Part Six
Battle
Initial air attacks
At about 09:00 on 16 June, PBY from Midway spotted the Japanese Occupation Force 500 nautical miles (580 miles; 930 kilometers) to the west-southwest of Midway. Nine B-17s took off from Midway at 12:30 for the first air attack. Three hours later, they found the transport group 570 nautical miles (660 miles; 1,060 kilometers) to the west. Harassed by heavy anti-aircraft fire, they dropped their bombs. Although their crews reported hitting four ships, none of the bombs hit anything and no significant damage was inflicted.
At 04:30 on 17 June, the initial attack on Midway itself was launched, consisting of 36 Aichi D3A dive bombers and 36 Nakajima B5N torpedo bombers, escorted by 36 Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters. From Junyo and Amagi of the 1st Air Fleet. At the same time, Kondo launched twelve search aircraft (8 "Kates" from Akagi and Kaga, and 4 "Jakes" from Tone. Japanese reconnaissance arrangements were in an arc to the northeast and east of the task force, initially hampered under poor weather conditions in that region. While this initial strike was to neutralize Midway’s air assets, if possible, its primary role was to trigger a response from US Carrier forces, which the reconnaissance aircraft could locate and report.
At this time 11 PBYs were leaving Midway to run their search patterns, and at 06:34, one reported sighting two Japanese carriers, and another spotted the inbound airstrike 10 minutes later. Midway's radar picked up the enemy at a distance of several miles, and interceptors were scrambled. As the islands unescorted bombers headed off to attack the Japanese carriers, their fighter escorts remained behind to defend Midway. At 06:20, Japanese carrier aircraft bombed and heavily damaged the U.S. base. Midway-based fighters intercepted the Japanese and suffered heavy losses, though managing to destroy eleven attackers. After the attack, only two of the original 28 fighters remained airworthy. American anti-aircraft fire was intense and accurate, destroying three additional Japanese aircraft and damaging many more.
Of the 108 Japanese aircraft involved in this attack, 11 were destroyed (including three that ditched), and 43 were damaged to some degree. The initial Japanese attack did not succeed in neutralizing Midway, as American bombers could still use the airbase to refuel and attack the Japanese invasion force, and most of Midway's land-based defenses similarly remained intact. Japanese pilots reported that a subsequent aerial attack on Midway's defenses would be necessary before troops could go ashore. This was expected as the initial strike was only the first step of the aerial campaign and eliciting an American response was desired. Hence only employing the air groups of two carriers for the first strike.
Having taken off before the Japanese attack, American bombers based on Midway made several uncoordinated attacks on the 1st Carrier Fleet. The Japanese repelled these attacks, losing three fighters while destroying seventeen of the 53 attacking aircraft. Having sustained no damage from the attacks Kondo determined to defer another immediate attack on Midway and proceeded to rearm a strike force armed for anti-ship operations.
The Carrier Exchanges Commence.
Some 240 miles north-east of Midway the three Allied Task Forces waited under a clear blue sky. Halsey, with nothing as yet to attack, had only launched his search planes at first light. The Admiral, according to one of Enterprise’s few survivors, was as tense as ever on the eve of action, pacing up and down the bridge, cracking nervous jokes about Japanese incompetence. At 06.35, a message came through from Midway Island. The radar there had picked up the incoming Japanese strike force some thirty miles out. Five minutes later Halsey got his precise fix. One of the Yorktown dive-bombers launched on search duty had found the Japanese Fleet south of the anticipated axis of approach, 135 miles west-north-west of Midway, pursuing a south-easterly course. The Admiral signaled to his own fleet: south-southwest at full speed. It would take three hours to be close enough to launch a strike.
It was 07.25. From the Yamato’s bridge, Yamamoto watched his fleet repairing the damage done to its formation. Kondo had just radioed news of the Midway attack, advising that Fuchida thought that there was no need for an immediate second attack and that he concurred. Though the airstrip was still operational, the Japanese could concentrate on the American carriers they hoped were within some 300 miles, away to the northeast. Accordingly, Yamamoto ordered that the air groups arm for shipping strikes. Barring a calamity there would be time to bring in the returning first strike while the Americans were still out of range. Reinforcements were sent up to join the Zero patrols above the fleet. And then, again, a period of waiting.
