If Germany had crushed the greater Poland uprising?

What would have happened:
Would the hold on to their Eastern border?
Still lose the corridor?
How would it weaken the Poles? Would they still have the miracle on the Wistula?
If there is no miracle on the Wistula….?
 
You started a thread on this last year. https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...sings-after-ww1-were-rapidly-defeated.488178/

As I said there, "this discussion is largely pointless because the issue isn't German military strength in the Polish borderlands but in the west." https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...1-were-rapidly-defeated.488178/#post-20527718 Poland's future boundaries with Germany will be decided on by the Allies.
We discussed more the corridor back then and not the impact on the Polish war with the SU. Also, your point was not uncontested. It is admittedly a good starting point for the discussion.
 
It is the western allies who have the final word on the border between Poland and Germany. As for Poland's eastern border, a lot depends on the scale of the German counterattack. If the Germans stop at the 1914 border the impact on events in the east will be limited. If they drive onto Warsaw and the western powers drag their feet before ordering them to halt the impact will be larger.
 

kham_coc

Banned
I mean France wanted as strong a Poland as possible of course, but both the uk and the us were more interested in the return of Poland on the map. Its not at all implausible that (with the right pods, obvi) Germany could keep all or most of 1914. While one of the 14 points was "secure" access to the sea, Channelisation of the vistula along with some extrateritorial rights (like Checkoslovakia got in hamburg) in danzig would cover that.

I would think either a delay or a rush job in the uprising could work, if earlier the Germans could crush it, and if delayed, the Allies might be more interested in the polish soviet war/Russian civil war.
 
I mean France wanted as strong a Poland as possible of course, but both the uk and the us were more interested in the return of Poland on the map. Its not at all implausible that (with the right pods, obvi) Germany could keep all or most of 1914. While one of the 14 points was "secure" access to the sea, Channelisation of the vistula along with some extrateritorial rights (like Checkoslovakia got in hamburg) in danzig would cover that.

I would think either a delay or a rush job in the uprising could work, if earlier the Germans could crush it, and if delayed, the Allies might be more interested in the polish soviet war/Russian civil war.
Actually, the Americans originally agreed with the French that Danzig should go to Poland. it was hard enough for Lloyd George to get the US and France to accept the Free City concept. https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...illes-sans-wilson.497083/page-2#post-21111972

Rather oddly, some people here think the more the Germans crush the Poles, the better terms thwy will get from the Allies. It doesn't seem to occur to them that the *opposite* may be the case: "The ruthless Huns' aggression against the Poles shows we must deal severely with them."

The idea that the Allies will accept the 1914 lines is preposterous. To quote an old post of mine:

***

There is no way Germany would be allowed to keep Posen. In fact, the German government itself was willing to give it up, subject to a plebiscite.

From William Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy; A Political History of the Reich from 1918 to 1933, pp. 137-8

"In April, 1919, the German government laid down a number of instructions to be used by its representatives at the Paris peace conference. It stressed the point that Wilson's program, which it regarded as binding on both sides, would have to be made the basis of the peace. It demanded a free plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine. It rejected the separation of the Saar and the left bank of the Rhine from the Reich. It likewise insisted on keeping the great coal mines of the Saar under German control. As regards the frontier with Poland, the Scheidemannn government felt that a plebiscite was indicated in one area only, Posen. Here alone, it held, was the population indisputably Polish. West Prussia could not be ceded because that would mean the severance of East Prussia from the Reich. The cession of Upper Silesia was also inadmissible because the large amount of coal produced there was vital to Germany's existence and because the people of the region would be adversely affected by union with Poland. The latter would receive privileges from the German government which would take care of her need for free access to the sea. A Polish corridor to Danzig was out of the question. Northern Schleswig's right to self-determination by means of a plebiscite was conceded. German territories now occupied by Allied troops would have to be evacuated when peace was concluded. The American note of November 5, 1918, was to he the basis for any settlement of the reparation question. This meant payment only for damage to civilians and their property. The blockade, which was still in effect except for carefully stipulated food supplies, would have to be lifted promptly. Germany would have to regain control of her merchant fleet. In her economic relations with other countries, she would not allow herself to be fettered or handicapped. Her colonies, which had been overrun by Allied armies, would have to he returned to her. She asked only that the principle of equality be adhered to in this matter. She was prepared to serve as a mandatory under international supervision if the other colonial powers consented to do likewise. Unilateral disarmament of the Reich was rejected. Disarmament would have to be carried out on an international scale and in accordance with the principle of reciprocity. Germany definitely favored the formation of a League of Nations; she was sympathetic to the idea of settling international disputes by means of arbitration. She wished immediate admission to the League on the basis of equality with other countries. As for the Allied charge that Germany alone was responsible for the outbreak of the war, it would have to be denied forcefully and unequivocally.

