8mm to the Left: If Hitler Died in 1923
- Thread starter KaiserKatze
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13 - Dangerous Games
8mm to the Left: A World Without Hitler
“There is no more ridiculous concept in the history of world politics than the notion of pacifism, for pacifism is one of those rare inventions which is solely human. Animals do not comprehend pacifism; they consume and destroy as is necessary for survival, be it flora or fauna, and know none of the artificial guilt with which humanity is taught to wrack itself. In this way, I argue, war is the universal test; it is the rock against which we beat our fists, testing our resolve, and either our resolve breaks, or the enemy does.” - Excerpt from “The War in the East”, Werner von Blomberg, 1947
Dangerous Games
It was a disgustingly wet June day in Banja, a small town (if it could even be called that) north of the city of Plovdiv in central Bulgaria. The conditions were horrible, almost brutal, with the unfortunate combination of rain pouring down from the nearby mountains merging with soggy, unstable earth churned up by farmers and now sucking in the boots of every soldier tramping through it like a voracious animal. Makeshift trenches had been dug at intervals and off to the side were several officers in uniforms, screaming directions through the biting wind while large tanks tried to force their way through the muck.
A quarter of a kilometre away, protected by a commandeered barn on a hill, a small crowd of men watched the military exercises play out. A large square table was laid out with a map of the area, and every few minutes an aide would shift one of the figures to match the ongoing events. Farther back from the table, beside the door and watching the men below, stood two men engaged in conversation. On the left was the handsome figure of Tsar Boris of Bulgaria, recognisable by his mostly-bald head and moustache, and to his right, dressed in a German military uniform, was General Erich von Manstein, German attaché to Bulgaria for the duration of their cooperation.
Erich von Manstein
(https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_von_Manstein)
Tsar Boris III of Bulgaria
(https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/t...ulgaria.jpg/revision/latest?cb=20171008015551)
“Notice the tank’s unwieldiness in the rain,” Boris was pointing out, watching the tank try and fail to react quickly as its sides were pelted with bullets. “Such a mechanism would be wholly impractical in the Eastern marshlands, not even touching upon mountainous terrain such as Romania.”
“Not in the midst of things, no,” von Manstein countered thoughtfully, rubbing his chin with one gloved hand, “but perhaps from a distance as support?”
“Bah!” Boris shook his head. His German was flawless, no doubt instilled in him by his family—originally of German stock—as a child. “Why not artillery, in that case? I can see the appeal in the open plains or cities, but these devices are no replacement for men on the ground!”
Von Manstein remained unconvinced. As they watched, the tank at last aligned itself towards its target and took off at a trundling speed. Its path continued on until it struck the trench, where, though first seeming to ride directly over the gap, it soon succumbed to the weak walls and sunk into the ground, coming to a halt. “Perhaps,” the German murmured, “we simply need a new approach.”
“Yes, well, let me know when you have found that,” Tsar Boris said with a smile, patting the other man on the shoulder. A glance behind the duo and he said, “It looks like our lunch is here. We should eat before it grows cold.”
The two men crossed to the grouping of armchairs brought in by the staff and a moment later a pair of plates were presented to them. Von Manstein politely held back his instinctive frown when he saw the clear evidence of food having been removed from his dish; he understood and empathised with the Tsar’s paranoia after what he had experienced recently and the annoyance of having his own food taste-tested before he could take a bite was a small inconvenience.
Only last year, Bulgaria’s democratic government had been the victim of a coup by the Zveno military organisation which, with the help of the army, had toppled the parliamentary system and turned the Tsar into little more than a puppet under a dictator. It had taken nearly a year before Boris had enlisted one of the Zveno’s own to launch his own counter-coup and return power to his own hands. He allowed the people their voice, but he kept a far firmer hold on the reigns than he had prior to 1935. An unfortunate consequence of this was a need for increased security.
The two ate in silence and von Manstein pondered this latest round of military exercises. They were learning a great deal from all this, it could not be denied, yet he could not shake the feeling of dissatisfaction. The Treaty of Versailles had cost Germany years of technological and military planning, an advantage which their enemies could very well make use of. Who knew what sort of dastardly inventions the Soviets were cooking up? Surely, the Communists understood nothing of fair and honourable combat.
