How "should" WWII in 1940 have gone?

Except it wasn't presented as an excuse. He said that Germany would still be at war even if they were nice people because they had a reason to invade Czechoslovakia and Poland. He was asked what that good reason was, at which point he spouted the Liebensraum propaganda BS unironically.
And the irony is... he did include Lebensraum, by writing that the Germans were inspired by the UK and the USA. Lots of people tend to defend Hitler's desire for Lebensraum through whataboutism about the Manifest Destiny, the british colonialism etc. So on one hand "Poor Germans were defending themselves against the international conspiracy", and on the other hand "Yeah, Germany did want to expand, any problems with that?" - doublethinking at its finest.
 
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Except it wasn't presented as an excuse. He said that Germany would still be at war even if they were nice people because they had a reason to invade Czechoslovakia and Poland. He was asked what that good reason was, at which point he spouted the Liebensraum propaganda BS unironically.
I guess the post before the kick had quite a bad connotation to it. In isolation it (the kick post) looked like a factual answer to a question, but my mistake reading it as such.
He was already doing the dangerous comparison of different countries unfortunate/cynical historic pasts which one should never do with Nazi Germany
 
Since there's been no detail from RP about where the RN allegedly blew it so badly, it's interesting to look at what reality (rather than the view with hindsight but no insight) seems to look like. The basic problem is that the German heavy ships can cruise at 26 knots (30 mph) and the British heavy ships cruise at 20 knots (23 mph) because of the lower speed of Valiant and Nelson.

From the German base at Wilhelmshaven to the Stavanger region, the closest point of Norway to Scapa, is 400 miles or 13.3 hours steaming for the Germans. The distance from Scapa to Stavanger is about 286 miles or 12.4 hours steaming for the RN. So one major problem for the RN becomes apparent - the Germans can get steam up and by the time they leave the Jade the British have just 50 minutes to spot them, send and process the sighting report, get orders out, and leave Scapa or else they cannot catch the Germans. That isn't possible - apart from the fact that the Germans dislike British recce sitting around off their major port, ships need at least an hour to get up steam and then they have to raise anchor, leave the harbour and work up to speed.

In addition, the RN must obviously be concerned about the possibility of heavy ships breaking out into the Atlantic. Their concern was very well founded since Lutzow had been meant to break out during Weserebung, and that plan was thwarted only by the finding of a mechanical issue. So when there was news that a German fleet was at sea, the Home Fleet headed NNE which is the best course to stop a German breakout, but takes them away from the closest point to Norway.

Once the Germans have passed Stavanger the geometry changes against the British even more. The Germans will be beyond the closest point to Scapa, and heading further away from Scapa as the coast heads NNE. The British will be in a stern chase - and they are slower. So how on earth were the British supposed to catch the German heavy ships?

The chart that CT put up indicates that the British recce patrols reached about 45 miles from the Danish coast. Hhaar says that the German forces bound for the two northern destinations were sighted by a Hudson at about 8:48 am when off Esbjerg in Denmark with about 112 statute miles covered since leaving the Jade. They were bombed that day by a dozen Blenheims with no damage. Visibility was less than a mile by the afternoon of 7 April.

The sighting report didn't reach Forbes, the commander of the Home Fleet, until 11.20am. And the report only mentioned one cruiser (probably a light one) and some destroyers - not heavy ships. The Hudson had been chased off by fighter cover so understandably could not get in close to get a perfect idea of the composition of the fleet. But even as we have seen, if the Hudson's report was transmitted straight to Forbes and he decided to send the whole fleet out after what was reported as a cruiser and some destroyers, he still did not have enough time to intercept the German heavy ships.

The slower German groups heading to the south and leaving later could have been caught by the British, but on the morning of April 8 again visibility closed in to less than a mile and they could not be spotted.

Yes the British did have one carrier (Furious) which was undergoing some work at the time of the invasion but got her Swordfish back on board quickly and went to sea after the British battleships had left. Even if she had been with the battleships her search pattern would very likely to have been aimed at finding ships aiming to break out into the Atlantic and therefore unlikely to find ships hugging the coast as the German ones were. I don't know where Renown was at the time but it is possible that Forbes may have been able to split Renown, Repulse and Furious into a fast group but given that is putting two old battlecruisers (one unmodernised) up against two new battlecruisers it is the sort of splitting forces that could have led to disaster, and left the most powerful ships (Nelson and Valiant) without a carrier and therefore without a ship that can slow down the faster Germans to allow them to be brought to battle.

Once it was realised that the Germans were invading Norway there is a chance, perhaps, that they would have been in reach of Furious' Swordfish but I haven't done the sums, and the weather was often terrible - the German destroyers lost no less than 10 men overboard in one night shortly after leaving port due to gales. Early war carrier strikes were often unsuccessful especially in the north and in that sort of weather.

