A history of the second HMAS Australia
- Thread starter johnboy
- Start date
Heck, a 40mm octuple Pom Pom at close range is going to rip a transport apart. If Australia gets in 'Danger close' her twelve in guns can literally flatten a transport with muzzle blast!
nbcman
Donor
I wonder if the Author will throw us a curve ball for the ongoing battle based on the POD. Spoiler to follow.
Recall that the IJN also received an additional battleship in the WNT as compared to OTL, the Settsu.
en.wikipedia.org
Maybe there could be a night time action between the HMAS Australia and the IJN Settsu?
IOTL, the Settsu was a target vessel which was used during IJN operations at various times during WW2.
Japanese battleship Settsu - Wikipedia
Maybe there could be a night time action between the HMAS Australia and the IJN Settsu?
Always love your masterful story telling.From WW1 to WW2 . Always having great battle action loving how you cannot predict the final outcome.
Any kind of warship getting inside a troop convoy means carnage, but in Australia's case it would mostly come from the secondaries, rather than the slow-firing, slow-traversing big guns. A big AP round fired at a transport just goes in one side and out the other, and a fast-firing CL or DD with a full torpedo load would be just about as deadly.
BCs are built to kill things from range, where they're had to hit with torpedoes and their armour will shrug off anything short of battleship counterfire. A close-range brawl at night doesn't play to their strengths at all, as Hiei found out OTL at 1st Guadalcanal.
The Germans would disagree. Generally you might get two or three merchants and the rest would scatter. It is one of the reasons Tirpitz gained torpedoes. They let in water not air.
Australia has no surface radar and has to engage quickly at night or get carriered in the morning. I don't see how you avoid a close range engagement.
Not sure if she still would, but in WW1 Australia would have carried at least a few rounds of large calibre shrapnel shell. They were actually supposed to be the primary defence against torpedo boats with lighter guns meant for when they sneaked up on you. Those would probably do a number on a transport as well.
Is more likely come the london naval treaty they kept hiei in active frontline use the whole time periodI wonder if the Author will throw us a curve ball for the ongoing battle based on the POD. Spoiler to follow.
Recall that the IJN also received an additional battleship in the WNT as compared to OTL, the Settsu.
IOTL, the Settsu was a target vessel which was used during IJN operations at various times during WW2.
Japanese battleship Settsu - Wikipedia
Maybe there could be a night time action between the HMAS Australia and the IJN Settsu?
1831 27 February 1942 - A turn toward, another rebuff
1831, 27 February 1942, Deruyter, off Java
He had run South long enough, the crippled Exeter detached with HMS Jupiter as her escort. Dorrman again signaled “follow me”, swinging back initially to the northeast, and then northwest, hoping to surprise the transports in the darkness, since they had been unable to close during the day. He had his heavy ships in line ahead, his four American destroyers on one flank, the destroyers Witte de With and Encounter on the other.
He was to have little success, not sighting the transports at all, but at 1925 he sighted multiple Japanese ships, 8 or 9 light cruisers or destroyers, some 17,500 yards to port. His line opened fire at 1733. At 1736, the Japanese heavy cruiser again appeared. One was still showing a dull glow, enough to actually see a torpedo launch. Observing this launch, he turned his ships to starboard at 1938. Whilst he was running away to present a more difficult target, the Japanese increased speed, made smoke and withdrew Northeast. By 2000, he was faced with a familiar problem, namely how to get past the Japanese warships and get at the transports? A night engagement against so many hostile destroyers would be a very risky affair. Perhaps it was possible to circle around and access the invasion force that way? A direct approach was not working, that was certain.
He knew all too well that there would be no future opportunities to defend Java, so decided to take his force inshore along the Java coast and then try and come upon the transports from their flank.
He had run South long enough, the crippled Exeter detached with HMS Jupiter as her escort. Dorrman again signaled “follow me”, swinging back initially to the northeast, and then northwest, hoping to surprise the transports in the darkness, since they had been unable to close during the day. He had his heavy ships in line ahead, his four American destroyers on one flank, the destroyers Witte de With and Encounter on the other.
He was to have little success, not sighting the transports at all, but at 1925 he sighted multiple Japanese ships, 8 or 9 light cruisers or destroyers, some 17,500 yards to port. His line opened fire at 1733. At 1736, the Japanese heavy cruiser again appeared. One was still showing a dull glow, enough to actually see a torpedo launch. Observing this launch, he turned his ships to starboard at 1938. Whilst he was running away to present a more difficult target, the Japanese increased speed, made smoke and withdrew Northeast. By 2000, he was faced with a familiar problem, namely how to get past the Japanese warships and get at the transports? A night engagement against so many hostile destroyers would be a very risky affair. Perhaps it was possible to circle around and access the invasion force that way? A direct approach was not working, that was certain.
