Of lost monkeys and broken vehicles
- Thread starter Lascaris
- Start date
Part 6 First thunders before a storm March 1921
Dersim, March 6th, 1921
A romantic would say that the Kurds rose up in revolt. Someone more cynic would say that a handful of Kurds rose up in revolt. The cynic would be the one closer to reality. The Koçkiri tribe, with about 3,000 fighters, had risen up at the instigation of the Cemîyeta Tealîya Kurdistanê, the society for the advancement of Kurdistan, and maybe a helping hand from the British. But the majority of Kurds had stayed loyal to the Ankara government and its promises of increased freedoms, with many more Kurds serving with the nationalist army than with the rebels. A bit over 3,000 cavalry and irregulars were sent out by Nureddin Pasha to suppress the rebellion. It would take some time...
Georgia, March 14th, 1921
The Turkish nationalist army under Kazim Karabekir captured Batum.
Moscow, March 16th, 1921
The Turkish nationalist delegation signed a treaty with the Soviet government that would leave the 1914 Kars oblast to Turkey and Batum to the Soviets. The Turkish government in Ankara proclaimed the same day the annexation of Batum despite the treaty.
Georgia, March 17th, 1921
The Georgians signed an armistice with the advancing Soviets. The next day they further agreed to allow the Soviet army to advance to Batum before exiling themselves. Georgia had been forced into the Soviet fold. The Georgian national army though had one last battle to fight. As soon as the armistice was signed general Mazniashvili brought his army south to bear on the invading Turkish army. After two days of fighting Batum was liberated in March 19th. The same day Mazniashvili surrendered it to the Soviet backed Georgian revolutionary committee. The Soviets were not altogether displeased to have pushed their ostensible allies in Ankara out of Batum by proxy. Still the events in Batum helped freeze the ratification of the treaty of Moscow by both sides for the time being even though the Soviets continued to provide arms and economic aid to the Turkish nationalists.
Black sea coast March 14th, 1921 (old calendar)/March 27th, 1921 (new calendar)
The two ports of Inebolu and Samsun, were the lifeline of the Nationalists war effort and their main outlet to the outside world. Soviet military aid, supplies smuggled out of Constantinople and whatever Italian material was not being sent through Antalya, were mostly brought to Inebolu. From Inebolu convoys of ox driven carts, camels and even a few trucks used the paved road to bring the supplies to Ankara. Ankara was thankthfully connected to the railroad. In a similar fashion supplies brought to Samsun found their way first to Amasya and from there to Sivas. From Sivas they would be brought west to Ankara or east to Erzerum. Given the distances involved, slightly below seven hundred km from Samsun to Ankara, less than half that from Inebolu, the latter had turned to the main supply hub of the Nationalists.
The Royal Hellenic Navy was out in force to deal with this. Two task forces had passed the Bosporus a few nights before, the attempt to hide their moves was probably in vain but this didn't mean is should not be made. The first and slower one with the battleships Lemnos and Kilkis, the recently delivered destroyers Kriti, Lesvos, Chios and Samos and the ocean liner Patris had headed to Inebolu. The second consisting of armoured cruiser Georgios Averof, the light cruisers Katsonis and Kountouriotis, destroyers Leon, Panthir, Aetos and Ierax and ocean liner Megali Hellas had headed to the port of Samsun. The two task forces had shown up before the two ports more or less simultaneously and at dawn had opened up on them with every available gun from the huge 12 inch pieces of the two battleships and the 9.2 inch guns of Averof to the 4 inch guns rapid firing guns of the destroyers. To say the least it was an uneven fight, Samsun was defended, if that was the correct word, by a single field gun. Following the bombardment, marine landing parties swarm ashore. Patris and Megali Hellas had hardly carried more than a brigade between them, not enough to hold the towns for any protracted period even with support from the guns of the fleet. But the Greeks did not plan to hold onto them in the first place. The marines were followed ashore by combat engineers who systematically demolished all port facilities that had survived from the bombardments then the Greek landing parties pulled out, without much trouble in Inebolu, after beating back a counterattack by Turkish irregulars under Topal Osman that cost him his life, afterwards it was determined that a shell from Averof had obliterated his command post, in the case of Samsun. Repairs would begin as soon as the Greek fleet was out, but for the time being the capacity of both ports had been significantly compromised.
Athens, March 25th, 1921 (old calendar)/ April 7th, 1991 (new calendar)
The first child a king Alexander and Aspasia Manos, a daughter, was born. She would be named Sophia, after Alexander's mother the former queen of Greece and sister of kaiser Wilhelm II. If there were any eyebrows raised at the choice of name given the political situation it was not done openly. After all who could accuse the young king for followed Greek traditions, that expected the first son and daughter of the family to be given the names of the parents of the father? The royal family still refused to recognise Alexander's marriage to Aspasia. A royal prince couldn't marry mere commoners. That said commoners were a phanariote family going back centuries mattered of course not.
A romantic would say that the Kurds rose up in revolt. Someone more cynic would say that a handful of Kurds rose up in revolt. The cynic would be the one closer to reality. The Koçkiri tribe, with about 3,000 fighters, had risen up at the instigation of the Cemîyeta Tealîya Kurdistanê, the society for the advancement of Kurdistan, and maybe a helping hand from the British. But the majority of Kurds had stayed loyal to the Ankara government and its promises of increased freedoms, with many more Kurds serving with the nationalist army than with the rebels. A bit over 3,000 cavalry and irregulars were sent out by Nureddin Pasha to suppress the rebellion. It would take some time...
Georgia, March 14th, 1921
The Turkish nationalist army under Kazim Karabekir captured Batum.
