Barry Bull
Donor
To learn the ropes. Also, one or two carrier would still offer much improved power projection capacity and increase bargaining power with other powers in conflicts.
To learn the ropes. Also, one or two carrier would still offer much improved power projection capacity and increase bargaining power with other powers in conflicts.
One can simply not see use for a single Russian carrier, for example in operations in Syria. Surface combatants and subs? Yes, definitely.
RamscoopRaider
Donor
The use is to keep the knowledge base fresh so they don't have to learn from scratch if they go from 1 to 3 in the future. Plus prestige and the ability to bomb someone on the other side of the world if needed
Barry Bull
Donor
As people said above, a carrier is a much more vesatile tool of power projection, and showing the flag. Subs can do neither and the reach of surface combatents is limited.
McPherson
Banned
(^^^) That was a naval operation called "show the flag". In practical terms I saw no use to it, because the navy involved was incapable of demonstrating true force projection. HOWEVER, it was an effective political demonstration exercise of support and resolve by physical presence. Here "we" are it announced with our "capital" ship. In peacetime, it is attempted, sometimes (Suez Crisis is one example) for an incapable navy to simply show up and demonstrates by its presence that a political line has been drawn and the ship is there to prove it. I kind of think it is colonialist in many cases, to use a navy that way, and economically inefficient, but when the political elements are applied, a nation will send an ineffective ship or two to "show the flag", to place its physical chips into the "Great Game". >Now using the Suez Crisis, again as an RTL example, the "allies" were not deterred at all by a cruiser or the couple of destroyers, since they did not have respect for the effort, but the power that possessed the carriers, suddenly showed her flag also, and it was over. It has something to do with the "presence" of a capital ship as opposed to a "mere" cruiser or gunboat. The capital ship, too, may not be actually militarily effective, but its "capital" nature may be what is enough to bluff the other side in the "peacetime" chess at sea and within the competition for political advantage. At Suez, the ignored navy, in question, finally got the message. Appearances matter.
One carrier, even if it is a Potemkin, is worth more than a cruiser (large missile cruiser) in the peacetime realm of appearances.
It is true that nations learn from the examples of their competitors. Another navy has learned the "show the flag" lesson and I am confident that it will put its chips into the Great Game. It will be interesting and should serve as a possible PoD for some future ATLs.
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Is it, really? The only time Soviets truly used their naval forces as instruments of power projection during crisis, in 1973, they did not have a single carrier but still got their message across. As for showing the flag, in case of an inferior naval power, like Russia, does it matter really if you can post a single carrier on the scene, which is heavily outnumbered, compared to a situation where you have deployed, say, a cruiser, and you're still completely outnumbered?
As for PLAN, the situation is different as they have enough economic power to buy a decent amount of carriers and their support ships, if they want.
McPherson
Banned
1. No they didn't. The US backed them down with bringing the US forces to defcon II. THEY were planning to reinforce Egypt via air bridge across the Mediterranean. The USN moved carriers into the eastern Med and the planned Soviet paratrooper movement "died" aborning. Sixth Fleet was the American chip.
2. In Syria, the EU has made it clear, they will not support an American play. It also must be pointed out that the American people are not prepared to force the issue. So, the Russians can swan around and "play at navy" all they want. It means nothing in the current central game. The real game is in the Persian Gulf and that is where your eyes should be. THAT is where the sea-power is and you will see nothing Russian that matters there.
3. In Syria, where the Russians have a dead-ender, like Assad, it matters to "show the flag". They have to show presence. Autocracies ruled by strong men have to give the appearance of strength at some place. If they show weaknesses in places where the other side has shrugged their shoulders and walked off, then the other side will notice and act. Democracies are timid unless they see such weaknesses. Then they become bold. How long will an autocrat last? Not long. It was not that long when the Berlin Wall fell, you know?
4. The PLAN may buy the carriers and bodyguard ships, but the geography and technology actually militates against it. Only an amateur ignores those elements of sea-power. In TECHNOLOGY, the Chinese talk about their carrier killer IRBMs, but that is PERSHING II technology, old and easily defeatable by the power supposedly threatened by it, since it is that very power who invented it and still USES IT. China is not even close to area access denial when one looks at it closely.
