Population growth was already in decline by 1978.
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TFR had already fallen from the Mao peak of 6 to 3.
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Efforts prior to the One Child Policy were incredibly effective, with 1968's Later, Longer, Fewer program - "wan, xi, shao" - a huge success. Promoting later marriages, longer waiting between births, and fewer children as a whole already addressed any overpopulation crisis. Deng Xiaoping overreacted, bought into the extreme malthusianism of an
aerospace engineer, Song Jian, and concluded a radical response was necessary to a problem that was already going away.
Evidence for the OCP actually working is contested. As you can see on graph two the TFR briefly went up in the late 80s. I would say that TFR collapsed below replacement in the 90s not because of direct family planning but due to a mixture of urbanisation and the cost of raising a child.
1. China is an
expensive place to raise a child and that trend began in the 90s when the private education market began to grow. As cities developed and expanded, the further loss of state sponsored or factory-adjacent daycares that were seen under Mao's natalist and socialist policies led to a rise in children being partially or wholly raised by grandparents as it was no longer possible to take care of infants while working. New white collar or blue collar workers had much less support for their children, as they migrated away from their families. This turning of children into a burden on the older generation for parents who barely saw their children played a role in the "Little Emperor" phenomenon of having fewer children but giving them grandparents who spoiled them with attention and heavily monitored their education.
2. The rapid economic development of the 90s also pushed the migration of rural workers to cities where they lacked Hukou, denying access to local education services led to their children either being sent back to their village, or being raised locally at a higher cost, again incentivising smaller families. These two factors have led to many children identifying more with their grandparents than their parents as well. This is not unusual, developed countries generally have higher costs for raising children. China
is unusual in how it's Hukou system uniquely raised the cost of urbanisation, lack of extensive daycare even in developed regions, and high emphasis on tutoring and education for a developing country. I would argue that those played a significant role of pushing TFR down during the 90s as part of overall economic acceleration and were directly linked to urbanisation breaking up family structures.
Additionally, it's important to know that the One Child Policy was inconsistently implemented. Many rural and minority families received an exemption or outright flouted the rules. Many more people had unregistered births and then paid a fine when their kid was old enough to go to school so they could be registered - every year sees a slight boost to the population of five and six year olds as a result and
many of these undocumented children are women for obvious reasons. I know some people offline who were registered later and in my experience these undocumented or exempted children grew up to have normal experiences for their age and class group.
None of this is to say that forced abortions or sterilisations never happened. They unequivocally have and in less developed regions still do, both on the judgement of individual officials towards individual families but also sometimes in large scale county-wide campaigns. Most rural towns might have overlooked large families but others enforced the rules strictly and cruelly. It's just that implementation did not happen often enough to meaningfully impact demographics.
So in conclusion the One Child Policy was not only an inhumane monstrosity, it was inconsistently implemented and completely pointless. Even without the One Child Policy, China's population still declines roughly on schedule unless the government flips back to natalism