Moscow, March 16th, 1921
The Turkish nationalist delegation signed a treaty with the Soviet government that would leave the 1914 Kars oblast to Turkey and Batum to the Soviets. The Turkish government in Ankara proclaimed the same day the annexation of Batum despite the treaty.
Georgia, March 17th, 1921
The Georgians signed an armistice with the advancing Soviets. The next day they further agreed to allow the Soviet army to advance to Batum before exiling themselves. Georgia had been forced into the Soviet fold. The Georgian national army though had one last battle to fight. As soon as the armistice was signed general Mazniashvili brought his army south to bear on the invading Turkish army. After two days of fighting Batum was liberated in March 19th. The same day Mazniashvili surrendered it to the Soviet backed Georgian revolutionary committee. The Soviets were not altogether displeased to have pushed their ostensible allies in Ankara out of Batum by proxy. Still the events in Batum helped freeze the ratification of the treaty of Moscow by both sides for the time being even though the Soviets continued to provide arms and economic aid to the Turkish nationalists.
Black sea coast March 14th, 1921 (old calendar)/March 27th, 1921 (new calendar)
The two ports of Inebolu and Samsun, were the lifeline of the Nationalists war effort and their main outlet to the outside world. Soviet military aid, supplies smuggled out of Constantinople and whatever Italian material was not being sent through Antalya, were mostly brought to Inebolu. From Inebolu convoys of ox driven carts, camels and even a few trucks used the paved road to bring the supplies to Ankara. Ankara was thankthfully connected to the railroad. In a similar fashion supplies brought to Samsun found their way first to Amasya and from there to Sivas. From Sivas they would be brought west to Ankara or east to Erzerum. Given the distances involved, slightly below seven hundred km from Samsun to Ankara, less than half that from Inebolu, the latter had turned to the main supply hub of the Nationalists.
The Royal Hellenic Navy was out in force to deal with this. Two task forces had passed the Bosporus a few nights before, the attempt to hide their moves was probably in vain but this didn't mean is should not be made. The first and slower one with the battleships Lemnos and Kilkis, the recently delivered destroyers Kriti, Lesvos, Chios and Samos and the ocean liner Patris had headed to Inebolu. The second consisting of armoured cruiser Georgios Averof, the light cruisers Katsonis and Kountouriotis, destroyers Leon, Panthir, Aetos and Ierax and ocean liner Megali Hellas had headed to the port of Samsun. The two task forces had shown up before the two ports more or less simultaneously and at dawn had opened up on them with every available gun from the huge 12 inch pieces of the two battleships and the 9.2 inch guns of Averof to the 4 inch guns rapid firing guns of the destroyers. To say the least it was an uneven fight, Samsun was defended, if that was the correct word, by a single field gun. Following the bombardment, marine landing parties swarm ashore. Patris and Megali Hellas had hardly carried more than a brigade between them, not enough to hold the towns for any protracted period even with support from the guns of the fleet. But the Greeks did not plan to hold onto them in the first place. The marines were followed ashore by combat engineers who systematically demolished all port facilities that had survived from the bombardments then the Greek landing parties pulled out, without much trouble in Inebolu, after beating back a counterattack by Turkish irregulars under Topal Osman that cost him his life, afterwards it was determined that a shell from Averof had obliterated his command post, in the case of Samsun. Repairs would begin as soon as the Greek fleet was out, but for the time being the capacity of both ports had been significantly compromised.
Athens, March 25th, 1921 (old calendar)/ April 7th, 1991 (new calendar)
The first child a king Alexander and Aspasia Manos, a daughter, was born. She would be named Sophia, after Alexander's mother the former queen of Greece and sister of kaiser Wilhelm II. If there were any eyebrows raised at the choice of name given the political situation it was not done openly. After all who could accuse the young king for followed Greek traditions, that expected the first son and daughter of the family to be given the names of the parents of the father? The royal family still refused to recognise Alexander's marriage to Aspasia. A royal prince couldn't marry mere commoners. That said commoners were a phanariote family going back centuries mattered of course not.
formion
Banned
Good riddance.
Topal Osman was a trully sadistic butcher!
Edit: Overall, the landings were a valiant effort, but I think in the case of Inebolu will have small impact as there was not much infrastructure to begin with. The "port" was comprised by a small single wharf and every cargo had to unloaded by lighters. A small stone wharf can be rebuild in a few weeks and in the meantime, the lighters will have to unload on the beach.
In Samsun the port destruction will have greater impact as there was decent port infrastructure. Samsun was the 2nd largest tobacco exporting port of the Ottoman Empire, so there were unloading piers and warehouses.
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Topal Osman was in the area, he was terrorising the villages around Samsun although he was not let into the town itself till May if memory serves so it made sense for his forces to try to contest the Greek landings, particularly given their limited numbers. Landing a 380 pound shell on his head? Why I could. On the upside one genocidal thug less in the world. On the downside without his assassination of Ali Şükrü Bey he probably gets statues all over the place and a university in his name TTL.
As for Inebolu yes not very much in the way of port facilities was present. Add to this sinking everything afloat in the harbour and some damage is done at least for a time. But a continued blockade and probably more raids will be needed to get more than a temporary effect.
formion
Banned
The blockade of Inebolu would be quite easy for the Greek navy, because Constantinople was close by. Moreover, at this point, the coal basin of Zonguldak is occupied by the French, so its coal can be utilized for the Black Sea blockade.One can argue that it would be also beneficial to tighten up the security of the Constantinople depots, as they were a major ammunition supplier.
I think this is the source that Prof. Travlos used for the Nationalist logistics. The ammo and oil depots are presented in the paper, as well as the hospitals.
