What were the drivers for them inventing that doctrine and when where those drivers first in place?
A Better Rifle at Halloween
- Thread starter diesal
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Which ANZACs? In 1918 they and the Canadians were functionally part of the British Army in they way they fought. Those that went to Gallipoli wouldn't have been able to.
The main doctrinal thing that's needed is fighting a full combined arms battle. That wasn't really adopted until 1918 - there were glimmerings at Cambrai and Messines but it wasn't until Amiens that they properly got it working. The Canadians essentially fought Ortona with the same sort of doctrine they would have brought to an open country battle, and that was all about Combined Arms and would have looked recognisable to the men of 1918.
The use of frame charges to create mouse-holes enabling them to fight from the top down appears to have been an inter-war innovation. It's not critical to doctrine however - that's really a tactical rather than a doctrinal thing and adding that alone to a 1914 army really won't make much of a difference.
The basics would probably be remembered theoretically from officers who read about the Peninsula War. Same in the US-Mexican War. I don’t believe there was any urban combat in the Boer war as far back as the Indian Mutiny.
And that’s an awful lot of satchel charges to advance along a street through the buildings as opposed to walking down a killing zone masquerading as a street. And the mills bomb hasn’t been invented yet.
Going straight from the Race To The Sea to house to house combat is going to be exceptionally hard for any army.
The BEF probably could pull it off, but I doubt there would be much if anything left of either Brussels, it, or the Entente’s shell stockpile afterwards.
And that’s an awful lot of satchel charges to advance along a street through the buildings as opposed to walking down a killing zone masquerading as a street. And the mills bomb hasn’t been invented yet.
Going straight from the Race To The Sea to house to house combat is going to be exceptionally hard for any army.
The BEF probably could pull it off, but I doubt there would be much if anything left of either Brussels, it, or the Entente’s shell stockpile afterwards.
Mouse holing (though the name seems to come from the Canadian army in Italy and often included going down from the upper levels) was, at least in basic form, around for far longer. It’s one of those strategies that likely just pops up when there is the need and the ability. The British used it in Dublin during the Easter Rising of 1916, so the armies of WW1 are certainly capable of coming to the conclusions necessary.
Even with such tactics though, urban combat is a messy business.
And given the lack of communication (no radio's , only messengers) on all levels of command even an greater nightmare. Every squad/platoon will fight it's owm battle with little support if any at all.
I believe the concept of a single barrel Villar Perosa " rifle" had been mooted by Signor Revelli from the very beginning. I believe there is also a Villar Perosa in .455 in the Royal Armouries.
9mm Parabellum is the best choice though, like all cartridges it's a compromise though historically it seems the best choice, it's powerful enough to be effective but not so powerful it's users need wrists of steel to use it in a pistol.
In theory yes, in practice no. Both the ANZACs and the Canadians formed separate Corps in 1918. The British were well, the British, the ANZACs and the Canadians were very separate.
Mouse-holes were used as early as the Indian Mutiny.
British only adopted a "doctrine" in the 1970s. They did not have one previously. They refused to develop one previously seeing it as limiting the ability of a commander to respond to a given situation.
Errolwi
Monthly Donor
The Australian Divions were in ANZAC or Australian Corps from 1915. The NZ Division was in an ANZAC Corps until 1917 but was in British Corps in 1918.
"functionally part of the British Army in they way they fought". Their chain of command was separate and there were differences in tactics and leadership but they still fought a combined-arms battle on the British model, under a British higher command and supported by British assets (tanks, artillery, logistics, etc.).
While the Canadians in particular tended to be used as shock troops, this is largely a reflection of the fact that the Canadian Corps was both a large and very good one rather than them fighting differently. Indeed, when Dominion troops made an innovation (for example the Australians with "Peaceful Penetration" it would typically be adopted by the British forces as a whole.
I was trying to be specific about the use of frame charges to make the mouseholes - doing so with a pick and shovel takes forever, while a satchel charge has a pretty serious risk of taking the whole wall down.
British doctrine is rather like the British constitution. Just because it isn't written down doesn't mean it doesn't exist.
