The upcoming forecast for Japan, today, tommorow, and next week, will have a guaranteed precipitation of bombs throughout the week. We'd suggest you take shelter, but....
Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
- Start date
Hmm, maybe the slivers Germany lost in the East OTL + East Prussia will create the German Democratic Republic, but will have West Germany to the West and an Allied-controlled Polish state to the east. I for one am glad the Soviets don't get as much of Europe as OTL.
By the way, will there be any border adjustments in Soviet-controlled Austria, perhaps to transfer to their german satellite?
Anyway, given the italians continuing to fight, i wouldn't be surprised if austria regained South Tyrol in a harsher peace deal than the italians had OTL
Anyway, given the italians continuing to fight, i wouldn't be surprised if austria regained South Tyrol in a harsher peace deal than the italians had OTL
Garrison
Donor
There will be an update along soon explaining the carve up, I mean the disposition of Europe.
So instead of West and East Germany, there'd be North and South Germany.
Anyone else expecting Italy to be split into a northern and southern part?
Anyone else expecting Italy to be split into a northern and southern part?
9th May – 7th July 1944 – Victory in Europe – Part III - Italy Divided
Garrison
Donor
9th May – 7th July 1944 – Victory in Europe – Part III - Italy Divided
It might have been more accurate and less bombastic to call VE-Day Victory in Northern Europe day, because the surrender of the Third Reich brought no peace in Italy. Technically the German forces in the country should have laid down their arms at the same time as their comrades in the rest of Europe, there was however the small matter of who they exactly they were supposed to surrender to? A delegation consisting of senior German officers escorted by British and American representatives were flown into Italy to confirm the surrender and make arrangements the details of disarming and demobilizing the German army in Italy. Later claims of defiant German Generals in Italy are completely inaccurate as the German forces there had absolutely no desire to fight on in the name of the fallen Nazi regime, they simply were not prepared to lay down their arms while they were still facing persistent attacks from Italian partisans, significantly reinforced by elements of the army that had defected to the Communist resistance movement. Those elements who had remained loyal to the Ciano government, or at least opposed to the prospect of the Communists taking power, were also not averse to taking time off from shooting at the Communists to ambush German troops [1].
What the German forces proposed was that they be allowed to retain their arms for self-defence and withdraw towards Austria, those parts not under control of the Red Army, where they could be safely disarmed and interned. The prospect of armed German troops marching into Austria did not sit well with anyone at SHAEF and things grew more complicated when Ciano announced that as Italy had been de facto at war with Germany for many months and that his government had, albeit rather late in the day, disavowed Mussolini’s actions Italy should therefore be regarded as an associate power, that is one that had fought alongside the Allies while never formally joining them. This breath-taking invocation the language used by the USA when it entered WWI was a desperate gamble to make the British and Americans to think twice about simply demanding the dismantlement of the Fascist regime, or perhaps providing the Western Allies with an excuse not to do so. These public pronouncements were supported by messages relayed via the Vatican warning of the dire consequences if the Communists were allowed to run amok, with anyone they saw as an enemy being lynched from the nearest lamppost and even the Pope himself not safe from their wrath [2].
Regrettably, or not depending on one’s view of the Fascist regime in Italy, the claims from Rome were not mere hyperbole. Representatives of the Fascist authorities in several northern cities had been executed for crimes against the people by Communist led workers committees as the fighting grew more and more bitter, especially around Turin. The Communist partisans might have been the most vocal in expressing their views, but none of Italian factions wanted the Germans to be simply allowed to depart Italy unscathed. They believed, with some justification as it transpired, that the Allies would go easy on the Germans who had fought in Italy, and that they would escape punishment for the crimes they had committed against Italian civilians. The Communists were naturally also adamant that the Ciano government was every bit as complicit in what had happened after the occupation by the Germans as the Wehrmacht and the SS were. The last-minute decision of the ‘Roman Regime’ to turn against their former allies should not be used as an excuse to let them off the hook for their previous actions [3].