As Ethem and the Circassians were mentioned, here are a couple of sources on Circassian separatism.
The Circassians of Turkey
Turkey's Circassians were exiled to the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in 1864, resettling most notably in the Danubian provinces, Thessaly, Syria, Central Anatolia and the southern shores of the Sea of Marmara. As experienced veterans of the wars with Russia...
books.google.com
Sorrowful Shores
The Turkish Republic was formed out of immense bloodshed and carnage. During the decade leading up to the end of the Ottoman Empire and the ascendancy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, virtually every town and village throughout Anatolia was wracked by intercommunal violence. Sorrowful Shores presents a...
books.google.com
It would be beneficial but unlikely to happen. As for a blockade, there is going to be one, the light cruisers in particular will be very convenient in the role. Of course the Italians will be still refusing to have their ships stopped and searched just like OTL, although TTL the French will be playing along. And the Greeks have also gotten a pair of modern, for 1921, submarines. It would be such a pity if some Italian ship that had refused to be stopped for inspection was torpedoed, would it not? Such an increase on insurance premiums...
Problem is, does Greece want a war with Italy at this point, with much of the Army out east and the Navy still vastly inferior to the Regia Marina?It would be beneficial but unlikely to happen. As for a blockade, there is going to be one, the light cruisers in particular will be very convenient in the role. Of course the Italians will be still refusing to have their ships stopped and searched just like OTL, although TTL the French will be playing along. And the Greeks have also gotten a pair of modern, for 1921, submarines. It would be such a pity if some Italian ship that had refused to be stopped for inspection was torpedoed, would it not? Such an increase on insurance premiums...
That's of course correct. But the Regia Marina is also vastly inferior to the Royal Navy. TTL the war remains one between the Entente and Turkey even if (most of) the fighting is being done by Greece. Of course if you want to get technical Italy is still part of the Entente and at war with Turkey even if actually she is aiding and supplying arms to the country she's supposedly at war with to use against the country she is supposedly allied with...
formion
Banned
On the matter of Nationalist logistics, if the following paper is to be trusted, a few small turkish ships of 7,000 tons in total, hauled a cargo of 300,000 tons during the war. Of these, 220,000 tons were originated from the Soviet Union. If I had to guess the rest should have come from Constantinople.
To seize or destroy the aforementioned steamships would be an easy task for a blockade force, as most of the ships were both tiny and slow. I doubt the Soviets would sent soviet-flagged ships as blockade runners, as they could lose the precious few merchantmen they had.
Could the Greeks maintain a blockade from Constantinople, or do they need to seize a Black Sea port?
To seize or destroy the aforementioned steamships would be an easy task for a blockade force, as most of the ships were both tiny and slow. I doubt the Soviets would sent soviet-flagged ships as blockade runners, as they could lose the precious few merchantmen they had.
Could the Greeks maintain a blockade from Constantinople, or do they need to seize a Black Sea port?
I think you are right, it seems quite feasiblw for the Greeks to shut down resupply with these forces. Temporarily seizing the ports and destroying infrastructure does make sense however too.
I was somewhat leery about seizing and holding the ports to cut down resupply because IMO you'd need to permanently tie down at least a two-regiment brigade if not a single division for each of Inepolis sorry Inebolu and Samsun to do it properly, my copy of the Turkish general staff's official history has the 15th infantry division in the general Samsun region and another divisional command at Kastamonu. Taking two divisions away from western Anatolia to do so just on the eve of a general offensive there did not make sense to me. Hence the raiding instead, after all that short regiment of marines (1300 infantry frontline strength in June 1921) had better uses than being left on garrison duty, if I may say so myself.
The continued blockade of the Black sea coast has certain practical difficulties, in the sense of the machinery of the older Greek destroyers being badly shot up at the time they had been seized by the French navy back in 1917 (to put it politely the British trained Greeks were unimpressed when they got the ships back) but it's certainly doable, the Greeks continued using the ships no matter the mechanical problems till they could get them through general overhauls in 1924. TTL they also have the ships bought from Britain that do not face such problems and given the better Greek economic situation face fewer fuel limitations compared to OTL...
Part 7 The Greek spring offensive of 1921 beginning
Yerevan April 2nd, 1921
The Soviet army was back in control of the city having pushed the Armenian rebels out of it. But the revolt was not over as the rebels retreated to the mountains proclaiming the republic of Mountainous Armenia in April 26th.
Western Anatolia, April 7th, 1921 (old calendar)/April 20th, 1921 (new calendar)
Greece had spent the winter months preparing for what it hoped would be the decisive battle of the war. Six classes of reservists, the 1903, 1904, 1912, 1913, 1914 and 1915 ones had been mobilized in January and February 1921, adding nearly 137,000 men from old Greece [1], and 19,500 men from Ionia to the army bringing its total strength to 359,337 men. More than two thirds of them, almost 253,000 men had been deployed in Asia Minor and another 23,000 would be sent there over the next couple of months. [2] Even if one subtracted the 63,000 men and 61 artillery pieces that covered Greek rear areas and communication lines the Greek Asia Minor army still had 12 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions with almost 190,000 men and 452 artillery pieces available for the offensive.
