Miscellaneous <1900 (Alternate) History Thread
- Thread starter RMcD94
- Start date
Perhaps, Blanche of Navarre and John is likely, if John is keen to continue an alliance with Navarre.
That could happen but Isabella of Angouleme will marry Hugh X of Lusignan as planned (John could also marry one of the daughters of Sancho of Portugal as he was planning to do before marrying Isabella)
John marrying Theresa of Portugal is good, as she has a proven fertility already, she has three children with her previous husband, another choice is Constance of Portugal.
Dunno if anyone's suggested this before, but apparently Premysl Ottokar, King of Bohemia, was offered the post of Holy Roman Emperor twice, and declined both times. The first was in 1257, when Richard of Cornwall was elected; he would be offered the post again after Richard's death.
While there's been discussion of Ottokar winning his wars against Rudolf I Hapsburg, this suggestion is that he, at the height of Bohemia's power, takes over all of the HRE before Rudolf matters.
While there's been discussion of Ottokar winning his wars against Rudolf I Hapsburg, this suggestion is that he, at the height of Bohemia's power, takes over all of the HRE before Rudolf matters.
I am considering a timeline based around the 1898 Fashoda Incident going hot. Not resulting in any massive war between the UK and France, but causing a heightened level of competition in Africa and increasing tensions between the two nations. Any suggestions for:
1. How to make the incident go hot
2. How to make it a bigger deal with the British and French public
3. How it would effect British relations with Italy and Germany
A major plot point of the TL I have been considering is Italy, Germany and Britain getting somewhat closer, to counter Franco-Russian threats, however, I'm not sure how probable this is. Feedback?
1. How to make the incident go hot
2. How to make it a bigger deal with the British and French public
3. How it would effect British relations with Italy and Germany
A major plot point of the TL I have been considering is Italy, Germany and Britain getting somewhat closer, to counter Franco-Russian threats, however, I'm not sure how probable this is. Feedback?
well the thing is that Britain isn't going to pick Germany over France, and Italy was less likely every year to remain on Berlin's side.
Granted, wether to lean towards the French or the Germans for British politicians was very much in the air as a question for the whole of the 19th century and in the first years of the 20th, but in hindsight, French and British interests in Europe would always converge since at least 1879, and that is ignoring the history going as far back as 1814 of the groundwork for that alliance being laid throughout the 19th century.
On the other hand, the revolution and the Napoleonic Wars (and overall the whole political movement of the Atlantic Revolutions and the 18th century) had Prussia and Britain and Prussia drift apart in terms of interests, while Germany as a whole from the 1810's onwards would slowly be dominated by German nationalists who sought to unite the country, which in itself would be very far from British interests.
An example: Say the French Captain at Fashoda is even more hotheaded than OTL and some skirmishes happen killing a few men. Francophobic and Germanophile British papers would make it their bread and butter, but by 1898, the French bourgeoisie had well understood that Britain was more of an ally than an enemy. Work on the Franco-British entente had been going behind closed doors for 4 years now, built up on decades of work by men like Louis-Philippe or Napoleon III, who quite liked Britain. French politicians just wouldn't throw through the window one of their best hopes at what they saw as their top priority of beating Germany in a fight. Even the far right of the time or the monarchists weren't like hanging on to the old tales of Franco-British rivalry.
On the other hand, Britain is enjoying its status of World Power partly due to the relative peace they manage to keep (that is keep France, Germany or Russia out of any war the British may be fighting), and that has been a strategy they employed for a few decades now. Add to that the general dislike of Germany among the British people cause well Germany under Wilhelm is an awful authoritarian militaristic state, while France at least is a bourgeois democracy having a good time like everyone else, and also France is neither well-industrialised nor well-militarised.
Sure it was a military landpower and is quite able to throw punches, but they're just not on par with Germany, and most people are aware of that, only they get then biased by Nationalism and National myths and this weird idea that they're gonna win cause the other folk next to them is fated to loose because they're not French or German and thus not destined to greatness.
So it's already pretty hard to get the Fashoda incident hot, cause the British will not be the one to light the flame, ever, and the French will never be the ones to feed that fire. The French public also mostly didn't gave two shits about Fashoda, nor did the French colonial establishment, who saw Sudan as just another ressources drain when a goddamn railroad was about to be built in the Sahara.
But say if such an incident were to go hot, it would likely just not impact Franco-British, Germano-British or Italo-British relations that much. Sure the French and the Brits might get a bit irritated for a few years, but they're still going to fear Germany getting any colonies more than the other getting colonies. They're still going to fear Germany getting more men prepared for a fight, and still getting more ships able to project power in the North Sea.
The real way to get European dynamics to change isn't Fashoda, it's the Balkans.
I know, unexpected.