"Armed with these instructions, the German delegation, headed by Brockdorff-Rantzau, arrived in Versailles on April 29, 194 The reception accorded it was far from friendly..."
 
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kham_coc

Banned
Actually, the Americans originally agreed with the French thar Danzig should go to Poland. it was hard enough for Lloyd George to get the US and France to accept the Free City concept. https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...illes-sans-wilson.497083/page-2#post-21111972
TIL - Anyway, yes i agree Posen was always the most secure polish claim, as well as the weakest German one - There are Pods where Silesia is German (I would think it's sufficient for the Allied commision not being headed up by a Frenchman), what i already said about Danzig for west prussia, I can't necessarily think of a PoD, but It's not impossible, but Posen...
Well that basically requires a Polish defeat in the Soviet-Polish war.
As for rushing it, I was thinking an uprising in say 1917 - That could have created facts on the ground not conducive to the poles, to put that mildly.
And I don't think that could have been spun as anything well good for the Poles.

That or they ask for terms before the kaiserschlacht - If it's a genuine negotiation, maybe they demand to keep posen? (but it would probably rank pretty low on the priority list, and well, genuine negotiation or not, it's still a loss).
 
There is no way Germany would be allowed to keep Posen. In fact, the German government itself was willing to give it up, subject to a plebiscite.

From William Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy; A Political History of the Reich from 1918 to 1933, pp. 137-8

"In April, 1919, the German government laid down a number of instructions to be used by its representatives at the Paris peace conference. It stressed the point that Wilson's program, which it regarded as binding on both sides, would have to be made the basis of the peace. It demanded a free plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine. It rejected the separation of the Saar and the left bank of the Rhine from the Reich. It likewise insisted on keeping the great coal mines of the Saar under German control. As regards the frontier with Poland, the Scheidemannn government felt that a plebiscite was indicated in one area only, Posen. Here alone, it held, was the population indisputably Polish. West Prussia could not be ceded because that would mean the severance of East Prussia from the Reich. The cession of Upper Silesia was also inadmissible because the large amount of coal produced there was vital to Germany's existence and because the people of the region would be adversely affected by union with Poland. The latter would receive privileges from the German government which would take care of her need for free access to the sea. A Polish corridor to Danzig was out of the question. Northern Schleswig's right to self-determination by means of a plebiscite was conceded. German territories now occupied by Allied troops would have to be evacuated when peace was concluded. The American note of November 5, 1918, was to he the basis for any settlement of the reparation question. This meant payment only for damage to civilians and their property. The blockade, which was still in effect except for carefully stipulated food supplies, would have to be lifted promptly. Germany would have to regain control of her merchant fleet. In her economic relations with other countries, she would not allow herself to be fettered or handicapped. Her colonies, which had been overrun by Allied armies, would have to he returned to her. She asked only that the principle of equality be adhered to in this matter. She was prepared to serve as a mandatory under international supervision if the other colonial powers consented to do likewise. Unilateral disarmament of the Reich was rejected. Disarmament would have to be carried out on an international scale and in accordance with the principle of reciprocity. Germany definitely favored the formation of a League of Nations; she was sympathetic to the idea of settling international disputes by means of arbitration. She wished immediate admission to the League on the basis of equality with other countries. As for the Allied charge that Germany alone was responsible for the outbreak of the war, it would have to be denied forcefully and unequivocally.

"Armed with these instructions, the German delegation, headed by Brockdorff-Rantzau, arrived in Versailles on April 29, 194 The reception accorded it was far from friendly..."