The Turkish nationalists had not been idle either. Everything humanly possible had been done during the winter to reinforce the army facing the Greeks while having to deal with problems that often looked insurmountable as the Ankara government was also having to fight the French army in Cilicia and deal with a hostile Britain, with only the Soviets and Italy supporting it. Still thanks to concerted efforts the Turkish Western Front opposing the Greek army was fielding 12 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions in its northern an southern commands with about 70,000 men and 140 artillery pieces. [3]
Now the time of battle had come, as the Greek Smyrna army corps under Dimitrios Ioannou charged out of the Akpınar-Kovalca line it had captured back in December towards Eski Sehir which was being defended by the Turkish Western front under Ismet pasha. Further to the south the main body of the Greek army with A and B corps under the direct command of Leonidas Paraskeuopoulos, attacked out of Usak towards Banaz and Dumlupinar against the Turkish southern command of the Western front under Refet Bey with a supporting divisional sized drive towards Gediz. While after taking Dumlupinar a covering force was to continue towards Afyon Karahisar, the bulk of the attacking force was to wheel north towards Kutahya and Eski Sehir to meet the northern prong of the offensive under Ioannou, trapping the Turkish army between them. Now it was to be seen how well the plan would survive contact with the enemy...
Addentum: Maps
The linked map below is from the excellent http://mikrasiatikhekstrateia.gr specifically the article here: http://mikrasiatikhekstrateia.gr/epixeiriseis/augoustos21/apofasi_epixeiriseon_pros_Agkura and shows the OTL battles of Kutahya-Eskisehir in July 1921. While it does not exactly match the TTL spring offensive it is substantially similar. Roughly:
Appendix 3 Greek Asia Minor Army Order of Battle April 1921
General HQ (Leonidas Paraskeuopoulos)
Scneider-Ducrest 65mm: 136
Scneider-Danglis 75mm: 64
Schneider M1906 75mm: 88
Skoda 75mm guns: 42
Skoda 105mm: 26
4.5in howitzers: 48
6in 26 cwt howitzers: 36
Skoda 150mm: 12
[2] In OTL out of 328,000 men in June 1921 128,000 were retained in Europe on various excuses although a number of them would be later sent to Anatolia, the Asia Minor army was up to 224,000 by April 1st, 1922. Here the number of troops back in Europe is kept at the OTL April 1921 levels (slightly below 107,000 men) and is then further reduced to 84,000 the OTL March 1921 levels.
[3] Rifle strength is of course significantly lower for both the Greek and Turkish armies as the numbers here is total strength but still the Greeks have roughly a 2,5- 3:1 numerical superiority in infantry (~119,000 to ~46,000) and artillery (452 to 140 guns) while being somewhat inferior in cavalry (~3,500 against ~4,500)
[4] Source is the map 69, in book 3 of the Turkish army's Western front's official history for April 15th, 1921
[5] This one is in Trebizont in the map I assume here it was still under Eastern front command
[6] Kocaeli group most probably
[7] By April 15th 11th and 24th infantry are showing as probably reserve in the southern group. Since they were in the thick of the fighting during 2nd Inonu just before this in OTL, I suspect they had been pulled from the line to reorganize so left them still in the north TTL.
[8] These may be directly under Western front command and by July were for certain in the 1st, 3rd and 4th "groups of divisions" themselves, but the map is not showing something beyond an army level command.
[9] Rear area units excluded. I also make the assumption that the older De Bange 120mm guns and BL 6-inch 30 cwt have been placed in reserve to provide trained manpower for the heavy artillery provided by Britain. Rear area units artillery would be as follows:
Krupp M1904 Mountain gun 75mm: 10
Krupp M1904 field gun 75mm: 15
Schneider M1906 75mm: 6
Schneider M1904 75mm: 22
Schneider M1907 75mm: 8
The Soviet army was back in control of the city having pushed the Armenian rebels out of it. But the revolt was not over as the rebels retreated to the mountains proclaiming the republic of Mountainous Armenia in April 26th.
Western Anatolia, April 7th, 1921 (old calendar)/April 20th, 1921 (new calendar)
Greece had spent the winter months preparing for what it hoped would be the decisive battle of the war. Six classes of reservists, the 1903, 1904, 1912, 1913, 1914 and 1915 ones had been mobilized in January and February 1921, adding nearly 137,000 men from old Greece [1], and 19,500 men from Ionia to the army bringing its total strength to 359,337 men. More than two thirds of them, almost 253,000 men had been deployed in Asia Minor and another 23,000 would be sent there over the next couple of months. [2] Even if one subtracted the 63,000 men and 61 artillery pieces that covered Greek rear areas and communication lines the Greek Asia Minor army still had 12 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions with almost 190,000 men and 452 artillery pieces available for the offensive.
The Turkish nationalists had not been idle either. Everything humanly possible had been done during the winter to reinforce the army facing the Greeks while having to deal with problems that often looked insurmountable as the Ankara government was also having to fight the French army in Cilicia and deal with a hostile Britain, with only the Soviets and Italy supporting it. Still thanks to concerted efforts the Turkish Western Front opposing the Greek army was fielding 12 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions in its northern an southern commands with about 70,000 men and 140 artillery pieces. [3]
Now the time of battle had come, as the Greek Smyrna army corps under Dimitrios Ioannou charged out of the Akpınar-Kovalca line it had captured back in December towards Eski Sehir which was being defended by the Turkish Western front under Ismet pasha. Further to the south the main body of the Greek army with A and B corps under the direct command of Leonidas Paraskeuopoulos, attacked out of Usak towards Banaz and Dumlupinar against the Turkish southern command of the Western front under Refet Bey with a supporting divisional sized drive towards Gediz. While after taking Dumlupinar a covering force was to continue towards Afyon Karahisar, the bulk of the attacking force was to wheel north towards Kutahya and Eski Sehir to meet the northern prong of the offensive under Ioannou, trapping the Turkish army between them. Now it was to be seen how well the plan would survive contact with the enemy...