In London and Washington, the Italian situation rapidly turned into a major headache, compounded by the shifting political balance in the US administration. While the battle against Nazi Germany still raged it had been possible to ignore the politics of the resistance groups that fought against them, whether they were ultranationalists or hard-line Communists. With the end of the war the Western Allies might still be willing to turn a blind eye to the actions of some of the nationalists but pre-war attitudes to Communist movements rapidly reasserted themselves, particularly in Washington. Faced with a series of unpalatable choices the Americans decided, for the time being at least, to treat the Ciano government as being a separate entity from the regime under Mussolini that had entered the war and that they could thus be used to maintain order and administer the country until such time as some more acceptable political entity could take charge in Italy. The plan was endorsed in London, reluctantly, and it was a compromise that made no one happy. Eisenhower and his staff at SHAEF were even less happy with the sudden demands put on manpower by the decisions taken by the politicians, divisions that had been looking forward to a much-needed rest, and the prospect of demobilization for those who had been drafted for the duration of the war, were suddenly given new orders, and dispatched to Italy by land sea and air [4].
The hastily improvised plan called for Rome to be secured and for a phased relocation of the German forces in Italy back to Austria, under Allied supervision, and thence to Germany. The soldiers would be systematically disarmed, and the officers interrogated as they were moved out. No one expected these relatively straightforward orders to be simple to implement and their worst fears would be swiftly realized as it became clear that the partisan groups were not going to comply, with the Communists front and centre in refusing any co-operation with the regime in Rome and now declaring their own Soviet councils, with Turin serving as their de facto capital. The remains of the Italian army that was willing to give its loyalty to the government in Rome began to fall back to a line anchored on the capital, officially to regroup and prepare for fresh operations against the Communists once the Germans had been evacuated. This was not what SHAEF had in mind when they began to deploy troops to Italy, they had expected the Italian forces in the north to remain in place and either assist the Allies or be disarmed. Ciano however was hoping that by placing the American and British troops between the resistance forces and the Germans the Communist partisans would attack the Allied forces while trying to get at the Germans and force the Allies to suppress the Communists while the loyalist elements of the army reorganized and bided their time. Ciano was banking on the Allies needing him and the Italian army to keep the areas of the country they did exercise some control over running, and the Italian High Command even entertained the possibility that they might turn over some captured Wehrmacht equipment to the Italian Army to assist them in maintaining order [5].
This seemed wildly optimistic on the part of the man who was the head of what was after all still a Fascist regime and one that had remained a member of the Axis whatever sophistry they might now be deploying. Astonishingly in this, if little else, Ciano proved correct. There were serious divisions between the Allies over the future of Italy, with the Americans far more willing to ignore some of the actions of the Ciano regime in the interests of preventing a communist takeover. What this led to was that many of those in Italy who had come to detest the Fascists were willing to temporarily align themselves with the Communists when they announced their intent to set up a ‘Free Italian’ government based in Turin. Whatever some senior politicians in Washington might want there was no support among the military chiefs for becoming bogged down in trying to suppress the ‘Free Italians’ many of whom seemed decidedly more anti-fascist than pro-Communist and Roosevelt was far from willing to pick such aa fight when there was another conference with Stalin looming. The reality was that what the political manoeuvring in the USA had created was a de facto partition of Italy, an accusation that would come back to haunt Dewey during his time in the White House [6].
[1] Basically all the Italian factions hate each other, but they all hate the Germans, even the remaining Italian Fascists.
[2] The thing is here the British and Americans haven’t been fighting a long hard battle against the Italians, indeed outside of Sicily the Americans haven’t fought them at all and the North African campaign was a short and one-sided affair as far as the British are concerned. The Greeks have a lot more to be angry about regarding Fascist Italy, but no one is asking them.
[3] Which is a fair point, but fair doesn’t count for all that much in the post-war disposition of Europe.
[4] Not invading Italy had definite benefits for the Allies, but now it means there is no one in position to quickly take charge, which means Ciano may avoid the hangman.
[5] It is a massive gamble by Ciano, but when the alternative appears to be summary execution…
[6] It’s a temporary division, if you measure things in terms of geological eras.