Geography...
Notice what I see?
_takes_part_in_a_photo_exercise_at_the_conclusion_of_exercis.jpg)
The PLAN is trying to beef up their ASW, but that is against the opponent, the very one who bashed through that geography and used that very tool (^^^) to defeat a genuine and much better sea-power; not another continental power with a naval auxillary.
Kind of shows what a daunting task both sides have, doesn't it? In peacetime I hope it stays, but... it can go ugly very quickly.
And a Soviet carrier or two would not have made any difference.
Assad and cronies are probably far more interested about PMC goonies, SU-25's and surface combatants firing cruise missiles than a single carrier that may or may not work when it make's it's deployments whenever it's not under maintenance.
China's carriers might not be a match for USN for a very long time, but one can certainly think of situations where they might be useful in for example putting pressure on Burma, engaging in Papua New Guinea etc. essentially gunboat diplomacy. As for technology, that's future ATL. However, historically rising powers have been able to provide nasty surprises for established powers. Whether USN frigates of 1812, German subs in WW1 or Japanese aircraft and torpedos in WW2. I see no reasons for complacency.
McPherson
Banned
CATOBAR?
What did I write about geography? In this case, it's the Dardanelles, the port of Alexandria, Egyptian air bases in the Nile delta, the long deep ocean bottom trench that runs from Sicily to the shores off Israel and playing CHICKEN.
This is the short version> The Montreaux Convention is the reason the Russian navy calls their large aviation cruisers, "cruisers"; in order to get around the Montreaux Convention; also why they did not build CATOBAR carriers (besides their naval architects inability to figure out how.). It is why their one true aircraft carrier is usually based near Murmansk.
But, if they HAD a couple of aircraft carriers, they could feed through the Gibraltar straits, the situation in 1955 through 1973 would have been extremely dangerous for 6th Fleet. Parking off Egypt's north coast in shallow water where it is deleterious for nuclear subs to operate and easy for diesel electrics in sub vs sub, and putting Russian nuclear boats south of Crete in international waters the Russian carriers could have safely acted as "I dare you" anchors for that air bridge from the Crimea to the Alexandria airfields. Air-sea-power used in a "peacetime setting". Turkey was not about to become a frontline state for Israel's survival, so Incirlik is neutralized. The other NATO aviation is out of range.
Missile cruisers cannot provide area air defense or air escort. Aircraft carriers naval aircraft CAN. If you remember the Libya raids mounted from the UK (Reagan), that is exactly what American aircraft carriers did for the FB-111s.
Assad and the Syrians know nothing of naval tactics, sea-air power or how it is used and applied. The Russians are not that stupid. They want to forward project into the Mediterranean. Syria is the only game they have on the board and the NATO player is not really contesting (SEE MAP ^^^).
THAT involves the Andaman Islands immediately (India) and will ignite war. Beijing is filled with strategic amateurs, but even they are not that crazy or stupid.
If you look here, (^^^) China is worried about her SLOCs (Africa and Persian Gulf). If she has no oil or raw materials, she will have 600 million nouveau riche to join the already angry 600 million peasants in a popular revolution. Rumania anybody?
And if you must know, she has already lost the high ground (NEO) and will never be able to fight on equal terms in peace or war with the coalition of enemies she has foolishly arrayed against her by her clumsy imperialism. Her best bet, (and the gerontocracy in Beijing knows it.) is to play nice inside the international system and compete economically. Her chief danger is that some western government will miscalculate and back her into the corner. This has happened before (1941) due to cultural misunderstandings.
Geography dictates air-sea-power, and China's is terrible. I prefer to play the other fella in the Great Game.
Reagan strikes were strikes to a country which operated an air defense network, not crisis management. In 1967 or 1973 timeframe the task of escorting transports to Egypt in crisis (not war) conditions can be also achieved by missile cruisers and aerial refuelling of fighters. Soviets did not think about power projection enough with their 1950's and 1960's designs which prevented this, but certainly would have had technological capability if they wished. In crisis, the task is to make the other guy blink, and that can be achieved by long range AA missile cruiser as well as fighters. Granted, OTL Soviets did not have TALOS equivalent in 1960's and 1970's, but it would not have been impossible to do that should they have deemed that necessary, say, mounting S-200's on ships should it be seen necessary.