By 08.20 the Amagi and Junyo’s planes were set down on the flight decks and being rushed below for re-arming and refueling. Simultaneously on the other carrier’s aircraft were brought up from the hangar decks, already primed for action against the American Fleet. By 09.00 the process had been completed without any ominous sighting of approaching American planes. There was still no word of the enemy carriers. The search planes should be on the return leg of their sweeps by this time. If the Americans were where they should be, then they would soon be sighted. Either that or things were not working out according to plan. And that would entail some radical rethinking of the operational plan.
It did not prove necessary. At 09.24 a report came in from the Akagi scout plane – ‘a large enemy force’. Ten minutes later came the composition. The force included three carriers and was steaming south-westward some 120 miles northeast of Midway. This was Halsey’s TF16. With this, the ready airstrike of the 2nd Air Fleet was released from the flight decks and into the air. This wave was mostly composed of Pearl Harbor veterans who had been deliberately held back by Yamaguchi for this moment. It was the cream of the Navy air arm. Soon over two hundred and forty planes – roughly equal numbers of Vals, Kates, and Zeros – were forming up overhead, and soon after 10.00, the order was given by flight-leader Egusa to proceed northeast against the enemy. Some forty of the Zeros remained behind, hovering above the Japanese carriers of the 2nd Airfleet. Yamamoto elected at this stage to retain some flexibility in his responses till he confirmed enemy dispositions, especially with four other carriers moving in from the south. Despite the risk involved in keeping fully laden aircraft on deck, he retained the ready strike on the Akagi and Kaga, ready to respond to any change. The wisdom of this policy was soon proven when some ten minutes later a second group of three carriers north of the initial group was reported. Kondo immediately released the ready strike of 120 aircraft on Kaga and Akagi, and within minutes both were clearing their decks of the laden aircraft. The speed of this action was fortunate as even as the last aircraft launched and the carriers resumed their positions within the screen, the destroyer Hatsuyuki reported a large enemy force approaching from the north. The aircraft of TF16 had arrived.
Since 06.00 Halsey had been hurrying his carriers, southwards to get within range of the Japanese Fleet, and by 09.20 his planes were lifting off from his three carriers. TF17 was also moving south, but due to the initial deployment, still was about 40 miles north of TF17 and Fletcher elected to delay an immediate launch to close with the Japanese location more before committing his aircraft. TF58 initially some 90 miles to the south was moving east and had closed to within 60 miles of Halsey. This meant that the strike of TF16 of some 210 aircraft was on its own. In their brief communication, Halsey appeared happy with this situation and indicated his intent to use subsequent strikes from TF17 and 58 to follow up and engage the survivors of the initial strike. This intent would soon be subject to the reality check of the IJN aviation capabilities. Shortly after this, the report came in from the searching aircraft of the location of the second group of four carriers some miles to the NW of the first reported group. Despite the sudden doubling of the size of the enemy carrier forces, Halsey appears to have been initially little troubled by this news, merely ordering Fletchers TF 17 to launch the full-strength strike marshaled on its decks. There appears to have been little immediate recognition or appreciation to the implications on the fact that the strength, dispositions, and location of the enemy forces were increasingly different from the intelligence assumptions on which his plan was based.
With the sighting of the Japanese 1st Airfleet, the American pilots found themselves plowing through the dense flak of the screen as they elected to concentrate on the three largest carriers visible, to a large degree disregarding the smaller Junyo. The dive-bombers, arriving just ahead of the slower torpedo-bombers, and bore the brunt of the 40 Zeros’ already aloft as the CAP. The 58 strong Wildcat escort outnumbered the Zeros of the CAP considerably but was hampered by the poor tactics employed, losing some 38 of their number in a large confusing melee as they attempted to prevent the Zeroes from engaging the strike. Nevertheless, they succeeded in limiting the attacks of the high elements on the dive bombers. Despite the disruption, the dive bomber element totaled 90 aircraft and portions succeeded in reaching their targets. The disjointed attacks of the diving Dauntlesses managed to score multiple hits on all three of the large carriers. The Amagi and Kaga each received three hits, whilst the Akagi received two.