7th June – 1st July 1944 – Japan Alone – Part I – Fighting on in the Name of the Emperor
Garrison
Donor
7th June – 1st July 1944 – Japan Alone – Part I – Fighting on in the Name of the Emperor
The death of Hitler and the surrender of the Third Reich produced remarkably little public reaction from the leadership in Tokyo, even though it meant there was now nothing to prevent the Allies turning the full weight of their militaries against them. Heavy censorship combined with propaganda that continued to pretend that there was still a path to victory for Japan meant that if it didn’t quite go unnoticed by the Japanese people its true impact on the country’s situation wasn’t appreciated, or if it was no one was foolish enough to discuss it in public. Even in the corridors of power in Tokyo information was hardly freely disseminated, but it was impossible to avoid some discussion of the consequences of being the last member of the Axis left in the war. In a sign of the delusions that were still prevalent among the Japanese leadership some tried to put a positive spin on the fall of Germany, after all with the war in Europe over the desire for a return to peace among the Allies might now prove overwhelming, especially if Japan demonstrated its unshakeable resolve to keep fighting and put her enemies to the sword. Despite the limitations of their intelligence apparatus Japanese leaders were somewhat aware of the shifting political situation in the USA and Britain via reports from neutral sources and the monitoring of Allied broadcasts. Given the distorted vision of the west still held by many in Imperial Japan it was hardly surprising that hopes of the Allies simply abandoning the war against Japan as too costly were treated seriously, even after the multiple reverses Japan had suffered [1].
The Japanese High Command was also aware of just how dependent British operations in South East Asia were on Indian ‘sepoys’ for manpower to fight their battles. The possibility that India might yet rise up against the British was still taken seriously, even though Japanese efforts to establish links with the fierier elements of the Indian independence movement had long since foundered and the disappearance of Chandra Bose, with the Japanese refusing to reveal what fate had befallen him, left a legacy of hostility that continued long after the war ended. Records show that the Japanese were completely unaware of the scope of the negotiations taking place between the British and the Indian nationalists. When news of the agreement on Indian Dominion status was announced to the British Parliament on the 9th of July, with the full support of the soon to be in government Labour Party, it was met with bewilderment in Tokyo and some members of the government simply refused to believe it even when the news came from ‘official’ sources such as the BBC. Emperor Hirohito himself stated his view that it had to be a deception, surely the British would not, could not, dishonour their own King by simply giving away part of the Empire he ruled over [2]?
To those who could still bring themselves to look at the bigger picture of the war and the situation in Asia as a whole it was obvious that this was deal was no deception and it benefitted both sides. The Indians would finally have self-rule, though details of the plans for autonomy in the Muslim and Sikh majority regions of the nation were still to be finalized, and the British not only guaranteed the continued supply of Indian troops to reinforce their armies but by removing the burden of having to impose control in the sub-continent could focus more of their energies on the rest of their imperial possessions in South East Asia, not to mention the territories of other colonial powers they were occupying as they continued their drive towards Japan. This view was still not entirely realistic with as it assumed the British were looking to expand their imperial holdings when in fact, they had no desire to make any long-term commitments in places such as Thailand and Indochina. The latter in particular was regarded as powder keg the British would be happy to leave to the French to deal with [3].
Whatever the British might want most in Tokyo could at least agree that it was the USA that was key to putting an end to the war, if the American public turned against continuing the war then peace would be inevitable regardless of what the colonial powers might want and the imminent departure of President Roosevelt was taken to represent a possible change of heart on the part of the American public about the desirability of continuing to prosecute the war. The problem with such ideas was that Thomas Dewey had long sympathised with those who felt more resources should have been made available to fight the Japanese from the beginning of the war. They had after all conducted a dastardly sneak attack on US soil and seized US possessions in the Pacific, Imperial Japan had to be destroyed every bit as thoroughly as Nazi Germany, and in this Dewey broadly represented the views of the average US citizen. If the Japanese had cared to listen to those few neutral contacts they still possessed they would have realized that for many Americans the desire for retribution against Japan still burned brightly and they were willing to make further sacrifices to achieve that goal, though there was likely to come a time when the cost in lives of defeating Japan might be seen as too high to contemplate the USA was nowhere that point in the summer of 1944. No one in Tokyo was interested in listening to any such warnings, instead choosing to believe that if they could just inflict some military setbacks on the Americans their ‘cowboy’ attitude would swiftly evaporate, and they would embrace a more sensible position [4].