Addentum: Maps
The linked map below is from the excellent http://mikrasiatikhekstrateia.gr specifically the article here: http://mikrasiatikhekstrateia.gr/epixeiriseis/augoustos21/apofasi_epixeiriseon_pros_Agkura and shows the OTL battles of Kutahya-Eskisehir in July 1921. While it does not exactly match the TTL spring offensive it is substantially similar. Roughly:
- The Smyrna Army corps is attacking along the lines showing here for III and XI divisions (in blue). But TTL it is already in contact and slightly to the east of Bozuyuk, "Κοβαλίτσα" in the map is Kovalca. And this is the main corps effort with all divisions and corps assets.
The Archipelago division is the VII shown in the map (it was renamed after the November election). TTL it's a single division push in support of the main effort at InonuEdit: Upon further thought this route is not used at all. Makes no sense to do so with the Greeks already in the Avgin-Kovalca line since January. Well it did not make much sense in OTL come down to this to put two divisions through effectively no roads.- The southern prong of the attack is more or less the same.
Appendix 3 Greek Asia Minor Army Order of Battle April 1921
General HQ (Leonidas Paraskeuopoulos)
A Army Corps (Konstantinos Nider)
I infantry division
II infantry division
XIII infantry division
Kydonies infantry division
Cavalry division
B Army Corps (Pierrakos Mauromichalis)
III infantry division
IV infantry division
IX infantry division
Crete infantry division
Smyrna Army Corps (Dimitrios Ioannou)
Archipelago infantry division
Magnesia infantry division
Smyrna infantry division
Xanthi infantry division
Appendix 4 Turkish army order of battle, April 1921 [4]General HQ (Mustafa Kemal)
Eastern front (Kazim Karabekir)
3rd Caucasus infantry division [5]
9th Caucasus infantry division
11th Caucasus infantry division
12th Caucasus infantry division
Kars provisional infantry brigade
Southern front (2nd corps, opposite the French in Syria)
2nd infantry division
5th infantry division
9th infantry division
Western front (Ismet pasha)
North command (icluding Kocaeli group, Ismet in direct command)
Provisional Infantry division (at Adapazari)
7th infantry division [6]
1st infantry division [6]
11th infantry division [7]
24th infantry division [7]
61st infantry division
3rd cavalry division
South command (Refet bey)
12th group of divisions
23th infantry division
41st infantry division
57th infantry division
4th cavalry brigade
3rd infantry division [8]
4th infantry division [8]
5th Caucasus infantry division [8]
1st cavalry division [8]
2nd cavalry division [8]
Central front (Nureddin pasha)
15th Caucasus infantry division (Samsun-Amasya)
Kastamonu provisional infantry division (could be directly controlled from Ankara)
14th cavalry division
13th cavalry brigade
27th cavalry brigade
Ankara provisional infantry division
Appendix 5 Artillery of the Greek Asia Minor Army [9]Scneider-Ducrest 65mm: 136
Scneider-Danglis 75mm: 64
Schneider M1906 75mm: 88
Skoda 75mm guns: 42
Skoda 105mm: 26
4.5in howitzers: 48
6in 26 cwt howitzers: 36
Skoda 150mm: 12
[1] In OTL the Royalist government mobilized the same classes in March and April 1921 recruiting about 111,000 more men, but allowed widespread draft evasion in central Greece and the Peloponnesus that were primarily royalist. TTL no excuses are taken, the mobilization may not go to the extremes of 1917-18 at the height of the national schism when the Royalist actively tried to sabotage it and the Venizelist government answered by public executions of deserters, but still is enforced the same all over the country recruiting some 26,000 men more.[2] In OTL out of 328,000 men in June 1921 128,000 were retained in Europe on various excuses although a number of them would be later sent to Anatolia, the Asia Minor army was up to 224,000 by April 1st, 1922. Here the number of troops back in Europe is kept at the OTL April 1921 levels (slightly below 107,000 men) and is then further reduced to 84,000 the OTL March 1921 levels.
[3] Rifle strength is of course significantly lower for both the Greek and Turkish armies as the numbers here is total strength but still the Greeks have roughly a 2,5- 3:1 numerical superiority in infantry (~119,000 to ~46,000) and artillery (452 to 140 guns) while being somewhat inferior in cavalry (~3,500 against ~4,500)
[4] Source is the map 69, in book 3 of the Turkish army's Western front's official history for April 15th, 1921
[5] This one is in Trebizont in the map I assume here it was still under Eastern front command
[6] Kocaeli group most probably
[7] By April 15th 11th and 24th infantry are showing as probably reserve in the southern group. Since they were in the thick of the fighting during 2nd Inonu just before this in OTL, I suspect they had been pulled from the line to reorganize so left them still in the north TTL.
[8] These may be directly under Western front command and by July were for certain in the 1st, 3rd and 4th "groups of divisions" themselves, but the map is not showing something beyond an army level command.
[9] Rear area units excluded. I also make the assumption that the older De Bange 120mm guns and BL 6-inch 30 cwt have been placed in reserve to provide trained manpower for the heavy artillery provided by Britain. Rear area units artillery would be as follows:
Krupp M1904 Mountain gun 75mm: 10
Krupp M1904 field gun 75mm: 15
Schneider M1906 75mm: 6
Schneider M1904 75mm: 22
Schneider M1907 75mm: 8
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formion
Banned
Indeed!
This way, the divisions can wheel towards Seydi Gazi after capturing Eski Sehir and thus cut off the Turkmen Dag bastion.
