i understand Germany experimented with a way to covert coal into oil would this help them and what were the qualities of this synthetic fuel
1920s Germany if they win ww1 what do you think would have been done with the imperial navy if they didn't scuttle their ships.
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i understand the kaiser was a big fan of the navy and saw it as a pet project
what do you think he would have on navel funding in the post war
Depends if they want to acknowledge British naval dominance, happy to be dominant on the continent, try and match it, or try and beat it.
Britain will spam out the remaining 15 inch armed ships, then move to 16.5 and 18 inch options already in the works. Anything prewar or even early war is going to be obsolete rapidly in this new threat environment, and the RN can outproduce the Germans. A powerful German fleet is an existential threat to Britain and the British will do everything to maintain their naval power, its a trump card they still hold, and need to defend the home isles and the empire and economic allies.
The naval treaties will not exist in anyway shape or form as in OTL, as it was a treaty of the victors, not equals or imposed on the defeated.
If the war ends with Russia being neutered as a great power and Germany controlling a cluster of vassal states including our timeline's Brest-Litovsk territories, or even more than that, then nope. The industrial potential of the British Isles pales compared to that of Continental Europe. If Germany is able to control just half of the latter it will be able to build a navy superior to the RN.
If Germany checkmates Russia in WWI, and is victorious or at least undefeated on the Western Front, it would probably come to consider the UK its principal adversary. France and Italy can't do much on their own in this context, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire is unlikely to survive without active German support. This would leave Britain as the most serious challenger to German continental hegemony. So, I doubt that the navy would be deprioritized substantially.
My two bits: for a late war German victory some form of naval treaty is extremely likely. For almost everybody this is in their national interest:
The UK will financially likely be in a worse situation than otl, with huge foreign debts, but no reparations or gains to offset it. Not to mention that they may choose to "buy" certain German colonies to square likely German demands for their return with the infeasiblity of a return for Dominion relations (Pacific and Südwest). So a renewed naval race would be extremely problematic.
Germany will have little international debts, but plenty domestic. And of course any victory likely means a shift of focus to land power and the consolidation of the new continental order. Otoh the experience of the blockade will also mean that they will want some degree of naval equality to Britain.
In the US political support will remain limited for a major naval construction program as otl. Given that the only two scenarios for the att great war are a successful neutrality (probable) or a failed short adventurein Europe (unlikely) isolationism might actually even be stronger. So a treaty that acknowledges their position will be welcome.
Japan of course is as otl aware that it can't directly compete with the US in a naval arms race, so a treaty is in their interest too.
France (and if it remains a player at all Russia) likewise are going to shift their focus to the land forces and internal stabilisation. No objections against a treaty that prevents becoming navally completely irrelevant from them.
Austria-Hungary has an interest in becoming Italy's naval equal, but is not really in a position for major naval expansion. So using their status as winner of the war to get that at the round table is obviously attractive.
Due to that Italy is the only Great Power who might fundamentally be opposed, although economically it makes likely even more sense than otl for them.
Now of course this leaves the question how such a treaty will look: UK and US will be the top dogs. imo the Germans will go in demanding equality, but likely relent to a ratio that leaves them second to those two, in a defensible position, say 70-80%. They might instead or in addition be willing to give the RN a temporary further margin by keeping a few 12 inchers around as part of their allotment for an agreed upon replacement cycle while the RN scraps 12 inchers. What they will not accept is equality with anybody else. That likely leaves Japan as a third tier on its own, in a similar position to otl: weaker than the big three but stronger than anybody else.
France, Italy and Austria-Hungary likely will share fourth tier as equals.
The Russians or Ottomans might also manage to get into the treaty, depending how the post war order shakes out, but if they do, I doubt they would get even that fourth tier.
The UK will financially likely be in a worse situation than otl, with huge foreign debts, but no reparations or gains to offset it. Not to mention that they may choose to "buy" certain German colonies to square likely German demands for their return with the infeasiblity of a return for Dominion relations (Pacific and Südwest). So a renewed naval race would be extremely problematic.
Germany will have little international debts, but plenty domestic. And of course any victory likely means a shift of focus to land power and the consolidation of the new continental order. Otoh the experience of the blockade will also mean that they will want some degree of naval equality to Britain.
In the US political support will remain limited for a major naval construction program as otl. Given that the only two scenarios for the att great war are a successful neutrality (probable) or a failed short adventurein Europe (unlikely) isolationism might actually even be stronger. So a treaty that acknowledges their position will be welcome.