The one great strategic question where there was something resembling a realistic discussion in Tokyo was what would the USSR do? The non-aggression pact between Japan and the Soviets had survived the war to date, but no one was under any illusion that was anything more than a convenience for both sides. The battle of Khalkhin Gol lingered in the minds of the Japanese Imperial Staff and they were acutely aware there were unresolved territorial issues between Japan and the USSR, especially on the divided Sakhalin Island where the north was in the control of the soviets and everything south of the 50th Parallel was included in the Japanese Karafuto Prefecture. The Kurile Islands were also a bone of contention. Despite the long war against the Germans there were still significant Soviets forces in Mongolia and Siberia that could threaten Manchukuo, the Japanese puppet state in Manchuria. None of these matters had been settled by the non-aggression pact and no one in Tokyo imagined Stalin had simply forgotten about them [5].
The possibility of reinforcing the non-aggression pact with the Soviets was the one area where Japan was willing to consider diplomacy rather than stubborn intransigence. This could be justified even by the hard-line militarists since Japan was after all not at war with the USSR so there was no shame in talking with them on the basis of equals. Framing the question of Soviet entry into the war in Asia in terms of whether the USSR really wanted to commit themselves to a fight that would only serve the colonial interests of the British and Americans seemed to offer a political strategy that might pay dividends. With the Soviet’s Communist allies in China fairing badly as the Americans funnelled an ever larger share of the Lend-Lease supplies flowing into the country to the Nationalists while the USSR was forced to dial back their support as their own share of Lend-Lease had been reduced, officially because of the demands of the Anglo-American offensive in Europe, it was even possible that some accommodation might be reached there with regard to ceding territory to the Chinese Communists, agreed in the same way the secret addendums to the Molotov-Ribbentrop had been in 1939 [6].
Such ideas might have sounded attractive to the leadership in Tokyo, and perhaps even to some in Moscow, however such remains a matter of speculation as this line of diplomacy was not actively pursued by the Japanese in the immediate aftermath of the defeat of Germany. The counterargument for negotiating with the Soviets in July 1944 was that it would be seen as a sign of weakness and it might backfire, encouraging the Soviets to enter the war and stiffening the resolve of the British and Americans. As would be seen when the Japanese did finally make overtures to the Soviets in the autumn it was an idea that was doomed to fail. Talk of the USSR making terms with the Japanese were no more realistic than suggestions of a separate peace with the Germans in 1943. The Anglo-Americans had after all kept their word about opening a second front and not accepting anything less than unconditional surrender from Germany and Stalin had made in turn made a commitment to enter the war against Japan, albeit reluctantly and with a certain vagueness about the timing. If the USSR reneged on that commitment, then the British and Americans might well feel free to change their minds about the future disposition of Europe. Joining the war against Japan might in fact provide the USSR with additional bargaining chips [7].
With no prospect of any political or diplomatic solutions to Japan’s situation, and given that surrender remained a taboo subject, the Japanese had no choice but to carry on looking for a military solution, regardless of how unlikely or desperate such a solution might be. There was little in the way of new weapons that Japan could deploy to fight the Allies, and what new models of tanks and aircraft did become available were produced in tiny numbers compared to British and American production. They were also retained for the defence of the Home Islands, in no small part because of the increasing difficulties of shipping anything to the remaining outposts of the Japanese empire. It would not simply be Japanese soldiers who would be expected to fight and die in the outposts of the empire such as Okinawa and Korea, it would be the civilian population both Japanese colonists and native peoples. There were no weapons available to be issued to these populations, they would be expected to sacrifice themselves while armed with kitchen knives, machetes and wooden spears. The civilian population had been relentlessly indoctrinated with the belief that death was better than the brutal treatment they could expect if they fell into the hands of the Americans or British. Given how the Japanese administration had treated the native Koreans and Okinawans such dire warnings seemed all too credible, and the Japanese civilians at least were terrorised into embracing the belief it was better to die rather than surrender, with tragic results [8].