Whilst the dive bomber occupied the CAP the twenty ready Zeros of the Junyo and Amagi, scrambling to gain height, had closed on the descending torpedo-bombers. Here again, they did brutal execution on the obsolescent Devastators, but the 71 aircraft of the three air groups again simply swamped the defensive fighters. Despite losing nearly 40 of their number and having to contend with the ships’ anti-aircraft fire some thirty managed to cut through to launch their torpedoes. Here they were cruelly served by the failure of the USN Bureau of Ordnance and the defective fuses of the torpedo warheads. At least three torpedoes struck carriers without failing to detonate. Despite this, all three of the Carriers were hit, as well as the Battleship Hiei but at a brutal cost. Only 17 of the 71 Devastators exited the area, and only five of those would be deemed airworthy when returning to TF16.
Of the three carriers, Amagi immediately suffered fatal damage. Stuck by two torpedoes that did detonate and five bombs, it is probable that it would have sunk anyway. But Laden with fueled and armed aircraft in preparation for a second strike immediately suffered a massive series of secondary explosions. The two torpedoes struck close together amidships disabling its engines. The carrier, holed beneath the water-line, shuddered to a halt, listing violently to port. Lacking power and with no pressure for the water mains, the flames from the exploding ordnance in the hanger spread unchecked and the carrier was soon burning from end to end as the crew attempted to abandon ship. She would still be burning fiercely when finally sinking that evening, taking over 900 of her crew with her. Akagi likewise took two torpedoes, one to port and one to starboard, but both on the main belt of her armor, resulting in the influx of several hundred tons of water. Despite this, she was able to remain under power and maneuverable, though at reduced speed. The single bomb hit that she suffered struck at the base of the island super structure. The detonation would not affect flying operations, but flying shrapnel Killed Admiral Kongo and injuring several of his flag staff, including Captain Genda, architect of the original Pearl Harbor attack. Kaga was also struck by two bombs and a single torpedo. The single torpedo hit well forward had little effect aside from causing a list of a few degrees and reducing her speed. One of the two bombs struck a 5-inch mount destroying it whilst the second penetrated the side of the flight deck just behind the trunked funnels and detonated in the hanger below. Unlike the Amagi the hangar was devoid of flammables and explosives. Though initially fierce the fire resulting from this hit was rapidly bought under control and within the hour Kaga was capable of resuming flight operations after some temporary repairs to the flight deck. The departing American aircrew would report three burning and sinking carriers upon their return. But the 210 aircraft suffered brutal losses in achieving this with barely 90 successfully returning to the location of TF16. Meanwhile second in command Rear Admiral Chuichi Hara, assumed command of the 1st Air fleet.
It was now after 10.00 and whilst this strike was in progress, in a series of cascading actions every carrier group on both sides had either launched or was in the process of launching an airstrike, and at one point a total of six flights of planes were airborne. The first American strike from TF16 on the 1st Airfleet was returning to its carriers. The first Japanese strike from the 2nd Airfleet was nearing those carriers and would shortly be attacking. A second American strike from TF17 which had just taken to the air was forming up and heading to the reported location of the 2nd Airfleet. Each of these strikes totaled over 180 aircraft. The final smaller strike of some 110 aircraft from the Kaga and Akagi was in the process of heading for TF17. At this point, Halsey was very confident and ordered TF58 to go ahead and mount a strike at the 1st Air fleet survivors.
