Monte Casssino-who screwed up?

[edvader]

Got an imported British History magazine on Monte Cassino.Good magazine.Now who screwed up leading to the battles?Senger's German forces were ready for the allies.Which of the Allies botched the battle(s)?Mark Clark or others?BTW who decided the Cassino be bombed when there was no evidence of troops.Clark said after viewing the rubble"If there were no Germans hiding there they are there now".The one ordering the bombing was a damn fool!

 

[Kevin Renner]

The whole idea of a protracted campaign up the Italian boot was ludicrous to start with. I can understand the political reason for taking/liberating Rome. Maybe it would of been better to take Sardinia and Corsica first and then land at a point on the Italian coast. Maybe at Livorno or another point north of Rome.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Got an imported British History magazine on Monte Cassino.Good magazine.Now who screwed up leading to the battles?Senger's German forces were ready for the allies.Which of the Allies botched the battle(s)?Mark Clark or others?BTW who decided the Cassino be bombed when there was no evidence of troops.Clark said after viewing the rubble"If there were no Germans hiding there they are there now".The one ordering the bombing was a damn fool!

Veterans of the battle insist that they saw German observers operating from the monastery before the bombing. Bombing it though turned it into a fortress and removed the obligation not to station combat troops there. I think it was an emotional reaction to the Germans using as an observation post and meant for morale, but they didn't anticipate that it would stand up to the bombing so well and become a harder target thereafter. IMHO it was a no-win situation for the Allies, it was just too hard a nut to crack and there wasn't a definitive 'screw up' in the sense that there was a 'right' option. It was all bad and the troops thrown into the battle were basically fixing the defenders to that position while the line was turned elsewhere; one of the many ugly features of war is that often soldiers are thrown away in an unwinnable situation to allow for success somewhere else. They just are pawns in a wider strategy and their lives are expendable; in ROTC I was told not to forget that you are just viewed as another resource by the military: expendable, despite the expense of your loss. Basically soldiers are no different than bullets, shells, or fuel, just more expensive and harder to produce, so they have to be spent more judiciously.

 

[edvader]

Thanks.BTW Senger after the war in an interview suggested the next time you invade Italy do it from the top down.Napoleon said Italy is like a boot go from the top!

 

[Simreeve]

Maybe it would of been better to take Sardinia and Corsica first and then land at a point on the Italian coast. Maybe at Livorno or another point north of Rome.

No. Too difficult to provide adequate air-cover going that way.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I found this article, which may be helpful:
https://server16040.contentdm.oclc....ROOT=/p4013coll2&CISOPTR=261&CISOBOX=1&REC=19

 

[Magnum]

No. Too difficult to provide adequate air-cover going that way.

actually no, its not difficult. the allies staged air operations from Corsica OTL with ease.

seriously, i sometimes get the feeling that, despite this being a site for alternate history, people reflexively reject any option other than what happened OTL

 

[TFSmith121]

From the Allied POV, if all else is as was historical

From the Allied POV, if all else is as was historical through to the winter of 1944, the simplest option is to:

a) withdraw the US 5th Army from the Gothic Line, and re-deploy it to the Anzio-Nettuno beachhead;
b) reinforce the 8th Army with the British forces from Anzio and sundry other Allied forces in the Mediterranean;
c) wait for spring;
d) wait for summer;
e) wait for OVERLORD;
f) Launch a break-out from the 5th Army beachhead against the German 14th Army, simultaneously with an attack by the British 8th Army against the Winter/Gustav Line held by the German 10th Army, with the focus on the Adriatic side, well east of Monte Cassino;
g) roll over a collapsing Army Group C as it withdraws northward under conditions of absolute Allied air and sea supremacy and Allied attacks at the army-level on both flanks;
h) Liberate Rome;
i) have the 8th Army line up along the Gothic Line position, dig in, and call it a day in Italy, while mobilizing a stronger Italian Royal Army;
j) move 5th Army to southern France behind the US 7th and French 1st armies and reinforce SHAEF.