Britain as I said did not have a "doctrine". Every commander fought his own battle according to the training that he had given his troops. Every commander was responsible for his unit's own training. There were training schools but they applied a philosophy rather than a "doctrine". The philosophy varied from theatre to theatre, giving a changing emphasis to various aspects for a particular aspect of the battle.
Not exactly. Australian and Canadian Corps were very much a part of the British system. They received SS pamphlets just as every other formation did, contributed their learning to the development of further pamphlets, just as every other formation did. And their training establishment, when it wasn’t actually the same organization, followed the exact same rule book.
Where the Canadian and Australian Corps were unique was that they had the political shelter that allowed them to remain as a Corps level unit, when most British Corps were geographic formations that had Divisions rotated through them regularly. This political shelter also allowed the Canadians to maintain a 12 battalion Division when everyone else (including the Australians) had gone to a 9 battalion Division to save manpower. And to basically create a fourth brigade of Engineers for every Division which massively increased their ability to follow up on a successful assault and increase the infantry’s training time at the expense of fewer formations than they would otherwise have had. Again, this was not an innovation the Australian Corps could afford to copy, having a closer organization to the standard British one of the day.
Long story short, In WW1 the Australian and Canadian Corps were very much part of the British army and the two formations learned at about the same rate. The two formations just had some extra benefits that allowed them to be organized differently with some benefits being accrued from that state of affairs.
British doctrine of the Great War was defined by Field Service regulations. These were very much similar to doctrinal documents produced by other major powers. Though they took care to delegate decision making to the “man on the spot” as much as possible. A concept that later doctrinal statements, particularly in the US, would fall all over themselves to ascribe as unique to German military planning. However, fast was designed to be used by professionals with a considerable time in service. And the Great War included a number of innovations anyway. So things needed to be spread around, reinforced and sometimes dumbed down for those with less time invested in the culture. Thus Sas pamphlets were put out throughout the war.
So yeah, by any reasonable metric, the British army did have a doctrine as we understand the term.
With the lack of automatic or semi automatic small arms in an urban setting the old Peninsula/Indian method involved charging in mob handed and the close use of the bayonet. The grenade and magazine rifles made differences in this period to the offence and defence but grenades were not a feature in 1914 and German magazines were only 5 rounds when full so not so much. IIRC the old way was to isolate the enemy from the rest and deal with them in detail advancing piecemeal. Bash your way in and bayonet them fast mob handed was still a thing. But then only a few of the regulars would ave actually practiced this and ditto for the junior officers. It is a corporals war. Period machine guns could dominate the streets themselves but were too large, heavy and thus inflexible for internal fighting. But the writer may wish to include British, Belgian or French grenades. Or German ones indeed.
Errolwi
Monthly Donor
Noted for completeness rather than a factor in the doctrine discussion. The NZ Division also retained 12 battalions until the end of the war. Pressure was applied to create a second Division, but a fourth Brigade was created for several months instead. This meant there was a reasonable level of replacements, and it was said that the each NZ Brigade at the end of the Hundred Days had more riflemen than the adjacent British Divisions.
First World War military formations
This article provides an overview of how the New Zealand forces were organised during the First World War.
You are failing to understand that there was simply no "Doctrine". Every commander was different in his approach to the problems facing him. "Doctrine" relies on them being the same. The British were individuals who responded differently to each and every situation.
To use the Canadian Army’s definition:
“Military doctrine is a formal expression of military knowledge and thought, that the army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of conflict, the preparation of the army for conflict, and the method of engaging in conflict to achieve success ... it is descriptive rather than prescriptive, requiring judgement in application. It does not establish dogma or provide a checklist of procedures, but is rather an authoritative guide, describing how the army thinks about fighting, not how to fight. As such it attempts to be definitive enough to guide military activity, yet versatile enough to accommodate a wide variety of situations.”
Or to use NATO’s;
“Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.”
This was very much what FSR was meant to do. It provided common context which informed the actions and expectations of the “man on the spot” without removing his ability to act based on the information in front of him.
Every Western army requires that the officer in place have some degree of latitude. So no matter what the doctrine is, each individual officer will still respond differently. Much as the British Army did in this period.