Part 8 The Greek Spring offensive of 1921, battles of Kutahya-Eskisehir
Western Anatolia, April 7th, 1921 (old calendar)/April 20th, 1921 (new calendar)
If the Greeks were expecting something as easy as their advances during the previous summer they were in for a bitter disappointment. Turkish troops were far more numerous, better armed and had spent the winter months to thoroughly fortify their positions. They fought back with extreme determination and Greek casualties start quickly mounting. But so did Turkish casualties. The Greek commanders, didn't have to deal with trenches for the first time, they were veterans of the Macedonian front themselves and so were the majority of their troops. Further they were superior in both numbers and artillery. If trenches had to be cleared by grenade and bayonet, then they were cleared by grenade and bayonet. The Greeks advanced behind rolling artillery barrages, capturing Banaz and threatening Inonu by the end of the day.
South of Kutahya, April 11th, 1921 (old calendar)/April 24th, 1921 (new calendar)
It had taken the Greek southern group four days of intermittent fighting to reach the main Turkish defensive line, covering Kutahya from the south at Akche Dagh - Cavus ciflik - Hill 1799. The III, IV and Crete infantry divisions of Greek B corps attacked the line frontally, as its IX infantry division tried to turn the Turkish left with mixed results as the Turkish 41st infantry division had dug in at Pular before the Turkish left flank was flank. The real danger was further to the east where the Greek A corps with four infantry and one cavalry division was advancing towards Afyon and Seyitgazi with only the much weaker Turkish 12th group of divisions opposing it. If Seyitgazi fell the Turkish forces defending Kutahya, reorganized as the 3rd group of divisions would be trapped.
North of Kutahya and Eskisehir, April 11th, 1921 (old calendar)/April 24th, 1921 (new calendar)
The Greek Smyrna Corps had captured Inonu in April 8th and kept pushing south slowly, having gained some 20 km of ground in the previous four days of fighting. The Turkish northern group under Ismet's direct command fought back tenaciously. while further north the Turkish 7th and Provisional infantry divisions had attacked towards Nicaea and Nicomedeia, Iznik and Izmit for them, threatening the Smyrna Corps rear areas. Any hopes that the Greeks would pull back forces from the frontline were dashed as general Ioannou, the Smyrna Corps commander, kept all his forces concentrated in the fighting against Ismet, leaving the forces of the Bursa military command to deal with the threat in his rear. All the northern group forces, now organized into the 1st group of divisions. were tied down in the fighting making it impossible to reinforce the units that were defending Kutahya in the south.
Kutahya, Night of April 12/13th, 1921 (old calendar)/April 25/26th, 1921 (new calendar)
After two days of heavy fighting the lines to the south of the city were crumbling. Further to the east Greek cavalry was threatening Seyitgazi and Greek artillery was bombarding Afyon Karahisar. Ismet and Refet pasha had every intention of fighting on, in six days of fighting they had inflicted thousands of casualties on the Greeks and their forces might had lost ground and suffered heavy casualties of their own but were still fighting back. Mustafa Kemal, somewhat more distanced from the fighting though otherwise. The Turkish army was flirting with disaster and had to retreat before the Greeks captured Seyitgazi and Eskisehir trapping the Turkish army. The 1st group of divisions was ordered to hold Eskisehir at all costs while the 12th group of divisions retreated north-east to defend Seyitgazi to keep the line of retreat of the 3rd group of divisions at Kutahya and the 1st group's units to the west of Eskisehir open. Then the Turkish army would retreat back to Sakarya. Now the question was whether it was too already too late. The 3rd group of divisions at Kutahya had to break contact with the Greeks and march hard for at least three days to get out of the ringer with Greek troops closely behind and Greek aircraft attacking Turkish columns.
Eskisehir, April 15th, 1921 (old calendar)/April 28th, 1921 (new calendar)
Eskisehir fell. Kutahya and Afyon Karahisar had been taken by the Greeks in April 13th, following the Turkish retreat. The next day the Greek 3rd cavalry regiment had entered Seyitgazi, only to be pushed back by elements of the Turkish 57th infantry division. The town had changed hands two more times till finally a night attack by the I/5 battalion of the Greek 5th infantry regiment under major Charalambos Katsimitros had secured it and beaten back a hasty Turkish counterattack at first dawn. But Eskisehir had been tenaciously been held, its fall would cut off the primary railroad and paved road east, as the Greeks had slowly but inexorably edged their way towards it. Finally in the morning of April 15th the 4th Archipelago infantry regiment had entered the town.
Eskisehir, April 18th, 1921 (old calendar)/May 1st, 1921 (new calendar)
The fall of Eskisehir had been followed by a general counterattack by the Turkish 1st and 12th groups of divisions as the men of the 3rd group of divisions tried to break out
of the Kutahya pocket. In two days of heavy fighting the Greeks had mostly held out, several thousand men of the 3rd group of divisions had escaped the pocket but without their heavy equipment and not as organized units. Greek newspapers were ecstatic. Venizelos and his generals, at the general headquarters, which had just established itself at Eskisehir, Dorylaion for the Greeks, were a tougher audience though. The Greeks had won a major victory but had not destroyed the Kemalist army altogether, most large formations were retreating towards Ankara. It would be folly to let the Kemalists recover. Just as the Kutahya pocket was being moped up, Theodore Pangalos, the chief of staff of army General HQ, issued on behalf of Paraskeuopoulos the orders "to pursue the enemy without pause" towards Ankara...
If the Greeks were expecting something as easy as their advances during the previous summer they were in for a bitter disappointment. Turkish troops were far more numerous, better armed and had spent the winter months to thoroughly fortify their positions. They fought back with extreme determination and Greek casualties start quickly mounting. But so did Turkish casualties. The Greek commanders, didn't have to deal with trenches for the first time, they were veterans of the Macedonian front themselves and so were the majority of their troops. Further they were superior in both numbers and artillery. If trenches had to be cleared by grenade and bayonet, then they were cleared by grenade and bayonet. The Greeks advanced behind rolling artillery barrages, capturing Banaz and threatening Inonu by the end of the day.