The allies still keep the Germans committed to Italy, still keep Foggia for the 15th Air Force and POINTBLANK, and still liberate Rome...they just manage to do it without fighting two winter campaigns in the Italian mountains - and they reinforce the 6th Army Group for the campaign in NW Europe.

Brilliance.

Best,

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

actually no, its not difficult. the allies staged air operations from Corsica OTL with ease.

Sardinia/Corsica were secured by early November 43 & in January 44 six US & French medium bomber wings were operating from Corsica. The proportionate number of fighters there were covering Axis territory from west of Marsailles to Rome and southwards. The P47s based there could cover northern Italy in depth.

seriously, i sometimes get the feeling that, despite this being a site for alternate history, people reflexively reject any option other than what happened OTL

I think its partially too much history chanel on TV & not enough in depth reading of the books, or good quality on line text like HyperWar. I should not criticize other folks too much on this as I find I have to frequently bite my tounge and avoid posting things cause My assumptions are wrong when I check them.

I found this article, which may be helpful:
https://server16040.contentdm.oclc....ROOT=/p4013coll2&CISOPTR=261&CISOBOX=1&REC=19

This CAR Library text wiking linked is not bad. You cant expect the whole picture from any single article of book, but is a decent start.

Thanks.BTW Senger after the war in an interview suggested the next time you invade Italy do it from the top down.Napoleon said Italy is like a boot go from the top!

Better yet avoid the place entirely. By late 1943 hardly 10% of the Axis miltiary production was coming out of Italy. Whoever held the place was stuck with feeding the population, and providing coal and medical supplies for the civilians. The place was becoming a sinkhole for stratigic resources, with hindsight it would be better to let the Germans and fellow Facists pay the cost.

The whole idea of a protracted campaign up the Italian boot was ludicrous to start with. I can understand the political reason for taking/liberating Rome. ....

There was the facination with 'political' prizes. One Allied leader I'll not name described Rome as a "Glittering Prize". Some people are too easily distracted by shiny stuff I guess. But, in their defense I have to admit that after the sucessive capture of Sicilly, Tranto, Calabria, Foggia, and Naples it did look like Rome was in reach.

We also must remember Rome was very nearly abandoned to the Allies. Hitler originally favored defending northern Italy as the south was too vulnerable. He was dissuabed by Kesselring who proposed a riskier strategy of defending south of Rome. Had the first plan been carried out we would be discussing how sucessful the Allied thrust into Italy was.

As for the Cassino battles (Quiz Question: Were there four or five attacks there?) The Allied commanders overestimated the effects of their firepower, air and artillery, vs positions like those the Germans possesed. As a former career artillery guy I've become aware of some of the defects in the fire plans supporting the the Allied attacks. This goes way beyond Mark Clark, or Alexander. The Corps and Division commanders were not always correct in their estimates. I suspect even Montgomery with his detailed attention for fireplanning heavy bombardments, and precise coordination would have had trouble cracking this one.

 

[TFSmith121]

This - if only:

Better yet avoid the place entirely. By late 1943 hardly 10% of the Axis miltiary production was coming out of Italy. Whoever held the place was stuck with feeding the population, and providing coal and medical supplies for the civilians. The place was becoming a sinkhole for stratigic resources, with hindsight it would be better to let the Germans and fellow Facists pay the cost.

This - if only...and it's not that the Germans would not have committed forces to the Peninsula absent an active front; they did so before HUSKY, and continued to do so before BAYTOWN and AVALANCHE.

Best,

 

[rast]

Veterans of the battle insist that they saw German observers operating from the monastery before the bombing.

If the OTL monastery hasn't been moved by the butterflies, there's absolutely nothing you can observe from operating in it that might be relevant for the Cassino battle. You can peek into the Liri Valley to the west, but that is about all. As that wasn't where the battle was taking place, the monastery was pretty useless as observation post.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

This - if only...and it's not that the Germans would not have committed forces to the Peninsula absent an active front; they did so before HUSKY, and continued to do so before BAYTOWN and AVALANCHE.

Best,

Very true.

 

[TFSmith121]

1943 is truly the great "what if"...

In multiple theaters, obviously.

