According to a Military Review magazine article, the three candidate points for
an amphibious descent on Korea for the UN forces at the end of summer 1950 were Inchon, Kunsan
(in southwest Korea, and the favorite of most observers) and Chinampo,
the port serving Pyongyang. Chinampo is most often annotated simply as "Nampo" on maps today.
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The pros and cons of Chinampo have not been compared as directly as the Inchon versus Kunsan options. The historic debate between MacArthur and the JCS mainly fixated on Kunsan versus Inchon, but Inchon was what happened historically, and I'm not interested in discussing the ostensibly more cautious Kunsan alternative idea for now.
Let's say MacArthur is hot for going to Chinampo & exploiting into Pyongyang, instead of the historical one-two punch of landing in Inchon, and exploiting into Seoul. The Chinampo option really just quickly becomes his favorite, and he becomes dismissive of alternatives. He basically uses all the same historic arguments in favor of Inchon, the surprise factor, audacity, strategic-level dislocation of the enemy's rear, in arguing for Chinampo, and all the same as historical arguments against Kunsan (the North Koreans can pivot to react to and contain a landing in strength, possibly just leaving UN forces with a second Pusan perimeter, at best, helping push the North Koreans back on to their supply zone)
MacArthur gets ultimate deference at this stage as theater commander, but other military chiefs are prepared to say "I told you so." if it fails.
So, the landing is prepared for Korea's northwest coast. It is set for September 15th, coinciding, like OTL's Inchon offensive, with a build-up in the Pusan perimeter which actually more than matched the surrounding North Korean forces, and a UN counter-attack and break-out from the perimeter.
Is Chinampo successfully seized between September 15-September 19 by the US force that historically went to Inchon, matching the real-world Inchon schedule?
If not, why not?
Assuming the US forces are not extra tangled up in Chinampo, or repelled from the beaches, wharves, seawalls, etc., what happens next is just as important. Do the US-UN-ROK forces exploit inland in the weeks ahead to conquer Pyongyang, just in the real history, they exploited inland to liberate Seoul? In real history, US-UN-ROK forces liberated Seoul on September 28th, one day shy of two weeks after the Inchon landing of Sep 15th. [and incidentally, the 28th was 3 full weeks before the real world US-UN-ROK capture of Pyongyang on Oct. 19th].
If we treat all combat conditions between Chinampo and Pyongyang as roughly equal to those between Inchon and Seoul [which they would be, in terms of the invading UN force], and adjust for what we know to be different - basically Pyongyang is a bit further from the port, half again, or possibly twice as far as Seoul is, I think an extra week for the UN allies to take Pyongyang on October 5th is a fair rough estimate. This is admitting the unknown factors of differences in strength between available North Korean regular and paramilitary and militia forces and fixed fortifications in the Seoul versus Pyongyang areas, and the impact of a probably more acquiescent to North Korean regime civil population around Pyongyang, than around North Korean occupied Seoul.
But, in considering all this, not all factors may be equal in comparing odds of success between the Inchon-Seoul plan versus the Chinampo-Pyongyang plan:
Pro's Chinampo-Pyongyang compared to Inchon-Seoul:
- Hits North Korean political center of gravity
- Does more than any other options to decively cripple North Korean
sources of power
- Leaves US/UN forces with greater ability to catch any Pyongyang
regime officials fleeing into the hinterland
- Makes for a very non-permissive environment for deployment of PRC or
Soviet forces in northern Korea
- Cuts off NKPA ultimate sources of supply and command
- Inchon had nasty tides, tidal flats and seawalls. Maybe Chinampo's
an easier landing area (info gap), with fewer mobile forces streaming through.
-likely fewer mobile enemy forces streaming through, even harder for NKPA to
try to solve anything with a retrograde movement from battlefields deep in South Korea
-The Chinese are much less prepared to intervene at this point, they
are forced to decide to intervene, or hopefully not, earlier. If they rush an intervention, it is with a smaller force, less trained for this particular campaign, against UN forces that have not marched as far.
Con's of Chinampo-Pyongyang compared to Inchon-Seoul:
-The allied invasion armada and reconnaissance flights and naval sorties right before it require additional time to steam up further north into the gulf of Korea, where North Korea ground observers, aircraft and limited numbers of boats and fishermen who get debriefed are operating. Not sure how many additional hours compared with Inchon (6 to 12?) . There may be more chance for the North Koreans (or Chinese, or Soviet shipping/aircraft operating from Port Arthur or Dairen) to observe, report and relay an actionable tactical warning to North Korean defenders at Chinampo, compared with Inchon further south.