He knew all too well that there would be no future opportunities to defend Java, so decided to take his force inshore along the Java coast and then try and come upon the transports from their flank.
2102 27 February 1942 - Ships bleed off
2102, 27 February 1942, USS Paul Jones, off Java
Lieutenant Commander John Joseph Hourihan was the senior officer for the four old "four piper" destroyers attached to Doorman's squadron. Unlike the other destroyers of Doorman's squadron, the four Clemson Class ships had not been refueled due to time constraints. Now, they were running short on fuel. At 2102, Hourihan advised Doorman that he could not go on, turning back to Surabaya.
It was to leave the allied line with only two destroyers, HMS Encounter and the Dutch Witte de With. THis became only one destroyer, when, at 2203, they came upon survivors from Kortenaer, sunk from a 'long lance' hit hours earlier. Doorman detached Witte de With to search for survivors, of which there were many. Witte de With conducted search and rescue operations until 0045 the following day, before heading back to Surabaya. Doorman's squadron was shrinking all the time, now down to only six ships.
Lieutenant Commander John Joseph Hourihan was the senior officer for the four old "four piper" destroyers attached to Doorman's squadron. Unlike the other destroyers of Doorman's squadron, the four Clemson Class ships had not been refueled due to time constraints. Now, they were running short on fuel. At 2102, Hourihan advised Doorman that he could not go on, turning back to Surabaya.
It was to leave the allied line with only two destroyers, HMS Encounter and the Dutch Witte de With. THis became only one destroyer, when, at 2203, they came upon survivors from Kortenaer, sunk from a 'long lance' hit hours earlier. Doorman detached Witte de With to search for survivors, of which there were many. Witte de With conducted search and rescue operations until 0045 the following day, before heading back to Surabaya. Doorman's squadron was shrinking all the time, now down to only six ships.
2303 27 February 1942 - Here they come again
2303, 27 February 1942, IJN Haguro, off Java
"Admiral, ships, no confirmed enemy ships, a line of four, no five, heading 000, speed 20, range 15,000 meters." Takagi could not believe it. They would not give up. He was worried about Nachi, although her fires were out, the cruiser was under the command of her engineering officer and had been hit hard. His number one weapon, his ships Type 93 torpedoes, had been heavily used and stock were now low, all vessels on reloads.
He did not fancy a gunnery duel in close with a heavy ship, not with no torpedoes. Why had they had so little luck with the mass torpedo salvos that had been launched. Now the enemy had found them again. The Gods were not on their side.
He had no choice but to reengage. His ships were headed Southwest. He quickly gave the orders to change course to 000. They swung to the port toward the enemy ships, taking a parallel course heading due North and increasing speed to 27 knots.
"Admiral, ships, no confirmed enemy ships, a line of four, no five, heading 000, speed 20, range 15,000 meters." Takagi could not believe it. They would not give up. He was worried about Nachi, although her fires were out, the cruiser was under the command of her engineering officer and had been hit hard. His number one weapon, his ships Type 93 torpedoes, had been heavily used and stock were now low, all vessels on reloads.
He did not fancy a gunnery duel in close with a heavy ship, not with no torpedoes. Why had they had so little luck with the mass torpedo salvos that had been launched. Now the enemy had found them again. The Gods were not on their side.
He had no choice but to reengage. His ships were headed Southwest. He quickly gave the orders to change course to 000. They swung to the port toward the enemy ships, taking a parallel course heading due North and increasing speed to 27 knots.
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2312 27 February 1942 - Opening with a hit
2312, 27 February 1942, HMAS Australia, off Java
It was a great feat of gunnery, though Waller. Without radar, Australia had sighted, ranged on, opened fire at and hit with her second broadside an enemy cruiser at 14,000 yards in pitch blackness, the dark velvet curtain only punctuated by sweep of a searchlight from Java.
It was a great feat of gunnery, though Waller. Without radar, Australia had sighted, ranged on, opened fire at and hit with her second broadside an enemy cruiser at 14,000 yards in pitch blackness, the dark velvet curtain only punctuated by sweep of a searchlight from Java.
2314 27 February 1942 - Flush them dry
2314, 27 February 1942, IJN Haguro, off Java
By the Gods that had been close to catastrophic damage, the shell passing through the main funnel, not fully detonating, no doubt due to the minimal resistance, before passing through and impacting the sea behind his flagship. Takagi felt he no longer had any option, no matter his torpedo shortage.
Nachi fired at 2316, the star-shells lighting the sea, marking the forward part of the allied line perfectly, yet leaving the rear ships in half light at best, including Australia.