Best,

 

[aktarian]

I remember reading about a screw up in sense that monastery was bombed but nobody bothered to tell troops it's going to happen at that point and they weren't prepared to move in on its heels.

Since there was finite ammount of planes Cassino was hit when planes were available and not when troops actually wanted it.

 

[Devolved]

Got an imported British History magazine on Monte Cassino.Good magazine.Now who screwed up leading to the battles?Senger's German forces were ready for the allies.Which of the Allies botched the battle(s)?Mark Clark or others?BTW who decided the Cassino be bombed when there was no evidence of troops.Clark said after viewing the rubble"If there were no Germans hiding there they are there now".The one ordering the bombing was a damn fool!

Cassino was a strong defensive position. Taking strong positions takes time. By the time the Allies arrived the weather was turning bad and the terrain was unsuited to mobile warfare. You have to use infantry. As in World War One it takes time and casualties to take a position that is difficult to outflank.

Anzio was supposed to be an outflanking operation but Mark Clark told General Lucas not to stick his neck out so he sat on the beach until the Germans arrived.

AFAIK bombing the monastary was requested by the New Zealand commander Freyberg. Alexander told Clark and Clark who had misgivings gave the order. TBH I wouldn't believe anything Mark Clark said on any subject.

 

[mudhead]

I remember reading about a screw up in sense that monastery was bombed but nobody bothered to tell troops it's going to happen at that point and they weren't prepared to move in on its heels.

Since there was finite ammount of planes Cassino was hit when planes were available and not when troops actually wanted it.

I used to work for someone who'd been a forward artillery observer at Cassino - there were few, if any, allied troops with a better view of what happened. He told me it was a surprise - and if it was a surprise to him, then no-one on the front line would have known.

There was also the quaity of the enemy troops to consider.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
Anzio was supposed to be an outflanking operation but Mark Clark told General Lucas not to stick his neck out so he sat on the beach until the Germans arrived.
...

Patton may have given Lucas similar advice. Atkinson describes Patton visitng Lucas shortly before the attack & after looking over the plan told Lucas it was a "suicide mission". I need to check on where Atkinson got that from.

Both Atknison and WGF Jackson 'The Battle For Italy' describe how before the decision for the Shingle operation had been made, in December 1943, after the bulk of the amphib. fleet in the Med had been ordered to the UK to prepare for Op Overlord. Nearly everyone on the Allied side recognized a single corps size assault was unlikely to capture Rome, or dislodge any German armies. I'm unsure why Alexander did not tell Churchill it was impractical & cancel the whole thing. Maybe he thought a simple beach head on the coast usefull and had lower expectations?

 

[TFSmith121]

SHINGLE was too far from the Winter Line to be

SHINGLE was too far from the Winter Line to be an envelopment, and the landing force was too small to open a second front.

Other than that, it was a great plan.

Lucas, who had done well in Sicily and then in Italy after taking over from Dawley, was really given an impossible task. He (and the VI Corps) were far more sinned against than sinners...

I think a lot of it stemmed from an over-appreciation of what the Alllied naval supremacy in the Med could accomplish...given its principal backers, not really surprising.

Best,

 

[BigDave1967]

The air attacks were never in synch with the ground attacks. It didn't help that the more Monte Cassino was bombed the better fortress it became. The situation at Monte Cassino became untenable when Mark Clark's forces finally fought their way out of Anzio. Mark should have cut off the retreat of the German army and the war in Italy might have been over nine months earlier.

 

[Locke01]

I remember reading about a screw up in sense that monastery was bombed but nobody bothered to tell troops it's going to happen at that point and they weren't prepared to move in on its heels.

Since there was finite ammount of planes Cassino was hit when planes were available and not when troops actually wanted it.

While it is certainly true that there were a finite number of planes available in the Italian theater in 1944, availability of aircraft was not really the issue. When the Allies wanted to concentrate on an important target, the aircraft were available. Weather tended to dictate when aerial operations were possible. Of course, it's true that air support didn't always arrive in the most timely fashion, that was ore an issue of delays occasioned by chain of command issues and communication difficulties.