In this interlude, Halsey and his subordinate Fletcher had been exchanging animated signals as to the second group’s composition. Halsey, true to his nature and the Japanese expectations, was inclined to throw everything he had at the enemy. Fletcher, who seems to be the first allied flag officer badly worried by the tactical picture and showing greater reverence for the cautious aspect of Nimitz’s initial instructions, and also uncomfortable due to the size and location of the reported Japanese forces wished to keep most of the fighter strength back for defense against the inevitable Japanese attack. Already far different from the anticipated enemy plan, it was better to weaken the American attack, he argued than to lose the carriers. Also, he urged that the two US TF merge for mutual support. In the face of the size of the Japanese carrier force. the attack by TF58 could only further weaken the Japanese force, and further strikes could be ordered once initial results were known. Earlier Halsey, uncharacteristically – there is evidence that he was feeling the strain of his illness on this day – agreed to a fatal compromise with the composition of the TF17 strike. Neither enough fighters were sent with the attack to make it count, nor enough kept behind to ensure adequate protection. But Halsey ordered TF16 about to close with TF17.
While this was happening the Japanese finally located TF58 closing from the east. To say the sudden and totally unexpected appearance of a new three-carrier group caused consternation in the Japanese command, would be a vast understatement. Suddenly all the comfortable assumptions and confidence in the situation was lost. With the carriers of the Kido Butai now unexpectedly outnumbered, Yamamoto could no longer afford to keep the presence of the 5th Airfleet secret. Some 250 miles to the south and closing, Admiral Ozawa was to launching a strike at this new presence from his still undiscovered fleet. His planes would have twice as far to fly as those from the other two rapidly converging fleets. They would be making their appearance in about two hours. In the meantime, he ordered all the fleet elements to close on the 1st Airfleet location for mutual support in the face of the sudden increase in enemy forces.
Even as the 150+ strike from TF58 left for the 1st Airfleet location, a report arrived from TF44 of a new Japanese carrier force to the south. This burst as a complete surprise to the Allied forces as at no stage had they received the slightest hint of its possible existence. At this point, it is fair to say that whatever prior plans had been made, both sides had been totally surprised by the unexpected presence of significant enemy forces. Each side was forced to make rapid tactical adjustments at short notice, with command decisions shrouded in the fog of war and sudden uncertainty as to what they faced. What Halsey thought will never be determined because even this latest report was being processed the incoming strike of the 2nd Airfleet was being detected by TF16s radar. Before any response was formulated, TF16 became locked in a vital struggle for survival as the 240 strong strike force swept into the attack.
What was to follow was often referred to as perhaps the most clinically precise major air strike by a carrier force in the Pacific campaign. The strike group composed of many Pearl Harbor veterans and under the experienced command of Lieutenant Commander Takahashi from the Shokaku represented perhaps the peak of the IJN aviation at this time. Composing almost equal numbers of Kate’s, Vals and Zeroes they were met about 20 miles out from TF16. Despite the advantage of early warning the 48 available Wildcats were again disadvantaged by poor tactics and outnumbered by over 60 Zero’s, which proceeded to sweep them aside. Losing over 30 of their number at the cost of 11 zero’s they were unable to disrupt the attacking formations. Without interruption Takahashi was able to marshal and coordinate the attack to maximum effect, only disrupted by the desperate anti-aircraft fire as the screen attempted to protect the carriers. With almost uncanny synchronicity dive bombers came diving out of the sun at the carriers, whilst hammer and anvil attacks from two axis’s by torpedo bombers came lancing in across the waves through the screen of covering ships. Arriving almost simultaneously the Ranger and Yorktown were overwhelmed from multiple directions.
The Ranger was the first purpose-built carrier of the USN in the early 1930s, lightly built as a weight-saving measure and designed to carry the maximum number of aircraft on a barely armored hull. Lacking the protection of subsequent classes, the decision to employ her in the Pacific theatre had been considered risky but accepted to defend Hawaii. The error of this decision was soon apparent as struck rapidly by four bomb hits and three torpedoes; she was almost immediately reduced to a sinking wreck. Ablaze for two-thirds of her length and listing rapidly port as she slewed to a halt. Less than 40 minutes after the first impact she would capsize and sink shortly thereafter, the second-fastest sinking of a carrier in the war, and take over 1500 of her 2150 crew down with her. Her unfortunate fate however was to be exceeded by the Yorktown being attacked simultaneously less than a mile away.