If jets, rockets, or the atomic bomb were beyond the resources of Japan to develop or deploy then there were still options available to them for the kind of force multiplier that would allow Japan to hold off or at least slow down the Allies. Chemical and biological weapons were both options that Japan had explored and they had been given information on the manufacture of the latest German nerve agents, but producing sophisticated chemical weapons such as Tabun on the scale needed for operational use beyond the capacity of Japanese industry. On the other hand, courtesy of Unit 731 the Japanese already had experience with biological weapons, though their efficacy during the ‘field tests’ carried out in China had been less than impressive, despite the civilian casualties caused. This had not discouraged Unit 731 and other associates from continuing to work on weaponizing Bubonic plague and other diseases, though developing effective deployment systems remained a work in progress. With an overabundance of ambition, the Japanese were looking for ways to not only deliver biological attacks against the Allied strongholds in the Pacific and Asia but even to target the west coast of the USA. That such plans were given serious consideration amply demonstrates the unwillingness to face the reality in front of the Japanese leadership, that their country was doomed to defeat and the only power they held was to decide how bloody that defeat would prove to be for both sides [9].
[1] The likes of Yamamoto who might have contradicted this view are either dead or learned to keep their mouths shut.
[2] For all his disbelief Hirohito has to begin wondering about his own future.
[3] The British might not want to make any commitments, that doesn’t mean they won’t have to in some places.
[4] When you’ve concluded that the choices are win or die such delusions are easy to embrace.
[5] Not so much the elephant in the room as the hungry Tyrannosaurus Rex in the room.
[6] It’s another of those things that sound like it might work, but it’s a badly flawed idea when you examine it in detail.
[7] Stalin is not happy, but he’s anxious rather than angry at this point and he’s not about to break the letter of his agreements, of course the spirit of them is a different matter.
[8] It’s going to be ugly as the Japanese leadership get more and more desperate, but even the most ardent believers in the Bushido code can only stand so much.
[9] What will it take to force Japan to give up? We will see over the remainder of 1944.
Has the B-29 started production yet and have the Allied secured airfields to begin bombing the Home Islands?
Garrison
Donor
That will be discussed soon, but the B-29 is following about the same production schedule as OTL.
So, there might be a chance that it might even miss its big moment? Interesting..
Had the thought that the hints and foreshadowing may be referring to a 'Yugoslavia style' state in Northern Italy, with a Rome-based Spain-esque Right-Wing Authoritarian state controlling the south of Italy.
By 'Yugoslavia style', I'm meaning a Communist/Socialist State, but not one cast in the Soviet mold nor found in the Soviet sphere. Particularly with the reference to many groups that wouldn't normally truck with the Communists being willing to get on board. That implies a broader and more pluralistic support base than a Vanguard Party really accounts for. And when they're all heavily armed and are all experienced in Guerilla/Partisan warfare, simply telling them 'Get with the Program' isn't the... Most clear-sighted option.
speaking of, what do we know about how Yugoslavia itself is doing?
By 'Yugoslavia style', I'm meaning a Communist/Socialist State, but not one cast in the Soviet mold nor found in the Soviet sphere. Particularly with the reference to many groups that wouldn't normally truck with the Communists being willing to get on board. That implies a broader and more pluralistic support base than a Vanguard Party really accounts for. And when they're all heavily armed and are all experienced in Guerilla/Partisan warfare, simply telling them 'Get with the Program' isn't the... Most clear-sighted option.
speaking of, what do we know about how Yugoslavia itself is doing?
Garrison
Donor
Owing to events in Greece and a more rapid arrival of Allied forces means that Yugoslavia is minus Croatia and Slovenia.