At 2318, Takagi gave the order to launch another torpedo spread, a spread that would shoot his ships dry. At 2320, his two accompanying destroyers, Yukikaze and Tokitsukaze launched four torpedoes each, followed at 2321 with Nachi launching eight, followed two minutes later by Haguro with a salvo of four. The range was approximately 14,500 yards. Launched in desperation to keep the allied ships at bay, this time they were to find their mark.
By the Gods that had been close to catastrophic damage, the shell passing through the main funnel, not fully detonating, no doubt due to the minimal resistance, before passing through and impacting the sea behind his flagship. Takagi felt he no longer had any option, no matter his torpedo shortage.
Nachi fired at 2316, the star-shells lighting the sea, marking the forward part of the allied line perfectly, yet leaving the rear ships in half light at best, including Australia.
At 2318, Takagi gave the order to launch another torpedo spread, a spread that would shoot his ships dry. At 2320, his two accompanying destroyers, Yukikaze and Tokitsukaze launched four torpedoes each, followed at 2321 with Nachi launching eight, followed two minutes later by Haguro with a salvo of four. The range was approximately 14,500 yards. Launched in desperation to keep the allied ships at bay, this time they were to find their mark.
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2339 - 27 February 1942 - Two critical hits
2339, 27 February 1942, De Ruyter, off Java
The Type 93 torpedo had hit abreast the aft turret, almost physically lifting the light cruiser out of the water. Hungry water immediately rushed into her, fires started. Electrical power failed two minutes after impact, disabling her gun, pumps and lights.
It rapidly became clear to Doorman that, although she may take some time to sink, the end outcome was inevitable. Nor was she the only ship to suffer a hit. Java had taken a torpedo that detonated the aft magazine, sheering the stern off the ship, By 2340, she had taken a heavy list to port, the crew already abandoning ship.
It was the end for both Dutch cruisers, likely for Java as well, thought Doorman. He had gambled on a night action to try and attack the invasion force's transports to stop the landings on Java. Gambled and lost, delaying the invasion by one day only, more than likely.
Perhaps Hart was right and they were better off maintaining a force in being. Well, it was all academic now. He turned to his signals officer. "Send to Captain Waller - A sinking. Retire immediately. Ignore survivors, repeat ignore survivors."
The Type 93 torpedo had hit abreast the aft turret, almost physically lifting the light cruiser out of the water. Hungry water immediately rushed into her, fires started. Electrical power failed two minutes after impact, disabling her gun, pumps and lights.
It rapidly became clear to Doorman that, although she may take some time to sink, the end outcome was inevitable. Nor was she the only ship to suffer a hit. Java had taken a torpedo that detonated the aft magazine, sheering the stern off the ship, By 2340, she had taken a heavy list to port, the crew already abandoning ship.
It was the end for both Dutch cruisers, likely for Java as well, thought Doorman. He had gambled on a night action to try and attack the invasion force's transports to stop the landings on Java. Gambled and lost, delaying the invasion by one day only, more than likely.
Perhaps Hart was right and they were better off maintaining a force in being. Well, it was all academic now. He turned to his signals officer. "Send to Captain Waller - A sinking. Retire immediately. Ignore survivors, repeat ignore survivors."
2346 27 February 1942, - Retreat and failure
2346, 27 February 1942, HMAS Australia, off Java
Hec Waller gave the order and the old ship swept around, turning South. She was followed by Perth, Houston and Encounter. With the Admiral gone, he was in command. Fuel was not short, but ammunition was running low, especially for Perth and Houston. With the Japanese likely landing near Surabaya, Batavia seemed a better bet to him. When they were clear, Waller ordered a change of course to West-Southwest. He signaled Houston. "Suggest 28knots." The laconic Captain of the U.S cruiser had not lost his sense of humour, signalling back. "Concur. But suggest 48."
Hec Waller gave the order and the old ship swept around, turning South. She was followed by Perth, Houston and Encounter. With the Admiral gone, he was in command. Fuel was not short, but ammunition was running low, especially for Perth and Houston. With the Japanese likely landing near Surabaya, Batavia seemed a better bet to him. When they were clear, Waller ordered a change of course to West-Southwest. He signaled Houston. "Suggest 28knots." The laconic Captain of the U.S cruiser had not lost his sense of humour, signalling back. "Concur. But suggest 48."
Just to ask on the command front, would Rear Admiral Karel Doorman really stay as commander? With Australia adding a real Capital ship, they would nominate at least a rear admiral for it and Perth (and Exeter) and at that point they would unquestionably assume command of the force by default? HNLMS De Ruyter for example is only 6,442 long tons and Java similar with a real if old rebuilt capital ship of 26,000+ in the formation the RAN would assume command and any rebuild would assume flag command for a cruiser squadron, so she would have the best facilities as well?