Thank you all very much! I have sadly limited knowledge of Taisho-era Japan and am grateful for the information.
Is there a particular book on the subject that I should look for?
The best one I'm familiar with, especially for the moments around the war, is
War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914-1919, by Frederick Dickinson, from the Harvard Press monograph series.
It does dispute several of the above posters, however: some significant personages in the Japanese power structure (if not in the 1914 government) genuinely
did consider committing to Germany, for several reasons. This was primarily the clique centered around Yamagata Aritomo, one of the surviving old guard of the initial Meiji days, and centered largely around ex-Choshu samurai, most of whom became Army officers, and their allies/hangers-on.
The Yamagata faction: (a) being Army based was more sympathetic to the Germans given their aid in training the Japanese Army, (b) was disdainful of civilian politicians, as exemplified by the British Parliament, favored by the more Anglophilic (and, usually, not ex-military) Japanese politicians, (c) believed well into 1915 that Germany and the Central Powers were going to defeat France and Russia on the field, and wanted in on the winning side, and (d) thought that the larger British presence in the Pacific was more of a threat than the Germans.
They were outmaneuvered in 1914 by Kato Takaaki, the Foreign Minister, who was exactly all the things that the Yamagata faction hated: a politician, committed to his party, an Anglophile, and opposed to the military's attempts to control Japanese politics. While he was no less interested in control over China (Kato was the author of the notorious 21 Demands to China in 1915), he wanted a civilian government by elected politicians, rather than old, unelected nobles making decisions and steering the country. Kato pushed forward to the Diet and to the Cabinet with Japan's obligations under the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, and thus entered the war on the British side. A different Foreign Minister might not have been so dynamic, and Japanese neutrality might have continued for longer; alternately, a Yamagata-clique government might have declared for Germany early. It is doubtful it would have ended well for Japan, especially if the Central Powers still lost. Even if they won, it's doubtful that it would have been as good a thing for Japan as the Yamagata clique hoped for.