Soviets building carriers would have been a wet dream for USN, RN and FN as they would undoubtely have had opportunity to buy more and better carriers for themselves.
Yes, as I said, carrier for two months during a crisis lasting years doesn't make any difference. One should have had, as USN discovered, several carriers Russians are unable to afford.
But you're thinking about BAU scenario. In a timeframe when China has several operational carriers, say 2025-2040, there may be situations in which India is trying to recover from a nuclear war, US decides to take less obvious international role, Bangladesh has exploded in a civil war due to climate change, Chinese investments in East Africa need protection etc. These are just a few examples. Carriers would be obviously useful. A major war ends up with nukes anyway.
McPherson
Banned
A cruiser operates at 30 knots battle or 15 cruise. It carries, in that era, if it is Russian, 20-40 SAMS of 4-8 % PK and no more than 40,000 meters slant effect range. It is suicidally vulnerable to Mark 37s or even heavyweight Mark 16s. Meat on the table. It is also useless as air cover for an air bridge, since it cannot reach, maintain presence or even operate aircraft with the right characteristics. Aerial refueling from Crimea? How did that work when the Americans can post ambush CAPS at easily predicted rendezvous points? The Americans can do aerial refueling in hostile air space, the Russians cannot. HINT; Vietnam war experience is necessary, a LOT of it. SAMS would do nothing to stop the Americans, at least not Russian SAMS, then or now. Also to escort airborne infantry in their airlifters, what fighters manned by what pilots, that are not ASB, do or can the Russians have that are a match for the USN naval aviation? Another hint: nothing. Pilot for pilot, the VVAF would be slaughtered. This is applied experience.
Now I perceive that you do not understand. The cure for the aircraft carrier is the submarine. I TOLD you this when I showed you where the Russians would have to operate their carriers to stay away from NATO subs.
Perception is 90% of reality. Two months was all the Red Fleet needed.
China's navy (and practically every other power projection means they have) is BLIND without Beidou. Beidou is hostage to the USN. They can't win... ever. Nothing is going to change that fact. The most they can do is kick and scream on their way to national destruction if they are stupid enough to fight a war within the next two to three generations. Their long term strategy is to let history take its course and gradually rise as the new number one as the US declines. Sanity and patience. Other example: if India does get nuked, China dies as a consequence, because India will hit them as well as Pakistan. It is not in China's survival interest to allow a nuclear war on its western border any more than to allow one on its eastern border. Why die for a lunatic client state?
Bengladesh is a non-factor in any of these calculations geopolitically though it would be a humanitarian catastrophe that should be planned for and mitigated, if possible.
As for a less obvious US role, that IS A MYTH. It may don a different fur coat, but American imperialism (Coca Cola colonialism) is alive and well, if not actually worse than it was a decade ago.
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For something a little different,
The terms of the treaty of Fontainebleau between Turkey and the Entente powers in February 1922, relaxed to a degree the military stipulations of the treaty of Sevres that it replaced but still denied Turkey possession of aircraft, submarines and warships larger than 10,000t in displacement. Sultan Selim Yavuz, already heavily damaged was dismantled in situ in Izmit under British supervision in 1922-24 and its guns and mountings stored away for future use.
Proposals to use the five twin 283mm turrets, for new coastal battleships similar to the Swedish Sverige class were aired several times through the 1920s, without result but it was the appearance of the Deutchland class pocket battleships that got the imagination of Turkish naval circles going. When Ansaldo with the backing of the Italian government offered to Turkey its own UP90 design for an 8,000t pocket battleship, it was an obvious step to replace the two 10in triple turrets in the original design with the available 283mm mounts to reduce cost. Three ships, Fatih, Yildirim and Turgut Reis would be built by 1939. None survived ww2, with Fatih sunk in action against cruisers Lemnos and HMS York in the battle of Karpathos strait in April 1942, Turgut Reis torpedoed and sunk by submarine Proteus and Yildirim destroyed by Soviet bombers off Batum while covering the retreat of the Turkish 3rd army from Georgia in late 1943.