The German military mission to Bulgaria had been the brainchild of von Manstein himself, one which the Minister of Defense had been eager to see through once he learned of it. It was an open secret that, in the 1920’s, the German government had partnered with the Soviets to test new military inventions and tactics where the eyes of the French and British could not spot them. Such measures had been necessary, von Manstein had and still felt, but times had changed; Germany was no longer the international pariah she had been and the Soviets were an increasingly-impossible option if Berlin truly sought alignment with her old foes.
Both Germany and Bulgaria had a lot to gain from cooperation. Both nations had seen their militaries heavily restricted following their defeat in the Great War and both had had territories ripped away which they were eager to reacquire. Compared to Bulgaria, Germany was in a relatively enviable position; Bulgaria was surrounded on all sides by suspicious eyes and any attempts to overturn the post-war status quo would be quickly and viciously suppressed. Bulgaria needed friends quite desperately, and Germany was more than willing to help them subvert their own unfair treaty.
Half of the men fighting in German uniforms down the hill were Bulgarians. Were any uncomfortable questions to be raised, all evidence would point to German military exercises in Bulgaria, nothing more. And that was not forbidden—not anymore, at least.
Once Tsar Boris finished off his meal, he turned to a chatty mood, as he often did. Von Manstein took this as his cue to light a cigarette and sit back.
“There are refugees in Bulgaria, did you know?” the Tsar spoke, seemingly almost to himself with how he gazed off into the distance. “Bulgarians fleeing from Yugoslavia. From Macedonia, their homeland, out of fear of the dreaded Serbs.” He glanced over. “Much like the Germans of the East, I hear.”
Von Manstein raised an eyebrow but did not comment. He had not heard of any expulsions or mass exoduses of Germans from Poland or one of the other regions with a large German population. Quite likely something the Tsar was speaking of the post-war relocation of the German minority in Posen.
“Bulgaria was nearly the queen of the Balkans,” Boris continued wistfully. At some point one of his servants had procured for him a glass of something strong-smelling, probably vodka, and he always got nostalgic with alcohol. “The ruler of the three seas…”
“Perhaps Bulgaria could have brought some stability to the region,” von Manstein mused. Despite his respect for the Balkan peoples as fellow Europeans, he found the region… frustrating. There was potential there, it was undeniable, but petty squabbles over this or that patch of worthless farmland had exhausted much of what the region could have been. It lacked a backbone, a leader, like Prussia had been to the disparate German states, or England to the British Isles.
Boris did not hear and launched into a tangent about the Greeks and Thrace, his favourite topic after Macedonia. At an earlier point in his mission here, von Manstein would have stayed to politely nod along, but it had been nearly a month and he had already learned that such rants were for no one but the Tsar’s ear. He rose, crossing back to the open doorway where he tossed the cigarette butt out into the rain. The downpour had grown even more heavy and the distant movements had become all but invisible. Much more and they’d have to cancel for the day or risk their droops drowning in the trenches, a horrifying, if accurate, bit of realism from the Great War.
The lumbering mass of the tank sank deeper into the mud and the men scrambled out of the top of it, yelling at each other if the gestures were to be understood. Yes, von Manstein thought to himself, the tank had potential, even if many of the old-school types did not see or understand it. Just like how Napoleon had revolutionised warfare with his speed and artillery, so too could Germany shake the foundations of modern combat with the introduction of such technological terrors… now, if only he could figure out how to convince the higher-ups…
The back-to-back changes to the European political theatre brought about in early 1935 had a profound impact on the complex web of relationships between the various nations of Europe. Germany’s resurgence as an equal Great Power, previously only anticipated as an event which would come to pass at some undefined point in the future, dramatically tipped the balance of power away from the dominant forces of the past decade-and-a-half. Whereas French- and British-aligned policies had been the European standard during the 1920’s, now it was Germany into whose sphere nations began to be drawn.
Included within thoughts and fears on German resurgence was the matter of the imperial German lands now residing within the borders of other nations. Until this point, many nations occupying formerly-German lands, such as Lithuania and Czechoslovakia, had rested their hopes on the notion of British and especially French intervention in the event of German moves towards retaking their old territory. 1935 proved to be a rude awakening, and with Anglo-German relations warming and France further retreating behind their fortifications, it became clear that the system in which they had trusted had all but ceased to exist.
For the Kingdom of Belgium, situated at the precarious crossroads of the Franco-German border, this shift was an uncomfortable and unwelcome one. Belgium was a nation roughly a century old, split from the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the early 1830's and in time growing to become a formidable Secondary Power with its acquisition of the Belgian Congo, one of the largest African colonies. Made rich from its industry and resource extraction both domestically and abroad, the kingdom was not without its problems, the largest of which being the two constituent peoples comprising it.