South of Kutahya, April 11th, 1921 (old calendar)/April 24th, 1921 (new calendar)
It had taken the Greek southern group four days of intermittent fighting to reach the main Turkish defensive line, covering Kutahya from the south at Akche Dagh - Cavus ciflik - Hill 1799. The III, IV and Crete infantry divisions of Greek B corps attacked the line frontally, as its IX infantry division tried to turn the Turkish left with mixed results as the Turkish 41st infantry division had dug in at Pular before the Turkish left flank was flank. The real danger was further to the east where the Greek A corps with four infantry and one cavalry division was advancing towards Afyon and Seyitgazi with only the much weaker Turkish 12th group of divisions opposing it. If Seyitgazi fell the Turkish forces defending Kutahya, reorganized as the 3rd group of divisions would be trapped.
North of Kutahya and Eskisehir, April 11th, 1921 (old calendar)/April 24th, 1921 (new calendar)
The Greek Smyrna Corps had captured Inonu in April 8th and kept pushing south slowly, having gained some 20 km of ground in the previous four days of fighting. The Turkish northern group under Ismet's direct command fought back tenaciously. while further north the Turkish 7th and Provisional infantry divisions had attacked towards Nicaea and Nicomedeia, Iznik and Izmit for them, threatening the Smyrna Corps rear areas. Any hopes that the Greeks would pull back forces from the frontline were dashed as general Ioannou, the Smyrna Corps commander, kept all his forces concentrated in the fighting against Ismet, leaving the forces of the Bursa military command to deal with the threat in his rear. All the northern group forces, now organized into the 1st group of divisions. were tied down in the fighting making it impossible to reinforce the units that were defending Kutahya in the south.
Kutahya, Night of April 12/13th, 1921 (old calendar)/April 25/26th, 1921 (new calendar)
After two days of heavy fighting the lines to the south of the city were crumbling. Further to the east Greek cavalry was threatening Seyitgazi and Greek artillery was bombarding Afyon Karahisar. Ismet and Refet pasha had every intention of fighting on, in six days of fighting they had inflicted thousands of casualties on the Greeks and their forces might had lost ground and suffered heavy casualties of their own but were still fighting back. Mustafa Kemal, somewhat more distanced from the fighting though otherwise. The Turkish army was flirting with disaster and had to retreat before the Greeks captured Seyitgazi and Eskisehir trapping the Turkish army. The 1st group of divisions was ordered to hold Eskisehir at all costs while the 12th group of divisions retreated north-east to defend Seyitgazi to keep the line of retreat of the 3rd group of divisions at Kutahya and the 1st group's units to the west of Eskisehir open. Then the Turkish army would retreat back to Sakarya. Now the question was whether it was too already too late. The 3rd group of divisions at Kutahya had to break contact with the Greeks and march hard for at least three days to get out of the ringer with Greek troops closely behind and Greek aircraft attacking Turkish columns.
Eskisehir, April 15th, 1921 (old calendar)/April 28th, 1921 (new calendar)
Eskisehir fell. Kutahya and Afyon Karahisar had been taken by the Greeks in April 13th, following the Turkish retreat. The next day the Greek 3rd cavalry regiment had entered Seyitgazi, only to be pushed back by elements of the Turkish 57th infantry division. The town had changed hands two more times till finally a night attack by the I/5 battalion of the Greek 5th infantry regiment under major Charalambos Katsimitros had secured it and beaten back a hasty Turkish counterattack at first dawn. But Eskisehir had been tenaciously been held, its fall would cut off the primary railroad and paved road east, as the Greeks had slowly but inexorably edged their way towards it. Finally in the morning of April 15th the 4th Archipelago infantry regiment had entered the town.
Eskisehir, April 18th, 1921 (old calendar)/May 1st, 1921 (new calendar)
The fall of Eskisehir had been followed by a general counterattack by the Turkish 1st and 12th groups of divisions as the men of the 3rd group of divisions tried to break out
of the Kutahya pocket. In two days of heavy fighting the Greeks had mostly held out, several thousand men of the 3rd group of divisions had escaped the pocket but without their heavy equipment and not as organized units. Greek newspapers were ecstatic. Venizelos and his generals, at the general headquarters, which had just established itself at Eskisehir, Dorylaion for the Greeks, were a tougher audience though. The Greeks had won a major victory but had not destroyed the Kemalist army altogether, most large formations were retreating towards Ankara. It would be folly to let the Kemalists recover. Just as the Kutahya pocket was being moped up, Theodore Pangalos, the chief of staff of army General HQ, issued on behalf of Paraskeuopoulos the orders "to pursue the enemy without pause" towards Ankara...
formion
Banned
Indeed! In OTL precious time was lost after the Eski Sehir-Afyon Karahisar Offensive. After all, the aim should have been the destruction of the nationalist field army, not just capturing and holding ground. As 2/3 of the kemalist army have escaped, it is only logical to pursue.
In OTL, I think the Kemalist army lost something like 14,000 men due to desertion after the battles, in addition to battle casualties. The break of pursuit provided enough time for Kemal to replenish his ranks.