Turgut Reis, Turkey Enter ship type laid down 1937
Displacement:
7.614 t light; 8.000 t standard; 8.679 t normal; 9.221 t full load
Dimensions: Length (overall / waterline) x beam x draught (normal/deep)
(561,94 ft / 546,92 ft) x 54,46 ft x (19,69 / 20,59 ft)
(171,28 m / 166,70 m) x 16,60 m x (6,00 / 6,28 m)
Armament:
4 - 11,02" / 280 mm 50,0 cal guns - 665,99lbs / 302,09kg shells, 100 per gun
Breech loading guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1937 Model
2 x 2-gun mounts on centreline ends, evenly spread
12 - 4,02" / 102 mm 40,0 cal guns - 31,03lbs / 14,08kg shells, 300 per gun
Dual purpose guns in deck and hoist mounts, 1937 Model
6 x Twin mounts on sides, evenly spread
8 - 1,57" / 40,0 mm 60,0 cal guns - 2,14lbs / 0,97kg shells, 150 per gun
Breech loading guns in deck and hoist mounts, 1937 Model
8 x Twin mounts on sides, evenly spread
16 - 0,79" / 20,0 mm 60,0 cal guns - 0,26lbs / 0,12kg shells, 600 per gun
Breech loading guns in deck mounts, 1937 Model
8 x Twin mounts on sides, evenly spread
Weight of broadside 3.058 lbs / 1.387 kg
Armour:
- Belts: Width (max) Length (avg) Height (avg)
Main: 4,02" / 102 mm 355,51 ft / 108,36 m 8,86 ft / 2,70 m
Ends: Unarmoured
Main Belt covers 100% of normal length
Main Belt inclined 15,00 degrees (positive = in)
- Torpedo Bulkhead - Strengthened structural bulkheads:
0,79" / 20 mm 355,51 ft / 108,36 m 17,62 ft / 5,37 m
Beam between torpedo bulkheads 54,46 ft / 16,60 m
- Gun armour: Face (max) Other gunhouse (avg) Barbette/hoist (max)
Main: 5,51" / 140 mm 3,35" / 85 mm 3,94" / 100 mm
2nd: 3,94" / 100 mm - -
- Armoured deck - multiple decks:
For and Aft decks: 2,52" / 64 mm
- Conning towers: Forward 5,91" / 150 mm, Aft 0,00" / 0 mm
Machinery:
Oil fired boilers, steam turbines,
Geared drive, 4 shafts, 61.579 shp / 45.938 Kw = 31,00 kts
Range 4.828nm at 16,00 kts
Bunker at max displacement = 1.221 tons
Complement:
449 - 584
Cost:
£4,557 million / $18,227 million
Distribution of weights at normal displacement:
Armament: 791 tons, 9,1%
- Guns: 791 tons, 9,1%
Armour: 1.897 tons, 21,9%
- Belts: 520 tons, 6,0%
- Torpedo bulkhead: 182 tons, 2,1%
- Armament: 337 tons, 3,9%
- Armour Deck: 803 tons, 9,3%
- Conning Tower: 54 tons, 0,6%
Machinery: 1.707 tons, 19,7%
Hull, fittings & equipment: 3.219 tons, 37,1%
Fuel, ammunition & stores: 1.065 tons, 12,3%
Miscellaneous weights: 0 tons, 0,0%
Overall survivability and seakeeping ability:
Survivability (Non-critical penetrating hits needed to sink ship):
10.028 lbs / 4.549 Kg = 15,0 x 11,0 " / 280 mm shells or 1,6 torpedoes
Stability (Unstable if below 1.00): 1,05
Metacentric height 2,2 ft / 0,7 m
Roll period: 15,4 seconds
Steadiness - As gun platform (Average = 50 %): 50 %
- Recoil effect (Restricted arc if above 1.00): 0,98