Ethnic map of Belgium
(https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-Belgium-with-the-linguistic-regions_fig1_252068201)
To the North sat Flanders, occupied by the Flemish, a Dutch-speaking people, and to the South the Wallonians in Wallonia, French-speakers. The two had been initially united in their distaste for the Protestant Dutch (given Belgium's Catholic majority) and had seceded together, with the disagreements only arising in the decades after. Wallonia was historically richer and more industrialised than Flanders, benefiting from both the rivers running mainly through its borders as well as close trade with neighbouring France, and it was the dominant aspect of Wallonia which had led to the capital, Brussels, keeping its Francophone nature despite the surrounding Flemish-speaking regions.
The Great War had thrown a wrench into this harmony when the German Empire invaded France through Belgium, breaching its neutrality and turning it into a battleground between the largest empires on the planet. The German occupation had been a time of great suffering for the Belgian people, the indignities suffered coining the phrase “The Rape of Belgium” to describe the occupation between 1914 and 1918. During the occupation, the German Empire overwhelmingly favoured the Flemish for positions within the regime, hoping to establish a Flemish-speaking client state to reduce French influence in the Lowlands, and dismantling much of the Wallonian heavy industry, shrinking the divide between the two regions, while at the same time Flemish soldiers fighting for Belgian freedom felt undervalued by Francophone generals. These four years awoke a flame of Flemish nationalism, one whose heat could not be so easily snuffed out once the war had drawn to a close.
Following Germany’s defeat, the question of the collaborationists became a bone of contention between the Flemish and the central government which would eventually give rise to several parties of varying stages of radicalism supporting everything from Flemish autonomy within Belgium to secession from Belgium and union with the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the North. Not helping the already-tumultuous internal strife was the Belgian region of Eupen-Malmedy on the German border, annexed from the Prussian Rhineland in 1920 but retaining an overwhelmingly German character, another dubiously-loyal group within the Belgian melting pot.
The fight to balance the influence of the adjacent powers and their linguistic siblings had been one fought by every monarch since Belgium’s first, and the young King Leopold III was no exception. The Great Depression had taken its toll on his nation and, though they had mostly recovered, he was deeply conscious of their vulnerable position both militarily and economically. Since even before Napoleon, France had eyed their valuable lands as a place for expansion, and despite their close ties in the last war, there remained a sizable population within both Wallonia and France which called for the former’s secession and absorption into the latter, just as many Flemish and Dutch did. The economic turmoil had not aided this, and King Leopold feared that the next conflict, regardless of the winner, would be one that a unified Belgium would not survive.
It was thus with no small amount of trepidation that, following the various economic concessions gained for other smaller European states in exchange for their support of Germany, the Belgian Parliament opened talks on investment with Berlin. The outreach had been intentionally delayed by Wallonian diplomats until the Disarmament Conference had reached its end, but that had not deterred the interested parties, and two weeks after the Geneva delegates had returned home, a request was wired to Germany, requesting the opening of talks on the idea of investment in Belgium.
What they got in return was a simple demand, its contents brief.
Prime Minister Georges Theunis sat alongside King Leopold III of Belgium, cigars in both mens’ hands, a heavy silence filling the room as they considered the proposal which had been brought to them that morning. It was one which had not been entirely unexpected, but its arrival was nevertheless a surprise. A flat trade, a purchase offer: Two million German Marks and the promise of future investment in exchange for the return of the Eupen-Malmedy territory.
On paper the offer was laughable. Two million Marks did not hold a candle to the amount owed in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles. Yet it had become apparent during the Lausanne Conference in 1932 that these payments would not be coming, and because of that the Belgians were put in somewhat of a quandary. Eupen-Malmedy, though worth little, was a prize showcasing their victory over the treacherous Germans who had invaded and raped their neutral nation. To hand it back in exchange for wealth which the Belgians were owed anyway… it would be a slight to their honour. But would it be a worse slight to their honour than refusing the economic aid which the money could bring? It was not just money, either; Germany had promised them a deal as lucrative as that gained by the Danes, with Belgian resources from the Congo gaining first preference, an invaluable bargain when the other major powers had their own empires from whence to draw such goods.