It should be mentioned that in terms of both material and manpower, Kemal didnt have much options if his field army was destroyed. A back-of-the-envelop quick estimation, the Nationalists would have a population base of less than 5,6 million people according to the 1914 statistics. If we take into account that the eastern villayets were fought over during WW1 with huge loss of life and that the muslim male population was devasted by fighting in 4 diffrent fronts, then the population base is even smaller. Moreover, at least 1 million of this population are Kurds, who while happy to fight as irregulars in low itensity theaters, they wouldnt allow to get drafted in a regular army.
At the same time, there is no functioning turkish economy to speak of. The economy has collapsed and all the export-producing regions are in Entente hands. The only resources left to the Kemalists are Samsun tobacco (and the port has been destroyed and blockaded) and Isparta/Konya carpets. In total, they can get their hands in 5-10% of the pre-war exporting goods. Therefore, they cannot pay for any substantial amount of weaponry and ammunition. They are almost completely depended upon Soviet and Italian goodwill. I have read that in OTL July 1921, after the Eski Sehir-Kutahya-Afyon battles, Lenin was thinking of distancing himself from the Nationalists. He changed his mind after the successful Sakarya battle. In TTL, the battles have been already worse for the Turks.
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Very intriguing timeline you had created here. I'm very interested to see where it goes and with the detail given I believe it's going to be a very well written one.
Two main notes I have :
1)I hope it won't be a complete Greek wank without Kemal proving why he is named Ataturk , even in defeat his charisma and intelligence could lighten the Turkish defeat.
2)I feel as a normal reader you are giving way to much detailed info in the division movements which makes me a bit lost but of course this one is up to me to keep up and not your fault.
Hope you keep up the pace cause you got me hooked!
Two main notes I have :
1)I hope it won't be a complete Greek wank without Kemal proving why he is named Ataturk , even in defeat his charisma and intelligence could lighten the Turkish defeat.
2)I feel as a normal reader you are giving way to much detailed info in the division movements which makes me a bit lost but of course this one is up to me to keep up and not your fault.
Hope you keep up the pace cause you got me hooked!
They are pursuing decidedly not like OTL. In OTL the Greeks came close to encircling the Turkish army at Kutahya but ultimately failed to do so. On one hand this was due to Kemal ordering a timely retreat. On the other it was due to failures on the Greek side, the northern prong of the attack had been split in two widely separated columns that effectively failed to tie down the Turkish forces in the north, while the south Papoulas switched one of his two corps from a wide encirclement of the Turkish left flank to driving it straight into the leftmost part of the Turkish line and also lost time shifting around his two corps. Then the Greeks simply failed to pursue the retreating Turkish army and gave it several weeks to regroup. These weeks were most certainly needed. Erickson's biography of Kemal laconically says "deserters had become a major drain on the field army". A major drain indeed... the Turkish army had initially over 30,000 men missing, nearly a third of its total force. But only about 5,000 had been taken prisoner by the Greeks, the majority was able to return to the colours. Problem is OTL Papoulas was jumped up from commanding a regiment in 1912, to commanding an 11 division strong field army in November 1920 just on his political credentials with the royalists, while at the same time all three corps commanders, 10 out of 11 division commanders and more than two thirds of the regimental commanders were replaced. TTL the Greeks have an uninterrupted command of Macedonian front veterans...
Most inconveniently, the Turkish official history on the battle is the ONLY one not online, unlike the ones for the periods right before and right after it. Granted I do not speak Turkish but can read maps and tables. Google translate is your friend. Now from what can be found online, Turkish casualties amounted to 37,807 men with 30,809 "missing". For Sakarya the official data is 39,289 casualties and I very much suspect, though I might be wrong this is the final tally for the whole period, Turkish histories have this tendency to view Kutahya-Eskisehir as just the opening stage of Sakarya. If I'm right, we do know the Greek army took about ~5,000 POWs, and subtracting about 22,000 combat losses at Sakarya (Greek signal intercepts right after the battle and also Erickson in his biography of Kemal) we get permanent casualties at Kutahya slightly over 17,000 men. If I'm right the Turkish army had over 20,000 deserters, perhaps stragglers is a better term as most apparently returned to the colours. If not and the Turks took over 39,000 casualties just in Sakarya on top of nearly 38,000 in Kutahya I'd have to up several notches my estimation of Greek combat effectiveness in the battles...
Which is another way of proving Papoulas was utterly, moronically stupid in failing to pursue after the fall of Eskisehir, Just picking up Turkish stragglers as the Turkish army pulled back towards Ankara could well turn the retreat into a mess, at little cost to his army. And of course Gounaris is the one that must take the blame for choosing him over Dousmanis or Gouvelis and Gennadis. An unfortunate that found himself dealing with a situation beyond his competence putting the Greek army in the hands of someone that's doubtful if he could command anything over a regiment successfully.
The Sakarya casualty tables from the Turkish official history
In terms of the Greek-Turkish war any Greek success is to a greater or lesser extend something of a Greek wank, not in terms of plausibility but rather in terms of its effects. And for better or worse it is a zero sum game which can't be helped much either. That said though I've always been a fan of keeping things plausible.
About Kemal he was no doubt a very capable man who created modern Turkey. That said he was also the man who finished the Young Turks job in destroying the Christian populations of Turkey and then proclaimed a republic, which is reality was single party dictatorship that remained so even after his death till 1950. It is not accidental that in the 1920s and 1930s republican Turkey was being compared to fascist Italy and was being thought thought of as a role model by German nationalists (see Ihring's "Ataturk and the Nazis" on that) before that went out of fashion. As it is not accidental that Kemal still has what amounts to a cult of personality and is thought, for good reason, very well off 8 decades after his death while Mussolini for example or Franco have been condemned to the dustbin of history. The man was far more capable, knew where to stop... and of course won and made sure his people were the ones writing the history books...