-North Korea, which once feared ROK invasion, may have better
prepared fixed fortifications, static garrison forces and solid
contingency plans for defending Chinampo and the capital prepared to
what it has improvised for the newly conquered Seoul-Inchon area
-It will take much longer to unite forces landing in Chinampo with
forces breaking out from Pusan, and it will take longer to liberate
South Korean population centers and to enlarge ROK forces and shove
them north to reinforce USMC and US Army, compared to OTL. There will be a slight time delay before the more mutually distant fronts begin to affect each other.
-The Chinese can still intervene in some strength, maybe it is enough
for their purposes against US/UN forces that are geographically harder
to reinforce.
Now, *if* the military operational success of a whole, multi-week US Chinampo-Pyongyang campaign ends up matching, basically, the success of the real-world Inchon-Seoul campaign, it seems to me this could "set" some advantages for the US-UN-ROK side that apply to a longer Korean war, relative to the real world Korean War, even if it does not preempt or prevent Chinese intervention entirely.
Even more of the historical North Korean early war army, officialdom, and possibly even some high-level political leadership has the potential to be "bagged" by Allied forces, even if Chinese forces intervene and push Allied forces back from the Yalu.
The Chinese, either intervening earlier, with less than historic strength and preparation, to keep up with the rapid Allied advance to Pyongyang and then the Yalu, and destruction of North Korean forces, or intervening at the historic time, with historic strength, but having allowed the UN-ROK position to consolidate more, should end up disadvantaged by this. While complacency should still let them push Allied forces back from the Chinese border itself, possibly even allow Chinese forces to seize Pyongyang for the Communist side, a weakened Chinese offensive is unlikely to prevent the Allies from regaining their compsure long enough that they are pushed south of the 38th parallel, or lose Seoul again. This should keep the South Koreans stronger and the North Koreans weaker for the whole war, and may motivate the Americans to aim for a ceasefire line well north of the 38th parallel, near Pyongyang, just north of it, or a little further north at the peninsular "waist", and make that goal achievable.
an amphibious descent on Korea for the UN forces at the end of summer 1950 were Inchon, Kunsan
(in southwest Korea, and the favorite of most observers) and Chinampo,
the port serving Pyongyang. Chinampo is most often annotated simply as "Nampo" on maps today.
North Korea, South Korea political map with capitals Pyongyang and Seoul. Korean peninsula, national borders, important cities Stock Photo - Alamy
Download this stock image: North Korea, South Korea political map with capitals Pyongyang and Seoul. Korean peninsula, national borders, important cities. - FA3JR4 from Alamy's library of millions of high resolution stock photos, illustrations and vectors.
www.alamy.com
The pros and cons of Chinampo have not been compared as directly as the Inchon versus Kunsan options. The historic debate between MacArthur and the JCS mainly fixated on Kunsan versus Inchon, but Inchon was what happened historically, and I'm not interested in discussing the ostensibly more cautious Kunsan alternative idea for now.
Let's say MacArthur is hot for going to Chinampo & exploiting into Pyongyang, instead of the historical one-two punch of landing in Inchon, and exploiting into Seoul. The Chinampo option really just quickly becomes his favorite, and he becomes dismissive of alternatives. He basically uses all the same historic arguments in favor of Inchon, the surprise factor, audacity, strategic-level dislocation of the enemy's rear, in arguing for Chinampo, and all the same as historical arguments against Kunsan (the North Koreans can pivot to react to and contain a landing in strength, possibly just leaving UN forces with a second Pusan perimeter, at best, helping push the North Koreans back on to their supply zone)
MacArthur gets ultimate deference at this stage as theater commander, but other military chiefs are prepared to say "I told you so." if it fails.
So, the landing is prepared for Korea's northwest coast. It is set for September 15th, coinciding, like OTL's Inchon offensive, with a build-up in the Pusan perimeter which actually more than matched the surrounding North Korean forces, and a UN counter-attack and break-out from the perimeter.
Is Chinampo successfully seized between September 15-September 19 by the US force that historically went to Inchon, matching the real-world Inchon schedule?
If not, why not?
Assuming the US forces are not extra tangled up in Chinampo, or repelled from the beaches, wharves, seawalls, etc., what happens next is just as important. Do the US-UN-ROK forces exploit inland in the weeks ahead to conquer Pyongyang, just in the real history, they exploited inland to liberate Seoul? In real history, US-UN-ROK forces liberated Seoul on September 28th, one day shy of two weeks after the Inchon landing of Sep 15th. [and incidentally, the 28th was 3 full weeks before the real world US-UN-ROK capture of Pyongyang on Oct. 19th].