During 1925 and 1926, talks had been underway to cede the two provinces to Germany in exchange for German recognition and repayment of debts tied to the currency used during the occupation of Belgium and which had remained in circulation. These talks had fallen through due to a variety of factors but it seemed that the Germans had not forgotten.
"What is your… instinctive, initial reaction?" King Leopold queried, turning to his Prime Minister.
Theunis allowed himself a drag of the cigar to formulate his response. "Give it to them," he admitted.
Leopold's brow drew together in confusion and frustration. "To the Germans? After what they did to us?" Leopold's distaste for the Germans was not as potent as his father’s, but nevertheless he had no great love for the steel-helmeted men of the Rhine.
"Us owning Eupen and Malmedy benefits us as little as it hurts Germany, and that is assuming we do not one day end up being pressured into giving it back to them outright or forced to hand it over in a war. We might as well take advantage of the offer and extract some worth from it. Learn from the French’s mistakes. Perhaps we can even coerce them to grant us more."
"You don't trust that the British will back us once more? The French?"
"The French are hiding beyond their precious Maginot Line and will leave us to die before taking one step into Germany. The British may protect us, but tell me, who will get here first, the Germans or the British? We may survive it, we may even come out of it an independent nation, but how much of Belgium will be left after the next round?"
King Leopold dipped his head in reluctant agreement. He had only been king for a year and the decisions weighed heavily on him, each one feeling as though it might be his last. "You make a good point. Regardless, I do not like the notion of endorsing German claims."
"I concur. But Germany has not been overtly aggressive, even with von Lettow-Vorbeck in control. The man fought with honour against our troops and he is not disliked in London. Look upon his success in Geneva. He seeks to redefine the current balance of power, and soon there will be little that any of us can do to stop him."
"You believe that the United Kingdom would ally with them?"
"Nothing so extreme, but perhaps support them as a counterbalance against the Soviets and Italy, depending on which direction they orient themselves. France has already proven unequal to the task, after all."
Leopold seemed to mull this over for several minutes, waiting until the cigar had burned down. "I fear the direction the world is going in," he said at long last. "It feels as though a great turmoil is on the horizon. A second Great War, greater than the last."
Theunis shuddered. "I can scarcely imagine such a thing."
Leopold gazed out the window. "Neither can I. And that is what scares me most."
“I will colour myself reluctantly impressed,” Chancellor Adenauer said in his usual dry way, considering the image laid out for him. “It would be quite the fait accompli. How did you come up with it?”
“You have my wife to thank for the idea, as a matter of fact,” President von Lettow-Vorbeck clarified, not lifting his eyes from the map, the region of the former Saar territory highlighted in bright red ink.
Adenauer hmmed. “It will anger the Socialists greatly, but the Prussian nationalists, too,” he pointed out, eyeing the man. Von Lettow-Vorbeck had not learned of Adenauer’s brief alliance with the Socialists to curb any attempts to restore Prince Wilhelm to the German throne and it was not likely that he would, but Adenauer would be keeping an eye out regardless. Thus far no more had been said on the topic of the royals, and Prince Wilhelm had retreated once more from the public eye, but the Chancellor was not so stupid as to believe that von Lettow-Vorbeck or his cronies had dropped the idea.
Despite this disagreement, Adenauer remained positive about their ability to work together on domestic matters. He was no Pacifist; the remilitarisation achieved by Germany was a cause worthy of celebration and he already looked forward to the day when the last dregs of Versailles were torn away. And while he and the president would never see eye-to-eye on certain core issues, he appreciated the honourable man hidden beneath feldgrau. For one, his commitment to fulfilling his promise to the Rhenish people.
The map laid out before them depicted Germany, though their focus remained on the Rhineland stretching from the Dutch border down to Alsace and Baden. Since long before Germany existed, the Rhineland had been split between various princes and bishops. Now was the closest that the region had come to unification, there were only a few barriers stopping them. The majority of the Rhineland was held by the Free State of Prussia, whose Minister-President Braun had made it clear would not be allowed to split off and form a Free Rhenish State as desired by its residents. While this was a hindrance, it was not the end of the story, for Prussia only controlled the bulk of the Rhineland. A large section was held by the Free State of Bavaria, another smaller sliver by the Free State of Oldenburg, and now, the Saar Territory, currently held in limbo until it was fully integrated. The re-connection of certain roads and railways, the abolishment of border crossings, and the conversion of their currency (as the region’s currency had been pegged to the French Franc) to the German Mark. All of these were necessary steps, but the slow and methodical process of undergoing them worked well as a smokescreen masking the Chancellor and President’s plans for the region.
