german win race to sea in 1914 can German win great war without ottoman ?
- Thread starter NATO1949
- Start date
Only if France surrenders and Britain decides to cut its losses and negotiate a settlement in the west.
Ian_W
Banned
There is this idea of 'backing up claims'.
Why on earth, with a front from the Somme to the Sea and the Allies not distracted by Turkey, are British and French losing the war by the close of 1914 ?
The Somme is a shorter line, well away from Paris, and the British can be supported via Le Harve.
Nope. If the French victory at the Battle of the Marne triggers a German counter-attack that is won by the Race to the Sea and the French and British retreat behind the Somme, we have another four years of trench warfare and the Germans lose on schedule.
Riain
Banned
I think so. Indeed I believe that the Germans winning the Race to the Sea will cause the Dardanelles campaign to be cancelled in favour of keeping the Channel Fleet intact and in place. Holding the pas de Calais gives the Germans a strategic offense/tactical defensive position against Britain, which is the strongest form of warfare.
Ian_W
Banned
With the Ottoman Empire neutral, the Dardanelles campaign is completely cancelled.
I'm also having a very hard time believing Bulgaria joins the Central Powers.
Riain
Banned
Yes, but I believe that wouldn't make any difference because the 1915 campaign would be cancelled anyway even if the OE did join .
AussieHawker
Banned
Why? Serbia is still going to crumble against the Austrian offensive 1915 offensive and Bulguria still wants to change the Balkan Wars borders. The Ottomans not being in the war, doesn't prevent them from being pro Central Powers or at least reaching a agreement.
... what I can only seconde especially in view of the secret pact of non-agression and mutual assistence in certain situations between Bulgaria and the OE concluded in late August/early September IIRC, well before the OE started any hostililies.
not to forget that the german-OE 'pact' was signed already on 02.August 1914.
Would well agree with that given IMO correct reasoning @Riain already made.
The forces used/abused/spent at the dardanelles would this time be similarily be spent in attacks against the ITTL german held Amien or for some other crossing of the lower Somme in a vain attempt to get the germans away from the channel coast.
Given the 'superiority' of the defense in this war the shortened front in the west might rather work more towards the germans than the Entente.
However, I would like to know how an ongoing neutrality of the OE might be achieved ?
No Suchon at the Dardanelles ?
Maybe he than 'stops' at Piraeus ? ... with the german leaning King now being in a better position against his enttente leaning PM Venizelos ? ... and not entente landing at Thessaloniki ? ... and no Balkan-front ?
Who gets than the gold the germans sent to Constantinople ?
'Buying' Romania instead with it ?
Better funding of the german economic (not necessarily 'sabotage' actions) activities in the US ? ... like buying off the northern Toluol producers (as attemted IOTL) to deny the stuff the Brits ?
Better funding of the german economic (not necessarily 'sabotage' actions) activities in the US ? ... like buying off the northern Toluol producers (as attemted IOTL) to deny the stuff the Brits ?
History Learner
Banned
I don't recall the OP asking for specific citations instead of fishing for general opinions, as is normal for WI threads. If you want citations, please do have the courtesy to go about asking for them instead of implying others are guilty of some error.
If the Germans win the Race to the Sea, the Entente is going to lose in a matter of months at best, if not weeks.
Simple geography explains the situation, in that Plymouth and Portsmouth (the major RN bases in the Channel) are on the opposite side of the Belgian and French ports, while the bases in Scotland are too far to the North. By the time the Royal Navy could respond, the HSF would already be in the narrowest part of the channel. It was not, however, the German surface fleet that was the main risk: it was instead a combination of heavy cannons, aircraft, submarines, torpedo boats, and mines that the Germans could use to block the channel approaches. Why is this a decisive advantage for the Germans? Because the British were dependent on the sea lanes to keep London itself, along with other cities, functioning:
Next, pulling back behind the Somme means the Anglo-French have lost control of the Bethune coal mines. The Bethune deposits were the last major source under French control and were the predominant (RE: Overwhelming) supplier of coal to Paris, which was the center of 70% of French war production. IOTL, the Germans merely shelling them during the 1918 Offensives was sufficient to engender disruptions to French production but here we're presuming they've outright fallen. This means that the French will, from September/October, rapidly become incapable of supplying even the basic needs of their Army as well as their industry.
With the French Army knocked out and Southeastern England removed, the capacity of the Entente to resist becomes negligible.
Last edited:
Ian_W
Banned
Oh noes, the French lose production adding up to one tenth of English production.
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/FRB/pages/1920-1924/26813_1920-1924.pdf
Oh noes, the Germans are suckered into a series of naval engagements in the Channel while the British supply line goes Portsmouth-Le Harve, or if we are really conservative, Liverpool to Bordeaux.
You really need to get in the habit of looking at maps.
History Learner
Banned
And collapses the only source available for supplying Paris and thus 70% of the French war effort; this removes the French Army from the field.
We're not talking about British supply lines for the BEF, we're talking about the British being forced to abandon Southeastern England.
RodentRevolution
Banned
You make it sound like the Germans have reached the mouth of the Seine*, that is not where the race to the sea was headed.
Oh so you are playing one of those games where the units have a magic zone of control mechanic...either that or you are really bad at geography. Shame you were not in command of the HSF, you would have either trapped them in the Channel to be destroyed by the Grand Fleet or had them in a desperate chase the long way around the British Isles in a situation where British ships that had to peel off had relatively nearby friendly ports to make for while any German ones that experience engineering casualties as they would have to be scuttled or risk being taken (yes there are things worse for a warship than being sunk) by the British.