The thoughts passing through Admiral Halsey’s mind at this time will never be known. In minutes his expectations of victory must have turned to the nightmare knowledge of certain defeat. He did not have to suffer such thoughts for long. The target of veteran aircrew from Shokaku and Zuikaku was immediately hit by at least five 500 lb bombs – three on the flight deck, one on the bridge, one on the rear of the superstructure – and two torpedoes close together amidships, and a third on the port bow. There were several large explosions in quick succession and one enormous convulsion. At least one or two of the ship's magazines detonated breaking the ship's back. With the bridge destroyed and both Admiral Halsey and the ship's captain dead the was no hope of recovery. Within five minutes of receiving the first bomb, the ship was on her way to the bottom, racked by internal explosions and her back broken. The flaming flight deck would slip under the sea barely 25 minutes after the first impact. It was the fastest sinking of a carrier in naval history, and the surrounding escorts would recover only 238 survivors of a crew of over 2200.
The fate of the final carrier Lexington was not quite as brutally abrupt and followed a few minutes after her two companions. Subject to the same synchronized hammer and anvil attack whilst being dive-bombed, she benefitted to a degree from the proximity of the one modern anti-aircraft cruiser of the screen Atlanta. Her dense and concentrated fire badly disrupted one arm of the torpedo attack, downing three Vals damaging several more. This was achieved at the cost of attracting the attention of a chotai of Kates from the Hiryu, which pressed an attack on the Atlanta to close range before releasing their torpedoes. All three were shot down, but two of the three torpedoes released struck, one in the second engine room and one near the propellers. One of the burning Kates also flew into the rear superstructure, causing further damage. Despite Atlanta's defense, Lexington was still struck on the port side by three torpedoes. These all struck near the stern quarter, destroying the rudder and propellers, and rapidly bringing her to a halt. The rapid loss of speed and resultant sharp swing to port, fortunately, caused most of the dive bombs to miss closely ahead. Nevertheless, a further three bombs struck the forward flight deck and blew the forward lift out of the hanger, whilst the near misses forward sprung plates near the bow. Despite having no aircraft in the hanger and aviation fuel secured, a severe fire took hold and proceeded to burn out of control. Left stationary and battling to control the fires and flooding, Lexington still maintained power and pressure to her water mains and pumps and was not in immediate danger of sinking. Nevertheless, despite the best efforts of the crew and supporting vessels, the fire could not be extinguished, nor could the influx of flooding, worsened by sprung plates forward be contained as the carrier steadily began to settle by the bow. Requiring counter flooding to prevent capsizing, her hull soon began settling deeper and as the water gained ground. By mid-afternoon, this threatened to flood the engine rooms and deny power to fight the damage. Around 1600 hours that afternoon the captain gave the decision to abandon ship with the flight deck less than 20 feet above the water. The accompanying destroyers closed to recover the wounded directly lowered onto the decks and swimmers from the water. This was concluded shortly after 1700 and as the ships withdrew the destroyer Owens fired torpedoes to scuttle the still burning hulk. In a further damning indictment on the torpedoes, the first three fired at the stationary target all struck and failed to detonate. It was only after the fourth and fifth detonated that Lexington slowly rolled onto her side and sank around 1735 with the loss of 228 of her crew. With her loss, the carrier element of TF16 had ceased to exist.
In a final insult to injury the heavy cruiser Chester had been struck amidships by a torpedo dropped at a target on the far side of the screen, losing an engine room and reduced to a maximum speed of twelve knots. The final loss for the strike by the Japanese was 49 aircraft and well worth the cost for the destruction of half the US carriers in the Pacific. With the remaining seven cruisers, two damaged, (Atlanta would have to be scuttled that evening after dark), and nine destroyers Admiral Spruance was again left in command of the remnants of the TF16 screen. Till TF17 joined his priority was to recover survivors from the water and organize the scattered and damaged vessels remaining.