German Rhineland, March 1935
(https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rheinlandbesetzung_(1936)#/media/Datei:Occupation_of_the_Rhineland.png)
“Now that the Minister-President of Bavaria has given his assent to the process, the Minister-President of Oldenburg has seen reason and given in as well,” Adenauer said.
Von Lettow-Vorbeck rubbed his face, the gesture communicating clearly his exhaustion with the aforementioned Bavarian Minister-President and the list of demands he had laid out before agreeing to theirs. If they were to go forward with their motion against the SPD, Bavaria’s acquiescence was critical, as without them this whole thing would fall apart or, worse, risk flipping the Bavarian voting bloc against the national government.
What the SPD’s threats towards the unity of Germany had done was convince von Lettow-Vorbeck of the necessity of not only defeating the SPD electorally, but in the hearts and minds of the German people. Even with the successes achieved under his leadership, an enormous portion of the German population continued to profess loyalty to the Left and their parties, and in order to drive them from the Reichstag, first he would have to turn the people themselves against Wels, Braun, and all those who opposed the Conservative order he wished to establish.
In this Adenauer was in agreement, and the two had re-entered a state of cool cooperation in February, 1935 in order to move forward with von Lettow-Vorbeck’s plan to use the annexation of the Saar Territory as a weapon against the SPD. Prior to its occupation by the League of Nations in 1920, the Saar region had been (excluding a small Bavarian component) part of the Kingdom of Prussia, and Minister-President Braun had already made it clear to the press that he expected to see the region reintegrated into the Prussian Rhineland.
Von Lettow-Vorbeck had no intention of doing so. The inability to fulfil his promise to the Rhenish people and see a Rhineland state created was a black mark on his record, one which his wife had provided a brilliant solution for. After all, nothing offered the opportunity for administrative reform like territorial expansion. If the Bavarians and Oldenburgers could be convinced to cede their territory in the Rhineland, the three could be unified into a Free Rhenish State, forcing Prussia into the corner as they either refuted their people’s desire for representation—damaging their democratic image—or agreed and lost the immense population and industrial might of the Rhineland.
A further step in this direction came with the president’s offer to the Belgians of a trade deal in exchange for solving the Eupen-Malmedy dispute. If it were to be accepted, the two regions could be even more territory towards the Free Rhenish State and an added bit of pressure placed upon Braun’s neck.
That was not to say that Adenauer himself was terribly pleased with the push towards purchasing the region from Belgium, as in his view it was yet another example of von Lettow-Vorbeck carelessly disregarding precedent—namely, consulting the Reichstag before agreeing to such a large transfer of funds—to achieve his own personal goals, but after much deliberation and a brief conversation with his party leader and parish priest, Ludwig Kaas, he had come around to the idea. What difference could such a small act make in contrast to the boons for the Rhenish people and stronger German ties to the West? To calm what little worries he’d had, he broached the subject of the possible purchase with the British Ambassador and had been surprised to see his concerns waved off.
“If the Germans and the Belgians have reached a friendly deal on the matter of that little sliver of territory, I say all the better!” Ambassador Phipps commented. “His Majesty’s Government has no qualms with the heads of two sovereign states solving a border dispute through diplomacy, and I myself admire the character of the thing to grant the Belgians what they are owed from the last war. No small thing, indeed!”
And, in truth, a small thing was just what it was. Eupen and Malmedy held no great worth and Belgium seemed quite happy to be rid of it. That was not to say that the Belgian people as a whole had forgiven the Germans for their actions in the war, nor were many in their government especially happy with increased trade with Berlin, only the immediate financial gains keeping the disquiet to a minimum.
In fact, it was the other involved German states who seemed to have the greatest issue with Adenauer and von Lettow-Vorbeck’s plans for the Rhineland. The Minister-President of Oldenburg would only agree to cede their lands in the Rhineland in exchange for eventual compensation bordering Oldenburg itself, not to mention Bavarian agreement in the matter being a prerequisite. For Bavaria, one of the most powerful states, the demands were much higher. The Bavarian Rhineland (commonly referred to in this era as the Bavarian Palatinate, another geographical name for the region) had been won following their victories over the forces of Napoleon, and it remained a symbol of their victory in this conflict. It was not without its economic boons, either, given its border with the Rhine river and France and the associated trade which could then be harnessed by Munich. Minister-President Heinrich Held of Bavaria was not unwilling to negotiate, but his price would be steep, as in order to win the approval of the Bavarian Landtag (their regional parliament), a necessity before any land could be given from the state, he would have to offer a substantial compromise. His suggestion had been the restoration of some of the Reservatrechte.