Japan of course is as otl aware that it can't directly compete with the US in a naval arms race, so a treaty is in their interest too.
France (and if it remains a player at all Russia) likewise are going to shift their focus to the land forces and internal stabilisation. No objections against a treaty that prevents becoming navally completely irrelevant from them.
Austria-Hungary has an interest in becoming Italy's naval equal, but is not really in a position for major naval expansion. So using their status as winner of the war to get that at the round table is obviously attractive.
Due to that Italy is the only Great Power who might fundamentally be opposed, although economically it makes likely even more sense than otl for them.
Now of course this leaves the question how such a treaty will look: UK and US will be the top dogs. imo the Germans will go in demanding equality, but likely relent to a ratio that leaves them second to those two, in a defensible position, say 70-80%. They might instead or in addition be willing to give the RN a temporary further margin by keeping a few 12 inchers around as part of their allotment for an agreed upon replacement cycle while the RN scraps 12 inchers. What they will not accept is equality with anybody else. That likely leaves Japan as a third tier on its own, in a similar position to otl: weaker than the big three but stronger than anybody else.
France, Italy and Austria-Hungary likely will share fourth tier as equals.
The Russians or Ottomans might also manage to get into the treaty, depending how the post war order shakes out, but if they do, I doubt they would get even that fourth tier.
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If it's a late victory, may the Germans leave the HSF much as is, and concentrate on building a *lot* more U-boats?
I guess it depends on a couple of factors:
1. Is the U-Boat campaign of the great war seen as a success? E.g. if unrestricted submarine warfare is not renewed in 1917 for diplomatic reasons and the U-boat traps for the Grand Fleet largely fail as otl, the Germans might well decide that the U-Boat is not a decisive strategic weapon, merely a supporting one. Or even an outright failure. It is also possible that it gets assigned a major role in bringing the UK to the negotiation table in post-war analysis and thus gains an important part in fleet doctrine.
2. How exactly is the post-war fleet orientated? For plain diplomatic reasons and prestige capital ships are required, not to mention the various strategic uses for them. Light Cruisers will be required for the global presence and the navy had noted during the war that they had underestimated the need for them prewar (though there were very divided opinions on future designs and roles). U-Boats might well be low on the construction priorities list even if regarded as important, because the inter-war models are faster to construct in case of war than surface units and less useful in peacetime.
3. Is the U-boat regarded as tech with a future? It was not unusual for naval thinkers in the 20s and 30s to regard the whole concept as becoming obsolete, due to new technologies countering their advantages. In Germany that contributed to the interest in large surface raiders, the UK due to that was willing to be generous with subs in the 1934 German-British naval agreement.
If all of the above questions are answered in favour of the U-Boat, it is possible that Germany focuses on the submarine branch. Most likely the future of the submarine will be a hotly debated topic and the branch will receive more interest and funding than prewar, but still have to compete with other fleet elements for resources - especially as the submarine branch is going to be in a flux post-WW1: Germany will also have to go down the various experimental U-Boat routes it avoided otl due to the restrictions of Versailles (e.g. fast fleet subs, cruiser subs) until the concepts were proven unworkable or technology had caught up to requirements in the 30s.
A lot of naval strategy thinkers post war thought the submarine blockade a failure. Interwar the USN and Japanese led the way with two doctrines for submarines. 1. Coastal defense. 2. Fleet scouts & light cruisers. The fleet subs operated in training exercises as a sort of a light stealth cruiser that covered the area of operations of the fleet, reporting and taking sniper shots at capitol ships. Everyone had a idea, accurate or not, on what the Germans put into a Gurerre de Course submarine fleet and judged it a waste of resources. The exception was the nazi regime which from 1934 had Radaer & Donitz organize another attempt at blockading Britain with submarines. Out of desperation the Brit also used their submarine fleet against the Italian cargo shipping to Lybia. And, of course the US changed strategy in 1943 and started a interdiction campaign vs Japans cargo fleet.
I think the "fleet faction" might get the upper hand for the reasons given (additionally, iirc this generation of subs were maintenance intensive which further disincentives investing too much in them). However, I could imagine Germany (and Austria-Hungary) keep a fairly substantial sub force because a) wartime propaganda has given the sub arm a lot of political capital and b) they were one of very few areas where Germany was seemingly ahead of the UK and ceding the undersea advantage would be unacceptable. Similar to how a single high profile success lead Italy to pour resources into its midget sub and frogmen programs.