If we treat all combat conditions between Chinampo and Pyongyang as roughly equal to those between Inchon and Seoul [which they would be, in terms of the invading UN force], and adjust for what we know to be different - basically Pyongyang is a bit further from the port, half again, or possibly twice as far as Seoul is, I think an extra week for the UN allies to take Pyongyang on October 5th is a fair rough estimate. This is admitting the unknown factors of differences in strength between available North Korean regular and paramilitary and militia forces and fixed fortifications in the Seoul versus Pyongyang areas, and the impact of a probably more acquiescent to North Korean regime civil population around Pyongyang, than around North Korean occupied Seoul.
But, in considering all this, not all factors may be equal in comparing odds of success between the Inchon-Seoul plan versus the Chinampo-Pyongyang plan:
Pro's Chinampo-Pyongyang compared to Inchon-Seoul:
- Hits North Korean political center of gravity
- Does more than any other options to decively cripple North Korean
sources of power
- Leaves US/UN forces with greater ability to catch any Pyongyang
regime officials fleeing into the hinterland
- Makes for a very non-permissive environment for deployment of PRC or
Soviet forces in northern Korea
- Cuts off NKPA ultimate sources of supply and command
- Inchon had nasty tides, tidal flats and seawalls. Maybe Chinampo's
an easier landing area (info gap), with fewer mobile forces streaming through.
-likely fewer mobile enemy forces streaming through, even harder for NKPA to
try to solve anything with a retrograde movement from battlefields deep in South Korea
-The Chinese are much less prepared to intervene at this point, they
are forced to decide to intervene, or hopefully not, earlier. If they rush an intervention, it is with a smaller force, less trained for this particular campaign, against UN forces that have not marched as far.
Con's of Chinampo-Pyongyang compared to Inchon-Seoul:
-The allied invasion armada and reconnaissance flights and naval sorties right before it require additional time to steam up further north into the gulf of Korea, where North Korea ground observers, aircraft and limited numbers of boats and fishermen who get debriefed are operating. Not sure how many additional hours compared with Inchon (6 to 12?) . There may be more chance for the North Koreans (or Chinese, or Soviet shipping/aircraft operating from Port Arthur or Dairen) to observe, report and relay an actionable tactical warning to North Korean defenders at Chinampo, compared with Inchon further south.
-North Korea, which once feared ROK invasion, may have better
prepared fixed fortifications, static garrison forces and solid
contingency plans for defending Chinampo and the capital prepared to
what it has improvised for the newly conquered Seoul-Inchon area
-It will take much longer to unite forces landing in Chinampo with
forces breaking out from Pusan, and it will take longer to liberate
South Korean population centers and to enlarge ROK forces and shove
them north to reinforce USMC and US Army, compared to OTL. There will be a slight time delay before the more mutually distant fronts begin to affect each other.
-The Chinese can still intervene in some strength, maybe it is enough
for their purposes against US/UN forces that are geographically harder
to reinforce.
Now, *if* the military operational success of a whole, multi-week US Chinampo-Pyongyang campaign ends up matching, basically, the success of the real-world Inchon-Seoul campaign, it seems to me this could "set" some advantages for the US-UN-ROK side that apply to a longer Korean war, relative to the real world Korean War, even if it does not preempt or prevent Chinese intervention entirely.
Even more of the historical North Korean early war army, officialdom, and possibly even some high-level political leadership has the potential to be "bagged" by Allied forces, even if Chinese forces intervene and push Allied forces back from the Yalu.
The Chinese, either intervening earlier, with less than historic strength and preparation, to keep up with the rapid Allied advance to Pyongyang and then the Yalu, and destruction of North Korean forces, or intervening at the historic time, with historic strength, but having allowed the UN-ROK position to consolidate more, should end up disadvantaged by this. While complacency should still let them push Allied forces back from the Chinese border itself, possibly even allow Chinese forces to seize Pyongyang for the Communist side, a weakened Chinese offensive is unlikely to prevent the Allies from regaining their compsure long enough that they are pushed south of the 38th parallel, or lose Seoul again. This should keep the South Koreans stronger and the North Koreans weaker for the whole war, and may motivate the Americans to aim for a ceasefire line well north of the 38th parallel, near Pyongyang, just north of it, or a little further north at the peninsular "waist", and make that goal achievable.
