closes the Straits' door. I think from a 1943-45 soviet point of view, denying western access to the Black Sea is way more important than projecting soviet naval power in the Mediterranean. The USSR is currently devastated and seeks security against future invasions, not being the dominant world power - not yet. It is not just Stalin's paranoia but centuries of russian policy.
They can fortify Biga to turn it into a fortress. Reinforced concrete pens for submarines, forts protecting it from both Asiatic Greece and an amphibious invasion. More bunkers than Hoxha could even dream of. A very big Gibraltar that will have to withstand siege only for so long. After all, with the Black Sea being a soviet lake, reinforcements would be able to arrive.
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I think Smyrna and Thessaloniki and the such would be next line of naval bases, if Souda is the main base a bunch of bases should be knocked out I'd think.
Yeah the Soviets won't be getting Mersin or Antalya. I do think that Turkey would be split between the Wallies and the Soviets where the two armies start to meet each other.
and I'd think Asiatic Constantinople and a port in Izmit with a land connection with a friendly Turkic regime would be paramount. I think taking bits of Bursa province, Kocaeli province and Asiatic Constantinople would allow for some depth against the wallies and in case the friendly Turkic regime falls/becomes western aligned.
Well, what is problematic is how easy the Wallies accepted that the USSR will get (co-)control of an area the Red Army will definately not occupy. IOTL there is no such example. And it's also problematic when they do so by backstabbing one of the most important allies, the only democratic country which fought on in continental Europe. And this while Greece held a referendum during the war and while the Turks when occupied Constantinople massacred the Ecumenical Patriarch and many Greeks. By supporting the Soviet agenta for Constantinople the Wallies actualy promote the Turkish interests. And that's definitely not easy for the Greeks to accept.
So Greece could play renegate if succeeds in liberating the city. And then your questions snactually teversed: if the Greek Army ocupies Constantinople, what are the Soviets going to do? Invade Greek proclaimed soil? And how are they actually are going to do it in 1944-45? They virtually have no fleet in the Black Sea for such an operation. Will they try in 1950 then, with the Vold War having already been started?
The arguments are not beacuse I think that Greece has to or can get Constantinople.
It's that the plan agreed by by the Big Three is too favourable for both the Soviets and the Turks to work. If then plan was for and internationalised and demilitarised Straits Zone, it would be far more easier to be accepted and work.
The Soviet arguments for having (two!!!) bases IMHO doesn't make much sense with the realities of 1943. Would make sense only if they all knew that the Doviets will become a nuclear power in a few years. Having two (!!!) bases (one far from the other) at the Straits, cut-off and so far from the Soviet mainland wouldn't offer much to the USSR if an enemy power launches a land attack on the Straits: the Soviet troops there will be overrun long before there can be an amphibious operation in a scale capable of relieving the garrison, and the the main body of the Red Army would have to march through Romania and Bulgaria, or through Turkey for long kilometres.
This voices most of my feelings on the deal the Soviets got as well, in better detail than I could say it myself. I’ll also add that it feels very unlike Churchill to just give something this big to the Soviets for essentially nothing. The other two of the Big Three are giving a whole lot and bot getting anything in return. Even a promise to eventually declare on the Japanese as happened OTL would be a weak payment. If Stalin got that large a portion of the straights it feels like Churchill would have gotten a significantly more advantageous napkin deal at the very least. And while he got a better one that OTL, it feels like that’s more just acknowledging the facts on the he ground more than anything else.
There are Soviet armies in Anatolia
Come a Greek- Soviet war they can march into Ionia or the asiatic part of the straits. Why are you all assuming that if Greece goes renegade Stalin is going to take the slap belly up?
Come a Greek- Soviet war they can march into Ionia or the asiatic part of the straits. Why are you all assuming that if Greece goes renegade Stalin is going to take the slap belly up?
My impression based on which countries weren't listed in the ATL percentages agreement is that the big thing Churchill is getting in return is Poland.
Add to that the Soviet presence in Romania and even Bulgaria ,depending on when the Bulgarians surrender, and there is an extra threat of Soviet invasion if something doesn't go according to negotiations...
This was exactly on my mind. We have seen a lot from Poland ITTL it would be nice to see them free after the war.
None of Central Europe was listed and there’s no way Stalin is completely ceding Poland, Germany, Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia. If the Allies are getting all of central and some of Eastern Europe in exchange it’s a great deal but I don’t see Stalin agreeing. And if he did I don’t see him keeping his promise anymore than he did with the original napkin agreement.
Because this is not a video game!
Honestly, first there has to be a Greek-Soviet war. By the 1944-45 situation, IMO this is definitely impossible!
In 1946 it would be really hard for the Soviets to attack, because:
1st, they will be pretty occupied in launching a series of coup d' etat in Eastern and Central Europe and attacking Greece either through Romania and (50-50, remember?) Bulgaria, or Turkey, wouldn't be easy nor would help them in turning half Europe Communist.
2nd they still would be missing the necessary navy for launching such an attack.
3rd, regardless of what many think, I doubt that Stalin would risk dragging his country to another great war, without some time first to recover (both psychologically and regarding resources, infrastructure and population) after the devastating WWII, and definitely before consolidating his gains in Eastern and Central Europe. Because if the USSR launches a direct attack on Greece (even a renegate Greexe), through other countries with at keast some western influence, will definitely mean that the USA and the UK get involved.
Any Soviet move after 1947 is completely out of question!
So, IMO, any military action of the Soviets against Greece is ruled out, IF Greece is going to make a move on Constantinople.
So far, it seems that the up to now successful Greek political system is choosing the road of being discredited by the Greek public without any obvious danger, or collateral gain.
Remember that IOTL, in the mid-1950s Greece chose to stand and make a case against Britain, and even send a guerilla force against the British in Cyprus. And maybe Britain at the time was a trembling empire, but still an empire and No 2 in the NATO, while Greece was a devastated bybthe war country, one of the poorest in Europe, politically torn by a civil war, corrupt, with a still hungry population depending on foreign aid, with an unstable political system, a weak army, already in the Cold War, etc.
What Greece would risk IMO is a degree of political alienation, but one far from that of OTL 1920, due to the Greek contribution in the war effort and the publicity this contribution had in the western Press.
To close my arguments, I expect Lascaris to have a hidden card to show us, as I doubt things can plausibly develop as they seem, at least without a big damage to the Greek political stability and the Western prestige (Churchill, especially) in the last stages of the war and after.
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