The Reservatrechte (Reserved Rights) had been a series of special rights endowed onto certain nations of the German Empire following their entrance into the Federation in 1871, most notably the Kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg, as well as the Grand Duchy of Baden. As the strongest constituent members of the Empire under Prussia, a certain level of autonomy had been demanded before they would recognise Berlin’s authority, with Bavaria demanding the most. These rights included primacy in the federal Bundesrat, control of rail and postal systems and its associated income, internal control of their military in peacetime, state control of settlement, and at one point even the ability to establish their own embassies separate from those of Germany proper. It was these rights which allowed Bavaria to keep its strength opposite its Northern brethren, and these rights, far more than the Bavarian Rhineland, which the Bavarian government wanted back, having lost the majority in 1919 when the Weimar Constitution abolished them.
Neither Adenauer nor von Lettow-Vorbeck were proponents of centralisation, but likewise neither were particularly keen on endowing Bavaria with too much power, having seen in the past how easily that power could turn secessionist when placed under duress. To von Lettow-Vorbeck and von Schleicher’s annoyance, it was Adenauer who had ended up running the debate, as his proud Catholic Rhinelander status meshed far better with Minister-President Held than the Prussian mannerisms, not to mention Adenauer’s own gift for outwitting opponents.
From the start Bavarian attempts to regain control over national institutions such as the post and rail had been blocked, as regional autonomy in these matters was seen by von Schleicher and von Lettow-Vorbeck as horribly feudal and impractical, especially in times of war. Unsurprisingly, the idea of Bavarian embassies and their own army was not even brought up. Instead, Held was far more interested in the loss of income which the removal of the Reservatrechte had caused, and while control of the national post and rail would remain in Berlin’s hands, it was agreed that 50% of the income generated from Bavarian post and rail would be reserved for use by Bavaria alone. Bavaria would also be prevented from bringing back their Beer Tax, but the amount which they gained from the national tax—until this point only 13%, well below the income prior to 1919—was raised substantially, to just under 30% of the national beer tax income. These concessions were seemingly innocuous on paper but would do wonders for the Bavarian economy, winning the federal government more loyalty from the Bavarian parties as they now felt themselves to be more than simply a border region subservient to Prussia.
“We have solved the issue of two exclaves but managed to make a new one,” Adenauer commented dryly, eyeing the marked regions. Following the union of the Saar Territory, the Bavarian and Oldenburger Rhineland regions, and Eupen-Malmedy, their new state would be one of the smallest German states, a sad reflection of the greater Rhineland which Adenauer dreamed of. It would be a visible symbol of the SPD’s unwillingness to cooperate, but it was an eyesore regardless.
German Rhineland, 1935
(https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Weimar_Republic_states_map.svg)
Von Lettow-Vorbeck waved a hand. “It will not last,” he declared with an air of absolute assurance. He then switched topics. “When did Held agree to announce the transfer?”
“If the other Bavarians are as keen to cooperate as he suggested—which my sources in the Landtag corroborate—the announcement of the handover will take place the first week of April. What of the Belgians?”
“The Belgians want the money and care little for when the transfer happens.” Von Lettow-Vorbeck’s expression of disdain told Adenauer what the man thought of the Belgians, his ideas likely stemming from the years he spent fighting them in Africa. “They will go forth with it as soon as the money arrives.”
“Then let us aim for that first week in April,” Adenauer decided. “Braun has undoubtedly heard rumours of our plans; we must make our move before he can.”
Von Lettow-Vorbeck’s eyes snapped to him. “He already knows? How can you be sure?”
“Braun is no novice. He will see your delaying tactic for what it is and I wager a guess that he might even see our plan. If he can find proof, your tactic to discredit them will backfire and you will be portrayed as seeking to dissolve Prussia, something which your electorate would not be in favour of.”
“I see.” Von Lettow-Vorbeck smiled a toothy smile. “Then we will have to be faster.”