Basically the Balkans were a playground of influence between Vienna, Moscow and Constantinople, and A-H swallowing Bosnia in 1908, and the various other crisises in that region ever since the 1880's slowly chipped away at the mess of European diplomatic links into a handful of bounds. The Russians and the French were economic partners, and military ones basically only in the case of Germany attacking first (like seriously, France wouldn't lift a finger if Russia attacked Germany first, and mostly vice-versa), Germany's only real ally is Austria-Hungary by then, as Italy's kind of doing things on its own with vague thumbsup from London, Paris and Berlin. But that 1908 crisis concerning Bosnia is what really buried any hope of the British siding with the Germans.
Another thing about making Fashoda hot is that you have to think about who wins fashoda. If France wins at Fashoda that's... surprising, to say the least. To the French first and foremost. Who would then promptly just leave Sudan alone and use that anecdote for fame and prestige. If Britain does win a Fashoda-which-went-hot, that's another pair of sleeves. The inefficacity of French military command would be there in full display, which would only embolden the Germans in Africa, which in turn would lead to France and Britain being even less agreeable to the Germans getting colonies,...
TLDR; you can't make Fashoda go hot, if you did the French and British publics likely wouldn't care about it for much more than 6 months, Britain and Italy are mostly ok with each other but a hot Fashoda wouldn't help Germano-British relations in any way, if not the opposite.
There's a way for the Habsburgs to make a Galicia 1846 electric boogaloo in Hungary, For those who don't know, in 1846 there was a peasant revolt in Galicia, the curiosity is that it was instigated by the Habsburgs and the Austrians, who a few months earlier discovered a conspiracy of Polish nobles, Although Polish nobles promised to abolish the serfdom that existed in Galicia in their conspiracy for independency, in 1843 they had voted against abolishing serfdom, and the Habsburgs took advantage of this and incited a peasant rebellion against polish Nobles Hundreds of polish nobles were killed, Is there any way the Habsburgs could repeat this in Hungary?
Random thought: The US taking everything down to panama is much easier to justify explain than getting any more of canada than OTL. I'm not saying it requires AANW levels of showing yor work but uh the royal navy means it requirs alot of thought to pull off(the initial attack on quebe in 1776 is my personal pod i'd use for it).
The potential for changing what the ATL USA would look like it also much greater with any significant portion of OTL Canada.
Only if you consider the US's external politics easier to justify than the US's internal politics. There's several chances the US had since the 1770s to grab more, and one could imagine it wouldn't even necessarily be the US doing the heavy lifting. Maybe Britain gets screwed in the Caribbean and the French+Spanish+American privateers occupy more islands there, and one of the concessions to the US is getting back, say, Bermuda in exchange for Canada.
And of course "more of Canada" could just be getting maximal claims on northern Maine or the southeastern Alaska border.
I don't buy canada changing that much about the US as a whole.
Depends on how much & when.
If the Lower Canada gets added to the original 13, you bet a potential state full of French speaking "papists" is going to effect things.
Wouldn't change that much imo. Getting some catholics BEFORE we get the confrontational irish means weaker anticatholicism in the long run imo.
Or it could force the confrontation to to happen earlier just with the French Canadians & not the Irish.
It's not like the 13 colonies weren't already into anti-Catholicism. The only Catholic to sign the declaration had was schooled in France as even Maryland was not that friendly to Catholics.
Maybe. I argue for it to be less confrontational since it'd be happening in the 1780s instead of during the second great awakenisg.
Anyone have any ideas on how to recreate a stable de facto late Eastern/Western Roman Empire split, better yet de jure?
I was imaging that a wildly successful Franco-Ottoman alliance that has reached the point of constant coordination and clear delineations of spheres of influence could reach such a situation de facto with a few border adjustments, such as Ottoman suzerainty over North Africa and southern Italy in exchange for French hegemony over Germany up to the Oder. The idea being that the historic borders are horse traded around in the name of realm cohesion and to minimize religious friction with a de facto Catholic West and Muslim East with Orthodox Christians being the redheaded stepchild of the Franco-Ottoman hegemony
Now, nothing last forever of course, but could such an arrangement last for ex. a generation? Or even arise with any degree of coherency?
I was imaging that a wildly successful Franco-Ottoman alliance that has reached the point of constant coordination and clear delineations of spheres of influence could reach such a situation de facto with a few border adjustments, such as Ottoman suzerainty over North Africa and southern Italy in exchange for French hegemony over Germany up to the Oder. The idea being that the historic borders are horse traded around in the name of realm cohesion and to minimize religious friction with a de facto Catholic West and Muslim East with Orthodox Christians being the redheaded stepchild of the Franco-Ottoman hegemony
Now, nothing last forever of course, but could such an arrangement last for ex. a generation? Or even arise with any degree of coherency?
Maybe a scenario where Hapsburg Spain at its height when it controlled Portugal, Austria, the low countries, and much of Italy makes peace with the Ottomans and set distinct spheres of influence for one another in the central med could fit? Say Spain does this before becoming embroiled in a long war with Spain while the Turks get involved in fighting in the middle east and Caucus?