Seaboat quality (Average = 1.00): 1,01
Hull form characteristics:
Hull has a flush deck,
a normal bow and large transom stern
Block coefficient (normal/deep): 0,518 / 0,526
Length to Beam Ratio: 10,04 : 1
'Natural speed' for length: 26,62 kts
Power going to wave formation at top speed: 57 %
Trim (Max stability = 0, Max steadiness = 100): 50
Bow angle (Positive = bow angles forward): 30,00 degrees
Stern overhang: 0,00 ft / 0,00 m
Freeboard (% = length of deck as a percentage of waterline length):
Fore end, Aft end
- Forecastle: 20,00%, 26,02 ft / 7,93 m, 21,29 ft / 6,49 m
- Forward deck: 30,00%, 21,29 ft / 6,49 m, 16,57 ft / 5,05 m
- Aft deck: 35,00%, 16,57 ft / 5,05 m, 16,57 ft / 5,05 m
- Quarter deck: 15,00%, 16,57 ft / 5,05 m, 16,57 ft / 5,05 m
- Average freeboard: 18,60 ft / 5,67 m
Ship space, strength and comments:
Space - Hull below water (magazines/engines, low = better): 98,3%
- Above water (accommodation/working, high = better): 157,2%
Waterplane Area: 20.991 Square feet or 1.950 Square metres
Displacement factor (Displacement / loading): 103%
Structure weight / hull surface area: 113 lbs/sq ft or 550 Kg/sq metre
Hull strength (Relative):
- Cross-sectional: 0,95
- Longitudinal: 1,60
- Overall: 1,00
Adequate machinery, storage, compartmentation space
Excellent accommodation and workspace room
The terms of the treaty of Fontainebleau between Turkey and the Entente powers in February 1922, relaxed to a degree the military stipulations of the treaty of Sevres that it replaced but still denied Turkey possession of aircraft, submarines and warships larger than 10,000t in displacement. Sultan Selim Yavuz, already heavily damaged was dismantled in situ in Izmit under British supervision in 1922-24 and its guns and mountings stored away for future use.
Proposals to use the five twin 283mm turrets, for new coastal battleships similar to the Swedish Sverige class were aired several times through the 1920s, without result but it was the appearance of the Deutchland class pocket battleships that got the imagination of Turkish naval circles going. When Ansaldo with the backing of the Italian government offered to Turkey its own UP90 design for an 8,000t pocket battleship, it was an obvious step to replace the two 10in triple turrets in the original design with the available 283mm mounts to reduce cost. Three ships, Fatih, Yildirim and Turgut Reis would be built by 1939. None survived ww2, with Fatih sunk in action against cruisers Lemnos and HMS York in the battle of Karpathos strait in April 1942, Turgut Reis torpedoed and sunk by submarine Proteus and Yildirim destroyed by Soviet bombers off Batum while covering the retreat of the Turkish 3rd army from Georgia in late 1943.