Hello,
So that may mean that this person's role may come out differently...
Josip Broz Tito | eHISTORY
7th June – 1st July 1944 – Japan Alone – Part II – Prosecuting the War to the Bitter End
Garrison
Donor
7th June – 1st July 1944 – Japan Alone – Part II – Prosecuting the War to the Bitter End
Whatever the hopes in Tokyo there was a clear resolve in Washington and London that Japan had to be defeated every bit as comprehensively as Germany had been, there could be no half-measures. Japan didn’t pose the existential threat to Britain that Nazi Germany had, but neither Conservative nor Labour politicians were inclined to see Britain dragged into some future war in Asia because Japan had been allowed to lick its wounds and regroup. The revelations about the brutality of the Japanese during their occupation of the areas they had conquered in 1942 had also hardened attitudes, especially the treatment of European POWs and civilians who fallen under their control. In the USA there had always been those who believed that Japan should have been the priority from the beginning of the war and with Germany defeated there was no question of pursuing anything but unconditional surrender from Japan. If the Japanese wanted to choose to fight to the death rather than capitulate then few in Washington would lose any sleep over that, with the caveat that such a victory should be achieved at the lowest possible cost in Allied casualties possible [1].
Thus, the question that occupied the Western Allies was not whether Japanese should be forced into unconditional surrender it was how best to achieve that objective. Even if the entirety of the Japanese defence perimeter was reduced and placed under Allied control mounting an amphibious invasion of the Home Islands would be a challenge on even greater scale than Operation Millennium. Given the distances involved and the prospect of facing an unyieldingly hostile civilian population it would require a far larger build-up of forces, and according to the best estimates of the planners a death toll an order of magnitude higher than the campaign in Northwest Europe. There would be no resistance movements in Japan to aid the Allies with intelligence information and acts of sabotage, and the logistics of building up the manpower and supplies to mount the operation in the absence of the kind of base that Southern England provided added another level of complexity. Still defeating Japan without having to mount such an invasion seemed unlikely in the summer of 1944 and regardless of the challenges work to devise a workable plan pressed ahead [2].
Given the grim estimates of the cost of putting boots on the ground in the Home Islands it was hardly surprising that the advocates of strategic bombing saw an opportunity to prove that they could win the war from the air, despite the mountain of evidence from Europe to the contrary. Even the sceptics though had to concede that the Allied bombing campaign had helped greatly to soften up the Reich and Japan’s infrastructure was far more vulnerable than that of the considerably more industrialized Germany. As attractive as an air campaign was it faced many of the same problems of distance and logistics as an amphibious operation. The workhorse of the USAAF in the European theatre the B-17 simply did not have the range for a strategic campaign in the Pacific, unless bases significantly closer to Japan could be seized and even if they could the USAAF was pinning its hopes on a new and far more powerful bomber, the B-29 Stratofortress. This was a state-of-the-art aircraft, with a fully pressurised crew cabin and an analogue mechanical computer that allowed two men to control multiple defensive gun turrets. More importantly from the point of view of attacking Japan it could carry four times the bombload of the B-17 with a 2000km greater range. In the summer of 1944, the B-29 had only just entered operational service and was not yet available in large numbers and even with its considerable capabilities it struggled to reach Japan from any currently available base. It could, barely, reach Japan from bases in China, but maintaining the supply lines for the USAAF bomber squadrons there was no easy feat, despite the considerable expansion of the Burma Road. The desire to establish new bases in China and shorten USAAF supply lines would help drive forward plans for a major offensive by the Kuomintang, but the Americans were also planning to invade the Gilbert and Marshall Islands to establish forward bases for the B-29 [3].
The RAF had an even more complex problem in that their next generation of bomber, an evolution of the Lancaster that would be renamed the Lincoln, was nowhere near operational status. Indeed, the Lincoln was barely in its testing phase and the Lancaster itself had a maximum range of 4000km, one thousand less than the B-29, though this was considerably greater than that of the B-17. This meant that like the Americans if the British wished to mount a major bombing offensive against Japan they would need new bases, which would mean yet more amphibious operations. The liberation of Hong Kong was already being planned; however the new British government would reluctantly accept that they would have to extend themselves further than that last occupied corner of the British Empire. Well before any official decision was made the Imperial General Staff was acquainting themselves with maps of the Korean Peninsula [4].