Given these realities it does not seem reasonable to claim that the RN "shat in its hand" in failing to intercept the German ships.
 
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To what extent do people think that German performance from 1940-42 was due to skill vs dumb luck and allied incompetence? I tend to the latter side, since once the allies got their acts together, the Germans got smashed, which is why it always astounds me when people have the Wehrmacht in their top 10 armies of all time lists.
 
To what extent do people think that German performance from 1940-42 was due to skill vs dumb luck and allied incompetence? I tend to the latter side, since once the allies got their acts together, the Germans got smashed, which is why it always astounds me when people have the Wehrmacht in their top 10 armies of all time lists.
Not being incompetent, and being able to withstand poor turns of fortune is a skill of its own. The Germans in 1940-42 were more practiced in that art. When the Allies caught up, material became the decisive factor. It would be no exaggeration to say the Wehrmacht was the most capable military force of 1940-41. It was the first to master mechanized warfare, and it is astounding that it achieved this while the bulk of its divisions relied on horses. The victories of 1940-41 were the product of among other things the work of a plethora of brilliant military theorists and practicians who came up with the first effective military system for fast-paced mechanized operations. Where the British and Italians had Liddel-Hart, Fuller, and Douhet, whose delusions about modern war can be listed at length, German military thinkers in the interwar period were as a matter of principle opposed to oversimplified theory.
 
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Not being incompetent, and being able to withstand poor turns of fortune is a skill of its own. The Germans in 1940-42 were more practiced in that art. When the Allies caught up, material became the decisive factor. It would be no exaggeration to say the Wehrmacht was the most capable military force of 1940-41. It was the first to master mechanized warfare, and it is astounding that it achieved this while the bulk of its divisions relied on horses.
I find the Wehrmacht somewhat difficult to rate. On the one hand, there's tons of stories of Germans maintaining positive kill ratios against the Soviets well into 1944, and they seem to have fought well against the WAllies in North Africa and Italy. On the other hand, they were outfought by the Soviets, and generally seemed to be bad at the parts of war that actually mattered, IE logistics, intelligence, and air warfare.
 
I find the Wehrmacht somewhat difficult to rate. On the one hand, there's tons of stories of Germans maintaining positive kill ratios against the Soviets well into 1944, and they seem to have fought well against the WAllies in North Africa and Italy. On the other hand, they were outfought by the Soviets, and generally seemed to be bad at the parts of war that actually mattered, IE logistics, intelligence, and air warfare.
In 1940-41, they kept a solid lead overall in military matters. Ultimately the German defeat was brought on by political failings, not military ones. The Wehrmacht was designed to fight short wars, and German leadership made it run a marathon. That it ended in disaster should surprise no one. The German military made many blunders, about which a plethora of literature exists, but at the end of the day the buck ends at the people in charge, namely Hitler & Co., who dragged them into a nearly unwinnable war, and actively fostered unrealistic ambitions in German military thought. The German General Staff was undoubtedly delusional in its planning of the war with the Soviets, but they weren't the final arbiters of that decision. Sane leadership would have reined in their worst impulses, but instead it encouraged them.
 
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I find the Wehrmacht somewhat difficult to rate. On the one hand, there's tons of stories of Germans maintaining positive kill ratios against the Soviets well into 1944, and they seem to have fought well against the WAllies in North Africa and Italy. On the other hand, they were outfought by the Soviets, and generally seemed to be bad at the parts of war that actually mattered, IE logistics, intelligence, and air warfare.
The best trained Soviet troops took the brunt of the initial attack and most were lost. After that there was little time to properly train the new troops they mobilized. That explains a lot of those kill ratios and Stalin being a micro manager hurt a lot as well
 
The best trained Soviet troops took the brunt of the initial attack and most were lost. After that there was little time to properly train the new troops they mobilized. That explains a lot of those kill ratios and Stalin being a micro manager hurt a lot as well
Yeah, that's why I generally chalk up the Wehrmacht's success to luck/allied incompetence. All things being equal, the allies usually won.
 
Yeah, that's why I generally chalk up the Wehrmacht's success to luck/allied incompetence. All things being equal, the allies usually won.
All things being equal was never the case. In the Battle of France, the Allies had a superiority in tank numbers and an overwhelming superiority in artillery, for example. Much good it did them! The Wehrmacht's early successes were the result of genuine skill, without which luck would have mattered little. Everyone gets lucky sometimes, but not everyone takes advantage of it. Saying that the German victories of 1940-41 were just a matter of luck is like saying that the Allied victory in Normandy was just a matter of luck since the Germans let themselves get totally duped and made poor decisions in deployment of the panzer divisions.
 