I know that some people will find the notion of Belgium selling Eupen and Malmedy back to Germany a bit ASB, but I base it on a few factors. 1) The Belgians already tried doing this in the 20’s and were only stopped due to external factors; 2) Belgium was having a lot of issues in this era and getting rid of the German minority would definitely help; 3) The region was basically worthless; 4) Leopold III, while not pro-German, was also not anti-German, and it would be seen as a good counterbalance to the very real fear of excessive French influence in the region.
I also felt that going after this right after getting back the Saar would make sense, as it would quickly and quietly end Western border disputes and let Germany turn their attention East.
I also felt that going after this right after getting back the Saar would make sense, as it would quickly and quietly end Western border disputes and let Germany turn their attention East.
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Well there is a lot of East. Poland, the USSR, the Middle East, Asia. Why, if you go far enough East, you hit France!
On that note, considering that Blomberg is noted as condemning pacifism, will Carl von Ossietzky still win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1935 ITTL and if so, I take it Vorbeck and Adenauer would be allowing him to accept the prize?
(Does quick Google search on who this person is...)
Ah, of course, I totally had his fate planned out!
I feel as though he would be shunned by the government and perhaps even forced to leave the country, therefore able to accept the reward, but being forced to join the community of expats such as the Communists.
As Bismarck said once "It'll start over some silly thing in the Balkans." Given that Bulgaria is rearming again and neither Greece or Yugoslavia are in exactly enviable positions, we could see yet another Balkan War
I am enjoying this timeline. One suggestion is that depending on the length of the timeline, you may want to look into epublishing. I have purchased several alternative history books based on time lines from this website.
I am wondering about Luxembourg in this timeline? Does it become part of Germany?
I am wondering about Luxembourg in this timeline? Does it become part of Germany?
I actually would like to get this published eventually, my posting it here is sort of a rough draft or "proof of concept". Any eventual published version is planned to be longer and more tightly-written, with a better balance between narrative and informative
I don't want to spoil anything with Luxembourg, though, especially since my.plans for them are far enough in the future that they might change. I can say that Liechtenstein won't survive, though.
Garrison
Donor
So Manstein hasn't written Achtung Panzer! yet but from some of the comments he made he is edging towards the idea of the assault gun. Be interesting to see if the Germans end up with the weird Panzer III/Panzer IV split of OTL or ditch the insistence that the infantry support vehicle had to have a turret and go full on with something akin to the StuG III and a single Panzer design.
Whats the policy on Universities? Since no Hitler Im assuming Gottingen doesnt collapse.
Sadly makes sense. That said unlike under the Nazis it's alot safer to be a dissident as the worst this government will do is jail you for a bit and then boot you. Not perfect but a far cry from the horror of the camps.
Also the Belgian move makes sense. It's worthless land for hard cash, a chance to reset relations and technically removes any legal reason for Germany to start a war. Although that won't always stop them as 1914 and OTL 1940 proved. That said since the first try clearly didn't work and an actual war expert is at the helm this time I assume this Germany will be less well disposed to a second attempt at an end run through Belgium anyway.
If France wants to war but also wants to stay behind the border defences let them, Germany can leave enough force to make sure they stay put and then focus on the East.
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Two years to early (1937 OTL) but with a more friendly Europe he can probably gather more data than he had in our world and may come to different conclusions.
@gradje can explain better when they are back, as they were a big help in explaining the Belgian internal policy in the era, but there was also a very prominent concern about excessive French influence. That, combined with France extending the Maginot Line along the Belgian border, has made them feel that they need to pivot away from France quickly or risk being caught between them again.
Currently, von Lettow-Vorbeck's goals are somewhat similiar to Bismarck's following 1871; namely, isolate France without a war and make it politically unfeasible for France to pursue one without becoming a pariah.
By 1937, the butterflies will have begun to swarm, and German tank and airfare doctrine will diverge quite starkly from that point onwards.
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In all cases hardly a shock. Belgium has a vested interest in not getting fought over twice in one lifetime after all.
Meanwhile L-V is going to insist on a more balanced force than Hitler did since (unlike old one ball) he understands that in war you plan for setback as well as victory. As the OTL Heer proved being a lightning bruiser only works on bantamweight opponents, once it slammed into the heavyweight's getting crushed was only a matter of time. "Attack, attack," isn't much good when you've shot your bolt a thousand miles inside Russia and Stalin has reserves. Just understanding the concept of strategic withdrawal and fallback positions could probably have (absent the nukes) prolonged the ostfront by a good year or two.