*and there are still a lot of other road, rail and canal links to Paris but lets keep things simple.
History Learner
Banned
I didn't mention the Seine anywhere, but that's besides the point. The Germans don't have to reach the Seine to knock the French out because without the Bethune mines, French war production catastrophically collapses.
Scarborough, but I digress.
You need to review a map, Plymouth and Portsmouth (the major RN bases in the Channel) are on the opposite side of the Belgian and French ports that the Germans now control, while the bases in Scotland are too far to the North. The Germans have the advantage of having major port facilities directly in the zone of action, while the English must project power at a much further distance from their own bases. It was not, however, the German surface fleet that was the main risk; it was instead a combination of heavy cannons, aircraft, submarines, torpedo boats, and mines that the Germans could use to block the channel approaches.
There's not, the main route passed through Amiens and there was only one side route along the coast but it's capacity was only about 10 trains a day or less. All of this is irrelevant, however, because the Germans are directly sitting upon the coal mines.
Last edited:
RodentRevolution
Banned
You do this a lot, you have not even looked at a map, you have failed to study the infrastructure of France and how Paris centric much of it is and you have absolutely no idea, that you have no idea what people are attempting to explain to you.
The Race to the Sea was not a war winner by itself. It is entirely possible that the forwards lines would have been abandoned in a manner similar to OTL as the geography is not always advantageous to the defender. What it might have done, at best, is restrict some resources to France and add some for German usage. Giving them more of a chance, in a war that would last years, against enemies who had access to the resources of most of the globe and in addition could pay for America to make extra stuff for them. An America moreover that was always going to be biased against the Germans as the Germans were their main business rival in almost all markets.
Also it is worth noting Antwerp is not really suitable as a naval base except for the smaller vessels (such as destroyers). Further it is at the wrong end of the Channel, the important bit is the Atlantic end and has been for centuries.
History Learner
Banned
I literally just explained to you the railway system of France circa 1914 as it relates to coal deposits North of the Somme as well as the location of the Royal Navy's bases in relation to the Channel approaches. Whether or not the infrastructure of France is geared towards Paris overall is irrelevant to the fact that, for the region in question, there literally is only two railway lines connecting to Paris and both are now under German occupation, with said occupation also literally sitting on top of the mines that supply 70% of French war production.
Saying I'm wrong doesn't make it so.
I've literally just explained how it is a war winner, you have yet to offer any reasoning or citations to the contrary. The Bethune Coal mines were the source of power for Paris, and Paris in turn was 70% of French war production; with the coal mines gone, production in Paris collapses and thus the French Army collapses. Likewise, the English cannot supply the London Basin via railway alone. The Germans, in the event of winning the Race to the Sea, now control the direct sea approaches to said basin and likewise have control of the only major ports in the area from which to carry out this operation.
Hence why I've said, for the third time in a row now, that the the German surface fleet was not the main risk. It is instead a combination of heavy cannons, aircraft, submarines, torpedo boats, and mines that the Germans could use to block the channel approaches, while likewise denying the use of mines, a major impediment to submarine operations IOTL, by the English.
Not at all, because Antwerp is right next to where the Germans need to be geographically. That more shipping enters the Atlantic side doesn't change the fact the Thames Estuary is next to Antwerp, relatively speaking.
yourworstnightmare
Banned
Germany need a way to at least theoretically threaten the British Empire, since they in no way could threaten the British navy and thus the British Isles. So I think they still invite the Ottomans to the party.
RodentRevolution
Banned
French coal can be substituted by Welsh coal, the British had a major coal exporting industry. Over time this may, may mind you, add cost and reduce total output but we are talking factors that come into play over years. You have an idee fixe and then have failed to look further than that point. The same applies to each of your points in turn. You never look at the complexity and rely on the fact you can just keep repeating yourself on an internet forum.
History Learner
Banned
No, it cannot be:
Which is exactly the problem; the Anglo-French don't have years to adjust, they have a few weeks to a few months at most to do so.
And the fact you have failed to produce any citations, nor present a more compelling case then saying I'm wrong speaks volumes on this alleged fault of mine, I do believe.
For the record, the citations are:
1) From Ian W's St. Louis Fed link
2) Welsh Coal Trade in 1922
3) The German Offensives of 1918 by David T. Zabecki, Pg 198 in paperback and Pg 324 on digital
Last edited:
RodentRevolution
Banned
You know that a citation is not magic? You need something applicable, like oh I do not know a study of the British Coal Industry during the actual war?
A couple of point spring to mind however. Welsh coal mining was heavily slanted to export and OTL was oddly among the slowest to mechanise, there being only about 1.8% of Welsh coal cut by machines as opposed to men compared with 12% being the national average CF tables VI and VII in The Government and Control of the British Coal Industry 1914-18 to which I linked above. There is more to address but basically OTL the British largely neglected their supplies of coal to their allies, the question is with more stimulus would they have upped their game or collapsed under pressure? One issue was the ongoing recruitment of miners which could have been curtailed had the British seen a greater French need than OTL.
Now the interesting thing here , it appears that had the British stepped up then other countries that did come forwards in the place of the British such as the Spanish and Far East colonies, might have be less inclined to do so, making your figures for the 1920s an interesting curiosity rather than marking an industry in decline due to much increased competition.
Again though this is a story that would have played out over years not months. In 1913 the British exported 73million tons of coal, easily enough to have some spare to divert to make up French losses. Largely then this would have been a question of will and understanding.