Even with the plans to dramatically increase the scale of the Allied bombing campaign consideration had to be given to weapons that would amplify the destructive power of those attacks this meant evaluating the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Unlike the Japanese the Americans had a functioning nuclear bomb program and considerable progress was being made, however the most optimistic projections put a working weapon in the spring of 1945, and the pessimists were suggesting the autumn or even 1946. Any chance of accelerating the project would require expanding its reach, meaning in practice sharing more technical information with the British to enlist their research institutions in solving the outstanding technical issues, as much as this pained those who wanted to keep nuclear weapons as exclusively US property. The British had acquired considerable information on the German plans for a radiological bomb and the grim experience at the Auschwitz SP site had shown the potentially devastating effects of radioactive fallout. A radiological weapon might be simpler than a true atomic bomb, but it still required large quantities of nuclear materials that were still in limited supply and the Americans were determined that those available should be retained for the Manhattan Project [5].
One thing the British did have an abundance of was Anthrax. This had been developed as a weapon for use against Germany if the Nazis deployed chemical weapons against Britain or as a last resort if the invasion of Europe was stalled. Under the aegis of Operation Vegetarian the Anthrax would have been distributed all across Germany, infecting and destroying the livestock on which Germany depended both for its food supply and transportation. That the disease would have spread to humans was all but inevitable and the loss of life would have been considerable even if one only considered the consequences of malnutrition and the diseases that would bring. Aside from the successful Allied advance across France and Germany the other reason not to use the Anthrax was its sheer persistence, spores would remain viable in the soil not for months or years but for decades. To illustrate the scale of the problem the site of the British Anthrax tests, Gruinard Island in Scotland, would not be successfully decontaminated and returned to the heirs of its original owners until 1990. There was also the risk that the Anthrax would be dispersed across the whole of Europe, inflicting further damage on countries that would already face a long battle to recover in the aftermath of the defeat of Nazi Germany without the threat of Anthrax hanging over them [6].
The objections to the use of Anthrax in Europe, both moral and practical, carried far less weight when it came to Japan, indeed the relative isolation of the Home Islands worked in favour of both biological agents such as Anthrax and of chemical agents, the latter being an area where the Allies found themselves reluctantly forced to embrace the work done by Nazi scientists on nerve agents, including utilizing the data those scientists had acquired from human testing. Until to the fall of Germany the Allies chemical weapon stockpiles were dependent on the array of weapons developed for use in World War I, in particular Mustard gas. It came as a considerable shock to both sides to discover how far behind them the British and Americans were in the development of chemical weapons compared to the Germans. One reason for the Germans restraining themselves from the use of the advanced chemical agents at their disposal was the assumption that the Allies would be able to respond in kind and probably on a larger scale given the disparity in industrial capacity. When the Allies captured the facilities dedicated to the production of these nerve agents, Tabun and the notorious Sarin, they were shocked as this was one area where their intelligence operations had let them down. Tabun and Sarin were persistent, fatal in extremely small doses and unlike many older chemical agents they didn’t have to be breathed in to be effective, skin contact would be sufficient to provide lethal exposure. This meant that protecting soldiers and civilians would require something far more sophisticated than a simple gas mask, like the Atomic, Biological and Chemical (ABC) suits used during the Cold War [7].
Owing to their work with the German engineers charged with cleaning up Auschwitz SP the British had been working on protective gear that could be adapted for this purpose, but what they had available at this time was similar to a deep-sea diving suit combined with a hood type gas mask, with a complex external filtering system to remove contaminants, or the use of compressed air bottles to avoid any contact with the local environment. This equipment was ungainly to say the least and there was no way anyone could engage in combat, or any sort of complex task, while wearing such gear. Even the far more advanced ABC suits of the 1980s or 2000’s only allowed the wearer to operate for more than a very limited time. In practical terms there was no way the Japanese military could implement such protective measures for its military, never mind its civilian population.