Turgut Reis, Turkey Enter ship type laid down 1937
Displacement:
7.614 t light; 8.000 t standard; 8.679 t normal; 9.221 t full load
Dimensions: Length (overall / waterline) x beam x draught (normal/deep)
(561,94 ft / 546,92 ft) x 54,46 ft x (19,69 / 20,59 ft)
(171,28 m / 166,70 m) x 16,60 m x (6,00 / 6,28 m)
Armament:
4 - 11,02" / 280 mm 50,0 cal guns - 665,99lbs / 302,09kg shells, 100 per gun
Breech loading guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1937 Model
2 x 2-gun mounts on centreline ends, evenly spread
12 - 4,02" / 102 mm 40,0 cal guns - 31,03lbs / 14,08kg shells, 300 per gun
Dual purpose guns in deck and hoist mounts, 1937 Model
6 x Twin mounts on sides, evenly spread
8 - 1,57" / 40,0 mm 60,0 cal guns - 2,14lbs / 0,97kg shells, 150 per gun
Breech loading guns in deck and hoist mounts, 1937 Model
8 x Twin mounts on sides, evenly spread
16 - 0,79" / 20,0 mm 60,0 cal guns - 0,26lbs / 0,12kg shells, 600 per gun
Breech loading guns in deck mounts, 1937 Model
8 x Twin mounts on sides, evenly spread
Weight of broadside 3.058 lbs / 1.387 kg
Armour:
- Belts: Width (max) Length (avg) Height (avg)
Main: 4,02" / 102 mm 355,51 ft / 108,36 m 8,86 ft / 2,70 m
Ends: Unarmoured
Main Belt covers 100% of normal length
Main Belt inclined 15,00 degrees (positive = in)
- Torpedo Bulkhead - Strengthened structural bulkheads:
0,79" / 20 mm 355,51 ft / 108,36 m 17,62 ft / 5,37 m
Beam between torpedo bulkheads 54,46 ft / 16,60 m
- Gun armour: Face (max) Other gunhouse (avg) Barbette/hoist (max)
Main: 5,51" / 140 mm 3,35" / 85 mm 3,94" / 100 mm
2nd: 3,94" / 100 mm - -
- Armoured deck - multiple decks:
For and Aft decks: 2,52" / 64 mm
- Conning towers: Forward 5,91" / 150 mm, Aft 0,00" / 0 mm
Machinery:
Oil fired boilers, steam turbines,
Geared drive, 4 shafts, 61.579 shp / 45.938 Kw = 31,00 kts
Range 4.828nm at 16,00 kts
Bunker at max displacement = 1.221 tons
Complement:
449 - 584
Cost:
£4,557 million / $18,227 million
Distribution of weights at normal displacement:
Armament: 791 tons, 9,1%
- Guns: 791 tons, 9,1%
Armour: 1.897 tons, 21,9%
- Belts: 520 tons, 6,0%
- Torpedo bulkhead: 182 tons, 2,1%
- Armament: 337 tons, 3,9%
- Armour Deck: 803 tons, 9,3%
- Conning Tower: 54 tons, 0,6%
Machinery: 1.707 tons, 19,7%
Hull, fittings & equipment: 3.219 tons, 37,1%
Fuel, ammunition & stores: 1.065 tons, 12,3%
Miscellaneous weights: 0 tons, 0,0%
Overall survivability and seakeeping ability:
Survivability (Non-critical penetrating hits needed to sink ship):
10.028 lbs / 4.549 Kg = 15,0 x 11,0 " / 280 mm shells or 1,6 torpedoes
Stability (Unstable if below 1.00): 1,05
Metacentric height 2,2 ft / 0,7 m
Roll period: 15,4 seconds
Steadiness - As gun platform (Average = 50 %): 50 %
- Recoil effect (Restricted arc if above 1.00): 0,98
Seaboat quality (Average = 1.00): 1,01
Hull form characteristics:
Hull has a flush deck,
a normal bow and large transom stern
Block coefficient (normal/deep): 0,518 / 0,526
Length to Beam Ratio: 10,04 : 1
'Natural speed' for length: 26,62 kts
Power going to wave formation at top speed: 57 %
Trim (Max stability = 0, Max steadiness = 100): 50
Bow angle (Positive = bow angles forward): 30,00 degrees
Stern overhang: 0,00 ft / 0,00 m
Freeboard (% = length of deck as a percentage of waterline length):
Fore end, Aft end
- Forecastle: 20,00%, 26,02 ft / 7,93 m, 21,29 ft / 6,49 m
- Forward deck: 30,00%, 21,29 ft / 6,49 m, 16,57 ft / 5,05 m
- Aft deck: 35,00%, 16,57 ft / 5,05 m, 16,57 ft / 5,05 m
- Quarter deck: 15,00%, 16,57 ft / 5,05 m, 16,57 ft / 5,05 m
- Average freeboard: 18,60 ft / 5,67 m
Ship space, strength and comments:
Space - Hull below water (magazines/engines, low = better): 98,3%
- Above water (accommodation/working, high = better): 157,2%
Waterplane Area: 20.991 Square feet or 1.950 Square metres
Displacement factor (Displacement / loading): 103%
Structure weight / hull surface area: 113 lbs/sq ft or 550 Kg/sq metre
Hull strength (Relative):
- Cross-sectional: 0,95
- Longitudinal: 1,60
- Overall: 1,00
Adequate machinery, storage, compartmentation space
Excellent accommodation and workspace room
How effective were rear-deck helicopter cruisers and destroyers? I'm considering the use of a helicopter cruiser with area air defense capabilities to use at the center of an ocean escort group. It would probably be about 12,000 to 15,000 tons with an Aegis or Aegis-like battle management system and maybe 80 or so VLS cells for long-range SAMs; the back half of the ship would have space for something like six SH-60s or four of some sort of larger helicopter. I've seen references to a 12,500 ton command and ASW cruiser that was conceptualized for the British Invincible-class program; does anybody have any information about that?