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David Glantz said in his book When Titans Clashed that the Nazis attacked the USSR at the time of maximum advantage due to the purges. It seems the Red Army only started to get back to where they were pre purge after Stalingrad.
 
Isn't it arguable that both the Germans and the Japanese favoured high-risk strategies that paid very little attention to logistics and vulnerable flanks because they both needed to win a short war, and that such strategies paid off well when up against less-prepared forces but led to disaster when the enemy got its act together and/or could amass superior numbers?
 
Sane leadership would have reined in their worst impulses, but instead it encouraged them.

To put my two cents in on this in general (they may not be that original, but this feels like a good line to quote as far as what they are):
This feels awfully relevant to Rommel in North Africa too. Rommel was good at some things, not all things by a long shot, but the way Hitler handled this didn't so much "make the most use of Rommel's strengths and anything that went wrong was outside (Rommel's) control anyway" as make a bad situation and flawed general's choices worse.

So overall - I think it's not terribly surprising 1940 went well for the Germans, with all the information we have now, but there was no reason it had to unfold in a way to play to what the Germans were able to do well as far as all ways "WWII" could have gone. The French fought in 1940 in a way the Germans were more able to exploit the weaknesses of than vice-versa.
 
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Found this old cartoon from 1939, it reminded me of this thread.

Maginot.jpg
 
To what extent do people think that German performance from 1940-42 was due to skill vs dumb luck and allied incompetence? I tend to the latter side, since once the allies got their acts together, the Germans got smashed, which is why it always astounds me when people have the Wehrmacht in their top 10 armies of all time lists.
The British were in panic mode after the Fall of France, having lost a lot of equipment on the beaches of Dunkirk (and indeed the 51st Division, left stranded somewhere in Northern France), and then having to desperately import obsolete equipment from the USA and settle for untried tank designs because even potentially crappy tanks when it came to home defence were better than no tanks at all. Plus the German bombing was extremely effective on some counts in 1940 in taking out critical British factories. (E.G. the Birmingham Small Arms [Company] factory in Small Heath - wiki page: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birmingham_Small_Arms_Company )
And apparently, in some cases (such as the British tank crews feeding Rommel a stream of top quality intelligence over their radios in North Africa in early 1942) the British soldiers and officers involved didn't understand the vulnerabilities of the systems that they were using. (Although later in the war, once the British had finally realised the Germans could listen in on their radio transmissions, they really went to town in deliberately giving the Germans material to 'listen in' on.... If I recall right, some of that was involved in the 'Fortitude' operations in the lead in to June 1944.)

Make of that what you will...
 
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kham_coc

Banned
Except it wasn't presented as an excuse. He said that Germany would
Could. That's the word you are looking for.
still be at war even if they were nice people because they had a reason to invade Czechoslovakia and Poland.
No my point was that a hypothetical 100% liberal democratic Germany could have found itself at war with say the Sanjaca regime who genuinely treated all minorities atrociously, and the UK and France is fairly likely to back Poland anyway (think say, Saudi Arabia, right now).
He was asked what that good reason was, at which point he spouted the Liebensraum propaganda BS unironically.
It's Lebensraum - And no, invading Poland wasn't (really) that, that was the USSR.
- Oh and just as a clarification, obviously the Nazis didn't invade Poland because it's poor treatment of German nationals, though that's true, they invaded because they wanted to wage an Imperialist geocidal war.
Anything else they said was a either a lie, or if it was incidentally true, not the real reason.
 

kham_coc

Banned
of people tend to defend Hitler's desire for Lebensraum through whataboutism about the Manifest Destiny, the british colonialism etc.
No, not defending - I was undermining this post:
Yes because they wouldn't have been at war
Which necessarily making the point that the UK could never be on the wrong side of a war, because they are the bestest people ever, who would never ever do something in their national interest even though it might be morally wrong. (Obviously, not relating to the Nazis).
 
Which necessarily making the point that the UK could never be on the wrong side of a war, because they are the bestest people ever, who would never ever do something in their national interest even though it might be morally wrong. (Obviously, not relating to the Nazis).
The British establishment of the time, including the most powerful members of the cabinet, and the Prime Minister was extremely, near myopically, focused on avoiding war. In fact, the thing they can, and have, been criticized most for is being so committed to avoiding war that they ignored provocation and failed to prepare the nation for the war they should have seen coming. An accusation most often defended against by the equally true rejoinder that the British people were broadly hostile to any act that might lead to increased tensions and the possibility of another Great War.

In other words, niceness had nothing to do with it. In the considered opinion of a majority of the British public and the leaders of the British political establishment, it was very much not in Britains interest to go to war. Which makes the 1930’s and 40’s about the epitome of “don’t start none, won’t be none”.
 
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