That the Allies were willing to consider deploying such weapons against Japan has often been condemned in the succeeding decades, however from the viewpoint of those charged with bringing the war to a swift conclusion with the minimum loss of life among the Allies these weapons were simply a fresh set of tools at their disposal. Few had baulked at raining high explosive and incendiaries on German cities and the conduct of the IJA in China and South East Asia simply served to reinforce the belief that extreme measures would be needed to break the will to fight of the Japanese and were entirely justified. An Allied amphibious invasion was the very thing the Japanese expected and were mentally preparing themselves to face. Pursuing a strategy that confounded their expectations might be the only way to force them to accept surrender [8].
The one arm of the Allied forces that could strike at Japan immediately were their navies. The submarine forces in the Pacific were already crippling the remnants of the Japanese merchant marine and the few surface warships that remained operational. Shore bombardments and carrier borne air strikes were also well within the reach of the allies without the availability of the new bases required by the USAAF and RAF. Such attacks might not be able to bring Japan to its knees, even if the chemical and biological weapons were adapted for use, but they could grind down Japanese defences and complete the isolation of the surviving Japanese outposts across the Pacific and Asia [9].
There were two other large questions over the conduct of the war against Japan which were, what could be expected from the Kuomintang in China? And when would the Soviets enter the war? The Kuomintang had been a source of constant exasperation to the Americans and British as they had continually fallen short in combat with the Japanese. By 1944 there was some cautious optimism that the Kuomintang might be able to mount a major offensive and if they did inflict a major defeat this could be a crushing blow to Japanese morale, China after all had been at the heart of their imperial strategy since 1931 and had been the major driving force behind the growing antagonism between Japan and the USA. If China were lost to the Japanese, then there would little or nothing left for them to fight for outside of the Home Islands [10].
If the American leadership was keen to see the Kuomintang take the fight to the Japanese, they had become far more ambivalent about the entry of the USSR into the war. There was no questioning the strategic value of the Red Army opening a fresh front against the Japanese, probably against the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, but politically there was no enthusiasm for having to partition Japan in the same way Germany had been. The question then was less, when would the Soviets declare war on Japan, but how far would they go once they did [11]?
[1] Of course its easy to talk about annihilating Japan, quite another to actual do it.
[2] It seems a grim prospect, but since the bomb is some way off the options are limited, for now.
[3] There will be B-29s on Tinian and more in China, and B-17s and B-24s will be drawn into the bombing campaign over Japan ITTL.
[4] It will fall to the British largely because the Americans will be committed to the island of Okinawa.
[5] Whatever they do there isn’t going to a nuclear weapon available until the summer of 1945.
[6] The basic issue of biological weapons, that you can’t prevent it spreading out of control.
[7] Yes ABC rather than NBC, cannot understand why historically they chose NBC.
[8] Breaking Japanese resolve may seem a long shot, but its still the best option available to the Allies.
[9] The Royal Navy and US Navy will be given free reign to attack targets along the coast of Japan, though they won’t receive much credit when the end of the war comes.
[10] There will be a series of updates about that offensive and the consequences to the Japanese will to fight.
[11] A question that will also be answered in future updates.
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It's interesting that the Japanese still have this victory mentality given they have failed to achieve some of their most stunning victories at Singapore, and failed to completely conquer the DEI - though obviously from an ATL perspective they've done as well as could reasonably be expected.
Hopefully the peace faction is able to force a concession once the Soviets enter the war and the British and Chinese defeat the Japanese field armies - much of their delusions centred around the idea they still had large territories to bargain with - less of a factor when they're losing the Kurils and Korea and about to lose Taiwan.
Hopefully the peace faction is able to force a concession once the Soviets enter the war and the British and Chinese defeat the Japanese field armies - much of their delusions centred around the idea they still had large territories to bargain with - less of a factor when they're losing the Kurils and Korea and about to lose Taiwan.