Considering the utility of actual fixed-wing aircraft in convoy protection roles, would a better option be some sort of 15,000 ton "through-deck cruiser" and offloading the area air defense role to another ship? My focus here is primarily on rear-deck helicopter cruisers like the Italian Vittorio Veneto and the Soviet Moskva-class ships to combine air defense and ASW helicopter capabilities. Basing my assessments simply on the number of these ships in service and the roles they were used for, the rear-deck helicopter cruiser-style ships seem to have been broadly replaced by larger full-deck helicopter carriers; however, these ships are not capable of area air defense.
Considering the utility of actual fixed-wing aircraft in convoy protection roles, would a better option be some sort of 15,000 ton "through-deck cruiser" and offloading the area air defense role to another ship? My focus here is primarily on rear-deck helicopter cruisers like the Italian Vittorio Veneto and the Soviet Moskva-class ships to combine air defense and ASW helicopter capabilities. Basing my assessments simply on the number of these ships in service and the roles they were used for, the rear-deck helicopter cruiser-style ships seem to have been broadly replaced by larger full-deck helicopter carriers; however, these ships are not capable of area air defense.
McPherson
Banned
Modernized Tone? Might want to scale back the missile load. A Zumwalt or a Tycho carries that size of missile battery and they are overloaded as is. Through deck ships are usually all aviation as the heavy SAM/SSM missile battery interferes with flight operations. Split the roles or settle for half measures.
RamscoopRaider
Donor
I'd argue that the Helicopter cruiser was more doctrinally replaced by a greater number of Helicopter carrying destroyers and frigates carrying 1-2 helos each. The full deck helicopter carriers are, with the exception of the Italian and Japanese ships, all primarily amphibious assault ships (they have this as a secondary role), with any ASW ability second to using helicopters to land and support ground forces
I'd argue just buy helo equipped DDGs with a few big deck amphibs to backstop if you really need all those extra helos and some VTOLS in wartime, outside that you'd be doing a lot more amphibious operations than ASW
What is a Tycho?
A hypothetical escort group with four large frigates (~7,000 tons) would already have between four and eight ASW helicopters before you even include any other ships. I'm already planning separate amphibious forces, so these ships would be used exclusively for escort roles. Without the helicopter cruisers, the alternative is an air defense cruiser with two helicopters, so the group would probably have a total of eight ASW helicopters.
Would there be utility for a larger ASW helicopter like an SV-22 to supplement Seahawk-sized ASW helicopters on the frigates? An Osprey would require a larger ship, but that might be too much for a cruiser to handle.
Considering an AEGIS with 2 helis comes at close to 10000, what you want would run at around 15000 minimum, I think. As for efectivness, the italians and french were quite satisfied with their heli cruisers.
RamscoopRaider
Donor
Thing is why do you need a separate ASW carrier? Just build extra run of your amphibs, in peacetime they'd be far more useful, and you can switch out as needed for more operational and strategic flexibility. You want an umbrella air defense ship anyways and that should not also be carrying a huge chunk of the task force ASW capability as it will be the ship broadcasting a big huge "shoot me" signature from its radar
There would be some utility in pushing out the ASW perimeter for a tiltrotor, but is it worth a much bigger ship is the question
That DDG-51 has 96 cells, I think there was a plan for a DDG-51 variant with 6-8 Helos and 64 VLS cells on about 10,000 tons, certainly you could do it on 12,000 tons