Wow, i want the same thing that the german government took, it must be some very good sh...t
 
TIL - Anyway, yes i agree Posen was always the most secure polish claim, as well as the weakest German one - There are Pods where Silesia is German (I would think it's sufficient for the Allied commision not being headed up by a Frenchman), what i already said about Danzig for west prussia, I can't necessarily think of a PoD, but It's not impossible, but Posen...
Well that basically requires a Polish defeat in the Soviet-Polish war.
As for rushing it, I was thinking an uprising in say 1917 - That could have created facts on the ground not conducive to the poles, to put that mildly.
And I don't think that could have been spun as anything well good for the Poles.

That or they ask for terms before the kaiserschlacht - If it's a genuine negotiation, maybe they demand to keep posen? (but it would probably rank pretty low on the priority list, and well, genuine negotiation or not, it's still a loss).
I think that before we stray too far from OTL, its Silesia the POD would affect and maybe, just maybe the nature of the corridor/ocean access.
IOTL, the Poles holding it made it much easier to claim it was undisputably Polish. ITTL, with the Germans holding it Silesia just doesn't fall under Rosevelt's promises and the French would be a minority. Still needs the Germans to play their cards well.
However, I'm also interested in the consequences of the POD from 1918, not just 1919. How far could/would we stray from OTL before the decision are made at Versailles? If the Poles are resoundedly beaten in Silesia and Germany and the Germans stresses their influence into Posen as well, how much of a Polish state is there and can that contest the rising Red Army? In particularly if there is German antagonism from the west?
With any underlying PODs available, as one option, I would speculate as far as Germany supporting any side in the Soviet civil war that might help crush the Poles->the Poles wont work as a buffer to the Soviet Union and a counter balance to the Germans when ToV needs to be finalized.
 
However, I'm also interested in the consequences of the POD from 1918, not just 1919. How far could/would we stray from OTL before the decision are made at Versailles? If the Poles are resoundedly beaten in Silesia and Germany and the Germans stresses their influence into Posen as well, how much of a Polish state is there and can that contest the rising Red Army? In particularly if there is German antagonism from the west?
In 1919 the Red Army was busy with first Kolchak and then Denikin. (Pilsudski did nothing to help Denikin in OTL, so there is no reason a weaker Poland would have produced an earlier Red victory in the Russian Civil War.) By 1920, the Poles will long since have been assigned their existing borders with Germany, and the size of the Reichswehr will already have benn limited by Versailles.
 
You can also compare Versailles to Brest Litovsk

Or the septemberprogram
Indeed they were harsh, although brest-litovsk can be seen as a consequence of perceived bad faith by the communists during negotiations and was worse than the starting offer.
The September program is more of a thought experiment. Having said that, while I can’t say what kind of peace the defeated entente would get, it’s fair to say the French treated the Germans worse than the Germans treated the French.
 
Indeed they were harsh, although brest-litovsk can be seen as a consequence of perceived bad faith by the communists during negotiations and was worse than the starting offer.
The September program is more of a thought experiment. Having said that, while I can’t say what kind of peace the defeated entente would get, it’s fair to say the French treated the Germans worse than the Germans treated the French.

Honestly, you can't compare the two treaty as they were done in two situation different as day and night; Versailles were done after 5 years of the greatest massacre know to men with France losing millions of men (both dead and crippled) and having seen the north of their nation ravaged by the German in their scorched earth retreat and with France having in the immediate postwar a strategic position very unfavorable (Russia gone and the UK and USA unwilling to give real assurance regarding their commitment to her security).
Frankfurt was instead a treaty done after a typical limited war of the period and with terms that were created to not destroy the balance of power in the continent
 
Honestly, you can't compare the two treaty as they were done in two situation different as day and night; Versailles were done after 5 years of the greatest massacre know to men with France losing millions of men (both dead and crippled) and having seen the north of their nation ravaged by the German in their scorched earth retreat and with France having in the immediate postwar a strategic position very unfavorable (Russia gone and the UK and USA unwilling to give real assurance regarding their commitment to her security).
Frankfurt was instead a treaty done after a typical limited war of the period and with terms that were created to not destroy the balance of power in the continent
I am aware the wars were different, but you sum up the treaty difference nicely. Germany didnt try to crush their French enemy in victory. France did. It was between those to countries, not Russia.
Sure, Germany would have done the same, but its easy to imagine why Germany thought they would have been treated differently.
 
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